A. recalling that the objectives of the IGC, laid down at the Turin European Council, are as follows:
B. welcoming the advances made by the draft treaty of 30 May 1997 in areas such as:
C. whereas if future enlargements are to be possible it is essential to carry out a root-and-branch reform of the Union's institutions and, in particular, to abolish the unanimity rule, in line with the positions adopted in paragraph 22(iii) of its resolution of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference - Implementation and development of the Union ( 1),
1.Notes that, on the eve of the Amsterdam meeting, a certain number of important objectives laid down in Turin have still not been fully achieved by means of the draft treaty, whereas a serious failure or an outcome seen as a step backwards would represent a blow to European integration, since:
(a) the draft does not yet point towards an interinstitutional balance relying on more democracy and efficiency among the institutions;
(b) the political, economic and social dimension to the European Union is still outweighed by the monetary dimension;
(c) the new powers invested in the institutions, on the eve of the opening of enlargement negotiations, an historic objective confirmed in Turin, are not yet sufficient to enable an enlarged Union to function properly;
2.Mindful, as the only Community institution elected by universal suffrage, of its responsibilities vis-Ó-vis European citizens, calls on the Heads of State or Government to demonstrate the requisite political determination so that in the closing stages of the conference further progress will be sought and achieved in the following areas;
3.Welcomes the gradual transfer to the Community pillar of policy on the right of asylum, refugees, immigration, the status of third-country nationals legally resident on the territory of the Union, Schengen and the draft protocol on the right of asylum, but considers that the extension of the role of the Court of Justice ( 2) in these areas is too limited to guarantee citizens access, and, given that Parliament is granted no power of legislative codecision ( 3), the orientation followed:
4.Emphasizes that sufficient progress has not yet been made in the draft treaty of 30 May 1997 with regard to the substance of citizenship, as regards both individual and collective rights, even though this represents a cornerstone of the European integration process ( 4); with that aim in view emphasizes that:
(a) fundamental rights must be guaranteed as effectively as possible, by procedures which do not depend on decisions taken by quasi-unanimity ( 5)
(b) the principle of freedom of movement and the principle of non-discrimination must be implemented by means of qualified majority voting and in accordance with the codecision procedure ( 6);
(c) as regards the economic sphere, policies conducive to increased competitiveness should be promoted at Community level - especially through greater flexibility on the labour market - in order to enable Member States to increase employment, thereby also creating the necessary basis for viable policies;
(d) as regards the social sphere:
(e) as regards the cultural sphere:
(f) as regards the requirements for transparency ( 8):
(g) the IGC should add a new title headed 'Energy' to the Treaties;
5.Notes that the ambition of introducing an efficient common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which was already proclaimed when the Treaty was last revised, has still not been given sufficient content in the draft of 30 May 1997; stresses that the European Parliament has shown itself capable of fulfilling an active and constructive role within the CFSP, regrets therefore the inadequate role foreseen for Parliament in the draft treaty and demands in particular that Parliament be fully consulted about and informed of the development of the CFSP;
6.Notes, however, that some progress has been made in introducing the concept of constructive abstention and in extending qualified majority voting when adopting common positions and joint actions; believes that the proposed decision-making procedures should be further developed in order to avoid blocking in CFSP ( 9);
7.Stresses that the Commission must be given the widest possible powers, and in particular play a full part in external representation of the Union ( 10);
8.Believes that, in the area of security policy, the EU should have the means to strengthen conflict prevention capabilities, taking account of the OSCE final act and the United Nations Charter;
9.Notes the continuing clarification of the relationship between the EU and the WEU with a view to gradual incorporation and welcomes the possibilities of enhanced cooperation between the EU and the WEU;
10.Expects the estimate of CFSP expenditure ( 11) to be defined in accordance with the present draft interinstitutional agreement which it hereby explicitly approves;
11.Considers that, if the Union is given legal personality in accordance with the text of the draft treaty, significant international agreements which implement the objectives of the CFSP as laid down in Article J.1 must be submitted to Parliament for its assent;
12.Calls, in the sphere of external economic relations, for the principle of parallelism between the internal and external responsibilities of the European Union to be respected by granting the European Parliament the right to give its assent to all international agreements whose substance is dealt with at internal level under the codecision procedure; asks to be involved in the decision-making procedure in connection with the common commercial policy (Article 113 of the EC Treaty) and calls for the inclusion of services, direct foreign investment and intellectual property in Article 113 of the EC Treaty;
13.Notes that there remain serious deficiencies by comparison with the objectives defined by the Turin European Council of 29 March 1996, and in particular:
14.Considers it essential for democratic representation to be strengthened by the adoption of a common procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament based on proportional representation, a provision clearing the way for the adoption of a single statute for Members of the European Parliament, and a legal basis relating to European political parties;
15.Considers that it must be involved in determining its own seat and must continue to control the organization of its own work;
16.Takes the view that the text of the draft treaty of 30 May 1997 must be improved in such a way that:
17.Emphasizes the need to resort to Community procedures and methods, which have been used successfully since Community integration began and which may once again prove indispensable (the inclusion of binding timetables, for example) if solutions are to be found to certain particularly difficult problems in the context of this IGC;
18.Is persuaded that no enlargement negotiations can be concluded successfully unless the necessary institutional reforms are carried out beforehand;
19.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Presidency of the IGC, the Council Presidency, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Commission and the other Community institutions.
( 1) OJ C 151, 19.6.1995, p. 56.
( 2) Articles H and K.7 of the draft treaty.
( 3) Articles G and K.10 of the draft treaty.
( 4) Article 8 of the draft treaty.
( 5) Article Fa of the draft treaty.
( 6) Articles 6a and 8a of the draft treaty.
( 7) New Title after Title VI.
( 8) Article 191a of the draft treaty.
( 9) Article J.13 of the draft treaty.
( 10) Article J.15 of the draft treaty.
( 11) Article J.17 of the draft treaty.
( 12) Chapter 16 of the draft treaty listing the articles for which extension of qualified majority voting is envisaged.
( 13) Declaration to be included in the Final Act.
( 14) Variants 1 and 2 for a new weighting of votes in the Council, Chapter 16 of the draft treaty.
( 15) Part V, Article (2) of the draft treaty.