Three Eastern Partnership neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus

The EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, established in 2009, covers six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It was created to support political, social and economic reform efforts in these countries with the aim of increasing democratisation and good governance, energy security, environmental protection, and economic and social development. All the members except Belarus participate in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
In June 2023 Moldova and Ukraine were granted EU candidate country status, followed by the decision of the European Council on 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with both countries once the last outstanding legislative steps are implemented satisfactorily.

Ukraine

Over the past decade, Ukraine has been a key partner for the EU, with enormous geopolitical significance and an unprecedented impact on EU policies. The European Parliament has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine’s European path and has built strong, close ties with its Ukrainian counterpart, the Verkhovna Rada.

The events that have taken place in Ukraine since November 2013 largely stemmed from the pro-EU protest against then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign the association agreement with the EU. The Euromaidan movement eventually led to a change of government and to parliamentary elections in October 2014, which brought pro-European and pro-reform parties to power.

In March 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea, and the eastern part of Ukraine plunged into an armed conflict spurred on by Russian-backed separatists.

Despite the Minsk agreements brokered in 2015, and the establishment of negotiating formats such as the Trilateral Contact Group (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia and Ukraine) and the Normandy format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France), periodic outbreaks of fighting called into question the sustainability of the truce. The EU’s economic sanctions against Russia were linked to Moscow’s full compliance with the Minsk agreements and were renewed periodically.

In June 2017, visa-free travel to the EU for up to 90 days came into force for Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports, as the benchmarks of the action plan for visa liberalisation had been fulfilled.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017, having been provisionally and partially applied since 1 November 2014. One of the agreement’s cornerstones, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), became fully operational on 1 January 2016.

In addition to political support, between 2014 and February 2022 the EU and its financial institutions allocated over EUR 17 billion in grants and loans to support the reform process in Ukraine. Under a jointly established reform agenda, the EU has been closely monitoring progress in a series of priority areas: the fight against corruption, reform of the judiciary, constitutional and electoral reforms, energy efficiency, reform of public administration, and improvement of the business environment.

In the April 2019 presidential elections, President Petro Poroshenko was defeated by Volodymyr Zelenskyy who dissolved parliament and called snap elections in July 2019, in which his party, ‘Servant of the People’, won an absolute majority. As a consequence, members of the party filled the posts of both Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister. In March 2020, President Zelenskyy undertook a major government reshuffle in which Denys Shmyhal took over as Prime Minister.

The new administration embarked upon an ambitious legislative reform agenda, while it also had to deal with the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country that had continued with varying intensity since 2014.

Following a steady and menacing build-up and concentration of Russian troops along Ukraine’s borders, on 21 February 2022, the State Duma of Russia officially recognised the independence of the self-proclaimed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk. Three days later Russian troops invaded Ukraine, attacking from several directions. The full-scale invasion and the ensuing bombardments and aerial attacks, including on civilian targets and critical infrastructure, have claimed a large number of casualties and caused enormous human suffering and mass displacement.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that an estimated 3.7 million people are currently internally displaced in Ukraine and 5.9 million refugees and asylum seekers – mostly women and children – are dispersed across Europe. In 2024, 14.6 million people in Ukraine will need humanitarian assistance, including populations experiencing multiple vulnerabilities.

Since the start of the invasion, the EU has repeatedly condemned in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and demanded the full respect of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders. On 23 February 2022, the Council of the EU adopted a new sanctions package in response to Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as independent entities and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas. Since 24 February 2022, the EU has greatly expanded restrictive measures in various sectors, as well as against individuals and entities, by adopting successive sanctions packages (13 sanctions packages as of April 2024). The overall aim of these measures is to weaken Russia’s economic base, depriving it of critical technologies and markets, and significantly curtailing its ability to wage war. In December 2022 the EU appointed David O’Sullivan as international special envoy for the implementation of EU sanctions. The special envoy’s task is to ensure continuous, high-level outreach and discussions with third countries to avoid the evasion or even circumvention of sanctions against Russia and to ensure that sensitive battlefield goods of European origin do not find their way to Russia.

Ukraine submitted its official application for EU membership on 28 February 2022 and was granted candidate status on 23 June 2022 following a unanimous decision by the leaders of the 27 EU Member States. This historic decision was based on the European Commission recommendation published on 17 June 2022, which advised granting Ukraine candidate status on the understanding that it would carry out seven specific reforms. The European Commission continued monitoring Ukraine’s progress on meeting the conditions laid down in its opinion on the membership application and provided an interim oral update on progress in June 2023. On 8 November 2023, the Commission issued its report to the European Council, which is part of its regular enlargement package. In light of the results achieved by Ukraine on the seven specific recommendations, the Commission recommended that the Council open accession negotiations. Furthermore the Commission recommended that the Council adopt the negotiating framework once Ukraine had taken certain key measures in four specific areas. The Commission provided an oral update to the Council in March 2024 on the progress relating to these measures and put forward proposals for a draft negotiating framework for Ukraine and Moldova to the Council, in parallel with undertaking the screening process.

The Council of the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive on 4 March 2022 in order to offer quick and effective assistance to people fleeing the war in Ukraine and guarantee that Ukrainian refugees would enjoy the same standards and rights in all EU Member States, including the right to accommodation, medical care, work and education. This measure was extended until 4 March 2025on the basis of a proposal formally introduced by the Commission and subsequently approved by the Member States on 28 September 2023. In May 2022, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes initiative was launched to enable Ukraine to export agricultural products and import the goods it needs. Moreover, the EU and the European Parliament consistently supported the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, allowing significant volumes of grain and food stocks from three key Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea to reach world markets through an agreed Black Sea corridor. While the Russian Federation refused to renew the agreement in July 2023, Ukraine managed to keep the Russian navy away from the Western part of the Black Sea and set up a protected maritime corridor in August 2023, allowing the resumption of grain exports.

Since the Russian aggression started, the EU and its Member States have been supporting Ukraine on an unprecedented scale, providing over EUR 98 billion (April 2024) in financial, humanitarian, economic, military and refugee support.

In 2022 and 2023 Ukraine benefited from the EU’s extensive macro-financial assistance programme, worth EUR 25.2 billion in the form of grants and loans to address Ukraine’s immediate needs and ensure its financial stability.

As of March 2024, under the Ukraine Facility, the EU will provide predictable and stable support to Ukraine under a dedicated financial instrument for the years 2024 to 2027 for up to EUR 50 billion (EUR 17 billion in grants and EUR 33 billion in loans). The Facility aims at supporting Ukraine’s effort to sustain macro-financial stability, as well as promoting Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, linked to a well-defined reform programme and conditions under the ‘Ukraine Plan’. The official Ukraine Plan, elaborated and submitted by the Ukrainian authorities, sets out a detailed reform and investment agenda for Ukraine for the next four years. On 15 April 2024 the Commission assessed positively the Ukraine Plan and adopted the proposal for a Council implementing decision to approve it. Ukraine receivedEUR 4.5 billion under a special bridging financial payment on 20 March 2024 before regular payments can start based on periodic assessments under the Facility.

In January 2023, the EU launched a Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform to ensure that international donors coordinate closely and that support for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction process is provided in a coherent, transparent and accountable manner.

The EU and its Member States have mobilised EUR 33.1 billion in military support for Ukraine, including EUR 11.1 billion under the European Peace Facility. Moreover, the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) was established on 17 October 2022 to enhance the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the training of 40 000 military personnel, funded with EUR 362 million so far.

The EU suspended all import duties on Ukrainian exports to the EU (implying full, zero tariff and quota-free access) for one year, starting on 30 May 2022, while also suspending all EU anti-dumping and safeguard measures in place on Ukrainian steel exports for one year. This beneficial trade preference, also referred to as an ‘autonomous trade measure’, was subsequently extended until June 2024. In January 2024 the Commission proposed to renew this measure for another year until June 2025, while reinforcing protection for some sensitive EU agricultural products, following the significant increase in imports from Ukraine and the ensuing protests by farmers and a border blockade. A compromise was reached between the Council and the European Parliament, which was finally approved in April 2024.

The European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine began working in the country in December 2014 and coordinates international support for the civilian security sector. In addition to its operational activities, it provides strategic advice, including training, to the Ukrainian authorities on how to develop sustainable, accountable and efficient security services that strengthen the rule of law. Following Russia’s invasion, the European Council modified the EUAM’s mandate to allow it to support Ukraine in investigating and prosecuting international crimes.

The EU has consistently supported all efforts in pursuit of justice and accountability for the grave human rights violations and the investigation of possible international crimes (war crimes and crimes against humanity) committed as a result of Russia’s aggression.

On 2 February 2023, President von der Leyen announced at a joint press conference with President Zelenskyy in Kyiv the creation of an International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression (ICPA) in The Hague, which will coordinate the collection of evidence and will be embedded in the Joint Investigation Team supported by Eurojust. The centre was launched on 3 July 2023. On 23 February 2023, a Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) was set up. The Council of Europe Summit of 17 May 2023 in Reykjavik set up a Register for Damage caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which may serve as one of the first steps towards an international compensation mechanism for victims of Russia’s war of aggression.

On 17 March 2023 the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, confirming that there are reasonable grounds to believe that President Putin and Ms Lvova-Belova bear criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. On 5 March 2024 the ICC issued arrest warrants against two high-ranking Russian military commanders.

On 2 April 2024, a Ministerial Conference on ‘Restoring Justice for Ukraine’ (co-organised by Ukraine, the European Commission and the Netherlands) took place in The Hague with the participation of 60 countries. The objective of the Conference was to take stock of the progress made so far in investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and coordinating international efforts to this end.

The EU has also developed extensive sectoral cooperation with Ukraine, notably in the field of energy. On 16 March 2022, the Ukrainian and Moldovan electricity grids were synchronised with the Continental European Grid. The EU has taken a number of steps to help ensure that Ukraine has a stable energy supply. For instance, it has enabled gas to be delivered to Ukraine through physical reverse flow capacity and has allowed Ukraine to benefit from the EU’s joint purchasing of gas, liquefied natural gas and hydrogen.

In its conclusions on Ukraine adopted on 17-18 April 2024, the European Council strongly condemned Russia’s continued air and missile attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population and its civilian and critical infrastructure, including the recent intensified targeting of the energy sector. EU leaders also stated that the EU and its Member States will intensify the provision of humanitarian and civil protection assistance, notably power generators and power transformers. The European Council underlined the need to urgently provide air defence to Ukraine and to speed up and intensify the delivery of all the necessary military assistance, including artillery ammunition and missiles. The European Council conclusions also welcomed progress on the proposals to use extraordinary revenues from Russia’s immobilised assets to benefit Ukraine and called for the proposals to be adopted swiftly.

A. The European Parliament’s position

Recognising the threat, in the course of 2021, the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the Russian military build-up along Ukraine’s border (one in April and another in December 2021). It also sent a delegation of members of its Foreign Affairs Committee and Security and Defence Subcommittee to visit Ukraine in late January 2022.

Following the start of the full-scale Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the European Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session on 1 March 2022 and adopted a key resolution setting out its position:

• Condemning in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against and invasion of Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this aggression;
• Demanding that the Russian Federation immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all military and paramilitary forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders;
• Underlining that the military aggression and invasion constitute a serious violation of international law, and in particular the UN Charter, and calling on the Russian Federation to return to fulfilling the responsibilities of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in maintaining peace and security and to respecting its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Budapest Memorandum;
• Considering the Russian invasion in Ukraine an attack not only against a sovereign country but also against the principles and mechanism of cooperation and security in Europe and the rules-based international order, as defined by the UN Charter;
• Calling for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, in line with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and on the basis of merit, and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the association agreement;
• Welcoming the swift adoption of sanctions by the Council, but insisting on the need to adopt additional severe sanctions.

The European Parliament has followed the situation in Ukraine closely and took a political stance in a series of resolutions, in particular in a resolution adopted on 7 April 2022, in which it called, among other things, for:

• Additional punitive measures, including an immediate full embargo on imports of Russian oil, coal, nuclear fuel and gas, accompanied by a plan to ensure the EU’s security of energy supply and the complete abandonment of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines;
• Russia’s diplomatic isolation, including its exclusion from the G20 and other multilateral organisations such as the UN Human Rights Council, Interpol, the World Trade Organization, UNESCO and others;
• The exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system and a ban on Russian vessels entering EU territorial waters and docking in EU ports;
• The termination of collaboration with Russian companies on existing and new nuclear projects and an end to scientific cooperation with Russian energy companies.

Regular parliamentary debates and exchanges with the President of the Commission, the High Representative and Commissioners have focused on countering Russian aggression and on the EU’s diplomatic, military and humanitarian support for Ukraine, the effectiveness of sanctions and the use of Russian frozen assets, justice and accountability for international crimes, as well as the situation of the illegal deportation and forcible removal of Ukrainian children. The European Parliament adopted a series of resolutions on these topics.

In its comprehensive resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament reaffirmed its support for consistently providing military aid to Ukraine for as long as necessary and in whatever form necessary for Ukraine to win, without self-imposed restrictions on military assistance. In particular it supported the proposal that all EU Member States and NATO allies should support Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25% of their GDP annually. Parliament also underlined that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe. It called for strengthening sanctions, notably by introducing a ban on Russian uranium and metallurgical imports into the EU, as well as cooperation with the Russian nuclear sector and Rosatom. The resolution called for an immediate and full embargo on Russian imports into the EU of agricultural and fishery products, as well as fossil fuels and liquefied natural gas transported by sea via pipelines, and to further decrease the price-cap on Russian petroleum products in coordination with G7 partners in order to stop financing Russia’s war with EU money. Members also reiterated Parliament’s support for the peace formula presented by Ukraine’s President. The text also underlined the urgency of establishing a sound legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU, and for their use to address the various consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including the reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of Russia’s aggression.

Regarding Ukraine’s EU accession path, Parliament took a strong stance early on, advocating for Ukraine’s candidate status and a merit-based EU enlargement process. The leaders of the European Parliament’s political groups (the Conference of Presidents) adopted a statement on 9 June 2022 in which they strongly appealed to the European Council to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine.

Parliament has also recognised the sacrifices and resilience of the Ukrainian people. Following on from the award of the European Parliament’s prestigious Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought to the Ukrainian film director Oleh Sentsov in 2018, in 2022 the Prize was awarded ‘to the brave people of Ukraine, represented by their president, elected representatives and civil society’.

Since 2022 the European Parliament has stepped up technical and in-kind assistance to Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, in particular in the fields of IT, communication, legal assistance and translation. It has also developed a number of communication tools, such as the Stand with Ukraine website, which is available in English and Ukrainian.

Parliament has also taken a series of concrete actions to reach out to and support Ukraine’s civil society and population. For example, it opened a Ukrainian civil society hub in the Station Europe building in Brussels and launched an initiative called Generators of Hope, under which it donated a generator on 8 December 2022 and shipped seven generators directly to the Verkhovna Rada.

B. Inter-parliamentary cooperation

The outbreak of full-scale war and the granting of official EU candidate status to Ukraine has led to more intense dialogue and more personal visits at all levels, including between the two parliaments’ leaders, political groups, parliamentary committees and other relevant bodies, and within the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee.

On 1 April 2022, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola became the first EU leader to travel to Ukraine since the Russian invasion. She visited Kyiv, where she addressed the Verkhovna Rada and met President Zelenskyy, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and representatives of the Verkhovna Rada’s political groups. To mark the Day of Ukrainian Statehood on 28 July 2022, President Metsola addressed the Verkhovna Rada with a video message in which she reaffirmed the commitments made by the EU to aid Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. On 5 September 2022, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal visited the European Parliament and met with President Metsola and the leaders of the political groups, while on 14 September 2022, President Zelenskyy’s wife Olena Zelenska attended the debate on the State of the Union address during the European Parliament’s plenary session in Strasbourg.

President Zelenskyy addressed the European Parliament’s plenary session during the Sakharov Prize award ceremony on 14 December 2022, while on the same day, President Metsola spoke to the Verkhovna Rada about Ukraine’s progress as an EU candidate country. On 9 February 2023, Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session (formal sitting) that was attended by President Zelenskyy in person. On 4 March 2023, President Metsola participated in the United for Justice conference in Lviv and met with figures including President Zelenskyy, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk and Ukraine’s Prosecutor-General Andriy Kostin.

On 2 December 2022, a delegation of members of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee for Security and Defence visited Kyiv to meet key Ukrainian officials and members of the Verkhovna Rada. On 20 February 2023, six members of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation, and the Strengthening of Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in the European Parliament (ING2) visited Kyiv. They had an intensive programme of meetings focused on foreign interference, disinformation and EU support to Ukraine in the context of Russia’s war of aggression and Ukraine’s EU candidate status. On 22 and 23 October 2023, a delegation from the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) visited the Chernihiv region and Kyiv to engage in discussions on justice and accountability and the shared human-rights agenda with local communities, including victims and witnesses, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Office of the President, the General Prosecutor, and representatives of civil society. Members of the Committee on Regional Development (REGI) visited Ukraine from 30 October to 1 November 2023 to discuss Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, its path to EU accession and the associated reforms.

On 25-26 March 2024 a cross-committee delegation visited Kyiv for talks on stepping up EU support with high-level representatives of the Ukrainian government, the Chairman and leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and civil society groups. 

The EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee (PAC) has met regularly since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. The 13th meeting of the PAC – an extraordinary meeting – was held on 24 March 2022, with Ukrainian MPs attending remotely, and a joint statement was adopted. Ordinary EU-Ukraine PAC meetings were held in Strasbourg in June 2022 (see the joint statement) and July 2023 (see the joint statement). Several ad hoc delegations from the Verkhovna Rada have visited the European Parliament, while the PAC Bureau, which consists of the PAC’s co-chairs and vice chairs, has also met regularly.

At the initiative of President Metsola and Speaker Stefanchuk, the two parliaments held their first ever inter-committee meeting on 12 April 2023 to strengthen contact between parliamentary committees in connection with Ukraine’s chosen path of European integration and its legislative harmonisation agenda.

The legal framework for the European Parliament’s support and capacity-building activities was set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed with the Verkhovna Rada on 3 July 2015 and renewed most recently on 28 November 2023 (Conference of Presidents statement), and the Administrative Cooperation Agreement, which was signed by the Secretaries-General of the two legislatures in March 2016.

As part of its democracy-support activities in Ukraine, the European Parliament is implementing a far-reaching capacity-building programme for the Verkhovna Rada. These efforts build on the recommendations drawn up between September 2016 and February 2017 during the needs assessment mission conducted by Pat Cox, a former President of the European Parliament who is still closely involved in the implementation and follow-up of the recommendations.

In 2017, the European Parliament launched a political dialogue and mediation process called the Jean Monnet Dialogue. The Jean Monnet Dialogue with Ukraine regularly involves the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada and the leaders of the political groups in discussions related to the implementation of these recommendations, as well as the internal reform of the Verkhovna Rada.

Anticipating the Verkhovna Rada’s ambition of moving towards a pre-accession agenda, the European Parliament is investing in capacity-building programmes and recently launched a series of online seminars for Ukrainian MPs. These focus on legal harmonisation, best practices in legislative processes, and ethics and conflict of interest. The two parliaments are also cooperating more closely on the digitalisation agenda, strategic foresight capacity and translation services. The European Parliament has developed an important parliamentary mechanism that will be embedded in the Verkhovna Rada’s control and oversight competencies and will aim to scrutinise the external funds received by Ukraine. Work in this area is being overseen by a designated lead MEP for democracy support, Michael Gahler.

C. Election observation

Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of a consolidated democracy. The European Parliament sent observation missions to Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 for the presidential, parliamentary and local elections, and in 2019 for the presidential and parliamentary elections.

The EU and the European Parliament have paid careful attention to elections in the illegally occupied territories, in particular the elections to the Russian Duma in September 2021 that involved occupied Crimea. In his declaration of 20 September 2021, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stressed that the EU does not recognise the so-called elections held in the occupied Crimean peninsula.

According to Ukraine’s Constitution, ordinary parliamentary elections are due to be conducted in autumn 2023, presidential elections in spring 2024 and local elections in autumn 2025. However, elections cannot take place while martial law is in place. The first post-war elections will pose unprecedented challenges, as a significant share of the electoral infrastructure has been damaged and millions of voters have been displaced within or outside the country.

Work has already begun to assess the war’s effects on Ukraine’s electorate and electoral infrastructure and prepare for the new electoral landscape. The Ukrainian electoral authorities are receiving assistance from the international community with organising out-of-country voting. The European Parliament held a parliamentary electoral dialogue on this topic at the end of May 2023, in cooperation with International Idea and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, which is providing large-scale electoral assistance to Ukraine and helping the country to determine the best model for out-of-country voting, with a focus on Ukrainian refugees abroad.

Moldova

On 27 June 2014, the EU and Moldova signed an association agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA), which entered into force in July 2016. The agreement strengthened Moldova’s political and economic ties with the EU. It set out a reform plan in areas vital for good governance and economic development and reinforced cooperation in several sectors. By signing the agreement, Moldova committed to reforming its domestic policies on the basis of EU laws and practice. The roadmap for the implementation of the association agreement is defined in an association agenda, the latest version of which – the revised 2021-2027 Association Agenda – was agreed in August 2022. The EU is by far Moldova’s main trading partner, accounting for 58.8% of the country’s exports and 43.9% of its imports. It is also the largest investor in the country.

Since the entry into force of visa liberalisation for short-term stays in April 2014, more than 2.5 million Moldovan citizens with a biometric passport have travelled to the Schengen Area without a visa, which has fostered tourism, business relations and people-to-people contacts.

In June 2021, the Commission published the EU’s Economic Recovery Plan for Moldova, which earmarks EUR 600 million to support the country’s post-COVID-19 socio-economic recovery, foster the green and digital transition and unleash the country’s untapped economic potential.

Pro-EU President Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a resounding victory in the early parliamentary elections of 11 July 2021. The PAS-dominated parliament approved Natalia Gavrilița’s appointment as Prime Minister and endorsed her ambitious programme to pull the post-Soviet country out of a protracted political and economic crisis and bring it closer to the EU – its number one foreign policy priority – by fully implementing the EU-Moldova Association Agreement. On 10 February 2023, Prime Minister Gavrilița stepped down and Dorin Recean was approved as the new Prime Minister. The government was also reshuffled. The current government continues to pursue a pro-EU agenda, with a new focus on national security and on accelerating the implementation of reforms as part of the process of joining the EU. In January 2024, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicu Popescu resigned and was replaced by the former Vice-President of Parliament, Mr Mihai Popșoi. In addition, a new position of Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration was created. Ms Cristina Gherasimov was appointed and is the chief negotiator for Moldova’s process of accession to the European Union.

Moldova’s proximity to Ukraine has made it particularly vulnerable to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This has severely affected the country. Against this backdrop, Moldova took the historic step of formally applying for EU membership on 3 March 2022. It was granted candidate status at the European Council meeting of 23 June 2022, opening a new strategic phase in EU-Moldova relations.

In the face of the war in Ukraine, the EU has been standing in solidarity with Moldova. Since October 2021, it has provided the country with over EUR 1.2 billion in support, in the form of grants and loans. The EU is seeking to strengthen Moldova’s resilience, security, stability, economy and energy security, enhance cooperation on security and defence, and support Moldova’s efforts to implement reforms and join the EU. In January 2022, the Commission proposed a EUR 150 million macro-financial assistance package for Moldova (two tranches of which were disbursed in 2022-2023), while on 24 January 2023, it proposed increasing this by up to EUR 145 million. Payment of the macro-financial assistance is conditional on the implementation of both the IMF programme and policy measures agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Ahead of the European Political Community summit in Moldova on 1 June 2023, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the Commission was stepping up its support to Moldova and would now leverage up to EUR 1.6 billion in investment through the Economic and Investment Plan for Moldova.

At a meeting of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 June 2023, Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi announced a support package for Moldova, which has five priorities:

• Economic development and connectivity;
• Supporting reforms and building administrative capacity on Moldova’s EU path;
• Energy;
• Security;
• Countering disinformation and strategic communication.

In this regard, the Commission has proposed beefing up its assistance to Moldova through the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework, with EUR 600 million under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) to be redeployed to programmes to increase support for other countries in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, including Moldova, between 2024 and 2027.

The Moldovan authorities are now stepping up their reform efforts to implement the nine conditions set out in the Commission’s opinion on Moldova’s application for EU membership and meet the objectives outlined in the EU-Moldova Association Agenda, which continues to be a driver for reforms and alignment with the EU acquis. The recommendations contained in the Commission’s February 2023 analytical report also guide the country’s reform and approximation efforts.

The 7th meeting of the EU-Moldova Association Council took place on 7 February 2023 in Brussels. During this meeting, the EU and Moldova reiterated their commitment to strengthening their political association and deepening their economic integration. The 8th Association Council meeting is due to take place on 21 May 2024 in Chisinau.

The Commission officially reported on the progress made by Moldova on 8 November 2023, as part of its enlargement package. It recommended that the Council open accession negotiations with Moldova and that the Council adopt the negotiating frameworks once Moldova has adopted certain key measures. The Commission found that six of the nine conditions had been met, On 14-15 December 2023, the European Council took the historic decision to open accession negotiations with Moldova. It invited the Council to adopt the negotiating framework once the three relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendations have been taken. In March 2024, as part of an oral update to the General Affairs Council, the Commission recognised that Moldova had completed eight of those nine conditions, and needs to continue to make significant progress in three areas; justice reform, the fight against corruption, and de-oligarchisation.

In February 2023, Russia stepped up its hybrid warfare against Moldova and has since been openly attempting to destabilise Moldova’s pro-EU government through proxies by carrying out cyberattacks, spreading disinformation, sowing social unrest and interfering in electoral processes. Despite being sentenced to 15 years in prison and his Shor party being banned, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor still maintains a significant level of influence in Moldova and continues his efforts to destabilise both the country and its pro-European government. President Sandu publicly confirmed that there had been a plot for a Russian-backed armed coup aiming to topple her and her government. In response to these attempts, the EU has increased its cooperation with Moldova on security and defence, notably by deploying an EU partnership mission (EUPM Moldova), by doubling its assistance under the European Peace Facility and by sanctioning individuals destabilising the country. An annual EU-Moldova High-Level Political and Security Dialogue was set up and engages in EU support in Moldova’s security and defence, in the face of Russian hybrid actions and threats. In addition, an EU Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management was launched in July 2022 as a response to increased internal security risks, such as firearms trafficking, migrant smuggling, drugs trafficking, etc. The support provided by the EU is continuing throughout 2024.

On 1 June 2023, the Moldovan authorities hosted the second summit of the European Political Community in Bulboaca. The meeting boosted Moldova’s international recognition and raised its profile as a reliable partner.

The breakaway region of Transnistria, which unilaterally declared independence in 1990, remains a major challenge for Moldova, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine, due to the presence of Russian troops and Moldova’s dependence on electricity from Transnistria. Although the 5+2 negotiation process on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict has been de facto frozen since 2022, the EU continues to support a comprehensive, peaceful settlement based on Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, with a special status for Transnistria. In addition, the already tense relations between the Gagauzia autonomous region and the central government in Chișinău have become even more strained with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and will continue to pose challenges.

2024 will be an important electoral year, marked by both presidential elections and a referendum on Moldova’s EU membership, to be held simultaneously in the autumn, as announced by President Maia Sandu. It is expected that Moldova will continue to experience ongoing pressure from Russia and its proxies, with hybrid threats anticipated to escalate ahead of the elections.

A. The European Parliament’s position

The European Parliament’s resolution of 20 October 2020 acknowledged the improvements Moldova has made in promoting democratic standards and fighting corruption, while repeating its call for an independent, impartial judiciary. A month after Moldova submitted its application for EU membership, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 5 May 2022 in which it called for the EU institutions to grant EU candidate status to Moldova and to integrate the country into the EU single market. Parliament also asked the Commission to further increase financial and technical assistance to Moldova, including through a new macro-financial assistance proposal, transport and trade liberalisation measures, and continued support for refugee management and humanitarian work.

Upon the adoption of its report on the implementation of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement on 19 May 2022, the European Parliament again called for Moldova to be granted candidate country status. In the report, it underlined that some important steps to implement the reforms had been taken, but that a lot more work had to be done, in particular to strengthen key state institutions. This call was repeated in Parliament’s resolution of 23 June 2022 on the candidate status of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia.

Following the increase in hybrid threats faced by Moldova in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 19 April 2023 in which it reiterated its unwavering support for the country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in these particularly challenging times, and called on the Commission and the European Council to start EU accession negotiations by the end of 2023, upon the fulfilment of the nine conditions.

Ahead of the presentation of the Commission’s enlargement package and the December European Council meeting, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 5 October 2023 in which it reaffirmed its commitment to Moldova’s future membership of the EU and reiterated its call for the opening of accession negotiations with Moldova before the end of the year.

B. Interparliamentary cooperation

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the European Parliament has shown unwavering support and solidarity with Moldova. On 18 May 2022, at the invitation of President Metsola, President Sandu addressed the European Parliament’s plenary session in Brussels in the midst of the war in Ukraine. President Metsola visited Moldova on 11 November 2022 to meet President Sandu, former Prime Minister Gavriliţa and Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament Igor Grosu, and to address the Moldovan Parliament. During her visit, she strongly reiterated the European Parliament’s support for Moldova’s EU membership. On the sidelines of the 7th EU-Moldova Association Council meeting, President Metsola met with former Prime Minister Gavriliţa (6 February 2023). On 21 May 2023, President Metsola met Prime Minister Recean, for the first time, and Speaker Grosu when she visited Chişinău in the context of the citizens’ gathering, ‘the European Moldova National Assembly’, which was convened by President Sandu. At the European Political Community meeting in Bulboaca on 1 June 2023, President Metsola called for the EU to start accession negotiations with Moldova by the end of 2023, while President Sandu used the summit to express her country’s European aspirations and reiterate the objective Moldova had set itself of joining the EU by 2030.

President Metsola met Speaker Grosu again at the European Parliament in Brussels on 5 July 2023, when a delegation from the Moldovan Parliament came on a study visit about the EU accession process organised by the European Parliament’s Democracy Support and Electoral Coordination Group.

Parliament’s committees have devoted a great deal of attention to the situation in Moldova, with several delegations travelling to the country in 2022 and 2023. In May 2023, a delegation from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence went to Moldova and Romania to visit the European Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova. In February 2023, members of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budget met with their Moldovan counterparts to discuss EU-Moldova trade relations and budget support in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In the same week, the Euronest Assembly took place in Chişinău and was attended by a large European Parliament delegation.

In March and April 2022, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence sent their first delegation to Moldova since the outbreak of war, as a sign of the EU’s unanimous solidarity and support for Moldova. In June 2023, members of the Committee on Development also went to Moldova to examine the situation of Ukrainian refugees hosted there.

The EU-Moldova Association Agreement established a Parliamentary Association Committee (PAC) in its Article 440. The first PAC meeting was held on 16 October 2014 and the 14th meeting was held in Chişinău on 29 November 2023. The PAC has vocally supported Moldova’s EU integration path since the country applied for EU membership in March 2022.

The European Parliament has identified Moldova as a priority country for its democracy support work and is implementing a wide spectrum of activities with the Parliament of Moldova, at both political and administrative levels. The framework for these activities is provided in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by European Parliament President David Sassoli and Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament Igor Grosu in November 2021. This Memorandum of Understanding is complemented by a roadmap.

A number of the European Parliament’s activities in Moldova focus on assistance for measures to counter disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes (the Triangle for Democracy Programme), on the promotion of a culture of dialogue and political debate in the Moldovan Parliament (Jean Monnet Dialogue), and on capacity-building at both political and administrative levels.

C. Election observation

The European Parliament sent a delegation to the International Election Observation Mission, led by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR), to monitor the Moldovan parliamentary elections of 11 July 2021. The observers noted that these elections were overall well administered, free and competitive, despite some remaining shortcomings that need to be addressed for future elections.

In December 2022, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a new Electoral Code addressing key recommendations issued by international and local expert organisations, including the Venice Commission. This new code entered into force on 1 January 2023. It covers the recommendations made by the European Parliament’s Election Observation Delegation, which was headed by the Chair of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, David McAllister.

The European Parliament sent an Election Observation Delegation to the International Election Observation Mission (I-EOM) led by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR), in order to observe the regional elections held on 5 and 19 November 2023. This was an opportunity to assess the Electoral Code’s effectiveness and enforcement, as these local elections were the first to take place under the new rules. Despite the tense campaign and the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s hybrid warfare and repeated interference in Moldova’s electoral process, the I-EOM delegation stated that the elections had been peaceful and managed efficiently, that the election administration had worked transparently and professionally and that candidates, for the most part, had been able to campaign freely and had provided voters with distinct alternatives. The head of the European Parliament’s Election Observation Delegation, José Ramón Bauzá Díaz, recommended that last-minute decisions to exclude candidates, such as that taken in respect of the Șansă party (which is associated with fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor), should not set a lasting precedent and should only be motivated by serious concerns about threats to national security. He also expressed support, on behalf of the Delegation, for the Republic of Moldova in implementing democratic reforms despite the state of emergency caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the hybrid war aimed at destabilising Moldova’s democratic institutions.

Belarus

In recent decades, the EU’s relations with Belarus have been difficult at times, owing to constant human and civil rights violations in the country. Between 2014 and 2020, however, Belarus appeared to display a more open attitude towards the EU and the Eastern Partnership policy. Its relations with Western countries had improved somewhat and it played an important role as host of the EU-mediated talks on the Ukraine crisis. In response, the EU committed itself to a policy of ‘critical engagement’ with Belarus, as outlined in the Council conclusions of 15 February 2016, according to which tangible steps taken by Belarus to enshrine fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, human rights – including the freedoms of speech, expression and the media – and labour rights, will remain essential criteria for shaping the EU’s future policy towards the country. Negotiations on a mobility partnership were concluded in 2017, and visa facilitation and readmission agreements entered into force on 1 July 2020 with the objective of fostering people-to-people contacts.

Regrettably, despite the resumption of the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue, the establishment of an EU-Belarus Coordination Group composed of senior experts in 2016 and the adoption of a human rights action plan for 2016-2019, and notwithstanding its active participation in bilateral and multilateral Eastern Partnership meetings, Belarus has not lived up to its commitment when it comes to human rights. It remains the sole country on the European continent that still carries out capital punishment, which excludes it de jure from the Council of Europe. Debates on a moratorium on the death penalty with a view to its possible abolition are regularly evoked but seem to be a smokescreen, as no concrete action has been taken so far.

The EU strongly condemned the violent crackdown on peaceful protesters in February and March 2017. The early parliamentary elections of 18 November 2019 were marred by a number of malpractices and shortcomings, as a result of which the opposition was deprived of any parliamentary representation. The presidential election of 9 August 2020 was deemed neither free nor fair by the international community and was preceded by systematic persecution of opposition members, then followed by a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters, opposition representatives and journalists of unprecedented proportions in the country’s history. As a consequence, the EU imposed new rounds of sanctionsagainst 233 individuals and 37 entities responsible for or complicit in the electoral fraud and violent repression, as well as in the facilitation of Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and stated its readiness to take further restrictive measures against the regime’s entities and high-ranking officials. The 12th sanction package against Russia adopted on 19 December 2023 also targeted 12 Belarusian officials who have a link to the military-industrial institutions of Belarus. Among the sanctioned persons, there are members of the Belarusian Security Committee and State Military-Industrial Committee who contribute to supplying the Russian Armed Forces.

Further to the adoption of Council conclusions on Belarus of 12 October 2020, setting the new EU policy vis-à-vis Belarus, the EU has scaled down bilateral cooperation with the Belarusian authorities at central level to a strict minimum, increased its support for the Belarusian people and civil society, and recalibrated its bilateral financial assistance accordingly. The Council conclusions make EU’s further political engagement, sectoral cooperation, and financial assistance to Belarus subject to the respect by the Belarusian regime to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights and credible and inclusive political process resulting in free and fair elections under the OSCE/ODIHR’s observation.

In response to the EU’s action, the Belarusian regime took steps in November 2020 to reduce its level of participation in the Eastern Partnership policy. In June 2021, it decided to suspend completely its participation in the EaP, as well as in other existing structures, such as the EU-Belarus Human Rights Dialogue and the EU-Belarus Coordination Group. At the same time, Lukashenko recalled its representatives to the EU back to Minks for consultations, and ‘encouraged’ the EU Ambassador to Belarus to leave the country.

The state of play of constant violations of human rights by Lukashenka’s regime remains critical. According to the Human Rights Centre Viasna, in March 2024, there were over 1 400 political prisoners in the country. In addition to detention in inhuman conditions, including long-term confinement in solitary isolation rooms constituting a means of psychological pressure, political prisoners also have their correspondence withheld, are denied access to medication and healthcare and refused contact with family members and lawyers. Currently five political prisoners have been held in solitary confinement for more than a year, in blunt violation of international standards. The regime also keeps persecuting and prosecuting ordinary citizens who took part in the 2020 protest movement or criticise Aliaksandr Lukashenka, under the pretext of so-called ‘extremism and public order violations’.

The amendments to the Belarusian legislation signed by Aliaksandr Lukashenka on 30 December 2023 raise concerns about the deterioration of the freedom of conscience and belief in Belarus. The new legislation imposes obligatory registration of religious organisations, while legal grounds for granting registration remain imprecise. The vague definition of the conditions facilitates an easy elimination of any religious institution under the pretext of ‘discrediting Belarus, humiliating of national honour or carrying out extremist activities.’ Moreover, only Belarusian citizens are allowed to be in charge of such an organisation. Since 2020, up to seventy clerics have been persecuted by the regime or were forced to leave the country.

In January 2024, Aliaksandr Lukashenka has signed a new law granting him lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution and preventing opposition leaders living in exile from running in future presidential elections. Only citizens of Belarus who have permanently resided in the country for at least 20 years and have never had a residence permit in another country are eligible to run.

New Council Conclusions on Belarus adopted on 19 February 2024 express deep concerns about the deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus and condemn the continuing persecution and intimidation campaigns against all segments of Belarusian society, the unprecedented level of repression, and restrictions on political participation. The Council conclusions also underline the EU’s determination to continue supporting Belarusian civil society, welcoming the establishment of the EU Consultative Group with Belarusian democratic forces and civil society.

On 26 February 2024, the Council decided to prolong the individual sanctions against Belarus until 28 February 2025. The sanctions target 37 entities and 233 individuals, including Aliaksandr Lukashenka. In parallel, in response to the involvement of Minsk in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Council adopted a decision suspending the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and any legal entity that is owned or controlled by citizens or nationals of the Russian Federation or of the Republic of Belarus.

The 25 February 2024 Parliamentary elections were held in conditions of fear and unfair political competition. On the basis of the Law ‘On Amendments to the Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus’ adopted on 16 February 2023, the norms of the electoral code were modified to prevent any opposition political force from challenging Lukashenka’s regime. As a consequence, only four out of fifteen political parties obtained the ‘re-registration’ credentials.

Belarus and Russia are the most closely integrated countries in the post-Soviet space, including in the area of military and defence cooperation. In 2023, Belarus and Russia implemented the ‘Main Directions for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of a Union State for 2021-2023’ and 28 sectoral union programmes, aimed at unifying the legislation of the two countries in various areas of the economy, business, financial and energy markets, transport, as well as industrial and agricultural policy. In 2022, the two countries agreed on a military-technical cooperation programme until 2025 that provides for a number of activities, including joint research and development on new models of weapons and military equipment and dual-use products as well as modernising existing ones.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, Belarus has supported and stayed closely allied to Russia. While Belarus is not directly participating in the war, it hosts up to 30 000 Russian troops and has been providing Russia with ammunition and military equipment. Importantly, Belarus allowed Russian armed forces to station Iskander missiles used to wage strikes against Ukraine on its territory and to maintain air defence and air force training facilities in Belarus. Following the adoption of a new military doctrine in January 2024, Russian tactical nuclear weapons were deployed on Belarusian territory in March 2024. In April 2024, the Armed Forces of Belarus carried out military drills in the proximity of the Ukrainian, Polish and Lithuanian borders near the cities of Gomel and Grodno.

A. The European Parliament’s position

Before the fraudulent presidential election of 9 August 2020, the European Parliament had adopted a number of resolutions criticising Belarus on account of political prisoners, constraints on media freedom and civil society, its failure to respect human rights, including its retention of the death penalty, and its flawed parliamentary elections. In its resolution of 19 April 2018, the European Parliament expressed its support for the EU’s critical engagement with Belarus, as long as this is conditional on concrete steps being made towards democratisation and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights. In particular, it called on Belarus to join a global moratorium on the death penalty as a first step towards its permanent abolition. In its resolution of 4 October 2018, the European Parliament once again condemned the harassment and detention of journalists and independent media outlets and reiterated calls to strengthen respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In response to the fraudulent presidential election of 9 August 2020, and the subsequent brutal crackdown on democratic forces, civil society activists, free trade unions, independent media and peaceful protesters, the European Parliament adopted resolutions on the situation in Belarus on 17 September 2020 and on 26 November 2020. In these resolutions, Parliament stressed that the election was conducted in flagrant violation of all internationally recognised standards and that a majority of Belarusians considered the united opposition candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to be Belarus’s real President-elect. Members called for prompt EU sanctions against the officials responsible for electoral fraud and repression, including former President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. They expressed their support for the Coordination Council established by Ms Tsikhanouskaya as an interim representation of the people demanding democratic change. Parliament reiterated these principled positions in its recommendation of 21 October 2020 on relations with Belarus.

In addition, the Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for relations with Belarus (D-BY) and the Standing Rapporteur on Belarus have issued a number of joint statements in which they deplored the continued worsening of the human rights situation in the country and criticised Lukashenka’s continued usurpation of power. In December 2020, the European Parliament conducted a fact-finding mission on Belarus in order to assess the needs of the Belarusian democratic forces and evaluate how the European Parliament could support them, at both administrative and political level. This mission coincided symbolically with the 2020 Sakharov Prize Week, which honoured the democratic opposition of Belarus. As a consequence, the European Parliament has launched a platform against impunity for human rights violations in Belarus under the aegis of its Subcommittee on Human Rights and in cooperation with the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the D-BY. In addition, the Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group has proposed a wide range of democracy-support activities tailored for Belarusian democratic activists.

In its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the systematic repression in Belarus and its consequences for EU security following the abduction of an EU civilian plane intercepted by Belarusian authorities, the European Parliament denounced the widespread human rights violations in Belarus and the outrageous instrumentalisation of illegal migration by Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime in order to destabilise the EU. These positions were reaffirmed in the European Parliament’s resolution of 7 October 2021 on the situation in Belarus after one year of protests and their violent repression and, following a new wave of arrests, in its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the prosecution of opposition and detention of trade union leaders in Belarus, its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus, its resolution of 15 March 2023 on further repression against the people of Belarus, in particular the cases of Andrzej Poczobut and Ales Bialiatski, and its resolution of 11 May 2023 on the inhumane treatment and hospitalisation of prominent opposition leader Viktar Babaryka. In its resolution of 13 September 2023 on relations with Belarus, the European Parliament called on the International Criminal Court to issue a warrant for the arrest of Lukashenka, given his regime’s role in the illegal deportation and indoctrination of Ukrainian children.

In its resolution of 9 November 2023 on the effectiveness of sanctions, the European Parliament reiterated its condemnation of the Belarusian involvement in the invasion in Ukraine and called for price and volume caps on imports of Russian and Belarusian fertilisers into the EU. Sanction and restrictive measures against Lukashenka’s regime have to be aligned with those against Russia. The subsequent resolution of 14 December 2023 was focused on the situation of the Belarusian political prisoner Mikola Statkevich, 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate, detained without access to healthcare. The European Parliament called for the release of all political prisoners and an end to repression of Belarusian citizens while reiterating its firm support to the Belarusian democratic forces. In its resolution of 16 January 2024, MEPs welcomed the decision to suspend cross-border cooperation with Russia and Belarus. Following mass arrests targeting 200 family members of political prisoners on charges of ‘extremism’ in January 2024, Parliament called for sanctions against the Belarusian regime to be stepped up in a resolution on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members, adopted on 8 February 2024. Members also demanded further documentation of human rights violations in Belarus be reshaping the OHCHR examination into an independent mechanism. Moreover, the resolution of 29 February 2024 on the need for unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after two years of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, reiterates a call for further work to be done on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia’s leaders and their allies, including the regime in Belarus. Parliament also strongly condemned Belarus’s involvement in the forcible deportation of Ukrainian civilians, particularly children, to Russia, the Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia, and Belarus.

B. Interparliamentary cooperation

The European Parliament does not have official relations with the Parliament of Belarus, due to the country’s repeated failure to conduct free and fair elections and to fulfil international standards for democracy and the rule of law, as illustrated by the new waves of protests and all-out repression following the fraudulent parliamentary elections of 18 November 2019 and the presidential elections of 9 August 2020. Likewise, Members of the Parliament of Belarus have not yet been invited to sit in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, as meeting OSCE election standards is a precondition for admission. That said, representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces have regularly been invited to attend the proceedings of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.

In addition, the European Parliament maintains, through the D-BY, an active and close dialogue with representatives of the country’s democratic forces, independent non-governmental organisations and civil society actors, including members of the Coordination Council and the United Transitional Cabinet established by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Regular meetings of the D-BY are held in Brussels and Strasbourg to discuss the evolution of EU-Belarus relations and to assess the political and economic situation in the country, as well as the latest developments regarding democracy, human rights violations and the rule of law. The D-BY also travelled to Minsk in June 2015 and July 2017, as did its Bureau in October 2018 and February 2020. In June 2022, the D-BY sent an ad hoc mission to Vilnius to meet with representatives of democratic forces and civil society in exile and evaluate the situation on the EU-Belarus border. An ad hoc D-BY mission to Vilnius in May 2023 was sent to assess the threat posed by Lukashenka’s regime to Europe’s security and Russia’s influence on Belarus. Another ad hoc mission to Berlin and Warsaw took place from 18 to 21 December 2023 to discuss with the representatives of Belarusian democratic forces the best strategy to adopt in the face of the February 2024 parliamentary and local elections in Belarus, the situation of Belarusian exiles in EU countries and the effectiveness of EU sanctions imposed on the Lukashenka regime.

Between 11 and 14 March 2024, the solidarity campaign with Belarus #EPSTANDSBYYOU was organised in order to raise awareness about the situation of the Belarusian political prisoners. The symbolic support by MEPs consisted of signing 600 postcards to political prisoners in Belarus. This campaign followed the first such initiative in December 2022 with participation of the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola. 

On the occasion of the 25 March Belarus Freedom Day, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with Belarus, MEP Juozas Olekas, and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Belarus, MEP Petras Auštrevičius published a joined statement expressing deep concern about de facto Russian takeover of Belarusian sovereignty in a wide range of fields. They deplored the suffering of the Belarusian political prisoners subjected to inhuman treatment and expressed their unwavering support to the efforts of the Transitional Cabinet led by Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya to achieve a free and democratic Belarus.

C. Election observation

Belarus has not invited the European Parliament to observe elections since 2001. As is customary in such cases, the European Parliament relies on the evaluation carried out in the country by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE ODIHR Parliamentary Assembly. Regrettably, these international observers were not invited to observe the presidential election of 9 August 2020 either, despite the Belarusian regime’s prior commitment to invite them.

On 8 January 2024, Minsk officially announced its decision not to invite the OSCE to observe the parliamentary and local elections held on 25 February. The elections were observed by the delegation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and parliamentarians from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental military alliance of six former Soviet states in Eurasia. According to the Belarusian authorities, the voter turnout reached 73.09%.

The joint statement on the 2024 parliamentary ‘elections’ in Belarus, issued by the Chair of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), David McAllister, Chair of D-BY, Jozuas Olekas, and Parliament’s Standing rapporteur for Belarus, Petras Auštrevičius, highlighted that elections held in such a restrictive and repressive environment could not be considered as fair and free, and called for the EU, its Member States, and the international community not to recognise the legitimacy of the individuals ‘elected’ in the ballot.

According to the OSCE, no Belarusian elections since 1995 have been compliant with international democratic standards. On the eve of the above-mentioned elections, the ODIHR called upon Minsk to respect international obligations resulting from his OSCE membership and expressed deep concerns about the persecution and illegal detention of Belarusian journalists, human rights defenders and members of political opposition.

 

Radka Hejtmankova / Vanessa Cuevas Herman / Levente Csaszi

04-2024