Official positions of the other Institutions and Organs - Council of the Union
Messina 2nd June 1995
Brussels 5th December 1995
74. The objective of the 1996 reform, as defined in the terms of reference and given the challenge of enlargement, is to ensure that the Union functions efficiently and with legitimacy; in short, the purpose is to improve the quality of the way the Union works. To this end it will be necessary to clarify its objectives and refine the instruments that serve those objectives, bearing in mind that in future the intention is not that the Union should necessarily have more powers but that it should perform its tasks better.
75. The instruments of the Union, that is to say its institutions, rules, resources and policies, are not ends in themselves but are there to serve the objectives and tasks of the Union. The aim of the reform must be to ensure that the adjustments decided at the Conference will enable the instruments of the Union to operate according to the criteria of efficiency, democracy, solidarity, transparency and subsidiarity.
76. The richness of the Union's natural diversity, transparency and greater participation by national parliaments, and the legal security of a Community on the rule of law require strict observance of equal treatment of the Union's official languages on the part of the institutions. This behaviour obligation should be reinforced without amendment of the treaties.
77. The 1996 reform must adjust the instruments of the Union so as to guarantee the improvement in their operation in the Union as it is now and in the Union that emerges from next enlargement. The reform is already necessary now, but the prospect of enlargement makes it imperative. The results of the Conference will have to be judged in this light.
General considerations
78. The Group considers it necessary that the institutional reform should consolidate the single institutional framework throughout the Union Treaty, whatever its structure may be. It is also the common view of the Group that the Union does not need to create new Institutions.
79. The Group also considers that the reform of the institutions must observe the overall institutional balance, in accordance with the specific character of the European Union. This is consistent with the adaptation of the institutions to new circumstances and needs - especially to the increase in the number of Member States - after enlargement, with their strengthening and with a better definition of their respective functions.
80. The prospect of the forthcoming enlargement makes it a matter of urgency that institutions designed for the six founding States of the Community be adapted, so that they can emerge from the Conference with renewed legitimacy: the more efficient and transparent the institutions of the Union are, the more support they receive from our citizens, the greater the benefits of all kinds that will flow from the Union to Europe and its citizens. An inappropriate or inadequate reform, on the other hand, would imperil the very nature of European integration. For this reason the negotiations for the accession of the applicant countries should not commence until the Conference has been concluded, as the European Council has pointed out.
The European Parliament
81. Composition: It seems appropriate to fix a maximum number of seats. A majority accept a maximum of 700 in an enlarged Union, as the European Parliament itself proposes in its report. It has also been suggested by some members that there should be at least enough members to ensure that major political forces of each Member State have the possibility to be represented.
82. Uniform electoral procedure: It has been recalled by the Group that Article 138(3) provides for the establishment of such a procedure in all Member States. Some members propose that this legal basis should be changed to help achieve this objective and that a final date be established for its application. Others do not consider such amendments necessary.
Legislation:
83. The EP's legislative initiative: The Group considers that the right of request established in Article 138b is broadly sufficient. Some members nevertheless point out that this Article should require the Commission to reply to the European Parliament's request.
84. Legislative procedures: The Group is in favour of reducing the variety of procedures currently in force under the Treaty, and a large majority proposes its reduction to three: co-decision, assent and consultation. Some members note that this should not imply a change of the present institutional balance.
85. Some members propose that assent should be applied where the Council decides with unanimity, specially in Treaty changes (article N), own resources, article 235 and Third Countries' agreements.
86. The Group feels it is appropriate to improve and simplify the codecision procedure without changing its nature. A large majority is in favour of extending it. Most would extend it to all legislation adopted by the Council by qualified majority. Another view focus extension to the matters currently dealt with by the cooperation procedure, whereas others suggest a case by case approach.
One member, in principle, opposes any extension.
87. Budgetary function: (see below under Resources)
88. Political control: As regards the role of the EP in the appointment of the Commission, several members see that the current approval procedure of Article 158, applied for the first time to the present Commission, represents a satisfactory balance that should not be changed. Others would prefer the EP to elect the President of the Commission from a list proposed by the European Council. (As regards political control of the Commission, see below Commission).
89. Executive control: A distinction should be made here between executive powers exercised by the Commission and those exercised by the Member States in implementation of Community law. Most members consider it appropriate to increase the EP's and the Ombudsman's powers in combating fraud and, in general, in monitoring the executive powers of the institutions.
90. Role of the EP under Titles V and VI: (see under "Freedom and Internal Security" and "Common Foreign Policy").
National parliaments
91. The Group considers that the national parliaments' principal role in relation to EU decision-making lies in the monitoring and control that each parliament exercises over its government's action in the Council. The procedures for exercising these powers are not a matter for the Union but are for each State to organize.
92. The Group also recommends that the role of national parliaments be fully respected. Therefore, national parliaments should be provided with all the necessary information of the Union and its institutions. The Group feels that the Community and the Union must not act "by surprise". Rather, an improved process of prior consultation and transparency is required, the central pivot of which must be respect for the role played by each national parliament in shaping the will of each Member State in regard to Union matters. In consequence, the institutions, specially the Commission and the Council, should conduct their work so as to facilitate the task of national parliaments. This could be reinforced by amending the Treaty and/or adopting an appropriate code of conduct, so that each national parliament receives clear and complete documentation in its official language adequately in advance (four weeks has been mentioned) on every substantial Commission legislative proposal enabling each parliament to examine and discuss it before it is discussed and decided on by the Council.
93. As for relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, the points contained in Declaration No 13 of the Treaty are especially apt. Some members referred to the possibility of giving Treaty force to some elements of Declaration No. 13.
The experience of the last few years favours a formula which has been operating adequately, namely COSAC, a conference composed of representatives of the European Affairs Committees of the national parliaments together with a delegation from the European Parliament.
The Group nevertheless has doubts about the wisdom of making this conference more institutionalized as its success is perhaps due to its informal nature. At all events, it is a body for the exchange of information and should not take decisions or replace the expression of the will of the people in each of the parliaments for which this conference is a coordinating body. Another formula is that of the growing number of contacts between specialist committees of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, especially for matters such as Foreign Affairs or Justice and Home Affairs.
In this context, the idea of the creation of a High Consultative Council made up of two representatives of each of the national parliaments has been put forward by one member. Such a body could, be consulted on Union matters outside Community competence. It could also advice the Commission on the proper application of the subsidiarity principle when preparing a proposal.
The Group shares the view that closer association of national parliaments should not result in the creation of a new institution or a permanent organ with its own staff and premises.
The majority in the Group does not recommend as a general rule the convening of Conferences of the Parliaments as referred to in Declaration No 14 on the Treaty, in the light of the experience of using this arrangement, which is not very practical.
94. Among the practical improvements that might facilitate the role of the national parliaments, some members feel it would be worthwhile for Commissioners to appear before national parliaments whenever circumstances warrant this. An idea was advanced by some representatives that the members of the Court of Auditors could also appear before national parliaments.
95. The creation of a second chamber comprising members of national parliaments has been rejected by the Group.
The European Council and the Council
96. The Group considers that the Conference must clarify and improve the role of the Council as an institution with legislative and executive functions, without detracting from other institutions and without prejudice to the institutional balance. The increase in the number of States affects the operation of this institution very directly.
The European Council
97. The Group considers that the European Council's central role is essential to the Union, as the ultimate political impulse and highest expression of the Union's political will and of its strategic policy formulation. The European Council assumed greater importance with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty when the Union acquired external policy and internal security responsibilities. The European Council is also the highest decision-making authority in the development of Economic and Monetary Union. The Group considers the leadership role of the European Council will be even more important in future in view of Europe's agenda.
The Council
98. Powers: The Group is in favour of maintaining its present functions and strengthening its capacity for action both by means of Treaty reforms and by practical improvements in the operation.
Decision-making mechanisms
* Unanimity and qualified-majority voting:
99. There is broad agreement in the Group that unanimity should remain the rule for decisions on primary law: Article N and Article O, as well as for establishing the system of the Union's own resources and their amount. All such decisions need to be ratified by national parliaments.
However, a few members have expressed concern about retaining unanimity on primary legislation in a Community enlarged to 30 members since such a procedure would render decision-making extremely difficult, and could in the future leave the Union in a state of paralysis. To resolve that problem, they point to the possibility of having some provisions of the Treaty either stipulate unanimity for a while, giving way thereafter to a more flexible decision-making mechanism, or stipulate that such a subsequent change would not take place automatically but could be adopted under a simplified procedure. The latter possibility is already envisaged in ECSC Treaty and for EMU.
100. In the case of Community legislation, a large majority in the Group is prepared to consider making qualified-majority voting the general rule, on grounds of efficiency, since it will facilitate decision-making and, according to some reduce discrepancies between the state of development attained by the internal market (qualified majority) and the policies in the social, fiscal and environmental spheres (in which unanimity is often the rule).
Some members consider exceptions warranted to safeguard sensitive interest; and one member sees no case for extending qualified-majority voting on the grounds that it would not mean more effective decision-making in comparison with unanimity.
It has been stressed by some members that the extension of qualified-majority voting would increase the efficiency of the Union only if its decisions are supported by a significant majority of the Union's citizens. In this context, those members point out to the need of adequately taking into account of population in the decision-making by the re-weighting of votes within the Council, and/or the adoption of a double significant majority of votes and citizens. Strengthening the principles of subsidiarity and adequacy of means have also been mentioned to help extension of qualified-majority voting in this context.
101. Novel arrangements steering a middle course between unanimity and qualified-majority voting have been mentioned in the Group for Council decisions on Title V and VI matters (a super-qualified majority, positive abstention, a qualified majority with a minority dispensation or consensus minus one). None of these have been explored in depth. However, it would be possible to have different decision-making procedures for the Council in such matters if they are established in the Treaty, irrespective of its structure.
* Threshold for a qualified majority and weighting of votes:
102. The European Council has decided that the 1996 Conference is to consider the question of the present qualified-majority and vote-weighting system, which currently operates in accordance with the current Treaty provisions as interpreted by the Ioannina compromise with regard to their practical implementation. The Group has been instructed to look into the matter.
103. There is a majority in the Group in favour of the 1996 Conference establishing a qualified-majority voting system through which the Union will strengthen its effectiveness and legitimacy. The Union must be able to take decisions but some members insist that it is not simply a matter of assisting the ability to decide. Its effectiveness will depend on such decisions having the backing of as many European citizens as possible. For this to be the case, the revision should keep the qualified-majority threshold at an effective level and such decisions should not leave a significant proportion of the people of Europe in a minority. However, there is no specific option enjoying broad support in the Group when it comes to putting this into practice.
104. Several members point to a gradual deterioration in popular representation in the weighting of qualified-majority voting as a result of the under-representation of the people of the more populous States and the growing number of less populous States in the Union. These members underline that this gradual deterioration feeds into decisions on policies which directly affect citizens in an integrated area. According to these members this problem seems even more serious in the view of next enlargement.
In the view of some, the answer is a new weighting of votes that takes greater account of population. On the other hand, a system of double majority of votes and population has been suggested. In this view, for some, decisions should be taken by a simple majority of States and population behind them. This implies the suppression of different weight in votes for Member States, and of the qualified majority voting system. For others, counting on population should not substitute but reinforce the qualified majority voting. For these members, besides reweighting of votes, the Conference should establish the significant proportion of Union's population that should allow decisions by qualified majority system.
105. In any event, several members have voiced objections to the arguments in support of greater account being taken of the population criteria in qualified majority voting. Some have pointed out that the entire integration process rests on the fundamental principle of sovereign equality of States, with the present voting system already representing a concession under that principle. Others have taken the view that the present voting takes due account of population, arguing that in any case the institution which represents the people is the European Parliament.
These members also emphasize that the smaller and medium sized Member States do not act as a block and that there is little if any prospect of Governments representing a majority of the Union's citizens being outvoted.
One member has stated that the present balance is satisfactory and should be maintained; but, since the enlargement will bring into the Union mainly small countries, keeping the present formula would weaken the position of the larger Member States, and, consequently, the number of votes granted to the last ones should accordingly be increased but without retaining a precise proportion between votes and population.
Organization and working methods
106. Aside from the growing imbalance pointed to by some in the voting mechanism, which they believe impairs the legitimacy of Council decisions, a broad majority in the Group sees a gradual deterioration both in the organization of the Council and in its working methods, devised for a smaller number of Member States. Both can be improved without revising the Treaties, although certain aspects of them, such as the role of the Council Presidency, are dealt with by the Treaty and this is therefore discussed as a separate issue.
The Group points to the need for the General Affairs Council to regain its role of general coordination of the Union's affairs, ensuring overall consistency in Council actions in all areas of the Treaty. With that end in view, some members of the Group have suggested practical improvements, such as the possibility of the General Affairs Council meetings being held at two levels: a preparatory level, composed of Ministers for European Affairs, and full-member level, which would concentrate on the most important issues. The Group also advocates greater consistency in the committees paving the way for Council meetings. In this context, several members were concerned to maintain the specific roles of these committees. A large majority recommends strengthening Coreper in its key role of coordinating and preparing for Council meetings in order to ensure their overall consistency.
In addition, the Group recommends that consideration be given to fresh approaches to preparatory work for the Council with the next enlargement in prospect. The possibility should here be looked into of replacing some stages of discussions in working parties by a written procedure. These ideas should be given further consideration.
Publicity
107. The Group notes that substantial progress has been made in making the workings of the Council more open. Following the 1993 Council rules of procedure, many Council votes are now published, and there has been a number of public Council debates. Most recently, the Council decision in October establishes much greater access to Council minutes (when the Council is acting as legislator) and minutes statements.
However, the Group agrees that further progress could be made. Several members maintain that the Council should meet in public whenever it is acting as a legislative authority. Several members in the Group favour extending the Council rules of procedure, to provide that Council votes on legislation be made public in all cases and not, as at present, unless the Council decides against; and that the initial debates on significant legislative questions should all in principle be made public.
Others, while sharing a will for transparency, point out that it is not easy in practice to separate the Council's discussions acting as legislator from its deliberations as a political institution with executive powers. They emphasize that what is involved in practice is a continual, intensive task of negotiation, which should not be performed in public if it is to remain genuine.
Presidency
108. The Group highlights the important role of the Presidency and its fundamental responsibilities for the conduct of the Council's affairs. The majority in the Group takes a positive view of the six-monthly rotating Presidency system under the Treaty (Article 146 EC, Article 27 ECSC and Article 116 EURATOM) since it fosters a sense of belonging and the urge to excel on the part of those holding office.
However, the present system applied to a 30-member Union would mean that each member serves as President only every 15 years. For some there could also be problems concerned with the accession of very small States. The Group has therefore considered different possible arrangements. One proposal has been the idea of a team-Presidency consisting for instance of four member States acting for a period of at least 12 months. Within the limits of the present Treaty there are practical improvements which must be given more careful study.
The Commission
Powers
109. Exclusive right of legislative initiative: The Group considers that maintenance of the Commission's monopoly of initiative is a fundamental aspect of the institutional balance of the Community. It will be exercised without prejudice to the right of request under the Treaty and the possible inclusion of an obligation to reply.
It is broadly accepted that legislative proposals should lapse at the end of the term of the European Parliament if they are not expressely confirmed by the Commission.
Moreover, some members have suggested that the Commission set a time limit to some proposals on a case-by-case basis ("sunset clause"): those Commission proposals should include the period of validity of the provisions proposed, with a date laid down for expiry or review, and/or should lapse after a fixed space of time, if not adopted by then.
110. Guardian of the Treaties: The Group is in favour of retaining this role.
111. Executive powers: The large majority of the Group is in favour of retaining the present system of responsibilities, in which the Commission shares executive powers with the Council. One member has put forward the idea of transferring executive powers of the Commission to special agencies. The broad majority of the Group considers that it is for the Commission as a college to exert its powers in full responsibility.
The Group also agrees that more needs to be done to ensure full and even implementation of EC law and obligations.
112. Powers of the Commission under Titles V and VI: These are dealt with in commenting on those Titles of the Treaty.
Composition of the college
113. The Group considers that a suitably constituted college of Commissioners is a fundamental aspect of the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission as an institution able to lend its proposals overall consistency and able to identify the different sensibilities and interests affected by each of its proposals.
114. In considering the various options for the composition of the college, the Group has attempted to identify proposals avoiding a confrontation between States with larger and smaller populations, while endeavouring to achieve a result providing greater democracy, greater effectiveness and a higher profile for this important institution. In the light of these considerations, it identifies basically two possible approaches set out hereunder.
115. One option would be to retain the present system under the Treaty. This arrangement has the advantage of ensuring at least a Commissioner per Member State, thus fostering their citizens' sense of belonging. Some members of the Group have pointed out, that they would have difficulty in supporting any revision as a result of which they did not have a Commissioner of their own nationality.
The drawback of this arrangement, in the view of some, is that an institution originally designed for a nine-member college now has 20 members and in a 30-member Union would have at least 36. The problem posed by such a large number of Commissioners is the difficulty of warranting portfolios of any real substance in a Commission which is not going to increase proportionally the number of its powers. This will give less importance to the members of a college which will be not only greater in number but also much more heterogeneous and thus likely to be less consistent in its decisions.
Its advocates, on the other hand, believe that these problems are surmountable. An enlarged College can strengthen its internal consistency and collegiality by adapting its working methods and, if necessary, its decision-making procedures. Its efficiency could be also increased by allowing greater authority for its President, and through an increased parliamentary monitoring. In support of their arguments, they point out that some Member States' Governments are composed of over 36 Ministers. Lastly, they maintain that the Community should not opt out of its complexity in as much as it ensures the safeguarding of its diversity. The presence of Commissioners of all nationalities is not the simplest course but it allows such diversity to be preserved.
116. An alternative option is to ascertain the appropriate number of Commissioners to perform the Commission's duties consistently and effectively. They would then be fewer than the number of Member States. This option has the advantage of visibility and consistency, it restores to the Commission its collegiate nature and independence, it avoids proliferation, bringing savings in human and financial resources, and it would give the Commission a higher profile, as the Institution that safeguards the general interests of the Community.
Its drawbacks have been pointed out in describing the advantages of the previous option: it fails to ensure the presence of Commissioners of all of the Union's nationalities at all times.
In its supporters' view, this option should not involve any discrimination since the Commissioners should be chosen by the President of the Commission (who would be chosen by the Parliament, acting on a proposal from the European Council, and subsequently invested, together with the entire college, by the Parliament) on their merits, from a list of three candidates put forward by each of the Member States. This system would make for a higher-quality membership of the college.
117. Set against these two approaches other possible arrangements have been mentioned:
118. Another idea that has been put forward is the possibility of the college in future being composed of two kinds of Commissioners, seniors members and voting or non-voting juniors commissioners. This proposal is, in principle, favourably considered by some members as a possible way of enriching or approaching the afore mentioned options, and should be given further examination in the Conference.
Accountability of the Commission
119. A majority in the Group favours making the Commission more accountable to the European Parliament. Some members propose the possibility of individual motions of censure of Commission members by the Parliament, but others object to this on the grounds that such a possibility would undermine the collegiate nature of the Commission. Some members advocate establishing procedures to improve the accountability of the Commission to the Council.
Other institutions and bodies
Court of Justice
120. The Group agrees on the need to strengthen the Court's role, highlighting the part played by the Court in watching over a Community based on the rule of law, in ensuring legal uniformity in the interpretation of Community law and in guaranteeing the protection of individual citizens' rights.
A majority of representatives are in favour of stepping up its role in the fields of justice and home affairs on grounds of legal certainty, in order to ensure the protection of individual rights which might be affected in those fields. A few have suggested the possibility of enabling the Court to enforce more swiftly the penalties it may impose.
One member argues, however, that ECJ judgments can lead to consequences that are considered disproportionate in their effect. This member suggests that the Conference should examine possible limits to member States economic liability when a member State has genuinely attempted to comply with Community law and the application of national time limits in such cases. This representative also suggests that the Conference should consider limits on the retrospective effect of judgements and the establishment of a right of appeal.
A proposal that the Court should speed up its procedures and improve its translation facilities was favourably received by the Group.
The Group has not been able to deepen the valuable ideas put forward by the Court in its report. A broad majority in the Group is prepared to recommend consideration of the amendment of Article 188 proposed by the Court in order to be able to adopt rules of procedure, which other institutions and bodies are already able to do.
121. As regards the Court's composition and number of members, a majority of representatives think the term of office of Judges should be extended to nine years, with no possibility of reappointment. With a view to future enlargement of the Union some take the view that the number of Judges, should be fewer than the Member States in order to ensure efficiency and consistency. Others take the line that all States should have a Judge at the Court so that all legal systems of Member States are represented. A middle course put forward is that, for the purposes of national participation, not only Judges should count but Advocates-General as well.
Court of Auditors
122. The Group note the key role of the Court in taking effective action against fraud and financial mismanagement of the Community budget.
Proposals have been put forward to make explicit the duty of States' internal official bodies and of national audit boards to cooperate with the Court of Auditors and also to make clear its ability to audit the Union's accounts for foreign policy and for justice and home affairs. The possibility has been expressed of the European Parliament being more directly involved in the appointment of the Court's members. Some members have also suggested that it should be granted a right of access to the Court of Justice for the protection of its prerogatives.
The Group makes the point that more effective action against fraud is also and primarily a matter for the Member States.
Committee of the Regions
123. The majority of the Group underlines the importance of the role played by this body representing the regions and local authorities and fostering throughout the whole territory of the European Union a further sense of belonging. It is also, however, argued by some that, as an innovative acquisition of the Union, it needs to be given time to fullfledge its effectiveness before consideration is given to developing it further.
The majority view is that it could be provided with administrative machinery of its own, that its consultative functions could be better used and possibly extended and that the European Parliament should have the right to consult it. Some members argue for it to be given active legal capacity before the Court of Justice in order to safeguard its prerogatives and one representative would like such capacity to be extended to the bringing of proceedings for infringement of the principle of subsidiarity.
Economic and Social Committee
124. A broad majority points to its role in social dialogue and appreciates its contribution as a consultative committee in economic and social matters, the abilities of which should be better exploited at the consultative stage in preparation for legislative action. One member, however, questions the future role of the Committee given the increased use of white and green papers and other possibilities for direct consultation.
Acts
Article 235
125. The Group is not in favour of incorporating a catalogue of the Union's powers in the Treaty and would prefer to maintain the present system, which establishes the legal basis for the Union's actions and policies in each individual case. It is therefore in favour of maintaining Article 235 as the instrument for dealing with the changing nature of interpretation of the Union's objectives. Some members have suggested incorporating the EP assent requirement in Article 235.
Hierarchy of acts
126. The Group has analyzed this question in accordance with the brief contained in Declaration No 16 annexed to the Treaty and identified two positions:
Among those in favour of a hierarchy of acts, some stress that directives should be retained as best suited means to abide with the principle of subsidiarity.
Powers of execution (committee procedure)
127. On this subject, which the interinstitutional "modus vivendi" of 20 December 1994 identified as one to be dealt with by the Conference, there are the following positions:
128. In any case, a large majority in the Group is in favour of simplifying the present committee procedure, which is already complicated and confused and will not survive beyond the next enlargement. The need to improve the quality of the rules adopted under these procedures was also emphasized.
In any event, revision of the 1987 Decision on committee procedure does not require reform of the Treaty and therefore consideration must be given to the improvements which can be introduced before the Conference. In this context, one member has suggested the idea of introducing a standard set of internal rules of procedure to apply to all committees.
Monitoring the implementation of acts
129. The Group considers that the Commission should make full use of the powers conferred upon it by Article 171 regarding penalties for failure to comply with Community law. Some propose that Article 171 be amended to enable the Court of Justice, at the Commission's request, to impose penalties on Member States in default, without the need for the second court case currently required.
130. Some members suggest that the EP's powers in this area should be strengthened by means of Investigative Committees empowered to convene and request explanations from Community, and even national, authorities. It was also pointed out that the Commission should make periodical reports on procedures of infractions.
131. On the other hand, a majority suggests making it obligatory for the Commission to produce annual reports on the effectiveness of policies implemented.
132. Some members also propose allowing private individuals more effective means of action to appeal against failure to comply with Community legislation.
Combating fraud
133. The Group wants the Community institutions to be more effective in combating fraud, improving financial control of the Community budget, ensuring value for money and full compliance with Community law.
A large majority believes that the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors should make full use of their responsibilities in combating fraud which, according to some, could be reinforced. All institutions and bodies must be subject to proper control.
It also must be recalled that often fraud cases appear within the Member States at regional and local level. As pointed out in the chapter on Justice and Internal Security several members of the Group suggested a harmonized rule in the national penal codes punishing fraud against the Community budget.
Resources
134. The 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure provides for examination of these questions on the occasion of 1996 Conference.
Own resources
135. Most members of the Group do not want the IGC 96 to deal with these questions. They point out that there is already another session planned for 1999, the year in which the present Financial Agreement expires. All aspects of the system of resources should be examined at that time. Any other course of action would unnecessarily complicate the agenda for the 1996 Conference and run the risk of delaying the European agenda scheduled to follow the Conference. The Community has always adopted a stage-by-stage approach and accumulating tasks for the IGC 96 would lead to a general debate about the future of Europe which would prove unmanageable.
136. Some members note, however, that the system of own resources is one matter and the amounts involved another, and that the Conference is the proper time to lay down in the Treaty, if so desired, the legal bases for a new system of the Community's own resources and the participation of the Community Institutions in these decisions.
As for possible revision of the system of contributions to the Community budget, some members advocate introducing a new revenue system which takes account of the relative prosperity of the various Member States, with several of them wanting the Conference to reduce the lack of consistency between the EP's powers with regard to expenditure and its present very limited role in revenue arrangements. Others defend the present system as reasonable.
137. At least one member is in favour of incorporating multiannual financial programming in the Treaty. A clear majority would prefer to keep it outside the main framework in the more flexible domain of interinstitutional agreements.
Budgetary procedure
138. In addition to the fairly general wish to simplify the procedure (abolition of one of the readings), the proposal made by some members to reduce the lack of consistency between the EP's budget powers with regard to expenditure and those with regard to revenue has already been mentioned. In the case of expenditure, some members propose simplifying the procedure by removing the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. Most members, are, however, against removing the CE/NCE distinction. Some suggest an intermediate approach for improving the balance of budget powers between the Council and the Parliament which would involve giving the latter some latitude to intervene in CE, perhaps in the form of a percentage.
Monitoring expenditure
139. As we saw earlier, a broad majority is in favour of strengthening the role of the Court of Auditors in the fight against fraud and establishing closer cooperation with national audit bodies. According to some members Ecofin and Budget Council should have more control over spending activities when dealt with in the Council.
Policies
140. The general feeling within the Group is that the Community should try to do not more but better.
141. In accordance with Declaration No 1 annexed to the TEU, the Group has analyzed the possibility of including the spheres of energy, tourism and civil protection in common policies and, although several members consider that specific Community action in one or another of those subjects is of great interest, a majority has reached the conclusion that it would probably be more appropriate in these spheres simply to envisage greater cooperation between the Member States. One member holds the opinion that article 3t should be deleted.
142. Several members think it necessary to incorporate a provision in the Treaty dealing specifically with support for the outermost and island regions of Member States of the Union. Some members point out that the Treaty should highlight the importance of local development.
143. Some members have suggested extending Article 113 to cover commercial policy as a whole and therefore including services and intellectual property. Other members recall the importance that they attach to the Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice.
144. Finally, some members have noted that maintaining Article 235 will make it possible, when appropriate, to embark on new spheres of Community action while complying with the limits of the Treaty.
145. Some members consider that the requirement of a high level of consumer protection should be taken into account also in other Community policies and that Article 129a should be revised accordingly.
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