Official positions of the other Institutions and Organs - Council of the Union
Messina 2nd June 1995
Brussels 5th December 1995
146. The profound changes which occurred in Europe at the end of the cold war have radically altered the scenario of international relations hitherto operating in the world. The threat posed by rival blocks facing each other has receded and has given way to new roles of the main actors on the international political scene and to an overall more secure, but also more unstable situation. The European Union must assume increased responsibilities in this new context and thus has to face new challenges confronting it. This requires the Union to give itself the means appropriate to more effective and coordinated external action.
147. The next enlargement is clearly a response to the new responsibilities but it in turn poses a challenge to the Union. Enlargement will undoubtedly make for political stability and security for the people of Europe but it will bring a qualitative change to the internal and external dimension of the Union. Preparations must be accomplished inter alia by clarifying the objectives and strengthening the instruments of the Union's external action.
148. In evaluating the experience from a complete new Title (V) on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), introduced by Maastricht into the TEU, the Group has drawn the following two conclusions. First, despite the short period of time which has elapsed, some positive results, such as the Stability Pact, have been achieved. Second, shortcomings in the operation of Title V and problems of a lack of overall consistency in coping with the new challenges have been detected.
The Group does not share, however, a common view of the causes of these shortcomings and problems. For some this is partly due to the lack of running-in time of a novel part of the Treaty yet to be developed or to the creation of excessively high and as yet unfulfillable expectations; for others there is a lack of political will and inertia of attitudes; for the majority there is also a structural problem of a mismatch between fairly ambitious, albeit somewhat vague, objectives and inadequate instruments for achieving them. Still others blame the shortcomings mainly on the current functioning of the Institutions and on the inadequate structural cohesion of a Treaty organized into "pillars".
Some members have pointed here to a readily discernible distinction between two kinds of Union external action: one working satisfactorily and the other with a long way to go. The first is the external dimension of Community policies and the second the CFSP. Many members see the real problem with the CFSP as lying in the disjunction between the external political and external economic dimensions of the Union. They have emphasized the lack of synergy and coordination between the first and second "pillars" and the paradox whereby matters of great moment with far-reaching economic implications, both for the Member States and for their citizens, are decided successfully by a qualified majority under the first "pillar", whereas others of less substance and consequence require a consensus under the CFSP. According to some, recent practice shows that the current functioning of the "pillars" does not make for increased consistency between actions undertaken under them but that, on the contrary, there is a risk of spill-over from the second "pillar" to the first, which reduces the efficiency of the Union and which could weaken the "acquis". Some are equally concerned by the opposite effect.
149. In view of the interdependent and global nature of today's world, many members call for a global approach to overcome inconsistencies between the external dimension of the Community and foreign policy proper. According to them, the weakness of Title V lies in the current separation between political, economic and military aspects. They highlight a need for greater consistency in all aspects of external action so that the Union's political weight matches its economic strength.
In order that the Union can ensure the member States the influence which it must exercise, bearing in mind their collective importance in economic and political fields, it is necessary both to make the most of the potential synergies between the different strands of external relations, and to ensure the effectiveness of each of the elements and of the Union as a whole.
150. To correct these problems and to facilitate the synergies required, the following ideas have been put forward:
151. In any event, it has been pointed out that decisions with political impact are taken in both CFSP and Community matters and that the Council is always involved; and that, once a decision has been taken, the Commission is required to take account of it in carrying out its executive role, regardless of whether the decision was taken under the first or second "pillar". The purpose of the reform is to ensure that Union external actions are clearly perceived as forming a harmonious whole.
For some representatives that idea should be expressly enshrined in the TEU by spelling out in Articles J.2 and J.3 that common positions and joint actions are binding on the Commission.
For other members, it should rather be emphasized that decisions under all "pillars" are taken within a single institutional framework in which all institutions participate and where the European Council provides guidelines. The day-to-day coordination of external action in order to ensure consistency between the Community and CFSP frameworks is, pursuant to article C, a matter for the Commission and the Council. To reinforce this, Article J.8, paragraph 2 might name not only the Council, but also the Commission, as having responsibility for ensuring consistency of external action decided in both the Community and CFSP frameworks. The necessary coordination between the two institutions, to this effect, must be ensured.
The need for greater consistency should also inform preparations for Council proceedings, clarifying the relationship between Coreper and the Political Committee. In that sense some members consider that Coreper's coordinating and central role as the preparatory committee for the whole of the areas within the Council's competence should be reinforced in the Treaty.
152. With a view to rectifying shortcomings in the operation of Title V, the Group considered the various stages of the realization of the CFSP, i.e. formulation, decision-making and implementation. Unlike the Community decision-making process, in the CFSP area it is not easy to distinguish clearly between the various stages, so that it would not be realistic to use a rigid structure basedonasuccessive distribution of tasks, since they intertwine. From a methodological viewpoint, it would nonetheless seem desirable to look at each one of them separately.
The formulation stage: setting up of an analysis unit
153. Regarding the preparatory stage of common foreign policy, the majority of the Group agrees that an analysis, forecasting, early warning system and planning unit should be set up. Thus, the necessary follow-up to crisis situations could be ensured from the outset; possible response and decision options could be considered and prepared. Such a unit could, moreover, encourage a common vision and greater cooperation among the Member States. The latter and the Commission should in the unit share the information they possess so that correct analyses of the situations may be done. In principle, setting up such a body does not necessarily require reform of the Treaties.
As regards the unit's composition and location, most representatives advocate locating it in the General Secretariat of the Council, with a strengthening of its structures. Those in favour of this option point to the merit of abiding by the present institutional framework by not creating any new bodies, and highlight the advantage of situating the unit at the Council on account of the central role played by the States within the CFSP. As stated above, a broad majority of members point at the same time to the need to involve the Commission in forecasting and analysis, by establishing a close link with the General Secretariat of the Council in order to avoid inconsistency between the political dimension and the external economic dimension of the Union. For a large majority, it is understood that the unit should include Commission staff as well as staff from the national foreign ministries.
Regardless of the location chosen, certain members see a case for some form of link or coordination between the unit and the WEU.
It is widely considered that, far from developing into a new institution, the analysis and forecasting unit ought to be a preparatory body and therefore have no formal right of initiative, which could be a source of conflict or confusion of powers between Member States, the Council and the Commission.
Decisions
154. With regard to decision-making procedures, some state that the failure to use qualified majority voting is one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the CFSP, which is why more general use should be made of such a procedure in this sphere, particularly given the prospect of enlargement. Others take the view that consensus and the right of veto are essential in matters which lie so close to the heart of national sovereignty and that unanimity does not prevent important decisions from being taken.
As intermediate options, the Group explored ad hoc arrangements such as unanimity with "positive or constructive abstention", "unanimity minus one", "super-qualified majority", qualified majority with dispensation of the minority, general platforms of decisions taken by unanimity to be followed in their specifics by qualified-majority voting, in order to overcome the risk ofdeadlockin a field in which the Union needs decision-making capability. It is understood that constructive or positive abstention would involve political solidarity and, according to some, also financial solidarity with the decision taken. Those ideas should be examined further by the Conference. There is widespread agreement on the need to have more frequent recourse to the possibilities for majority voting laid down in the TEU.
It should be commonly agreed whether, and if so, how to provide for the possibility of flexible formulae which will not prevent those who feel it necessary to take for the Union a joint action from doing so.
155. The efficiency imperative will succeed only if the legitimacy of decisions in this area is assured. Given that in some cases it might not be acceptable for a State to be put into a minority, many of those in favour of the adoption of decisions by qualified majority favour as a further arrangement the recognition that a fundamental or vital national interest may prevent a common position or action. According to some members, this approach should be tempered by the need for prior definition of the concept of vital interest and the circumstances in which it applies.
Implementation: management and administration
156. Because of the specific nature of the CFSP, instead of implementation, (which is a matter for the Member States and/or the Council and - within areas falling within its jurisdiction - for the Commission), we should really use the terms management or administration, depending on whether we want to highlight internal or external aspects respectively. To achieve this, the Group identifies various possible approaches: either the CFSP might be personified in the guise of a "Mr or Ms CFSP", or through arrangements which keep the central role of the Presidency in the external representation and implementation of the CFSP; another possibility would be to reinforce the Commission's role and responsibilities in this area.
Personification of CFSP
157. In order to find an answer to the problem of stability and continuity in the Union's external representation, the Group examined the possibility of embodying the CFSP behind the figurehead of a "Mr or Ms CFSP". Three main options were identified:
158. Some members consider that this function would devolve, at least in time, upon the Commission. The advantage would be that it would be better able to ensure consistency with external economic measures and to call directly on Commission resources and means to implement foreign policy. While situating such a person in the Commission, possibly with a special status given by the European Council the advocates of this option recognize that CFSP management would, in any case, require a method for the Institutions to work in common and an ad hoc system of voting within the Council in line with the arrangements outlined above.
159. For the majority, this would be someone in the Council. They consider that this approach is more in keeping with the central role which States have within the framework of the Council in relation to the CFSP. Two variants, which are not respectively incompatible, have been identified:
Within this variant the High Representative must be clearly subordinate not only to the European Council but also to the General Affairs Council and to the Presidency.
Some propose that this "Mr CFSP" attends the Commission when it discusses matters relating to external action.
160. A synthesis option would be that the President of the Council together with the Commission, takes direct charge of CFSP affairs assisted by a Secretary-General of the Council who would head the analysis and planning unit and have increased functions. This option would be even more effective if the Secretary of the WEU and the Secretary-General of the Council were one and the same person.
161. There is no consensus on the personification of CFSP. Many members stress that the formula decided upon must allow for a higher profile for the Union without introducing additional confusion over functions or creating a conflict between the powers of this new personality and those of the Council Presidency, nor fragmenting the unity of the existing institutional framework. Lastly, they do not want this "Mr or Ms CFSP" to contribute to increased inconsistency between the "pillars".
162. Various representatives insist that, over and above the alternatives described, the central role of the Presidency must be maintained in the external representation and implementation of CFSP and should not be impaired through any external representation figure. Such is the current approach of the Treaty, although the Union's enlargement and growing external responsibilities make it advisable to consider ways of bolstering the Presidency by means of better utilization of the Troika or, as some representatives see it, by means of some innovative Presidency formula, either in the form of teams or by other arrangements ensuring participation, democratic legitimacy and continuity in the exercise of the Presidency. It was also underlined that coordination between the Presidency and the Commission must in any case be strengthened and that this should also be done structurally.
Other questions
163. As regards the financing of the CFSP, there is consensus in the Group on the need to establish specific procedures ensuring the availability of the funds necessary for rapid action when required. In any event, solidarity in general and, according to many members, financial solidarity in particular should underlie financial arrangements and therefore be applicable to possible cases of "positive abstention" or "opting out". The view is taken by a broad majority that the CFSP should be financed from the Community budget. For some members, this would imply the approvalbytheEuropean Parliament of the broad outline of outlays related CFSP.
164. The majority consider that the role of the European Parliament cannot be the same in this area as in Community legislation, since national parliaments do not use the same mechanisms of participation in framing and monitoring foreign policy as in their legislative work or in domestic control. However, some members think the present Treaty provisions should be better developed in practice, centring on the European Parliament's right to be informed in this respect. Others think it necessary to go further and involve Parliament more closely in determining the broad lines of the CFSP and in controlling the Union's external political affairs by means of arrangements in the Treaty ensuring confidentiality.
Several members point out that the EP should not under any circumstances be given powers in this area in which governments conduct their foreign policy without prior authorization from Parliament, except in cases of extreme gravity. At least one member is against any increase in Parliament's role in this sphere.
165. It is not easy to distinguish which of the above options can be achieved by means of simple, practical improvements in operation and which of them require amendment of the Treaties. In fact it will depend upon the degree of political will achieved at the Conference. The creation of an analysis unit does not in principle require amendment of the Treaty. According to some, neither does the creation of a personality symbolizing the management of CFSP appear to require any institutional change. The question is whether the creation of such a personality does or does not in practice require the strengthening in the Treaty of consistency between Title V and the other functions of the Union. Furthermore, the best practical organization of the Presidency has its limits in Article 146 of the Treaty. If it is not amended and special arrangements made for CFSP, the single institutional framework will necessarily have to be retained for all aspects of the Union.
The Group recommends a global approach to assess the impact of each of these arrangements on the functions of the Union as a whole.
Elements for reflection
166. The new international situation and prospects for enlargement lead to a more just and secure European order but also pose new challenges to the security of the Union. These challenges require a collective response to the new risks and crises which can affect Member States' security. Their multifaceted nature calls also for a global approach ensuring consistency between the various aspects of the Union's external action, based on a comprehensive concept of security.
The Group therefore believes that the Conference could examine ways to further develop the European identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development should proceed in conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into consideration the Treaty provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
167. Provisions of the TEU to be revised in 1996 also include those dealing with links with WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union. On 14.11.95 WEU Ministers approved and transmitted to the EU a WEU contribution to the IGC on the experience acquired since Maastricht (regarding both WEU's relations with the EU and with NATO and its operational development) and on the possible future development of the European Security and Defence Identity. In its reflection, the Group has been fully aware of this WEU work.
168. Apart from the classic collective defence of territorial integrity, the cooperation on security and defence matters which the new challenges require is also directed at preventing conflicts and managing regional crises which stem from a large variety of political, economic, ecological, social or humanitarian factors. While both types of task may become intertwined in practice, it must also be pointed out that, as we shall see below, some Member States of the Union, which are not members of military alliances, wish to contribute to European security by participating in humanitarian, peacekeeping and other crisis management operations (the so-called Petersberg tasks), but without entering into collective defence commitments such as those defined in Art. 5 of the Brussels and Washington Treaties. These two facts will have to be taken into account when considering future arrangements for European security and defence cooperation.
169. In the view of many members of the Group, the gradual development of a European Security and Defence Identity agreed by the members of WEU at Maastricht must be given fresh impetus in order to establish the mechanisms permitting a European response to such crises, including through military operations to supplement the political, economic or humanitarian action decided on within the CFSP framework.
170. The means needed for such European operations must be to hand:
The EU "peace corps" suggested by some members of the Group (see above) could, were the idea to be accepted, play a role in this regard. Its relationship with existing or planned humanitarian capabilities, including those of WEU, would need to be considered.
171. The Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link continue to play a fundamental role in European security. The Alliance guarantees the collective defence of its members and also contributes through other tasks to the security of the continent. For this reason, the Conference will have to take account of the fact that, in the view of NATO members, the development of a European Security and Defence Identity should strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and include a development of Euro-Atlantic relations.
The prospect of an eastward enlargement implies qualitative as well as quantitative changes for the security and defence of the Union. The enlargement of the EU, WEU and NATO will proceed autonomously according to their respective internal dynamics and processes. Each organization should ensure that their respective processes are transparent and mutually supportive of the goal of enhancing European stability and security.
172. Participation in military operations in the framework of the Petersberg tasks will remain a matter for national decision. The majority of members strongly feel that the principle of national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between European countries on defence matters and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues should be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus. Some representatives consider that the consensus rule should not exclude the possibility of European supranational bodies playing a certain role in defence matters in the future. Others wish the IGC to consider all possible options in this respect, including majority-voting.
In case present decision-making procedures are preserved, it would seem appropriate in the view of some members to introduce some element of flexibility in this sphere. To that end, the possibility has been suggested of applying a non-binding principle to the effect that, while no one can be obliged to take part in military action by the Union, neither should anyone prevent such action by a majority group of Member States, and this without prejudice to the required political solidarity and adequate financial burden sharing.
173. Some members, while indicating that the range of institutional options identified for future EU-WEU relations would be of assistance to the IGC negotiators, saw a need to identify at this stage the purposes and principles that should govern developments in this regard. In particular, in response to Europe's new security challenges, developing the Union's capabilities in such areas as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations was identified as a priority. These members attached importance to the concern that all the Member States of the Union, whether or not they are members of a military alliance, should be in a position to contribute to the European security through the Petersberg tasks. Some members of the Group also welcomed the fact that, in all of the options identified below, consideration was given to how to accommodate those partners not in a position to enter into Article V type commitments, and that the Group had examined ways to address this situation.
Options for future EU-WEU relations
174. Working from these general premises and taking note of Declaration 30 of Maastricht, the Group agrees on the need to continue improving the relationship between the EU and WEU, while fully respecting all Member States' national defence policies. In this context, the WEU Contribution to the IGC reaffirms the agreement of all WEU Member States to strengthen the EU-WEU institutional and operational links, together with WEU's operational capabilities.
Nevertheless, different views have emerged within the Group (as in WEU) on how this relationship should be developed in the future. In this respect, a number of options and modalities have been put forward in the Group's discussion, although most representatives were open to consider several interrelated options.
175. One view advocates maintaining full autonomy of WEU in the foreseeable future. According to this view, such autonomy allows maximum flexibility for participation by all Member States in developing the European Security and Defence Identity and avoids weakening the defence commitments within NATO and WEU, taking into account the differing memberships of these organizations and the Union.
In this context, the option of an EU-WEU "reinforced partnership" has been proposed, aimed both at establishing closer political (EU/WEU back-to-back Summits) and administrative relations (coordination of Presidencies and Secretariats) between the two organizations and at developing WEU operational capabilities for crisis management tasks to complement NATO, while allowing for participation in such tasks of the widest possible range of European States.
176. Another view advocates a greater role of the Union in the Petersberg tasks while at the same time preserving WEU as a separate defence organization. The development of operational capabilities necessary for the implementation of these tasks would proceed as a matter of urgency in view of Europe's new challenges. Two options have been mentioned in this context:
177. The majority of representatives see the way to the establishment of a genuine European Security and Defence Identity as lying in the gradual integration of WEU into the EU, in parallel with the development of European operational capabilities. In this way, the European defence function (both for crisis management tasks and for the collective defence guarantee embodied at present in the Brussels Treaty) would in time be incorporated into the single institutional framework of the Union. According to this view, EU-WEU integration responds to the logic of Maastricht, would reflect the solidarity amongst Europeans (which cannot be solely confined to the economic sphere) and would be the best way to achieve coherence between the CFSP and the defence policy, thereby allowing for better coordination between the various instruments of crisis management (political, economic, humanitarian, as well as military) available for effective action by the Union in crisis situations such as that of the former Yugoslavia. In this context, the idea has also been put forward within the Group that the IGC examines the possibility of including in the revised Treaty a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the external borders of the Union.
This view admits various approaches on the timetable and stages for WEU-EU integration:
Three possible ways of establishing this commitment have been suggested: A new Article J.4 (and a new WEU Declaration) could state that the European Council will address general guidelines to WEU, as the organization requested to implement through the appropriate military actions the follow-up decisions adopted by the EU at ministerial level. Or it could state that the EU will address concrete instructions to WEU, thereby expressing its political and operational subordination to the Union. Finally, it could also be envisaged that a legally binding EU/WEU agreement be established whereby WEU would be committed to implementing decisions of the Union with defence implications.
The modalities for this integration could be decided on by the IGC or at a later moment. One possibility would be to transfer all WEU functions and capabilities from WEU to the Second Pillar ( defence function within the CFSP); Member States not willing or able to enter into a collective defence commitment could opt out of such commitment. Another, initially more feasible, modality of integration, would be for the CFSP to take on the crisis management functions (Petersberg tasks) but leave the collective defence guarantee to a Defence Protocol to which those Member States so desiring would opt in on conditions to be agreed.
Those who advocate the gradual integration of WEU into the EU consider, furthermore, that all these modalities could be seen as complementary measures and that the IGC could therefore envisage their being carried out either separately or as successive phases of a sequential approach, within the framework of an agreed timetable.
Carlos Westendorp :
Joseph Weyland
Michel Barnier:
Elmar Brok:
David Davis:
Franklin Dehousse:
Niels Ersbøll:
Silvio Fagiolo:
André Gonçalves Pereira:
Elisabeth Guigou:
Werner Hoyer:
Gunnar Lund:
Ingvar Melin:
Gay Mitchell:
Marcelino Oreja:
Michiel Patijn:
Manfred Scheich: Stephanos Stathatos:
Brussels, 5th December 1995
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