Three Eastern Partnership neighbours in the South Caucasus
The EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, initiated in 2009, covers six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It was created to support political, social and economic reform efforts in these countries with the aim of increasing democratisation and good governance, energy security, environmental protection, and economic and social development. All the participating countries (except Belarus whose membership is suspended) send delegations to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
In addition to the work of the competent committees on foreign affairs and international trade, Parliament has a standing delegation for relations with the South Caucasus (DSCA) which oversees EU relations with the three South Caucasus states under the frameworks of the Parliamentary Association Committee with Georgia, the Parliamentary Partnership Committee with Armenia and the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee with Azerbaijan. It also monitors the work of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia.
Georgia
Despite its long-standing reputation as a reform front runner and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations included in its Constitution, Georgia has been experiencing serious democratic backsliding in recent years, particularly since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024. These elections failed to meet international democratic standards or comply with Georgia’s commitments under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These developments have marked the state of EU-Georgia relations, with the Commission concluding in its November 2025 enlargement report that Georgia was now a candidate country ‘in name only’.
Georgia submitted its application for EU membership in March 2022, in the wake of Ukraine’s EU accession bid. The European Council granted the country EU candidate status in December 2023, with a requirement to take nine specific steps identified by the Commission. Reflecting its lack of progress, and, on the contrary, the further deterioration of the situation, in particular with the adoption of the law on transparency of foreign influence, Georgia’s accession process came to a de facto halt following the European Council conclusions of June 2024.
In November 2024, the Georgian Dream ruling party decided to suspend the country’s EU accession process until 2028, sparking widespread street protests against the perceived shift away from EU integration. A subsequent crackdown on demonstrations, the criminal prosecution of peaceful protesters, the persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements, and increased pressure on civil society and independent media raised grave concerns about the country’s turn towards authoritarianism. In January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, in response to the situation.
The local elections of October 2025 only confirmed the negative trends, with allegations of systemic fraud and repression of opposition figures, the media and civil society, while a large part of the opposition opted for a boycott. On 28 October 2025, the Georgian Dream party announced that it would be filing a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court seeking to ban three major opposition parties.
EU-Georgia relations continue to be governed by the Association Agreement, including a deep and comprehensive free trade area, which entered into force in July 2016. Georgian citizens have been benefiting from visa-free travel to the Schengen area since March 2017. The EU is the largest provider of financial assistance to Georgia and used to provide around EUR 85 million annually to support the country’s reform agenda. However, owing to democratic backsliding, financial support to the country’s government has been suspended. The EU-Georgia Association Council, which supervises the implementation of the Association Agreement, held its latest meeting on 20 February 2024 in Brussels.
The EU has repeatedly underlined its unwavering support for Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, as well as its support for longer-term conflict resolution in the occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU supports the conflict resolution efforts made through the work of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, the EU Monitoring Mission and the EU Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention programme, thus complementing the Geneva International Discussions.
A. Parliament’s position and interparliamentary cooperation
Bilateral interparliamentary relations are developed in the context of the Parliamentary Association Committee, which held its latest meeting on 8 June 2023, with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) deploring the backsliding trend with respect to the rule of law, the independence and efficiency of the judiciary, labour law and non-discrimination.
Parliament has always been a strong supporter of the Georgian people’s European aspirations and has responded to the worrying developments in the country via numerous resolutions and statements from leading MEPs.
Since the beginning of the current parliamentary term, Parliament has adopted five specific resolutions: on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (19 June 2025), on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia (9 July 2025), on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (13 February 2025), on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud (28 November 2024) and on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia (9 October 2024).
In its resolutions, Parliament has stated that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party, established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, and that it considers Georgia to be a captured state. Parliament has also called for new parliamentary elections to be held and for the EU, its Member States and the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities and to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia.
Parliament has also denounced the growing number of political prisoners in Georgia. It selected Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, the co-founder and director of online media outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, as one of the two laureates of its 2025 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Mzia Amaglobeli was arrested in January 2025 while participating in anti-government protests and was sentenced to two years in prison in August 2025.
Between 2017 and 2024, Georgia was a priority country for Parliament’s democracy support activities. Georgia has, however, repeatedly refused to engage in a cooperation programme on the use of the parliamentary oversight mechanism, or in a Jean Monnet Dialogue to address the issue of chronic political polarisation, which has forced Parliament to scale down its ambitions until the Georgian side adopts a more constructive attitude.
In October 2025, the Georgian Dream one-party parliament announced its decision not to participate in future sessions of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
B. Election observation
Georgia has hosted missions from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), monitoring the country’s parliamentary, presidential and local elections since 1995. As is usual in the OSCE area, Parliament observers have been embedded in the ODIHR missions. The latest election observation mission was conducted in October 2024 to observe the parliamentary elections. The international observers found that the elections offered voters a wide choice but ‘were marred by entrenched polarization and concerns over recently adopted legislation and its impact on fundamental freedoms and civil society, as well as highly divisive campaign rhetoric and widespread reports of pressure on voters’. International observers denounced incidents of violence, vote buying, double-voting, media and observers’ removal, non-respect for vote secrecy and intimidation of voters inside and outside the voting stations. In addition, the Head of the European Parliament election observation delegation issued a statement describing the atmosphere on election day as a ‘climate of hatred and intimidation’ and stated that the conduct of this election caused deep concern about the democratic backsliding in Georgia. For the October 2025 local elections, the Georgian authorities prevented an ODIHR election observation mission from taking place by sending a very late invitation.
Armenia
Armenia’s relations with the EU have significantly intensified in recent years, as the country seeks to diversify its security and economic relations. In March 2025, the Armenian Parliament adopted a law on the ‘initiation of the process of EU accession’, based on a citizens’ initiative. While not constituting an official EU membership application, the law confirms the country’s European aspirations. Reflecting the mutual interest in deepening ties based on common values, the EU and Armenia have agreed on a new EU-Armenia partnership agenda for more ambitious cooperation across all areas, including on security matters, which is expected to be adopted by the Partnership Council in December 2025.
EU-Armenia relations continue to be based on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which was signed in November 2017 and fully entered into force on 1 March 2021. The CEPA, which replaced the previous Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, strengthened bilateral relations in a range of areas, while ensuring compatibility with Armenia’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Union.
Armenia’s situation over the last three decades has been heavily impacted by the conflict with Azerbaijan, centred around the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a formerly autonomous entity within Soviet Azerbaijan, with an ethnic Armenian population and an unrecognised de facto state since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, in the aftermath of Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the Armenian Government has shown strong commitment to a positive peace agenda, proving its willingness to show restraint and compromise in negotiations with its former adversary. These efforts culminated in the historic outcome of the Washington Summit on 8 August 2025, including the initialling of a peace treaty between the two countries and an agreement on the principles for the opening of a key regional transport route. Both countries reconfirmed the mutual recognition of their territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter and the 1991 Almaty Declaration.
The EU has wholeheartedly welcomed the accords from Washington, building on earlier EU efforts to facilitate conflict settlement and opening at last a prospect of sustainable peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus. Ever since the 2020 war, the EU has been steadily increasing its engagement with Armenia and has stepped up assistance to help the country deal, in particular, with the numerous conflict-related challenges. Most significantly, after Azerbaijan’s September 2022 attack on targets within the Republic of Armenia’s territory (i.e. not Nagorno-Karabakh) laid bare Russia’s unreliability as Armenia’s security provider and the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization failed to honour its obligations to the country, the EU agreed to deploy civilian observers along the border with Azerbaijan. The EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) has proven to be crucial for enhancing security on the ground. Following Azerbaijan’s full military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 and the flight of the entire local population of over 100 000 Karabakh Armenians to Armenia, under the passive watch of Russian ‘peacekeepers’, EU support has helped the country to face the challenging refugee situation.
The political situation in Armenia continues to follow the course ushered in by the May 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’, when peaceful street protests brought the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan to power, with a focus on a broad reform agenda, including in the areas of the rule of law, transparency and the fight against corruption. With both domestic reforms and the peace agenda seemingly being the subject of significant foreign information manipulation and interference efforts, the upcoming parliamentary elections of June 2026 are likely to become a test of the resilience of Armenia’s democracy.
Taking due account of the multiple challenges facing the country, at the joint EU-US-Armenia high-level meeting in support of Armenia’s resilience held in Brussels in April 2024, the EU pledged to put forward a resilience and growth plan for Armenia worth EUR 270 million for the 2024-2027 period, effectively increasing by 50% the allocation for the country under the Global Europe instrument compared to the 2021-2024 period. This includes, in particular, support for connectivity and business focused on trade, transport and energy, support for the country’s reforms in order to strengthen democracy and the rule of law and to implement the CEPA agreement, and support to help increase resilience by focusing on employment, education, foreign interference and the civil society. Part of this funding underpins the EU’s Economic and Investment Plan for Armenia launched in 2021 (now included under the umbrella of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy), a package of grants, loans and guarantees aimed at mobilising up to EUR 2.6 billion in public and private investment for strategic projects. In July 2024, the EU adopted its first assistance measure for Armenia under the European Peace Facility and in September 2024, it launched the visa liberalisation dialogue to help Armenia meet conditions for a visa-free regime for short stays in the EU. The related action plan was adopted in November 2025.
The EU also fully supports the agenda of enhancing connectivity in the region, including the process of normalisation of Armenia-Türkiye relations.
A. Parliament’s position and interparliamentary cooperation
Parliament has stood firmly on the side of Armenian democracy and a peaceful settlement to the long-standing conflict with Azerbaijan, as expressed in numerous resolutions. In March 2025, it condemned the unjust detention and sham trials of Armenian hostages by Azerbaijan. In March 2024, Parliament strongly welcomed Armenia’s interest in closer ties with the EU, noting that, ‘should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations’. In October 2023, Parliament ‘condemned in the strongest terms the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan’ against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and called for a substantial increase in EU assistance to Armenia in response to the influx of refugees, Azerbaijan’s threats and Russia’s destabilisation attempts. It also demanded a resolute EU response to Azerbaijan’s actions, including targeted sanctions and a comprehensive review of relations. In March 2023, Parliament adopted a comprehensive resolution on EU-Armenia relations, sending a strong message of support for the democratic reforms in the country, the deepening of bilateral relations and increased EU engagement in security, in particular through the EU Mission in Armenia and mediation efforts.
Bilateral interparliamentary relations are developed in the context of the Parliamentary Partnership Committee, which held its latest meeting in February 2025, adopting a statement supporting the country’s European aspirations. Leading MEPs following the situation in Armenia have released a series of statements on major developments, including a strong message of support for the August 2025 Washington agreements. Moreover, as of 2025, Armenia is a priority country for Parliament’s democracy support activities. Armenia’s firm commitment to develop interparliamentary cooperation was also demonstrated by its hosting of the 12th Ordinary Session of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly in Yerevan in October 2025.
B. Election observation
Armenia has hosted MEPs – as part of ODIHR election observation missions – on several occasions, including the country’s snap parliamentary elections in 2018. The 2018 elections were judged positively, as being well organised and with minimal irregularities, and the Parliament delegation observed a major drop in electoral malpractice. Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, Parliament was not able to observe the June 2021 elections, but MEPs noted the generally positive assessment by the ODIHR.
Azerbaijan
The EU and Azerbaijan have had a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement since 1999. Negotiations for an enhanced agreement were launched in February 2017, but have so far been inconclusive. The EU is Azerbaijan’s key trade partner, representing about 41% of the country’s total trade (2024), mainly owing to oil and gas exports to the EU (accounting for about 3.8% and 4.5% of the EU’s oil and gas imports in 2024 respectively by net mass). Azerbaijan’s natural gas exports to the EU started in December 2020, following the completion of the Southern Gas Corridor project. In July 2022, the EU and Azerbaijan declared the intention to double the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor by 2027.
Azerbaijan’s approach to the conflict with Armenia, and in particular its attack against the Republic of Armenia in September 2022 and the full military takeover of its former Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, have presented undeniable challenges for EU-Azerbaijan relations in recent years, despite the EU’s efforts to facilitate the peace process. However, the developments of 2025, and above all the historic outcome of the 8 August 2025 Washington Summit, including the initialling of a peace treaty between the two countries and an agreement on the principles for the opening of a key regional transport route, set the scene for a possible reinvigoration of relations, especially given the prospects for significant improvements in regional connectivity and Azerbaijan’s key role in the development of the Middle Corridor.
The internal political situation in Azerbaijan nevertheless continues to raise concern among the EU institutions. Azerbaijan ranked 126th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2024 Democracy Index and was classified as ‘not free’ in the 2025 Freedom in the World report. President Ilham Aliyev, currently serving his fifth term, succeeded his father, Heydar Aliyev, in 2003. In 2017, he appointed his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, to the newly created post of First Vice-President. According to the latest EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, published in May 2025, the state of human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan was characterised by an ‘unprecedented crackdown on critical voices, reduced space for civil society and independent media, and continuous limitations to civil liberties’. In recent years, the number of political prisoners has reached almost 400, in particular as a result of the systematic crackdown on remaining independent media in the country since the autumn of 2023.
The Azerbaijan-Armenia accords from the August 2025 Washington Summit marked a historic step as both countries explicitly committed to the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, in line with the UN Charter and the 1991 Almaty Declaration, and also recognised the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national jurisdiction as the basis for the opening of regional communications. The EU has strongly welcomed this significant breakthrough in the normalisation process and expressed hope for the timely implementation of the agreed steps, notably the signing and ratification of the peace treaty.
Azerbaijan’s victory in the six-week Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Armenia, which it launched in September 2020, allowed it to regain control of the seven districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenian forces for over 26 years, opening the possibility for a future return of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive against the residual Nagorno-Karabakh entity, a formerly autonomous region that was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but was inhabited by ethnic Armenians, resulting in the defeat of the Armenians’ de facto state and its eventual dismantling. The entire local population of over 100 000 Karabakh Armenians fled to Armenia within a few days. The diplomatic achievements of both governments during 2025 have been remarkable in this light, and the EU has strongly commended them for their ability to work together to overcome the difficult past and open the prospect of sustainable peace and prosperity in the South Caucasus. The presence of European civilian observers in Armenia along the Azerbaijani border since autumn 2022 has greatly contributed to regional security in a particularly challenging period, and the EU has been committed to work further with partners towards full-fledged normalisation.
A. Parliament’s position and interparliamentary cooperation
Parliament has repeatedly raised in its resolutions the concerning situation of human rights in Azerbaijan and matters of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. In March 2025, it condemned the unjust detention and sham trials of Armenian hostages by Azerbaijan. In December 2024, it raised its voice against the continued repression of civil society and independent media in the country. In October 2024, Parliament adopted a strong position on many of its concerns regarding Azerbaijan, calling for EU sanctions on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations and on those threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia, as well as urging the EU not to rely on gas exports from Azerbaijan. In October 2023, Parliament ‘condemned in the strongest terms the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan’ against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and demanded a resolute EU response to Azerbaijan’s actions, including targeted sanctions, the suspension of negotiations on an enhanced EU-Azerbaijan partnership agreement, the suspension of the memorandum of understanding on energy and a comprehensive review of relations. In April 2024 and September 2023, Parliament raised the case of political prisoner Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and urged the Azerbaijani authorities to ‘release all political prisoners, independent journalists and human rights defenders, drop all politically motivated charges against them and stop extraterritorial repression’. In March 2023, Parliament adopted a comprehensive resolution on EU-Azerbaijan relations, in which it expressed ‘deep concern that violations of fundamental human rights in Azerbaijan follow a systemic and widespread pattern and affect citizens’ rights to liberty and security’. It stressed that further cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan should be conditional on the country’s effective and tangible progress towards respect for international standards and international commitments and that the release of all political prisoners is an indispensable condition for a new partnership agreement. At the same time, Parliament welcomed Azerbaijan’s humanitarian aid to Ukraine and recognised the role played by Azerbaijan as a provider of fossil fuel energy to the EU.
The last Parliamentary Cooperation Committee meeting took place in December 2021. Leading MEPs following the situation in Azerbaijan have released a series of statements on major developments, including strongly welcoming the positive outcome of the August 2025 Washington Summit. In 2024, Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu was a finalist for Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.
B. Election observation
Parliament has not observed any elections in Azerbaijan since 2013, deciding not to send observers to the 2015 parliamentary elections or any other elections since then, due to the fact that all of the Azerbaijani elections it had previously observed were deemed to fall short of international requirements, and recommendations were not being implemented. The ODIHR mission to the February 2024 presidential election stated that the election ‘took place in a restrictive environment’ and was ‘marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives’, and that there was ‘shrinking space for independent media, civil society, and political parties’. It noted that ‘longstanding severe limitations on fundamental freedoms of association, expression and peaceful assembly both in law and in practice run contrary to standards for genuine democratic elections’. Similarly, the September 2024 parliamentary elections were found by the ODIHR observation mission to have taken place ‘in a restrictive political and legal environment’, ‘against the background of continued repression of dissenting voices’, resulting in ‘a contest devoid of competition’.
Michal Jiráček