European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards a gradual roll-out of Eudamed, information obligation in case of interruption of supply and the transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices (COM(2024)0043 – C9-0010/2024 – 2024/0021(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0043),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 and Article 168(4), point (c), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0010/2024),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 20 March 2024(1),

–  after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

–  having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 21 February 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 25 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards a gradual roll-out of Eudamed, the obligation to inform in case of interruption or discontinuation of supply, and transitional provisions for certain in vitro diagnostic medical devices

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1860.)

(1) Not yet published in the Official Journal.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev (2024/2698(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0369 RC-B9-0227/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its repression of civil society, activists and the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media, through detentions and judicial harassment; whereas civil society organisations currently list nearly 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan; whereas Freedom House’s 2024 Freedom in the World index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

B.  whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life;

C.  whereas Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; whereas he is facing up to 12 years in prison;

1.  Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

2.  Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals;

3.  Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent non-governmental organisations and media to the margins of the law;

4.  Considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s preparations to host COP29; demands that the organisers ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms and effective civil society participation are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement;

5.  Calls on the Commission to consider suspending the strategic partnership with Azerbaijan in the field of energy; insists on making any future partnership agreement conditional on the release of all political prisoners and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country;

6.  Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

7.  Reiterates its call for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia (2024/2699(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0370 RC-B9-0228/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Samoa Agreement,

–  having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

–  having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Maputo Protocol and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,

–  having regard to Sustainable Development Goal 5, aiming for the global eradication of female genital mutilation (FGM) by 2030,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the landmark Women’s (Amendment) Act of 2015 in The Gambia bans FMG, making it punishable by up to three years in prison;

B.  whereas on 18 March 2024, a proposed law to repeal the ban passed the second reading in the Gambian Parliament and has now been referred to a parliamentary committee that will take at least three months to examine it before returning to parliament for a third and final review;

C.  whereas The Gambia risks being the first country in the world to reverse legal protection against FGM; whereas this risks encouraging a similar weakening of the rights of women and girls in the region;

D.  whereas FGM is a grave violation of human rights and discrimination against girls and women; whereas it is not justified by any religion or culture, is an abusive, exploitative and harmful practice with severe consequences including irreparable physical, psychological, reproductive and sexual health damage, and can lead to death; whereas it prevents women and girls from reaching their full potential and participating in society;

E.  whereas The Gambia has among the highest prevalence of FGM in the world, and according to UNICEF, 76 % of Gambian women aged 15-49 have been circumcised; whereas over 230 million girls and women worldwide are affected by FGM;

1.  Urges the Gambian Parliament to demonstrate its commitment to international human rights law and multiple international and regional agreements to which The Gambia is a signatory, to protect the rights of women and girls, and therefore to reject the proposal and uphold the criminalisation of FGM;

2.  Urges the Gambian Government to strengthen its efforts to prevent and eliminate FGM through robust enforcement measures and awareness and education efforts to address its root causes; invites the Gambian Government to engage with international partners, notably the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on the Elimination of FGM;

3.  Stands ready to support the government and civil society organisations in community engagement, including with religious, traditional and community leaders, in combating FGM, and to support survivors and women’s rights defenders;

4.  Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to urgently and systematically address the issue of FGM with the Gambian authorities in coordination with international partners;

5.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the Gambian authorities and the African Union.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John (2024/2700(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0371 RC-B9-0238/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 19 March 2024, the Hong Kong (HK) Legislative Council passed the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), based on Article 23 of the HK Basic Law; whereas the SNSO expands the National Security Law (NSL) imposed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and authorises even more radical infringements of basic freedoms and liberties, in breach of the Sino-British and Sino-Portuguese Declarations, the one country, two systems principle, and international human rights obligations;

B.  whereas Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities; whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has expressed concerns;

C.  whereas the case of Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; whereas John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment;

D.  whereas Polish national Aleksandra Bielakowska, who intended to attend Lai’s trial, was detained upon arrival in HK, interrogated and deported;

1.  Strongly condemns the SNSO’s adoption, which erases the last vestiges of fundamental freedoms in HK; is appalled at the shutting down of pro-democracy political forces, civil society and news outlets and the arrest of over 200 people since the NSL’s adoption; urges the PRC and HK to repeal the NSL and the SNSO;

2.  Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

3.  Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists;

4.  Is alarmed that the SNSO significantly impacts the work of the EU’s Office and the Member States’ Consulates-General, and EU citizens, organisations and companies in HK;

5.  Urges the Council to review its 2020 Conclusions on HK and adopt sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Chief Executive John Lee and all HK and PRC officials responsible for the crackdown on freedoms in HK;

6.  Denounces obstructions to trial monitoring and stresses the prioritisation of adequate support to and reporting of relevant trial observation and human rights monitoring, including the establishment of focal points for human rights defenders, in coordination with like-minded partners;

7.  Is concerned at the SNSO’s extraterritoriality and retroactivity applying worldwide; condemns the targeting of EU-based HK diaspora and of Beijing-critical politicians and public figures; urges the Member States to suspend extradition treaties with the PRC and HK and to introduce lifeboat schemes for at-risk HK activists and journalists;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the other EU institutions, the Government and Parliament of the PRC, the Hong Kong Chief Executive and Legislative Council, and the EU Office in Hong Kong.

European Parliament decision of 25 April 2024 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Committee of the Regions, establishing an Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards for Members of Institutions and advisory bodies mentioned in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union (2024/2008(ACI))

P9_TA(2024)0372 A9-0181/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Conference of Presidents' decisions of 14 and 19 March 2024, endorsing the draft interinstitutional Agreement establishing an Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards for Members of Institutions and advisory bodies mentioned in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the European Court of Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Committee of the Regions, establishing an Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards for Members of Institutions and advisory bodies mentioned in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union (the ‘Agreement’),

–  having regard to Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union,

–  having regard to Article 232 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the communication from the Commission of 8 June 2023 on a proposal for an interinstitutional ethics body and the annexes thereto (COM(2023)0311),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on strengthening transparency and integrity in the EU institutions by setting up an independent EU ethics body(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on suspicions of corruption from Qatar and the broader need for transparency and accountability in the European institutions(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2023 on the establishment of an independent EU ethics body(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 16 February 2023 on following up on measures requested by Parliament to strengthen the integrity of the European institutions(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 July 2023 on the establishment of the EU ethics body(5),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption(6),

–  having regard to Rule 148(1) of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A9-0181/2024),

A.  whereas the independence, transparency and accountability of EU institutions are of the utmost importance for their democratic legitimacy and for fostering citizens’ trust; whereas the European Parliament today ranks amongst the most transparent legislatures in the world;

B.  whereas there is a need to address the shortcomings stemming from the current ethics framework, which is fragmented across the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with different rules, procedures and levels of enforcement;

C.  whereas Parliament proposed, in its resolution of 16 September 2021(7), and reiterated, in its subsequent resolutions of 16 February 2023(8) and 12 July 2023(9), to set up an ambitious, genuine and independent ethics body;

D.  whereas the Commission presented its proposal for the establishment of an interinstitutional ethics body on 8 June 2023, putting forward a standard-setting body; whereas that Commission proposal fell far short of the ambition put forward in Parliament’s resolutions, mainly lacking in capacity to examine individual cases and potential breaches of ethical rules as well as to recommend sanctions;

E.  whereas Parliament’s resolutions of 16 February 2023(10) and of 12 July 2023(11) served as the Parliament’s negotiating mandate;

F.  whereas an interinstitutional ethics body will contribute to strengthening trust in Union institutions and their democratic legitimacy, as well as to building an institutional culture based on the highest ethical standards;

G.  whereas Parliament’s current ethical rules in its Rules of procedure provide for many standardised written declarations including declarations of private interests, declarations of assets, declarations on awareness of conflict of interests for office holders, rapporteurs, shadow-rapporteurs and participants in an official delegation or interinstitutional negotiations, declarations of scheduled meetings with interest representatives, also when delegated to their assistants, declarations of input by the rapporteurs on their files, declarations of attendance at events organised by third parties, declarations of gifts and declarations of intergroups or unofficial groupings on external financial support;

1.  Welcomes the Agreement enabling the development of strong common ethical standards and the exchange of best practices, and allowing for individual cases to be examined by the independent experts at the request of an institution or an advisory body that is a party to the Agreement regarding any declaration of their Members;

2.  Underlines the fact that the final decision-making power on implementation remains with the relevant authorities of the institutions or bodies; notes that any consultation of the independent experts on an individual case begins with a request as regards its own members of a party to the Agreement in accordance with its internal rules; underlines that the declarations of financial interests of the Commissioners-designate, as high level cases transcending the interests of the institution concerned, should as a rule be subject to examination by the independent experts;

3.  Reiterates, however, that Parliament remains fully committed to an independent ethics body, capable of carrying out investigations on its own initiative and issuing recommendations for sanctions to the responsible authorities of the participating institutions or bodies, composed of independent experts as full members, that covers Members of EU institutions and bodies before, during and after their term of office or service as well as staff, as envisaged in Parliament’s resolution of 16 September 2021(12) and reiterated in its resolutions of 16 February 2023(13) and of 12 July 2023(14);

4.  Regrets that the European Council decided not to join the Agreement;

5.  Regrets the unwillingness of the Council to extend the scope of the Agreement to at least the representatives at ministerial level of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council, by arguing that there is no legal basis in the Treaties to adopt common minimum standards applying to the representatives of Member States; commits to use the first review of the Agreement to address this legal gap and calls, in the meantime, on the upcoming Council Presidencies to voluntarily apply its provisions; is of the opinion that Members of the Council, like Members of the European Parliament, could be bound by the rules set by the Council pursuant to its power of self-organisation, which would prevail in the event of a conflict with national rules; underlines, in this context, that representatives of the Member States gathered in the Council act in their capacity as Members of the Council when adopting EU legal acts; commits to seeking a legal clarification as to whether the Council could bind its Members by common minimum standards;

6.  Takes the view that the resources made available must enable the proper functioning of both the interinstitutional body for ethical standards (the ‘Body’) itself composed of one representative of each party to the Agreement and the five independent experts assisting the institutional representatives and joining the Body as observers, as well as any necessary support therefor; regrets that according to Article 17 of the Agreement, any cost resulting from a consultation of the independent experts is to be covered by the requesting party, as this might result in a limitation of the number of such consultations;

7.  Is of the opinion that the independent experts, who are to be appointed by consensus of the parties to the Agreement, need to have professional experience specifically in the areas of ethics, integrity and transparency, in addition to the requirements outlined in Article 5(2) of the Agreement referring to an impeccable record of professional behaviour and experience in high-level functions in European, national, or international public organisations;

8.  Emphasises the essential role of the independent experts in examining individual cases at the request of a party to the Agreement; is of the opinion that each party sending a small random sample of cases to the independent experts would be highly beneficial for the purpose of developing or updating an ethical standard;

9.  Believes the Body should rely on the existing powers of institutions to ask their members for information or on the agreement of national authorities to share information; believes that the independent experts should be able to exchange information with national authorities where necessary for the performance of their tasks, while treating such information with the same confidentiality as the originating authority did; stresses in this regard that the independent experts should have access to the administrative documents of participating parties, especially the party consulting them on a case, in order to allow them to carry out well-reasoned and well-documented assessments;

10.  Notes that the independent experts shall designate a speaker from amongst them; takes the view that the independent experts should have full autonomy in organising their work, as well as in convening their own meetings;

11.  Believes that the reasoned recommendation of the independent experts, without prejudice to the General Data Protection Regulation and personal rights, should be made public by the institution or advisory body, together with the decision of the competent authority who should provide an explanation if the recommendations are not fully followed;

12.  Calls for the Body to lead by example on transparency by publishing all recommendations, annual reports, decisions and records of spending in a machine-readable open data format available to all citizens, and in accordance with the applicable data protection rules, including, inter alia, the written opinion of the independent experts on the institutions’ self-assessments in accordance with Article 10 of the Agreement and the anonymised and aggregated annual account of every year which summarises in aggregated and anonymised form the consultations and questions submitted by the parties and actions to follow them up in accordance with Article 7(4) of the Agreement; underscores the importance of protecting the privacy of the individuals concerned to an appropriate extent and the presumption of innocence; calls on the parties to the Agreement to develop common guidance for the consultation of the independent experts and the publication of their recommendations;

13.  Believes that, in order to be fully effective, the Body would need to combine the functions of existing organs responsible for ethics and that therefore, for cases which require specific consideration or for the purpose of developing or updating an ethical standard each participating party should consult the independent experts;

14.  Stresses the need to define how the mandate of the Vice-President representing Parliament in the Body will be determined and to put in place appropriate accountability mechanisms;

15.  Considers it necessary to clarify who would be the Parliament’s alternate representative in the Body;

16.  Considers that the Committee on Constitutional Affairs should play a role in determining the mandate of the Vice-President representing Parliament in the Body, as well as in holding the Vice-President and the alternate representative accountable; considers it of the utmost importance that Members of the European Parliament have a say in the development of standards that will be binding on them;

17.  Remains committed to constructively engaging in the review of the Agreement which is to be conducted three years after its entry into force in order to improve and enhance the Body, as provided for in Article 21 of the Agreement;

18.  Recalls its position that the Body should be able to investigate on its own initiative alleged breaches of ethical rules by officials and staff of EU institutions and to conduct on-the-spot and records-based investigations using the information that it has collected or that it has received from third parties;

19.  Approves the conclusion of the Agreement annexed hereto;

20.  Instructs its President to sign the Agreement with the President of the Council, the President of the Commission, the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the President of the European Central Bank, the President of the Court of Auditors, the President of the European Economic and Social Committee and the President of the Committee of the Regions and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this decision, including its annex, to all the parties to the Agreement for information.

ANNEX

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, ESTABLISHING AN INTERINSTITUTIONAL BODY FOR ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR MEMBERS OF INSTITUTIONS AND ADVISORY BODIES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 13 OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

(The text of this annex is not reproduced here since it corresponds to the interinstitutional agreement as published in OJ L, 2024/1365, 17.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2024/1365/oj.)

(1) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 159. (2) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 109. (3) OJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 31. (4) OJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 27. (5) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0281. (6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0292. (7) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 159. (8) OJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 31. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0281. (10) OJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 27 and p. 31. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0281. (12) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 159. (13) OJ C 283, 11.8.2023, p. 31. (14) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0281.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2025 (2023/2221(BUI))

P9_TA(2024)0373 A9-0180/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014 and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(1),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027(2), and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context(3) and the related unilateral declarations(4),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5),

–  having regard to its interim report of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027(6),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(7),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(8) (MFF revision),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 May 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(9),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union(10),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 April 2023 on Parliament’s estimates of revenue and expenditure for the financial year 2024(11),

–  having regard to its resolution of 18 October 2023 on the Council position on the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024(12),

–  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024(13) and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

–  having regard to the Secretary-General’s report to the Bureau on drawing up Parliament’s preliminary draft estimates for the financial year 2025,

–  having regard to the preliminary draft estimates drawn up by the Bureau on 11 March 2024 pursuant to Rules 25(7) and 102(1) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the draft estimates drawn up by the Committee on Budgets pursuant to Rule 102(2) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to Rule 102 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0180/2024),

A.  whereas the budget proposed on 26 February 2024 by the Secretary-General for Parliament’s preliminary draft estimates for 2025 amounts to EUR 2 507 233 329 and represents an increase of 5,21 % or EUR 124 132 017 compared to 2024 budget;

B.  whereas the Commission forecasts the EU inflation rate to be 3 % in 2024 and 2,5 % in 2025 in its Winter 2024 (Interim) Forecast; whereas the level of expenditure in Heading 7 of the MFF 2021-2027 is based on a 2 % yearly increase;

C.  whereas the credibility of the Parliament depends on its ability to deliver on its core budgetary, legislative and scrutiny work to the highest standard, while setting an example vis-à-vis other Union institutions to plan and conduct its spending prudently and efficiently and to reflect the prevalent economic realities;

D.  whereas 2025 will be the first full year after the elections and there will therefore be a return to the normal pace of core political and support activities;

E.  whereas the Parliament finalised its deep reform process started last year to, on one hand review its internal working methods making parliamentary work more efficient, and on the other hand to strengthen its institutional role leading to a better functioning Parliament as co-legislator, as arm of the budgetary authority, as discharge authority and increasing its capacity to exercise democratic oversight;

General framework

1.  Is concerned with the situation of Heading 7 in the current MFF; recalls that the constraints are the results of the cuts applied by the Council to the Commission’s already very low initial proposal when agreeing on the current MFF 2021-2027; regrets the Council’s opposition to the Commission’s proposal to increase the ceiling of Heading 7 in the MFF revision as from 2024; points out the failure to address the issue of the ceiling of Heading 7 in the MFF revision; highlights that the forecasted negative margin for 2025 presupposes the use of special instruments in Heading 7 for that purpose;

2.  Recalls that almost two-thirds of the budget is fixed by statutory obligations; recalls that the salary indexation, in line with the Staff Regulations and Statute for Members of the European Parliament, is currently forecasted by the Commission for July 2024, April 2025 and July 2025 at 5,3 %, 0,6 % and 3,7 % respectively; notes that the 2024 budget includes a salary indexation of 3,4 % as from July 2024; notes that the Committee on Budgets will monitor the official forecasted evolution of the salary indexation;

3.  Endorses the agreement reached in the Conciliation between the Bureau and the Committee on Budgets on 9 April 2024 to set the increase over the 2024 budget at 4,87 %, corresponding to an overall level of estimates of EUR 2 499 233 329 for 2025, and to reduce accordingly the appropriations proposed on the following budget lines for a total of EUR 11 000 000:

2 0 0 0 — Rent, 2 0 0 7 — Construction of buildings and fitting-out of premises, 2 3 9 0 — EMAS and sustainability activities, including promotion, and the European Parliament’s carbon offsetting scheme, 3 2 4 2 — Expenditure on publication, information and participation in public events, 3 2 4 3 — European Parliament visitor centres, 1 0 1 — Contingency reserve;

furthermore, decides to increase the level of expenditure of the preliminary draft estimates approved by the Bureau on 11 March 2024 by EUR 3 000 000 and to increase accordingly the appropriations proposed on the following budget lines:

3 2 4 4 — Organisation and reception of groups of visitors, Euroscola programme and invitations to opinion multipliers from third countries; 4 0 3 — Funding of European political foundations;

4.  Notes that out of the increase of EUR 116 million compared to the 2024 budget an increase of EUR 98 million is due to statutory obligations, mainly for salary updates for staff (EUR 54,7 million) and parliamentary assistance related expenditure (EUR 33,2 million); notes that the increase for non-statutory expenses between 2024 and 2025 does not exceed 2 %;

5.  Notes that the Parliament does not request any additional posts for 2025;

6.  Notes that the 98 permanent posts created in the 2023 budget to facilitate the application of Article 29(4) of the Staff Regulation have been removed from the 2025 establishment plan;

Visitors groups and Europa Experiences

7.  Recalls that visitors groups in all the places of work of the Parliament represent an important tool for Members to connect with constituents and to demonstrate their parliamentary work to constituents; highlights that visitors groups contribute to promoting the role of the Parliament to voters throughout the Union;

8.  Notes with concern the increasing difficulties of arranging such visits due to the financial limitations of the existing budget, particularly for Members from Member States that are geographically far from Brussels and Strasbourg; calls for sufficient funding to cover expenses related to travel and accommodation, taking into account the inflation rates and prices, both in the countries of origin of the visitor groups and Brussels and Strasbourg; believes that a 10 % increase in the per-person allocation is necessary to address the prevailing conditions; calls the Secretary-General to propose to the Quaestors as soon as possible an increase of the ceilings for the costs covered to continue and enhance Members’ support in enabling visitors groups to visit the Parliament;

9.  Notes with concern the internal rules governing MEP visitor groups, which result in 30 % of the up-front costs having to be incurred by Accredited Parliamentary Assistants (APAs) in some circumstances; stresses the impracticability of these rules and the financial burden this places on APAs; calls on the Bureau to review and update its existing rules governing visits to overcome difficulties in the planning and organization of visits;

10.  Recalls the Bureau decision of 25 November 2019 to establish Europa Experience centres in all Members States by the end of 2024; regrets the delays in establishing Europa Experiences in all Member States before the 2024 Parliament elections and notes that currently only 12 are in operation; recognises that a number of external factors, including the volatility of real estate markets, have contributed to these delays;

11.  Takes note that five centres are planned to be opened in 2025 (in Athens, Zagreb, The Hague, Sofia and Budapest); calls for the establishment of Europa Experiences in all Member States as soon as possible; recalls that Europa Experiences should allow all citizens to have a better understanding of the functioning of the Union institutions;

Infrastructure

12.  Takes note that the Committee on Budgets approved the Bureau’s decision to carry out a profound renovation of the SPAAK building, in line with its resolution of 19 October 2022 on the Council position on the draft general budget of the European Union for financial year 2023(14); stresses that the current building has a very low energy efficiency rating and lacks much needed flexibility to be fit for purpose; highlights that the Parliament should manage its own building portfolio in terms of energy efficiency and sustainability to align with the objectives of the Green Deal; notes that the renovation will lead to significant annual savings and reduction of CO2 emissions and will help to comply with the requirements of the revised Energy Efficiency Directive and Energy Performance of Buildings Directive; reminds the Bureau that transparency, proper information and consultation with the Committee on Budgets, including access to comprehensive details, before adopting any major decision on building related issues and its financing is needed due to their important budgetary implications;

13.  Recognises the need to start renovation works in 2025 to the TREVES II building in order to facilitate the temporary accommodation of staff that will be displaced as part of the renovations of the SPAAK building;

14.  Welcomes Parliament’s policy aiming to ensure the fully independent use of Parliament buildings by persons with disabilities and supports further measures and adaptions that will be necessary in this regard; recognizes the need to improve access for persons with disabilities to the Plenary Chamber in Strasbourg;

15.  Recalls that Parliament's administration is currently working on a comprehensive approach to define Parliament's long-term building policy considering in particular environmental obligations, costs and budgetary constraints, energy efficiency, and waste management in line with the "Fit for 55" package and expects the results to be made public; calls for taking stock of flexible ways of working that have arisen as a consequence of the pandemic, while acknowledging that physical presence for political negotiations, debates or exchange of views remains more efficient for public policy making;

16.  Takes note of the practice of the year-end ‘mopping-up transfer’ to contribute to building projects; takes note that such ‘mopping-up transfer’ takes place systematically on the same chapters, titles and often on exactly the same budgetary lines; notes that the ‘mopping-up’ yearly exercise can also serve other purposes than to finance building related projects;

17.  Welcomes the continuous efforts and measures put in place by the Parliament in order to reduce its environmental footprint; reiterates its full support for Parliament’s environmental management system (EMAS) targets for 2024; expects Parliament to achieve all the EMAS key performance indicator targets by the end of 2024 and proceed to adoption of new ambitious targets for the coming years; notes in particular a number of achievements in this regard, including a 44 % reduction in carbon emissions since 2006, a 66 % reduction in paper use compared to 2014, the high rates of staff walking or cycling to work, significant decreases in the use of plastic, and the successful roll-out of renewable energy infrastructure, which saw 458 MWh of solar energy generated by the Parliament in 2023;

18.  Takes note of the increases of the carbon credit prices; recalls that energy efficiency investments are a good method of achieving value for money; welcomes and encourages the investments in renewable energy and for the phasing-out of fossil fuels in particular given the energy crisis and geopolitical context and for it to be reflected in the next multi-annual building strategy; notes that Parliament has installed and is continuing to install photovoltaic solar panels to further increase the share of renewable energy produced on-site to reach the target of 25 %; recalls that nearly two-thirds of Parliament's carbon footprint originates from the transportation of people; welcomes Parliament's efforts to reduce CO2 emissions through chartered trains and calls for upscaling the availabilities to shift travel between the three places of work to train;

Other issues

19.  Recalls the ongoing struggle in which the Union is involved to safeguard European values and uphold the integrity of our democratic processes; welcomes the actions undertaken by the Parliament in the pursuit of these objectives, fighting against disinformation and information manipulation; calls on DG COMM and European Parliament Liaison Offices (EPLOs) to keep developing and implementing effective strategies to counter disinformation and information manipulation; highlights that one of the most powerful weapons against disinformation is positive, fact-based communication regarding the Parliament’s activities;

20.  Recalls that the Parliament strongly supports multilingualism and promotes the rights of the national, regional and linguistic minorities; considers that the Parliament can actively contribute to the fight against disinformation by deepening its communication also in linguistic minorities and communities languages where appropriate; requires the Bureau to widen the extent of Parliament’s production and dissemination of communication materials that are in line with the needs of national, regional and linguistic minorities in Member States for example in the EPLOs and Europa Experience Centres as a way to counter any attempt to rely on linguistic differences to hinder cohesion; recalls in that sense the efforts undertaken by EPLOs in Baltic countries to provide information to citizens in Ukrainian and Russian since the start of the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, with a particular focus on countering Russian disinformation and propaganda and encourages to continue supporting and promoting such activities in Ukrainian and Russian; underlines the importance of EPLO's active participation in the implementation of the Parliament's work on citizenship education through multiple programmes involving local communities, schools and universities;

21.  Underlines the potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for supporting Members to exercise their mandate and for various activities of the Parliament’s administration; welcomes that projects in AI are already in the pipeline for 2025;

22.  Supports the announcement made by the Secretary-General in the Committee on Budgets to reduce administrative burden and bureaucracy for Members and their offices while accelerating the digitalisation of processes within the administration; stresses that investments in digitalisation are generating a return on investment in the midterm and should not be delayed for short-term cost savings;

23.  Calls on the Parliament to continue conducting regular assessments of the organisation of its personnel needs, to optimise the repartition of staff in Parliament’s Secretariat, notably by reallocating vacant posts between services in order to maintain as much as possible constant staffing levels; invites the Secretary-General to assess the risks related to employing growing numbers of contract agents, including the danger of creating a two tier staffing structure within Parliament; insists that core permanent positions and tasks should be performed by permanent staff;

24.  Highlights that ensuring a fair geographical balance is an important part of creating a truly European public service; remarks that, over the years, Parliament has taken a number of measures in that respect; notes that there is still room for improvement; notes that the Bureau has created the legal framework for the organisation of nationality specific competitions and decided to organise the first of such competitions; highlights that competitions should always be based on merit;

25.  Takes note of the procedure already in place for requests from a parliamentary body user for International Sign Language interpretation at a meeting; asks the Secretary-General to continue exploring other possibilities, such as Speech-to-Text and Machine Translation tools in respect of the principle of equal access to all citizens;

26.  Reiterates its request, adopted at Plenary level at several occasions, to the Bureau to start the work on revision of the Rules of Procedure enabling Members to exercise their right to vote remotely, during benefiting from maternity or paternity leave, during a long-term illness or in cases of force majeure, taking advantage of the lessons learnt during the pandemic on the technical aspects of this voting method;

27.  Reiterates its call to the Bureau to guarantee that all restaurants within Parliament uphold their standards of quality, efficiency and affordability, and to re-introduce access control at the entrances to the self-service restaurant during peak time; welcomes the implementation of access controls at the entrance of the WEISS self-service in Strasbourg during part-sessions;

28.  Calls for a genuine commitment to achieving the principle of multilingualism;

29.  Reiterates its call on the Conference of Presidents and the Bureau to revise the implementing provisions governing the work of delegations and missions outside the Union; underlines that such a revision should consider the possibility for APAs, subject to certain conditions, to accompany Members on official Parliament delegations and missions; highlights that this change would not result in any change to the envelope and would be budget neutral;

30.  Expects that requests voted by the Plenary should be implemented as a matter of high priority;

o
o   o

31.  Adopts the estimates for the financial year 2025;

32.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the estimates to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1. (2) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. (3) OJ C 444 I, 22.12.2020, p. 4. (4) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2020)0357. (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28. (6) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0335. (7) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115. (8) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj. (9) COM(2022)0223. (10) OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 15. (11) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0119. (12) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0367. (13) OJ L 207, 22.2.2024. (14) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0366.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 1/2024 of the European Union for the financial year 2024 Amendments of the 2024 budget required due to the MFF revision (07432/2024 – C9-0048/2024 – 2024/0056(BUD))

P9_TA(2024)0374 A9-0174/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(1), and in particular Article 44 thereof,

–  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, as definitively adopted on 22 November 2023(2),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(3),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility(4),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(5),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 (‘the MFF Regulation’)(6),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(7),

–  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(8),

–  having regard to the proposal of 8 November 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans (COM(2023)0692),

–  having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

–  having regard to Draft amending budget No 1/2024, which the Commission adopted on 29 February 2024 (COM(2024)0080),

–  having regard to the position on Draft amending budget No 1/2024, which the Council adopted on 19 March 2024 and forwarded to Parliament on 21 March 2024 (07432/2024 – C9-0048/2024),

–  having regard to Rules 94 and 96 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0174/2024).

A.  whereas, in a joint statement annexed to the agreement on the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, Parliament and the Council invited the Commission to propose an amending budget as soon as the revision of the MFF Regulation was agreed with a view to bringing the 2024 budget into line with a revised MFF Regulation and, for their part, undertook to consider the draft amending budget without undue delay, taking into account the urgency of the matter;

B.  whereas Draft amending budget No 1/2024 is therefore focused on including in the 2024 budget the necessary changes stemming from the recently agreed MFF revision; whereas Draft amending budget No 1/2024 increases expenditure by EUR 5 833,7 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 4 143,6 million in payment appropriations;

C.  whereas, in addition to changes flowing from the MFF revision, Draft amending budget No 1/2024 also includes changes to the budgetary remarks for support expenditure under the Digital Europe programme to enable it to cover the costs of external staff required for the Artificial Intelligence Office, which is to be established in line with the recently agreed Artificial Intelligence Act;

1.  Welcomes Draft amending budget No 1/2024, which includes important reinforcements proposed by Parliament in its budget reading that could not be included in the 2024 budget owing to delays in adoption of the revised MFF Regulation;

2.  Stresses that, with the adoption of Draft amending budget No 1/2024, the 2024 Union budget will be more fit for purpose, more flexible and better equipped to meet the challenges the Union faces;

3.  Welcomes the proposal to mobilise EUR 4,8 billion from the newly created Ukraine Reserve to enable the payment of grants to Ukraine; recalls that the payment of loans does not require an amending budget and therefore that the Union is already providing support to the Ukrainian government so that it can maintain essential services; stresses that grant- and loan-based financial support through the Ukraine Facility will help to keep the state and essential services functioning, while supporting Ukraine on its path to reconstruction, recovery, reform and membership of the Union;

4.  Underlines that the budget nomenclature for the Ukraine Facility, introduced through Draft amending budget No 1/2024, will help to ensure that the budgetary authority can exercise proper scrutiny over spending; welcomes the inclusion in the Facility of interest rate subsidy payments for Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) provided to Ukraine in 2022, which will reduce pressure in Heading 6 (Neighbourhood and the World), in particular in the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe cushion;

5.  Recalls that the interest rate subsidy for MFA+ loans paid to Ukraine is to be covered by Member States; regrets that three national contribution agreements are still not in place; underlines that the inclusion of EUR 5 million in the 2024 budget was provisional subject to an alternative financing solution, in line with the Commission’s and Parliament’s unilateral statements annexed to the 2024 budget agreement; expects, therefore, the EUR 5 million to be deducted from the relevant line in a forthcoming draft amending budget for 2024;

6.  Welcomes the EUR 376 million reinforcement for the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2024, resulting from the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) Regulation(10); notes that, in contrast to the legislative financial statement annexed to the STEP proposal, the Commission now considers that no additional payment appropriations are required in 2024; calls on the Commission to monitor payment needs carefully;

7.  Notes that, on 5 March 2024, the Commission put forward a proposal to establish a new defence programme - the European Defence Industry Programme - for the period 2025-2027, with a planned transfer of EUR 1,5 billion from the EDF, precisely the amount of the EDF reinforcement agreed under STEP; reiterates its long-standing position that new policy priorities require fresh money; insists that the additional resources assigned to the EDF for the remainder of the MFF period be used for STEP objectives as per the agreement of the co-legislators;

8.  Welcomes the additional EUR 500 million for the Western Balkans, placed in reserve subject to the adoption of the proposed regulation establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; points out that it does not consider the nomenclature as set out in Draft amending budget No 1/2024 to be fit for purpose and intends, with the Council, to review the nomenclature as part of the 2025 budgetary procedure in order to ensure appropriate political and budgetary scrutiny;

9.  Notes that, of the total EUR 3,1 billion in reinforcements for Heading 6 between 2024 and 2027 agreed in the MFF revision, only EUR 500 million is included in Draft amending budget No 1/2024; points out, furthermore, that planned redeployments of funds within that Heading are not included; reiterates its request to the Commission to provide the budgetary authority with detailed information explaining how it intends to manage all changes to programmes and special instruments resulting from the MFF revision;

10.  Welcomes the fact that the Union will be better able to respond to crises as a result of the increased financing for natural disasters and other emergencies included in Draft amending budget No 1/2024; notes that Draft amending budget No 1/2024 creates new lines in accordance with the decision to split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve into two parts - the European Solidarity Reserve for natural disasters and public health emergencies within the Union and in accession countries and the Emergency Aid Reserve for rapid response to emergencies inside and outside the Union; considers that the new architecture will make the funds easier to manage and recalls the importance of swift treatment of applications under the European Union Solidarity Fund and timely mobilisation of the two reserves to ensure rapid disbursement of funds;

11.  Recalls that humanitarian aid for Ukraine is not covered by the Ukraine Facility and fully expects needs globally to remain high and likely further increase in 2024 in a context where Humanitarian Aid is under-budgeted; taking into account budgetary implementation in recent years, calls on the Commission to monitor humanitarian aid needs closely and to propose any necessary measures to the budgetary authority in good time; recalls, in that regard, that the Flexibility Instrument has been reinforced by around EUR 500 million for 2024 as part of the MFF revision;

12.  Notes that the 2024 allocation for the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) is reduced to EUR 33,8 million, in accordance with the revised MFF Regulation; calls on the Commission to monitor EGF implementation and for all institutions to take any necessary measures to ensure that all justified requests for EGF support, as a manifestation of Union solidarity, can be met;

13.  Takes note of the changes to the budgetary remarks to enable the Digital Europe programme to finance the costs of recruiting contractual agents for the Artificial Intelligence Office established under the recently agreed Artificial Intelligence Act; underlines that such a workaround solution is only necessary owing to insufficient resources under Heading 7 (Administration), to the Commission’s self-imposed stable staffing policy and to the Council’s refusal to address administrative spending in the MFF revision; insists that covering staffing costs for the new Office in this manner is acceptable only as a temporary fix and does not constitute a precedent, that a long-term structural solution under Heading 7 must be found beyond the current MFF and that spending under Heading 7 must be set at a level that guarantees that the Union has an effective and efficient administration;

14.  Recalls that, in its executability letter assessing Parliament’s and the Council’s respective readings on the 2024 budget, the Commission stated that the budget remarks should, “as a general rule, [...] reflect the legal base and should be reviewed only if necessary to reflect the changes in applicable legal bases” and “should not propose any changes and modifications to programme general and specific objectives or actions that are not explicitly mentioned in basic acts”; expects that, given the Commission’s evident flexibility in amending the remarks for the Digital Europe programme to accommodate the recruitment of external personnel unrelated to the programme’s implementation, it will apply the same degree of flexibility when assessing any changes to the budgetary remarks that Parliament or the Council may propose in the 2025 budgetary procedure;

15.  Approves the Council position on Draft amending budget No 1/2024;

16.  Instructs its President to declare that Amending budget No 1/2024 has been definitively adopted and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

17.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

(1) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1. (2) OJ L, 2024/207, 22.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/budget/2024/207/oj. (3) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj. (4) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj. (5) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj. (6) OJ L, 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. (7) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28. (8) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1. (9) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0082. (10) COM(2023)0335.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 3 to the general budget 2024 reinforcing the European Public Prosecutor's Office following the accession of Poland and the expected participation of Sweden (08805/2024 – C9-0147/2024 – 2024/0090(BUD))

P9_TA(2024)0375 A9-0179/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(1), and in particular Article 44 thereof,

–  having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2024, as definitively adopted on 22 November 2023(2),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027(3) (‘MFF Regulation’),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(4),

–  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(5),

–  having regard to Draft amending budget No 3/2024, which the Commission adopted on 9 April 2024 (COM(2024)0090),

–  having regard to the position on Draft amending budget No 3/2024, which the Council adopted on 22 April 2024 and forwarded to Parliament on the same day (08805/2024 – C9-0147/2024),

–  having regard to Rules 94 and 96 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A9-0179/2024),

A.  whereas, following Poland’s 5 January 2024 notification of its intention to participate in the enhanced cooperation on the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the Commission adopted a corresponding implementing decision on 29 February 2024 confirming Poland’s participation;

B.  whereas, on 26 January 2024, the Swedish government put forward draft legislation that would pave the way for Sweden’s participation in the EPPO, which is expected to be confirmed later in 2024;

C.  whereas Draft amending budget No 3/2024 therefore reinforces the EPPO’s 2024 budget with an additional EUR 3,6 million in commitment and payment appropriations and an additional 20 establishment plan posts;

D.  whereas, in the absence of any margin in Heading 2b (Resilience and Values), the Commission proposes to cover the additional costs by mobilising the Flexibility Instrument;

1.  Warmly welcomes Poland’s accession to the EPPO and Sweden’s expected participation, which would take the number of participating Member States to 24; notes that, with this enlargement, the EPPO will also be in a position to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the Union’s financial interests committed in those Member States, thus better protecting the Union’s interests and its budget and helping to uphold the rule of law;

2.  Underlines the need to provide the EPPO with additional financial and human resources, including to cover the recruitment of European Prosecutors, the necessary support functions and related operational and salary expenditure; welcomes the fact, therefore, that the Commission heeded Parliament’s call in proposing a corresponding draft amending budget with due urgency;

3.  Understands that the Commission will no longer provide the EPPO with digital workplace services from 2025; notes that the EPPO has repeatedly requested the necessary additional financial and human resources to make the transition to full IT independence and ensure the security of its IT system;

4.  Regrets the fact that Draft amending budget No 3/2024 does not provide the resources necessary to ensure that the EPPO is fully equipped to pursue effectively its investigations, can manage its growing operational workload and has sufficient resources to prepare for full and secure IT systems autonomy as of 2025; calls on the Commission to include the necessary additional resources, as set out in Decision 016/2024 of the College of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office of 21 February 2024, in a future draft amending budget and to provide IT services until such time as the EPPO has the necessary resources to become IT-independent;

5.  Underlines the importance of ensuring that the EPPO enjoys full independence, which depends on budgetary autonomy and thus adequate resources; notes that the possibility for the EPPO to make use of administrative support from Eurojust under Article 100 of its founding regulation has not materialised; recalls that, in Amending Letter 1/2022, the Commission committed to an assessment of the EPPO’s staffing situation by the end of 2023; calls on the Commission to transmit the results of that staffing review to the budgetary authority without delay so that it can factor them into its work for the 2025 budget;

6.  Approves the Council position on Draft amending budget No 3/2024;

7.  Instructs its President to declare that Amending budget No 2/2024 has been definitively adopted and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

(1) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1. (2) OJ L, 2024/207, 22.02.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/budget/2024/207/oj. (3) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. (4) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28. (5) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information (API) for enhancing and facilitating external border controls, amending Regulation (EU) 2019/817 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1726, and repealing Council Directive 2004/82/EC (COM(2022)0729 – C9-0428/2022 – 2022/0424(COD))

P9_TA(2024)0376 A9-0409/2023

CORRIGENDA COR01

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0729),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 77(2), points (b) and (d), and Article 79(2), point (c), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0428/2022),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2023(1),

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the responsible committee under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 13 March 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0409/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 25 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2025/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for enhancing and facilitating external border checks, amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726 and (EU) 2019/817, and repealing Council Directive 2004/82/EC

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2025/12.)

(1) OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 97.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818 (COM(2022)0731 – C9-0427/2022 – 2022/0425(COD))	P9_TA(2024)0377 A9-0411/2023
CORRIGENDA COR01

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0731),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 82(1) point (d) and 87(2) point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0427/2022),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2023(1),

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 13 March 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A9-0411/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 25 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2025/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the collection and transfer of advance passenger information for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/818

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2025/13.)

(1) OJ C 228, 29.6.2023, p. 97.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act) (COM(2023)0161 – C9-0062/2023 – 2023/0081(COD))

P9_TA(2024)0378 A9-0343/2023

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0161),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0062/2023),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social committee of 13 July 2023(1),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of Regions of 5 July 2023(2),

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 74(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 February 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the Rule 59 of its Rule of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Committee on Transport and Tourism, Committee on Regional Development,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A9-0343/2023),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 25 April 2024 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s net-zero technology manufacturing ecosystem and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1735.)

(1) OJ C 349, 29.9.2023, p. 179. (2) OJ C, C/2023/254, 26.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/254/oj.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories (2024/2665(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0379 RC-B9-0253/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and on Ukraine,

–  having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to the international human rights obligations to which Russia has committed itself as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),

–  having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

–  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ and UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’,

–  having regard to the statement of 17 June 2023 by the European External Action Service Spokesperson on intentions to hold ‘elections’ in occupied territories of Ukraine,

–  having regard to the statement of 29 January 2024 of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on the decision of the Russian Federation not to invite the OSCE to observe the Russian presidential election,

–  having regard to the statement of 18 March 2024 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on Russian presidential elections and their non-applicability on Ukrainian territory,

–  having regard to the statement of 18 March 2024 by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Theodoros Rousopoulos, on the presidential ‘election’ in Russia,

–  having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, of 15 September 2023 entitled ‘Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation’,

–  having regard to Opinion No 992/2020 of 23 March 2021 of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on constitutional amendments and the procedure for their adoption in the Russian Federation,

–  having regard to Resolution 2519 (2023) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 13 October 2023 entitled ‘Examining the legitimacy and legality of the ad hominem term-limit waiver for the incumbent President of the Russian Federation and to its report No 15827, of 22 September 2023 and of the same title, on which it was based,

–  having regard to Resolution 2540 (2024) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Alexei Navalny’s death and the need to counter Vladimir Putin’s totalitarian regime and its war on democracy’,

–  having regard to the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights of 11 July 2023 entitled ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders at Risk: EU entry, stay and support’,

–  having regard to Article 28 of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,

–  having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas all OSCE participating states, including the Russian Federation, have agreed that the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through genuine and periodic elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of government;

B.  whereas OSCE participating states have committed themselves to respecting a number of principles, such as those defined in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, to ensure, inter alia, that electoral campaigning can be conducted in an open and fair atmosphere without violence, intimidation or fear of retribution against candidates, parties or voters, and to ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot and counted and reported honestly;

C.  whereas the so-called presidential election held by Russia from 15 to 17 March 2024 was conducted without any political competition, in a severely restricted environment of systemic and grave repression and during the Russian Federation’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas there were reports of voters being intimidated, voters being denied their right to vote, ballot boxes being stuffed, protocols from the precincts being falsified on a massive scale and independent domestic election observers being detained; whereas Russia illegally organised voting in the occupied Ukrainian territories of Crimea, Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, at times amid violence and threats by armed Russian soldiers; whereas Russia also has a record of organising illegal voting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in Transnistria, against the will of the Georgian and Moldovan authorities;

D.  whereas the Russian authorities did not invite OSCE/ODIHR to observe its election, which runs contrary to Russia’s commitments and obligations as an OSCE participating state; whereas this was the second Russian election in a row to have been held without impartial and independent international election observers in the country;

E.  whereas the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation unreasonably refused to register as candidates any politicians critical of the regime or of the war of aggression, including some who had reportedly collected more than 100 000 signatures, as prescribed by the national legislation;

F.  whereas Alexei Navalny, the most powerful figure in the democratic opposition and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was murdered in a Siberian penal colony on 16 February 2024, just weeks before the so-called presidential election; whereas Navalny had been serving an unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence; whereas the full responsibility for his murder lies with the Russian state and with its president Vladimir Putin in particular;

G.  whereas Russia’s 1993 Constitution limited the president to two consecutive terms of office, but Vladimir Putin has been in power continuously since 2000, finding different ways to circumvent this limit; whereas the sham referendum of 2020 cannot be perceived as valid and was enacted in violation of the laws and international commitments of the Russian Federation; whereas the renewed presidential term of Vladimir Putin is viewed as unconstitutional by numerous experts; whereas since 2022, the Kremlin regime has implemented various restrictive election monitoring laws, while supporters of opposition parties are routinely targeted, detained and often charged, largely under the new law passed in February 2024 permitting property and asset confiscation for any individual criticising the war in Ukraine;

H.  whereas Russia’s authoritarian regime has used such increasingly fraudulent and farcical so-called elections for decades to provide a semblance of democracy in order to continue to concentrate all power in the hands of Vladimir Putin; whereas the government suppresses any dissent with the support of loyalist security forces, a subservient judiciary, a state-controlled media environment ensuring a continuous flood of propaganda and disinformation, and a legislature consisting of a ruling party and pliable opposition factions;

I.  whereas the other candidates running in this sham election were representatives of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), New People, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and are currently under EU and US sanctions because of their support for the war in Ukraine;

J.  whereas Putin’s ‘electoral victory’ with 87 % of the vote, a clearly inconceivable number for a free and fair election, derived from a clearly manipulated outcome from polling stations throughout Russia, from Adygea to Yamalo-Nenets; whereas this shows the cavalier and flagrant manner in which elections are misused by the Putin regime to continue into its 24th year in power;

K.  whereas since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian authorities have increased their repression of political opposition, the media, civil society and the LGBTIQ community by curtailing rights and individual liberties even further to stifle domestic dissent;

L.  whereas many Russian voters bravely expressed their anger at and opposition to the Kremlin regime and the farce it presented as an election by engaging in acts of resistance at polling stations; whereas crowds descended on polling places at noon on the final day of the so-called election in support of the ‘noon against Putin’ demonstration that Alexei Navalny had also called for before he was murdered in prison after being subjected to torture and inhumane treatment;

M.  whereas the Kremlin regime has decimated a generation of Russian civil society, democratic political opposition, and human rights organisations, including Memorial and the Moscow Helsinki Group; whereas the number of political prisoners in Russia, estimated to be at least 1 000, exceeds levels seen even during the late Soviet period, and there has been a significant increase in the number of individuals detained for criticising Putin’s policies, particularly concerning the war in Ukraine; whereas according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia is holding at least 22 journalists in prison;

N.  whereas the EU has frequently expressed its unequivocal solidarity with all those dissidents and the Russian people, who, despite the threat to their freedom and their lives and the pressure from the Kremlin and the Russian authorities, continue to fight for freedom, human rights and democracy; whereas the EU hosts a variety of Russian dissidents and representatives of the media and civil society who were forced to leave Russia as their criticism of the government put them at significant risk of retaliation from the authorities;

O.  whereas the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation has concluded that there is no longer any safe space for civic action or political opposition within Russia;

P.  whereas the Venice Commission, in its Opinion No 992/2020, concluded that the speed of the preparation of the 2020 constitutional amendments was clearly inappropriate, that the hastily adopted 2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia have disproportionately strengthened the position of the president and that the ad hominem exclusion from the term limits of the current and previous presidents contradicts the very logic of the adopted amendment limiting the president’s mandate to two terms;

Q.  whereas, in its Resolutions 2519 (2023) and 2540 (2024), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on European governments to recognise Vladimir Putin as illegitimate after the end of his current presidential term and to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian purposes and in the pursuit of peace;

R.  whereas, in its 2021 recommendation on the direction of EU-Russia political relations(1), Parliament concluded that the constitutional changes implemented in June 2020 were illegal, as did the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its Resolution 2519 (2023);

S.  whereas the Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law;

T.  whereas on 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in view of his responsibility for the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

1.  Strongly denounces all electoral violations committed by the regime of Vladimir Putin during the so-called Russian presidential election of 15 to 17 March 2024, as well as the preceding long-standing and systemic repression and violations of civil and political rights; underlines that Russia’s so-called presidential election was held in a climate of fear and repression and in the context of an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes that during the so-called presidential election, there were no genuine alternative candidates, no free media, no credible observers and no political freedoms; concludes that the so-called presidential election in Russia was illegitimate and undemocratic;

2.  Concludes that this farcical performance by the Russian authorities had the single goal of creating the appearance of electoral legitimacy for Vladimir Putin, his policy of relentless domestic repression and, most of all, the war of aggression against Ukraine;

3.  Unequivocally condemns the illegal so-called election conducted in the territories of Ukraine that Russia has temporarily occupied, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol and parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions; stresses that holding an election in these territories constitutes a clear breach of Ukrainian sovereignty and a distinct violation of international law, in particular the UN Charter; deplores the use of the threat of violence by the Russian authorities, as people were forced to vote in the presence of armed Russian soldiers; reiterates that, as stated by the High Representative on behalf of the EU, the EU will not recognise the holding of this so-called election in the territories of Ukraine or its outcome; calls for EU restrictive measures against those involved in the organisation and execution of the illegal polls;

4.  Underlines that the refusal to allow independent international observation of the Russian presidential election, in accordance with Russia’s international commitments as an OSCE participating state, points to an unprecedented degree of democratic backsliding and a critical lack of willingness to honour international commitments and respect established principles of cooperation within international institutions; stresses that the decision of the Russian authorities not to invite the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission to observe the election shows that they want to deny voters an impartial and independent assessment of the election;

5.  Urges the Member States of the European Union and the international community not to recognise the outcome of the Russian presidential election as legitimate, as it was held in the illegally occupied territories of Ukraine, and, even within Russia, was neither free nor fair, did not meet the basic international electoral standards, and thus lacked democratic legitimacy, and urges to limit relations with Putin to matters necessary for regional peace as well as humanitarian and human rights purposes, for example prisoner exchanges, the return of deported children to Ukraine or calling on the release of political prisoners;

6.  Salutes the bravery of the thousands of people in Russia who are protesting against Putin’s regime and seeking to transform their country into a democracy, including by acts of resistance during the so-called election, such as the protests that crowded polling places in Russia and abroad at noon on Sunday 17 March 2024;

7.  Reiterates that the Kremlin regime and Vladimir Putin personally bear criminal and political responsibility for the death of their most prominent opponent, Alexei Navalny; calls for an international investigation into the circumstances surrounding his death, with the aim of holding those responsible to account;

8.  Continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release and compensation of all political prisoners, including Vladimir Kara-Murza, Oleg Orlov, Alexei Gorinov, Alexandra Skochilenko, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Dmitry Talantov, Yuri Dmitriev, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Ivan Safronov and Ilya Yashin, unjustly imprisoned journalists, including Alsu Kurmasheva and Evan Gershkovich, and their families, for the restoration of freedom of expression and association in Russia and for increased international scrutiny and monitoring of human rights abuses in Russia;

9.  Urges the Russian authorities to provide immediate access to comprehensive medical care for political prisoners whose health is in critical condition, most notably Vladimir Kara-Murza; reminds Russia to adhere to its international obligations on the rights of prisoners;

10.  Calls on the Russian authorities to grant consular officials access to prisoners with dual citizenship;

11.  Reiterates that the EU should stand in full solidarity with Russian civil society that has subscribed to universal democratic values and rejected imperialism, and should make use of the European human rights violations sanctions regime to sanction perpetrators of human rights violations; denounces the escalation of human rights violations by the Kremlin regime and condemns the ongoing crackdown on government critics, human rights defenders, anti-war activists, independent journalists, lawyers, and historians researching Soviet crimes, as well as the increased suppression of LGBTIQ activists;

12.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to work with international partners and organisations to provide support to political prisoners, in particular medical and legal assistance, which is being limited or denied to them, and to seek ways to secure their release; reiterates its call for the diplomatic representations of the EU and its Member States to continue to closely monitor court proceedings against members of the Russian political opposition and the conditions in which they are being held in prison; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to raise awareness about the deteriorating human rights situation in Russia and to pressure the Russian Government to uphold its international obligations;

13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to actively support independent Russian civil society organisations, independent media outlets and human rights defenders; calls for the EU and its Member States to actively engage with and offer support to the Russian democratic opposition who oppose Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

14.  Urges the Member States to provide humanitarian visas and other support to Russian dissidents, including lawyers, who are at risk of political persecution; reiterates its call for an EU-wide multi-entry visa scheme for human rights defenders and politically persecuted individuals and for the existing flexibility to be used to address gaps in legislation, as proposed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in its 2023 report entitled ‘Protecting Human Rights Defenders at Risk: EU entry, stay and support’; stresses, in this regard, that such schemes may also extend to opposition leaders, civil society activists and otherwise politically persecuted persons;

15.  Urges the EU institutions and the Member States to prepare for a situation in which Russia, like Belarus, ceases issuing passports in its consulates, in which case it may be necessary for the EU and all its Member States to recognise de facto statelessness and issue travel documents, as provided for in Article 28 of the UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons;

16.  Calls for the simplification of processes for Russian dissidents in the EU to register organisations and entities, open bank accounts and carry out other administrative tasks in order to allow them to continue their work in exile;

17.  Deplores the fact that the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, chose to break ranks with the EU and congratulate Vladimir Putin on his sham re-election;

18.  Expresses support for the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, and calls on the Member States to ensure that the UN Human Rights Council extends her mandate again in 2024;

19.  Reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; reiterates, therefore, its strong condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and demands that Russia and its proxy forces terminate all military actions, cease attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, withdraw all military forces from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, end forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, release all detained Ukrainians, particularly children, and permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine;

20.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Russian authorities.

(1) European Parliament recommendation of 16 September 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the direction of EU-Russia political relations (OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 170).

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union (2024/2696(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0380 RC-B9-0262/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolution of 8 February 2024 entitled ‘Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union’(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation(4),

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on EU-Russia relations, in particular its resolution of 23 November 2022 on recognising the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism(5),

–  having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) report of 23 January 2024 entitled ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats – A Framework for Networked Defence’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 December 2023 on Defence of Democracy (COM(2023)0630), and the proposals for the Defence of Democracy package therein,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,

–  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine(6),

–  having regard to its Rules of Procedure and the Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parliament,

–  having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas increasing attempts by state and non-state actors from third countries to directly or indirectly interfere with democratic decision-making and electoral processes in the Union and its Member States are being reported; whereas there is clear evidence of such attempts by Russia to interfere in electoral processes and policymaking worldwide and especially against the EU and its Member States, through a wide array of different hybrid warfare methods, embedded within a broader strategy to undermine the proper functioning of European democratic processes and legislative procedures; whereas these methods include but are not limited to cyberattacks, including on the European Parliament, elite capture of European decision-makers, election meddling, as well as by funding movements and lobbies;

B.  whereas new studies and reports shows that, in recent months, well-known disinformation networks have scaled up operations aimed at disseminating pro-Kremlin narratives on social media, especially on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok; whereas there is proof that Russian influence networks have used AI and bots in social media and relied on the large-scale publishing of political advertisements purchased through fake accounts; whereas traditional media outlets have also been used to push their interests in the political agenda; whereas this hybrid war was the precursor for and continues to support Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas this foreign interference constitutes a form of external pressure that can effectively undermine the exercise of EU and Member States’ sovereignty;

C.  whereas Russia has systematically maintained contacts with far-right and far-left parties, and other personalities and movements to gain support from institutional actors within the Union in order to legitimise its illegal and criminal actions; whereas analysis of voting patterns and speeches in the European Parliament has shown these parties to have been the most sympathetic to Russia, including calls as extreme as those made in public in January 2024 by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Miroslav Radačovský – who was also paid by Russian sources to observe the parliamentary elections in Russia in 2021 – for the destruction of Europe; whereas the Hungarian Fidesz party has been spreading pro-Kremlin messages and propaganda;

D.  whereas there are also ‘Russlandversteher’ (Russia understanding) politicians within mainstream political parties; whereas several public figures from EU Member States, including former heads of government and cabinet members, most notably Gerhard Schröder, have held well-paid positions in Kremlin-controlled energy companies; whereas, even after the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, some of these people decided not to step down and continued to receive the Kremlin’s blood money, with the silent complicity of their political parties; whereas they continue to use their pro-Russian influence in both their domestic and the European political scenes;

E.  whereas under President Putin, Russia has identified democracy, human rights and the European way of life as a threat to its dictatorial government and hence for years has been pursuing a strategy of systematically trying to weaken and ultimately destroy democracies both in the EU and in candidate countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Western Balkans and other neighbouring countries such as Armenia;

F.  whereas according to media reports confirmed by Polish, Czech and Belgian security services, as well as by the Prime Ministers of Belgium and Czechia, certain MEPs and candidates in the upcoming European elections have received payment from the Russian Government or its proxies to spread propaganda and disinformation and to influence the elections to the European Parliament in various European countries;

G.  whereas on 27 March 2024, after having uncovered a pro-Russian network attempting to conduct influence operations with implications for Czechia and the EU, via the Prague-based ‘Voice of Europe’ news site, the Czech foreign ministry announced that it had sanctioned Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, an ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for running a Russian influence operation from Czech territory using this news site, along with a middleman called Artem Marchevskyi, for his activities conducted with the aim of undermining European support for Ukraine and influencing the 2024 European Parliament elections by portraying the EU as a belligerent entity, and describing Ukraine as an irremediably corrupt country; whereas shortly after this revelation, the website was taken offline by the authorities but was back online on 11 April 2024, operating from a website hosted by a cloud services and website service provider based in Kazakhstan;

H.  whereas on 28 March 2024, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo stated, during a debate in the Belgian Parliament, that based on investigations conducted by Belgian intelligence services in collaboration with their Czech counterparts, it was evident that Russia had approached European parliamentarians and paid some of them to promote Russian propaganda; whereas, on 12 April 2024, Prime Minister De Croo further announced the opening of criminal prosecution and requested an urgent meeting of the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and called for the broadening of the mandate for the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office;

I.  whereas on 28 March 2024, Poland’s Internal Security Agency announced that it had conducted searches as part of a collaborative investigation with other European security services into alleged Russian espionage linked to ‘Voice of Europe’, recovering large sums of cash and leading to charges against a Polish citizen suspected of Russian espionage; whereas according to the Internal Security Agency, this individual is believed to have been embedded within Polish and EU parliamentary circles, carrying out tasks commissioned and financed by counterparts from Russian intelligence;

J.  whereas on 29 March 2024, Austrian authorities arrested a former Austrian intelligence officer on multiple charges, including allegedly providing mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence, involvement in planning a burglary at a prominent journalist’s apartment, and drafting ‘suggestions for improvement’ following a Russian-ordered killing in Germany; whereas the arrested former Austrian intelligence officer was in close contact with far-right politicians from the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the country’s parliament and government;

K.  whereas on 16 April 2024 media reports circulated that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had questioned German MEP Maximilian Krah, the lead candidate of Alternative for Germany (AfD) for the European elections and member of Parliament’s Committee on International Trade and Subcommittee on Security and Defence, last December in New York over suspicions that he was receiving money from Kremlin agents; whereas, on 23 April 2024, press reports indicated that an assistant to MEP Maximilian Krah had been arrested on suspicions of spying for China, showing a pattern of cooperation with malign foreign actors seeking to undermine European democratic values and processes;

L.  whereas on 18 April 2024, the German authorities arrested two suspected saboteurs in the German state of Bavaria who were allegedly spying on military installations for possible bomb or arson attacks on behalf of a Russian intelligence service, allegedly to sabotage German support for Ukraine in the war against Russia; whereas the arrests indicate that Russia’s secret services are evidently entering new dimensions, which include attacks on military facilities, in addition to disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

M.  whereas a Czech media outlet claims that the Czech secret services have audio recordings confirming the payment of money of Russian origin to Petr Bystron, a candidate for the European elections, member of the German Bundestag and foreign policy officer for AfD; whereas according to German newspaper Der Spiegel, the money was handed over either in cash at covert meetings in Prague or via cryptocurrency; whereas reputable German media outlets have also recently revealed that an employee of an AfD member in the German Bundestag was identified as a contact person for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB); whereas, according to media reports, the same person had been checked twice by German authorities when entering Germany from Russia and was carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;

N.  whereas, on 12 February 2024, VIGINUM, the French Government agency responsible for identifying foreign digital interference, published a report detailing a vast Russian disinformation campaign dubbed ‘Portal Kombat’, consisting of 193 websites tasked with disseminating pro-Russian narratives among Russian-speaking and European populations across Europe and the United States; whereas, in late 2023, the French authorities indicated that the Stars of David found painted in several locations in Paris were part of a destabilisation operation tied to a pro-Russian businessman from Moldova;

O.  whereas, according to media analyses, since August 2023, 16 far-right MEPs from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Slovakia, Estonia, Spain, Croatia, Denmark and Belgium participated in debates and interviews organised by ‘Voice of Europe’; whereas the vast majority of these politicians tend to normalise manifestations of hatred and intolerance based on race, national origin or sexual orientation and to project a vision of Russia as the authentic keeper of traditional family values; whereas the public discourse of those politicians is leading to dangerous divisions in society as a whole, and is a threat to democracy;

P.  whereas investigative journalists exposed a classified addendum to Russia’s official ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, in which the Russian Foreign Ministry calls for an ‘offensive information campaign’ and other measures spanning ‘the military-political, economic and trade and informational psychological spheres’ against a ‘coalition of unfriendly countries’ led by the United States, noting that ‘it is important to create a mechanism for finding the vulnerable points of their external and internal policies with the aim of developing practical steps to weaken Russia’s opponents’ and that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will ‘to a great degree determine the outlines of the future world order’;

Q.  whereas a recent study by the Commission(7) found that, in the first year of Russia’s war against Ukraine, online platforms ‘enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views’; whereas Russian funding of political activities and politicians within the European Union also contributes to an increase in the reach of pro-Kremlin propaganda, contributing to a disproportionately negative impact on civic discourse online;

R.  whereas through its cultivation of contacts and relationships, Russia aims to build political and economic influence to destabilise democracy in the European Union; whereas press reports have highlighted contacts between some secessionists in Catalonia, going so far as to the holding of a meeting between the former Russian diplomat Nikolai Sadovnikov and the then-separatist leader and former President of Catalonia, now sitting MEP Carles Puigdemont, in Barcelona, on the eve of Catalonia’s illegal referendum in October 2017; whereas some MEPs and members of national and regional parliaments have consistently voiced sentiments that can be considered pro-Russian, for example by attributing the start of the conflict to Ukraine, participating as unofficial election observers in Crimea, and expressing a wish for its defeat in the war, downplaying the possibility of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, opposing further weapon shipments to Ukraine, and advocating for territorial concessions from the government in Kyiv; whereas in March, a delegation of AfD members of the Bavarian regional parliament was invited to observe the so-called presidential elections in Russia and subsequently assessed the elections as open, democratic and free in public statements;

S.  whereas the Kremlin has sponsored and supported a number of far-right parties in Europe, including by providing the party of Marine Le Pen with a loan of EUR 9.4 million in 2013; whereas since then, Le Pen and her party members have further bolstered their pro-Kremlin stance by attending political events in Russia, including their participation in sham election observation missions during regional or national elections;

T.  whereas several investigations have revealed that, due to Russian interference, electoral rules have been breached or circumvented, in particular the existing provisions on the transparency of election campaign financing with allegations of covert funding from non-EU sources, notably from Russia;

U.  whereas there is credible evidence that, in 2020, Peter Pelligrini, then Prime Minister of Slovakia, requested the help of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to obtain support from the Kremlin ahead of Slovakia’s 2020 parliamentary election; whereas this resulted in a visit by Prime Minister Pelligrini to Russia in February 2020, three days before the elections were held; whereas the 2023 parliamentary elections were targeted by further Russian interference and disinformation campaigns; whereas Peter Pelligrini is now President-elect of Slovakia and due to take office in June 2024;

V.  whereas following reports of a Latvian MEP providing extensive assistance to Russian intelligence services, Parliament launched its own administrative probe, resulting in President Metsola imposing sanctions on the MEP, including a five-day fine of her daily allowance amounting to EUR 1 750 and a ban from certain roles representing Parliament until the end of this parliamentary term in July;

W.  whereas the European Parliament Special Committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (INGE and ING2), has exposed in detail the efforts and operations led by Russia in order to infiltrate, influence and interfere with European democracies and the European institutions;

X.  whereas some political groups unsuccessfully tried to deny the last extension of ING2’s mandate to address all forms of corruption and foreign interferences in the European Parliament, advocating instead for an investigation committee focusing only on Qatargate;

Y.  whereas, while MEPs have been regularly targeted by spyware, as shown by the recent revelations on the past targeting of two MEPs and one staffer on Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence, there has been a surge in cyberattacks and foreign interference targeting the work of the European Parliament in the run-up to the European Parliament election;

Z.  whereas in September 2023, the European Parliament, following the Qatargate revelations, updated and significantly strengthened its internal integrity framework, among other things, through an in-depth revision of its Rules of Procedure, the Code of Conduct for MEPs and the relevant Bureau decisions; whereas the reviewed Code of Conduct establishes that any elected MEP found to be in breach of transparency rules can be given a penalty by the President of the European Parliament;

AA.  whereas it is critically important to combat the proliferation of disinformation and foreign interference in European democracy, and to take further measures to safeguard the right of European citizens to accurate and trustworthy news sources, as well as to shield the European information landscape from manipulation by authoritarian regimes; whereas Reporters Without Borders recently put forward 12 proposals for a New Deal for the Right to Information;

AB.  whereas at its meeting on 17 April 2024, the European Council concluded that ‘in the context of the upcoming European elections, the European Council underlines the Union and its Member States’ determination to closely monitor and contain any risks stemming from disinformation, including through artificial intelligence, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference in electoral processes. The European Council invites the EU institutions and national authorities to cooperate on such matters’;

AC.  whereas MEPs have called on President Metsola to ask for an urgent investigation into Russian interference attempts ahead of the forthcoming European elections; whereas there has been no reply so far;

1.  Is appalled by the credible allegations that MEPs were paid to disseminate Russian propaganda as well as to support Russian efforts to systematically create a network of dependencies through European political parties that then act as amplifiers of the Kremlin’s propaganda;

2.  Expresses its outrage at the participation of MEPs in a pro-Russian media outlet, ‘Voice of Europe’, while Russia is waging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; emphasises that most views propagated by MEPs on ‘Voice of Europe’ do not reflect the stance of the vast majority of MEPs, who overwhelmingly denounce Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine, its employment of hybrid warfare tactics against European democracy, and its other aggressive and anti-democratic policy decisions in recent years;

3.  Firmly denounces all attempts, especially by the Russian Federation, to undermine the functioning of European democratic processes and stresses that these tactics must be met with consequences; calls on the political leadership of the EU and its Member States to finally address these Russian efforts with the necessary sense of urgency and resolve; reiterates its call on the Member States to further develop and fine-tune the sanctions packages adopted against the Russian Federation to more effectively limit its ability to wage its war of aggression and to close loopholes in the enforcement of the restrictive measures currently in force; reiterates its call to introduce a sanctions regime against perpetrators engaging in malign foreign information manipulation and interference;

4.  Is appalled by recent credible reports that Petr Bystron, a leading member of AfD (ID Group) and member in the German Bundestag, has accepted payments of up to EUR 25 000 to spread pro-Russian propaganda;

5.  Furthermore, expresses its concern about the recent FBI questioning of AfD MEP Maximilian Krah and calls upon the AfD to publicly declare its financial relations with the Kremlin without delay and to publicly disclose the purpose and exact amount of all payments originating from Kremlin-linked sources; further expresses its utmost concern regarding the arrest of MEP Krah’s assistant on 23 April 2024 following serious charges of espionage for China;

6.  Is extremely worried by recent reports, dated 17 April 2024, of two alleged Russian spies with dual German-Russian nationality who were arrested in Bavaria after being accused of scouting targets for potential attacks and sabotage operations, including the targeting of military facilities; reiterates its high concern about the extent of Russian espionage activities in Germany and other countries, such as Poland where similar activities were discovered in March 2023, and reiterates its strong call for a decisive response to the threat posed by Russian agents operating in Germany and beyond;

7.  Strongly condemns the Russian practice of instrumentalising illegal immigrants by pushing them into EU territory to destabilise neighbouring Member States, in particular Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland;

8.  Is equally concerned by the arrest on 22 April 2024 of three Germans detained on suspicion of working with the Chinese Ministry of State Security to hand over technology that could be used for military purposes; reiterates its previous calls on Member States to more effectively combat all elements of spying in the EU, which must also include better protection of critical infrastructure as well as a frank and clear confrontation of the originating states of espionage; underlines that these espionage revelations are likely to be just the tip of the iceberg and are a serious threat to our security and democracy;

9.  Strongly condemns the alarming revelation brought to light by reputable German media outlets in February, revealing that an employee affiliated with the AfD and associated with a member of the German federal parliament was identified as a contact person for Russia’s FSB, raising serious concerns about potential foreign influence within the German political landscape; moreover, strongly condemns the fact that the same individual, upon entry into Germany from Russia, was repeatedly intercepted by German authorities carrying cash sums of EUR 9 000;

10.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to mirror the sanctions adopted by the Czech Government against ‘Voice of Europe’, as well as Viktor Medvedchuk and Artem Marchevskyi; deplores the fact that ‘Voice of Europe’ has been able to restart its operations from Kazakhstan as of 11 April 2024; calls on the Member States to ensure that ‘Voice of Europe’ cannot be accessed across the European Union; furthermore, notes that badges allowing ‘Voice of Europe’ to access the European Parliament’s premises have been suspended;

11.  Commits to providing its full support and collaboration to national authorities in their investigations into the conduct of the MEPs concerned; welcomes the opening of an investigation into the suspected cases of Russian interference in EU elections by the Belgian authorities, calls upon relevant Member States to determine whether the involved MEPs are liable for prosecution under their respective criminal law; calls for judicial and law enforcement cooperation with international partners to be strengthened to facilitate the uncovering, investigation and prosecution of transnational criminal activities and networks of malign foreign actors promoting corrupt practices aimed at interfering with the European elections and at undermining democracy in the EU; commits to providing its full support and cooperation therefor; calls upon the relevant Parliament bodies to do everything possible to ensure a timely decision on the request to lift MEPs’ immunity whenever such a request is received by the relevant authorities; calls upon these bodies to convene as soon as possible after their constitutive meetings following the forthcoming European elections in order to immediately start their proceedings if such requests have been received; remains ready to further improve its internal rules on ethics, based on the highest standards, and its oversight and accountability framework, as well as the sanctioning mechanisms available for ascertained breaches of Parliament’s integrity framework; calls for the highest level of attention to be given to the recommendations for reform of the European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption adopted on 13 July 2023 and the full implementation of its new rules on transparency and integrity adopted in September 2023, as well as the monitoring of all its internal codes of conduct and decisions approved by its Bureau, in particular concerning the interaction with third countries;

12.  Welcomes the referral of the MEPs concerned to the Advisory Committee on the Code of Conduct; commits to enforcing its applicable internal sanction framework in full and calls for any sitting MEPs or candidates in the upcoming European elections that have taken money from or been corrupted by the Russian Government or its proxies to be exposed; notes that the alleged facts pre-date the recent adoption of the reform of Parliament’s integrity framework; considers that rules by themselves would not have prevented the MEPs’ alleged reprehensible conduct; remains nevertheless ready to further evaluate and fine-tune the functioning and sanctioning of Parliament’s integrity framework, which was reinforced in the wake of Qatargate;

13.  Welcomes the call for an urgent meeting of Eurojust requested by Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo; welcomes further the request to examine, and when necessary broaden, the mandate for the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to be able to prosecute such cases; welcomes also the agreement announced by the Belgian Presidency to launch a temporary crisis task force to counter Russia’s attempts to interfere in the forthcoming European elections and stresses that in the context of the upcoming European elections, all national and EU authorities must intensify their efforts to combat foreign interference to ensure the full integrity of these important elections; stresses, in this regard, that freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and compliance with the law are equally important in all democratic processes and cannot be unduly restricted;

14.  Reiterates its previous condemnation of past cases of political partnerships between far-right parties in Europe and the Russian leadership, such as the bank loan for Le Pen’s party in France, the partnership agreement between Austria’s FPÖ party and Putin’s United Russia party, as well as numerous meetings and exchanges between various elected MEPs, including the leadership of Germany’s AfD party;

15.  Expresses its concern about the Austrian espionage case, in which a former Austrian intelligence officer, Egisto Ott, who is said to be closely tied to FPÖ politician Hans-Jörg Jenewein, is accused of spying for Russia and illegally retrieving personal data from police databases, including handing over mobile phone data of former high-ranking Austrian officials to Russian intelligence;

16.  Expresses its concern about credible reports of increased Russian attempts to interfere in the upcoming elections for the Bulgarian national parliament on 9 June 2024; raises strong concerns about the existence and Russian control of a network of disinformation agents active on social media platforms, in traditional media, academia, non-governmental organisations and political parties; is extremely concerned about the numerous properties currently owned by Russian authorities in the territory of Bulgaria, some of them of strategic importance, and which serve as centres of Russian influence and leverage over the democratic processes in the country;

17.  Expresses its serious concern about a number of policies and positions of the Hungarian Government, which under the leadership of Prime Minister Orban has on numerous critical occasions assumed a pro-Russian, as well as pro-Chinese, stance;

18.  Condemns Russia’s participation in disinformation campaigns, as well as the alleged intense contacts and number of meetings between the agents responsible for Russian interference with a Catalan secessionist group; suggests that the European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats in Helsinki carry out a study; calls on the competent judicial authorities to effectively investigate the connections of the MEPs allegedly associated with the Kremlin and Russia’s attempts at destabilisation and interference in the EU and its Member States; deplores all attacks on judges investigating any interference activities;

19.  Believes that the recent allegations might constitute sanctionable behaviour under its Code of Conduct and if confirmed must be met with the firmest response; underlines the importance of immediately conducting a thorough internal investigation in order to assess all possible cases of foreign interference from Russia and other countries in the European Parliament; highlights that these revelations are part of a larger pattern of Russian interference, as highlighted in the final reports of INGE and ING2;

20.  Considers that the allegations regarding the MEPs concerned underline the need for an enhanced security culture in the European Parliament; reiterates, therefore, its call for the full implementation of the recommendations contained in its resolution of 13 July 2023 on recommendations for reform of European Parliament’s rules on transparency, integrity, accountability and anti-corruption, including mandatory security training for MEPs and staffers, appropriate security clearance and reinforced screening of staffers, in particular those attending in camera meetings; underlines that many national parliaments and international organisations have legitimate and well-functioning systems in this domain and calls for best practices to be assessed;

21.  Calls for Parliament to introduce mandatory, effective and regular training on security, interference, ethical standards, compliance and integrity for all MEPs and their offices and for all Parliament staff, raising awareness that they are potential targets of foreign state and non-state actors; calls for Parliament’s services to put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems to detect foreign interference while respecting MEPs’ freedom of mandate;

22.  Recalls that foreign interference is a systemic threat that must be countered vigorously; recalls further that, while Russia remains the main origin of foreign interference and disinformation in the European Union, other countries have also conducted such campaigns; underlines that the EU’s response to these threats can only be effective if it is based on a transversal, holistic and long-term policy approach jointly carried out by both the EU and its Member States; remains determined to follow through in its efforts to combat foreign interference in the EU in the years to come, among other things, through a dedicated parliamentary body; stresses that vigilance and protection against foreign interference are particularly necessary in the run-up to the European elections this year;

23.  Highlights the key legislation on media freedom and digital rights adopted by the European Union in recent years, such as the European Media Freedom Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act or the Digital Services Act; highlights, nevertheless, that further action is needed to stop the spread of malign disinformation online and to protect the right of European citizens to reliable news;

24.  Welcomes the adoption of the legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which includes new EU-level rules aimed at addressing money laundering risks related to politically exposed persons;

25.  Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to include in the forthcoming 14th sanction package new Kremlin-backed media outlets and other broadcasting and media organisations and individuals responsible for propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the EU;

26.  Underlines the key role of investigative journalism in revealing the attempts at foreign interference and covert activities; reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to ensure sufficient and sustainable funding for investigative journalism; strongly condemns the large-scale disinformation campaign exposed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January, purportedly orchestrated by Russia on X (formerly Twitter), with the intention of manipulating public opinion;

27.  Strongly condemns ongoing Russian efforts to abuse and falsify the historical recollection of Europe’s most tragic periods, such as the terror of the Nazi regime, in order to try to justify its current brutal, illegal and inhumane aggression and its expansionist policy, as well as its attempts to systematically spread false historical narratives;

28.  Insists on the need to do more to protect the European information environment and EU citizens’ right to access reliable information; recalls the need to establish, as stated in Parliament’s previous reports, ‘mirror clauses’ whereby the openness of the European information space to third countries would be proportionate to the access European media outlets have in these countries; underlines that the media outlets working for hostile and authoritarian regimes should not have access to European Parliament premises; insists that labelling on platforms should go beyond identifying deep fakes to also establish positive labelling using tools created by the media sector, such as the Journalism Trust Initiative; expresses, in this context, its general support for the New Deal for the Right to Information proposed by Reporters Without Borders;

29.  Believes that more efforts are needed to properly protect European democracy and strongly calls upon national authorities to fully inform citizens of the Member States concerned in the ‘Voice of Europe’ case;

30.  Notes that the ultimate goal of Russian interference is to undermine, divide and weaken the EU and to erode support for Ukraine; Stresses that the Russian Federation’s hybrid tactics do not advance Russia’s political agenda within the EU in the least, but, on the contrary, generate further momentum for the EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine in its defence against the illegal occupier;

31.  Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has exposed the massive extent of foreign manipulation of information in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, namely the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; calls for the EU and its neighbouring countries to increase their cooperation in the fight against disinformation, hybrid threats and cyber security;

32.  Calls for the European Union to be vigilant with regard to attempts by any third country, including Russia, to unduly influence its democratic processes; warns the Russian Federation that hybrid disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and influence operations already constitute serious attacks on European democracy and any physical action on European soil would constitute a dramatic escalation; calls on the Member States to expose and investigate Russian attempts to sabotage critical infrastructure; stresses the need to strengthen safeguards to protect election infrastructure, which is particularly vulnerable to physical attacks and cyberattacks before and during elections;

33.  Recalls that even in the case where the law limits the sources of political funding, Russian actors have found ways to circumvent them and offered support to their allies; recalls in particular the evidence of loans from foreign banks (such as in the case of the National Front party in France in 2016), purchase and commercial agreements (such as in the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung on 17 May 2019 about the FPÖ party and by Buzzfeed and L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 about Lega per Salvini Premier in Italy), and facilitation of financial activities (as reported by the British press in relation to the Leave.eu campaign);

34.  Condemns the fact that foreign interference campaigns are often directed against specific minorities and vulnerable groups and notes that the targeting of those minorities serves the larger purpose of undermining the appeal of democratic and equal societies;

35.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

(1) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0079. (2) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0292. (3) OJ C, C/2023/1226, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1226/oj. (4) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61. (5) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 18. (6) OJ C 125, 18.3.2022, p. 2. (7) European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, ‘Digital Services Act: – Application of the risk management framework to Russian disinformation campaigns’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2759/764631.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society (2024/2703(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0381 RC-B9-0244/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

–  having regard to the statement by the High Representative and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement of 17 April 2024 on the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law,

–  having regard to the European External Action Service statement of 4 April 2024 on the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’,

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690),

–  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part(1),

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

–  having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia of 18 April 2024 on the reintroduction of the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

–  having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly are fundamental rights enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

B.  whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

C.  whereas the European Union expects Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, to abide fully by the Association Agreement and other international commitments it has made and, in particular, to fulfil the conditions and take the steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia solely on the understanding that these steps would be taken; whereas this recommendation called on Georgia to ensure that civil society was able to operate freely (step 9) and to fight disinformation against the EU and its values (step 1), and whereas the draft law violates both objectives;

D.  whereas on 17 April 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed the so-called transparency of foreign influence law at first reading with 83 votes in favour and none against, despite mass protests by Georgian citizens, criticism from the President of Georgia, who called the draft law ‘sabotage of the country’s European path’, national and international condemnation and repeated calls from Georgia’s European partners to withdraw the draft law; whereas this law would require organisations receiving over 20 % of their funding from abroad to register within two months as ‘organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas the organisations would be subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties of up to GEL 25 000; whereas the law would seriously restrict media and civil society organisations’ ability to operate freely;

E.  whereas the legitimate aim of ensuring transparency of non-governmental organisations receiving foreign funding cannot in any way justify measures which restrict their activities, especially not in the field of democracy, the rule of law and human rights;

F.  whereas this draft law is being proposed at a time of increasing attacks against civil society and independent media in Georgia, as well as against democracy support from international donors in a seeming effort to narrow the civic space and silence critical voices in the public sphere, among other things by cutting access to foreign funding; whereas this draft law is only the latest in a series of pre-election legislative and other initiatives by the Georgian Government, which also includes the announcement of constitutional amendments to fight ‘LGBT propaganda’ and the reversal of a policy mandating gender quotas for women in parliament, which jeopardise democratic reforms and contribute to spreading disinformation about the EU, its values and policies; whereas the European Parliament has already called in previous resolutions for measures to reduce the destructive role played by oligarchic interests in Georgia’s politics and economy, including in the politically motivated persecution of journalists and political opponents such as former president Mikhail Saakashvili, for whom Parliament has called to be released on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad;

1.  Strongly condemns the re-introduction of the controversial draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ which would impose debilitating restrictions on civil society and independent media and thereby undermine the possibility of their operating freely, and has therefore been met with massive protests by the Georgian public, civil society organisations, independent media, prominent public figures and the country’s European and international partners alike;

2.  Underlines that the draft law is incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, runs against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damages Georgia’s international reputation and endangers the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration;

3.  Stresses that EU accession negotiations should not be opened as long as this law is part of Georgia’s legal order;

4.  Urges, therefore, the Georgian Parliament to halt the parliamentary proceedings leading to adoption of the law and urges the Georgian Government to honour the commitments it made in March 2023 when it announced that it would unconditionally withdraw its draft law to impose restrictions on civil society and independent media and would not propose such a law again; calls on the Government of Georgia also to abstain from submitting any further legislative proposals that contradict the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms and which would therefore run counter to the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership;

5.  Highlights that the draft law betrays the aspirations of the large majority of the Georgian people to live in a democratic society, continue democratic and rule of law reforms, pursue close cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners and commit to a path towards EU membership;

6.  Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected under all circumstances, particularly in a country aspiring to join the EU;

7.  Urges the Georgian Government to respect Georgian citizens’ constitutional rights and therefore expresses its concern about reports of riot police using disproportionate force to disperse protesters demonstrating against the controversial draft law; calls on the Georgian authorities to investigate and hold accountable those responsible for the unlawful and disproportionate use of force;

8.  Underlines that the public watchdog role exercised by civil society and independent media is essential to a democratic society and crucial in advancing EU accession-related reforms and therefore calls on the Georgian authorities to do their utmost to guarantee an enabling environment in which civil society and independent media can thrive;

9.  Denounces the fact that the Georgian Government is taking inspiration from highly controversial similar Russian legislation, such as Russia’s ‘Foreign Agents Law’, which intentionally labels and discriminates against civil society organisations and activists and has also been used to stifle opposition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and silence any remaining critical voices in the country;

10.  Recalls that the European Council of 14 and 15 December 2023 granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that this recommendation called on Georgia to ensure that civil society was able to operate freely and to fight disinformation against the EU and its values, and that the draft law violates both objectives;

11.  Reminds the Georgian Government of the commitments it made and the values and principles it subscribed to when it applied for EU membership and calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement and the President of the Commission to do the same;

12.  Invites the Commission to submit an interim assessment of Georgia’s progress related to the implementation of the nine steps indicated in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023;

13.  Calls on the Commission to promptly assess the impact of Georgia’s planned ‘foreign agent’ law on Georgia’s continuous fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark, a crucial component of the EU visa liberalisation policy;

14.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to assess the impact of this draft law on the EU’s role as a donor in Georgia and to communicate clearly to the Georgian Government and Parliament about this possible impact and its consequences for EU funding in general;

15.  Urges the Georgian Government to return to its European path, uphold its commitment to respect, strengthen and promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and genuinely engage in the full implementation of the steps required to fulfil the conditions for candidate status and EU membership, in a spirit of engagement and cooperation with Georgia’s civil society and political opposition;

16.  Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s sole oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 becoming ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the western-oriented course of the country in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

17.  Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens;

18.  Urges the Georgian Dream majority to withdraw its proposed constitutional legislation curtailing LGBTIQ rights, which represent an attack not only on the LGBTIQ community, but also on freedom of speech and a free civil society;

19.  Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to release former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds and to allow him to receive proper medical treatment abroad; emphasises that his case further highlights the importance of implementing genuine reform of the justice system;

20.  Calls for an impartial and independent long-term international election observation mission by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to monitor the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2024;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

(1) OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

European Parliament resolution of 25 April 2024 on Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response (2024/2704(RSP))

P9_TA(2024)0382 RC-B9-0235/2024

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the UN Secretary-General’s statement of 13 April 2024 regarding attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran targeting Israel,

–  having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement of 14 April 2024 on Iran’s attack against Israel,

–  having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 14 April 2024 on Iran,

–  having regard to the statement of 3 April 2024 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the attack in Damascus,

–  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1532 of 20 July 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine(1),

–  having regard to the EU terrorist list and Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP laying down the criteria for listing persons, groups and entities(2),

–  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 April 2024,

–  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly,

–  having regard to international humanitarian law, in particular the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols,

–  having regard to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,

–  having regard to the EU statement to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of 12 September 2023 on verification and monitoring in Iran in light of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),

–  having regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970,

–  having regard to Rules 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 13 April 2024, Iran attacked Israeli territory for the first time, firing over 300 drones and missiles; whereas most were intercepted by Israel, the US, the UK and France, who also provided aerial reconnaissance and defence from Jordanian soil; whereas five missiles still impacted Israeli territory, hitting the Nevatim Israeli Air Force Base and seriously injuring a seven-year-old girl from Israel’s Arab Bedouin community; whereas all 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles were intercepted before entering Israeli territory, while 105 out of 110 ballistic missiles were intercepted by Israel’s missile defence systems; whereas preceding and during the attack, Hezbollah also launched rockets towards the Golan Heights and the Houthis attacked Israeli territory;

B.  whereas on 1 April 2024, Iran’s consulate in Damascus, Syria was bombed in an air strike widely attributed to Israel that killed seven officers, including two senior Iranian generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and injured 13 others; whereas Iran’s consulate in Damascus has been reportedly used to stage 150 attacks on American and Israeli targets in the region; whereas following the bombing, Iran called for ‘punishment and revenge’; whereas the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations grant protection to diplomatic premises; whereas all UN Security Council members expressed concerns and called for de-escalation; whereas US officials confirmed that, during the night of 19 April 2024, Israel carried out some retaliatory military operations with drone attacks in the central province of Isfahan;

C.  whereas the EU, the UK, the US and others have unanimously condemned the attacks and called on both sides to de-escalate;

D.  whereas Hamas’s despicable terrorist attacks in Israel on 7 October 2023, during which its operatives brutally killed mostly civilians, abducted 253 people as hostages and took them to the Gaza Strip, with 112 of them having since been released, has had profound and detrimental effects on the stability of the entire Middle East; whereas Israel’s subsequent war against the Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip has entailed a disproportionate military response that has killed tens of thousands of civilians, including many humanitarian workers and journalists, and caused a catastrophic humanitarian situation, including unprecedented levels of famine, due to the population’s lack of safe, unhindered access to humanitarian aid; whereas the events since 7 October 2023 have had profound and detrimental effects on the stability of the entire Middle East;

E.  whereas in the occupied Palestinian territories, Iran has been supporting the terrorist organisation Hamas financially and logistically;

F.  whereas hundreds of rockets and air strikes launched by Hezbollah and its allies and Israel have hit southern Lebanon and northern Israel since 7 October 2023, displacing 60 000 Israelis and 30 000 Lebanese; whereas Israel’s air strikes in Lebanon have targeted Hezbollah and Hamas members;

G.  whereas Iran has brought militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan to Syria to quell dissent and control the Syrian regime’s territory; whereas since 7 October 2023, Iran-backed militias in Syria have stepped up the firing of drones and rockets at Israel;

H.  whereas Iran’s ally in Syria, the Assad regime, besieged, shelled and starved Yarmouk Camp, the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Syria, between 2011 and 2015, killing hundreds of civilians and displacing over 200 000 Palestinian refugees;

I.  whereas in Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have exerted nefarious political and military influence, acting outside the control of national defence authorities; whereas they have specifically targeted US military bases, as well as the Iraqi Kurdistan region; whereas a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq claimed responsibility for the strikes on 1 April 2024 against an Israeli naval base in Eilat;

J.  whereas in Yemen, Iran provides substantial support and is closely linked to the Houthi movement; whereas the Houthis’ attacks have targeted international commercial shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait since October 2023, heavily disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea and threatening global economic stability; whereas they have been holding Japan’s Galaxy Leader vessel and its crew, including three EU nationals, hostage since 19 November 2023; whereas the US and its European allies have intercepted Houthi drone attacks; whereas EU Naval Force Operation ASPIDES was created in February 2024 to protect international maritime passage; whereas the UN-led peace process in Yemen has been stalled since October 2023; whereas previous Iranian attacks, such as the seizure of the MSC Aries, a Portuguese-flagged container ship with an Estonian crew on board, in the Strait of Hormuz, pose a danger to international maritime security;

K.  whereas Iran’s nuclear programme has consistently breached the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by exceeding the limit on its uranium stockpile, elevating enrichment activities to 60 %, resuming JCPOA-restricted operations at nuclear facilities and effectively obstructing IAEA oversight; whereas on 13 September 2023, France, Germany, the UK and the US expressed grave concerns about these developments to the IAEA Board of Governors; whereas Iran warned Israel that it could review its nuclear doctrine following speculation that Israel would target Iran’s nuclear facilities;

L.  whereas Iran has provided significant military assistance, including by constructing a drone factory in Russia and delivering several thousand drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), (artillery) ammunition and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas these weapons have been used indiscriminately against Ukraine’s population and civilian infrastructure; whereas on 20 July 2023, the European Council established a new framework for restrictive measures targeting Iranian military assistance to Russia;

M.  whereas human rights defenders, peaceful protesters, journalists, artists, the LGBTIQ community, unionists and sports champions have suffered under Iran’s brutal domestic and transnational repression, including on EU soil, particularly opponents to the Iranian regime, such as former European Parliament Vice-President Alejo Vidal-Quadras, who was shot, presumably by the IRGC; whereas thousands of political prisoners are currently being held in horrendous detention conditions, many on death row; whereas Iran is one of the world’s top offenders with regard to capital punishment, as it executed at least 853 people in 2023, according to Amnesty International; whereas ethnic, religious and sexual minorities in Iran continue to face violent repression;

N.  whereas the issue of gender apartheid in Iran has been raised by UN special rapporteurs; whereas since September 2022 and the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, historical protests for women’s rights have taken place in Iran; whereas the 2023 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded to Jina Mahsa Amini and Iran’s ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement; whereas the Iranian regime has responded with an even harsher legal environment, further restricting women’s clothing and expanding gender segregation;

O.  whereas the US designated the IRGC a foreign terrorist organisation in April 2019; whereas the European Parliament has been requesting that the IRGC be added to the EU terrorist list since early 2023; whereas the IRGC have been implicated in the planning and/or execution of dozens of operations, assassinations and terrorist attacks on EU soil over the past 30 years, including the ‘Mykonos Plot’ in Berlin in 1992, the bus bombing and killing of five Israeli citizens and one Bulgarian national in Bulgaria in 2012, the murder of Iranian dissidents in the Netherlands in 2015 and 2017, a planned bomb attack on Iranian dissidents in Paris in 2018, a planned assassination of three Iranian dissidents in Denmark in 2018 and an attempted arson attack against a synagogue in Bochum, Germany in 2022; whereas some EU foreign affairs ministers made a request for sanctions against the IRGC during the Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 16 April 2024;

P.  whereas an estimated two dozen innocent EU nationals have been arbitrarily detained as part of Iran’s hostage diplomacy to extort political wins; whereas Iran has abducted dissidents outside of its own territory in order to detain or execute them in Iran;

Q.  whereas, in response to the sanctions imposed on Iran by the EU, Iran has taken retaliatory measures against Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); whereas in response, in November 2022, Parliament decided that its delegations and committees will no longer engage with Iranian authorities;

R.  whereas on 17 April 2024, the Council decided to expand its sanctions regime against Iran to include Iran’s missile and drone production; whereas the US administration has imposed new sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes;

S.  whereas despite support among part of the Iranian population being displayed by state media, the attacks by the Iranian regime have been heavily criticised by many Iranians within and outside the country; whereas measures were allegedly taken to suppress dissenting voices from expressing criticism following the attack; whereas the Iranian regime does not legitimately represent the people of Iran;

1.  Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the unprecedented drone and missile attack carried out by Iran on Israel on the night of 13 to 14 April 2024, as well as the serious escalation and threat to regional security that this represents; reiterates its full support for the security of the State of Israel and its citizens; conveys its sympathy to the family of the victim from Israel’s Arab Bedouin community, a seven-year-old girl who was seriously injured by shrapnel; condemns the simultaneous attacks perpetrated by Iran’s proxies, namely Hezbollah in the Golan Heights and the Houthi movement off the coast of Yemen;

2.  Deplores the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April 2024, which resulted in several casualties; recalls the importance of the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, which must be respected in all cases under international law;

3.  Calls on all parties to avoid any further escalation and calls for maximum restraint and de-escalation;

4.  Welcomes the EU’s decision to expand and broaden the current sanctions regime established in July 2023, including by sanctioning Iran’s supply and production of unmanned drones and missiles to Russia and the wider Middle Eastern region; demands that these sanctions be urgently put in place; calls for more individuals and entities to be sanctioned, such as the Baithe Rahbari (Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran), the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters and its commander Gholam Ali Rashid, the IRGC’s navy, Iran’s Defence Minister Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani, and Director of Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organisation Seid Nooshin; notes that the current EU sanctions only include six individuals and five entities responsible for Iran’s nuclear programme; underlines that these sanctions will need to be prolonged after July 2024; calls on the Council to prepare additional sanctions in the banking, oil and aviation sectors to be imposed in the event that the Iranian regime unacceptably escalates the situation further, and to communicate these preparatory measures in advance to the Iranian authorities; urges the Council to evaluate the latest US sanctions on Iran and consider the added value of synchronising the EU and US sanctions regimes wherever relevant and possible; underlines that these abovementioned sanctions should be coordinated with the US, the UK, the G7 and other allies to the extent possible;

5.  Reiterates its long standing call for the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to add the IRGC to the EU list of terrorist organisations and stresses that this decision is long overdue; highlights the fact that there have been dozens of IRGC assassinations and attempts on European soil in the past few years;

6.  Highlights the strong links among Iran/the IRGC, its proxies such as the Houthis, Iraqi and Syrian militias and organisations on the EU terrorist list, namely Hamas and Hezbollah’s military wing; calls on the Council and the VP/HR to add Hezbollah in its entirety to the EU list of terrorist organisations; condemns Iran’s export of drones and ammunition to support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

7.  Is highly concerned by the spiralling escalation in the region and the destabilising role that the Iranian regime and its network of non-state actors play in the Middle East; is alarmed by the severe risk of a widening regional escalation; condemns all acts by state and non-state actors that provoke or feed an intensifying escalatory cycle; urges all parties to de-escalate and to refrain from the threat or use of force in line with their international obligations, in particular under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and to exercise the utmost restraint; urges all actors to fully respect and uphold international law and international humanitarian law at all times;

8.  Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to continue and step up their diplomatic efforts with international partners, including with the Gulf countries, building on recent initiatives and in particular on the first EU-Gulf Cooperation Council High-Level Forum at ministerial level held on 22 April 2024, and to encourage urgent de-escalation and meaningful dialogue;

9.  Highlights the profound effects of the war in the Gaza Strip on the stability of the region; deplores the terrorism and war crimes committed by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups against Israel and against the Israeli and Palestinian people; calls for all Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip to be immediately and unconditionally released and for the International Committee of the Red Cross to be given immediate access to all Israeli hostages being held in the Gaza Strip, so that it can provide them with medical care; underlines Israel’s obligation to comply with international law when exercising its right to self-defence, as enshrined in the UN Charter; condemns the disproportionate Israeli military response, which has caused a civilian death toll of unprecedented scale; urges Israel to provide the Gaza Strip’s starving population with full, unhindered and safe access to humanitarian aid and to comply with orders from the International Court of Justice; highlights that finding a long-lasting political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would significantly improve the region’s stability and prospects; reiterates its unwavering support for a negotiated two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 lines with two sovereign, democratic states living side by side in peace and guaranteed security, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, and in full respect of international law;

10.  Notes that Iran, Russia and China have been increasingly sharing critical intelligence and cooperating through front companies, efforts to link their banking systems and oil transfers at sea with location devices turned off, making EU sanctions less effective; calls for improved enforcement of EU sanctions, for an urgent upgrade of automatic identification systems to counter sanctions and embargo evasion, and for increased surveillance and inspections of suspected Iranian ships;

11.  Condemns Iran’s persistent non-compliance with its legal safeguard obligations under the JCPOA and the advancement of its nuclear programme beyond all credible civilian justification; stresses that multiple credible sources have stated that Iran’s current ‘breakout time’ – the time Iran needs to produce sufficient weapons-grade plutonium – is a matter of weeks; urges the Iranian authorities to immediately abide by their obligations and address all related outstanding issues; urges the E3 (France, Germany, the UK) and its partners to consider imposing a deadline on Iran to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA and, in the event of non-compliance, to invoke collectively the snapback sanctions mechanism under UN Security Council Resolution 2231;

12.  whereas the US is incredibly concerned about the military cooperation between Iran and North Korea, in particular on nuclear and ballistic missiles; whereas there are also legitimate concerns regarding Iran’s military cooperation with Russia and Pakistan, and its enhanced cooperation with China on military technology; whereas the UN Security Council has reported on the exchange of long-range missile technologies and weaponry between North Korea and Iran, which have also been delivered to Iran’s proxies in the Middle East; whereas North Korea has supplied Iran with critical missile components, enabling the development of ballistic missiles that are capable of striking targets much further away, in effect, helping Iran turn into a missile powerhouse;

13.  Recalls that Hezbollah must disarm in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701; condemns its active role in repressing opposition voices within Lebanon and Syria, including through its assassination of several whistleblowers who reported on the explosion of the port of Beirut in August 2020; condemns Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel and Israeli air strikes in Lebanon; urgently calls on both parties to show restraint and cease hostilities so as not to further escalate tensions; calls on the Council to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organisation;

14.  Urges the EU and its Member States to consolidate and intensify all efforts to ensure the secure and immediate release of all hostages taken from the Galaxy Leader vessel, including two Bulgarian, one Romanian and three Ukrainian citizens, who have been held by the Houthis since 19 November 2023; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to step up their diplomatic outreach to this end and engage with all relevant stakeholders in order to guarantee the safe return of the captured Europeans without further delay; strongly condemns the unlawful interception, boarding and detention of the Portuguese-flagged vessel MSC Aries, along with its crew, by entities operating under the direct or indirect control of the Iranian Government; urgently requests their immediate release; welcomes the EU Council’s decision to launch the EU Naval Force Operation ASPIDES to safeguard freedom of navigation off the coast of Yemen, in close cooperation with regional actors;

15.  Condemns Iran’s hostage diplomacy; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Johan Floderus, a Swedish citizen and EU official who was arbitrarily detained in Tehran and who remains imprisoned in Iran under inhumane conditions; urges the EU to launch a strategy to counter it with a dedicated task force to better assist detainees’ families and effectively prevent further hostage-taking; calls for all non-essential travel by EU citizens to Iran to be discouraged; calls on Iran to immediately and unconditionally release all EU nationals, including the European External Action Service official Johan Floderus, as well as all other political prisoners;

16.  Condemns the sanctions imposed by the Iranian authorities against MEPs; reaffirms that as long as these sanctions on European parliamentarians persist, interparliamentary dialogue must remain suspended;

17.  Calls on the Commission to launch a broad strategy to address transnational repression by the Iranian regime in the EU and considers that the strategy should promote technical tools to prevent such repression; calls for sanctions against the family members of prominent IRGC members who study or work in the EU and for measures to prevent any harassment or intimidation of the Iranian diaspora in the EU, including on campuses; calls on the European intelligence services, CSIRTs, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre, the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and the East StratCom Task Force to actively cooperate in countering and deterring online Iranian / IRGC / Iranian Ministry of Intelligence disinformation and cyber and intimidation operations directed against the Iranian diaspora; calls on the EU Member States to actively counter Iran’s attempts to spread its revolutionary ideology on EU soil;

18.  Calls for the EU and the Member States to provide cybersecurity support and free and accessible virtual private networks (VPNs) or other circumvention tools to civil society and the opposition in Iran;

19.  Condemns the massive nationwide crackdowns by the Iranian authorities on women who violate the outrageous hijab law; notes with grave concern the recent escalation in the use of the death penalty in Iran and reiterates its call for its abolition;

20.  Expresses its full support and solidarity with Iran’s civil society and democratic forces; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for human rights defenders who need to leave Iran, including through rapid access to visas and asylum, and to provide technical support to those helping Iranian civil society, while ensuring Iranian ownership of these activities;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Government and Parliament of Iran and the Government and Parliament of Israel.

(1) OJ L 186, 25.7.2023, p. 20. (2) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93.