Central Asia
Central Asia links the huge Asian continent with Europe. The EU recognises its strategic importance in trade and energy routes, as well as in resources such as gas, oil and minerals (particularly gold, uranium and all types of rare earths). In 2019, the EU updated its Central Asia strategy to focus on resilience (covering areas such as human rights, border security and the environment), prosperity (with a strong emphasis on connectivity) and regional cooperation.
The first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit, which took place in April 2025, represented a milestone and was an opportunity to upgrade relations to a strategic partnership, deepen trade and focus on energy economic cooperation, investment, high-quality connectivity, digitalisation, sustainable development and security cooperation (including hybrid threats). A EUR 12 billion investment package is planned through the Global Gateway, aimed at improving trade routes. It is a key opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its geopolitical interest in intensifying bilateral engagement and enhancing regional cooperation with Central Asia, to reduce its dependence on China and Russia in the context of global geopolitical changes. The summit also focused on climate action, human rights and strategic resources (including critical raw materials).
In the light of the situation in Afghanistan, Central Asia has become crucial for security and stability. The January 2022 riots in Kazakhstan, which ended after the Collective Security Treaty Organization sent Russian-led troops, and the border clashes between Central Asian countries show the risk of instability in a region under Moscow’s influence. This influence in Central Asia is, however, weakening as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the concentration of troops at the front. This shift has created opportunities for Central Asian countries to emerge as more independent regional actors and has opened new avenues for partnership and cooperation with the EU in areas such as energy, raw materials and connectivity. However, Russia remains a key security provider in the region, with military facilities in three of the five Central Asian countries, and it controls two thirds of arms’ imports and supports the region’s governments.
For trade and investment, the Chinese influence is growing with its Belt and Road Initiative. In response to the initiative, the EU has increased its engagement and investment in the region with the EU Global Gateway. Taking into account individual Member States’ assistance, the EU has become the largest donor in Central Asia, allocating over EUR 550 million to the Central Asia regional multiannual indicative programme for 2021-2027. The EU and Central Asia have taken important steps through the EU Global Gateway to develop the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, aimed at creating a multimodal, modern and competitive route linking Europe and Central Asia.
Parliament continues to highlight the importance of respect for human rights, good governance and social development, underlining the role of parliamentary diplomacy and strongly supporting democracy and the rule of law.
Legal basis
- Title V of the Treaty on European Union: ‘external action’;
- Articles 206-207 (trade) and Articles 216-219 (international agreements) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
- Partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs) covering bilateral relations, with the exception of Turkmenistan for which an interim trade agreement is in place. The new enhanced PCA (EPCA) with Kazakhstan fully entered into force on 1 March 2020. The EPCA with Kyrgyzstan was initialled in July 2019 and negotiations with Uzbekistan are under way. Tajikistan has also expressed an interest in an EPCA.
The Central Asian countries and EU-Central Asia relations
For years, relations between Central Asian countries were generally poor, owing to border and resource disputes. Nevertheless, the situation changed rapidly following the change of leadership in Uzbekistan in 2016, opening up new possibilities for regional cooperation.
Regular summits of Central Asian leaders are the cornerstone of regional diplomacy. The first Central Asian leaders’ summit on regional cooperation was held in Astana in March 2018. In August 2024, at the sixth Consultative Meeting of Asian Heads of State in Astana, leaders approved a roadmap for regional cooperation until 2027 and introduced the Central Asia – 2040 strategy. These initiatives aim to enhance intergovernmental coordination, strengthen regional identity and promote economic integration. Renewable energy sources are another focus of attention in view of the enormous potential for regional cooperation and investment. The regional economy currently faces uncertainty as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global inflation and rising commodity prices.
All the Central Asian countries follow multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to balance ties with Russia, China, the EU and the United States in particular. Relations with Türkiye and Iran are also important. Turkmenistan has been largely closed to the outside world, and its ‘permanent neutrality’ status is even recognised by the UN. Following the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the situation in Afghanistan has become not only a global issue, but also the leading concern of Central Asian governments. The entire Central Asian region has become a crucial area for containing religious extremism and terror networks, together with drug trafficking within its borders. Because of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Central Asia has become a destination for large numbers of Afghan refugees, who are therefore potential recipients of additional EU support, with bilateral and regional programmes as part of the 2021-2027 EU multiannual indicative programme.
The scope of the EU’s relations is linked to the readiness of individual Central Asian countries to undertake reforms and strengthen democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Countries must also be prepared to modernise and diversify their economies, including by supporting the private sector and small and medium-sized enterprises. The EU’s Central Asia strategy was endorsed by the Council in June 2019. To further deepen bilateral ties, the EU has been negotiating EPCAs with Central Asian countries. As of early 2025, EPCAs have been signed or are nearing completion with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, while negotiations with Tajikistan have concluded.
The EU-Central Asia International Conference on Connectivity (Global Gateway) was held in November 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The importance of a regional approach and regional cooperation has also been stressed at the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meetings. The 19th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting took place in October 2023. The EU and Central Asia adopted a Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties, outlining areas and action points for strengthening relations through dialogue and practical cooperation. This roadmap emphasises the enhancement of connectivity, particularly through trade, investment and infrastructure projects, aligning with the EU’s Global Gateway initiative.
In 2023, EU-Central Asia trade in goods amounted to EUR 52.8 billion, with a EUR 12.4 billion trade surplus in favour of Central Asia. Central Asia mainly supplies the EU with raw materials such as crude oil, natural gas, metals and cotton. In return, the EU primarily exports machinery, transport equipment and manufactured goods, which together make up more than half of its total exports to the region. The first-ever EU-Central Asia Summit took place in April 2025 in Samarkand. In an evolving global and regional geopolitical landscape, the EU-Central Asia leaders reaffirmed their commitment to deepening cooperation and decided to upgrade the relationship to a strategic partnership.
Parliament’s activities with Central Asia are conducted mainly by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA), the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the Delegation for Relations with Central Asia (D-CAS), and through the Parliamentary Cooperation Committees (PCCs) and the Delegation for relations with Afghanistan (D-AF), among other bodies. Parliament oversees the implementation of the agreements and focuses on human rights issues, the political situation, economic and development cooperation and electoral processes.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the EU decision to impose a number of sanction packages on Russia, some Central Asian countries and particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, became possible hubs for circumventing sanctions, as denounced by Parliament resolutions.
Parliament passed a resolution in January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia, updating its comprehensive approach to the region and welcoming the plans for the first EU-Central Asia summit, which took place in April 2025. The resolution also endorses the October 2023 Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which serves as a strategic blueprint to advance dialogue and cooperation.
A. Kazakhstan
Parliament gave its consent to the EPCA with Kazakhstan in December 2017, stressing the importance of the ‘more for more’ principle to stimulate political and socio-economic reforms. The EU-Kazakhstan EPCA entered into force in March 2020.
Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019 after three decades in power, but as ‘Supreme Leader’ and ‘Father of the Nation’ he maintained significant influence and formal powers until 2022.
In 2020, Kazakhstan joined the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty that is included in the International Bill of Human Rights. In January 2021, Kazakhstan abolished the death penalty after ratifying the UN’s Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The European External Action Service lauded the step.
After protests broke out following a spike in liquefied gas prices in January 2022, violence was provoked by unknown, well-trained and organised armed persons. President Tokayev declared a state of emergency. In response to President Tokayev’s request, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance led by Russia, agreed to send soldiers (‘peacekeeping forces’) to Kazakhstan from Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
President Tokayev used the crisis to blame the previous administration, consolidate his power and end the dual-power arrangement forced on him by Nazarbayev. Tokayev assumed the office of the Chair of the Security Council and appointed a new prime minister. Key members of Nazarbayev’s family lost their positions of influence. In September 2022, Kazakhstan’s Parliament renamed the nation’s capital from Nur-Sultan to Astana, the latest move to distance the country from the former Soviet republic’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev
In June 2022, Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum that introduced substantial changes to the existing institutional balance of power, including by curtailing the power of the president and strengthening the role of the parliament. These reforms were aimed at addressing long-standing concerns about the concentration of power in the presidency and promoting a more balanced political system.
Kazakhstan’s economic outlook for 2025 remains cautiously optimistic, with GDP growth expected to be around 4%. However, uncertainties persist, particularly regarding oil production and global economic conditions. The country continues to work towards its long-term goal of joining the world’s 30 most developed nations by 2050, as outlined in the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy. Kazakhstan continues to pursue liberalisation and work towards adapting to a socially oriented economy. The country’s budget for 2025 to 2027 maintains a strong social focus, with significant investments in education, health and social programmes. The government has intensified its fight against corruption.
The EU is Kazakhstan’s leading trade partner and biggest foreign investor. In 2024, Kazakhstan’s exports to the EU amounted to EUR 33.5 billion, while imports from the EU to Kazakhstan reached EUR 11.5 billion. Overall, trade in goods increased by 6% compared to 2023.
In March 2023, Kazakhstan held early parliamentary elections, implementing a mixed electoral system with 70% of seats allocated on a proportional basis and 30% on a majority basis. The elections resulted in the Amanat party (former Nur-Otan) securing a majority with 53.9% of the votes, obtaining 64 out of 98 seats in the Mazhilis (lower house).
In October 2024, the EU and Kazakhstan held their 21st Cooperation Council meeting, focused on enhancing transport links, especially the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. Both sides acknowledged the progress made on the Horizontal Aviation Agreement and their partnership on critical raw materials. They also discussed the upcoming Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements. The EU commended Kazakhstan’s contributions to energy security and its commitment to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060, as well as its participation in the Global Methane Pledge.
Parliament has not observed elections in Kazakhstan since 2005. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) has sent election observers to Kazakhstan. OSCE/ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission to the early parliamentary elections in March 2023 in response to concerns about the lack of genuine opposition to the Amanat (ex Nur-Otan) party and due to Kazakhstan’s non-compliance with recommendations relating to fundamental freedoms, impartiality of election administration and eligibility.
Parliament has highlighted the need to guarantee fundamental freedoms, end the arbitrary detention of human rights activists and members of political opposition movements, and ensure the rights of LGBTIQA+ people and the safety of Kazakhs and other ethnic minority groups. Moreover, it has called for possible individual sanctions against Kazakhstan’s officials who are directly responsible for human rights abuses.
Parliament adopted a resolution on the protests and violence in Kazakhstan in January 2022, reiterating its concern over human rights abuses following the outbreak of protests in the country, including the widespread use of torture and disregard for democracy.
The EU-Kazakhstan PCC is responsible for managing relations between the two parliaments. In October and November 2024, the 21st EU-Kazakhstan PCC took place. It focused on enhancing political and economic relations and on sanctions evasion, the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, energy collaboration and climate change. Parliament highlighted the importance of political diversity and media freedom in Kazakhstan and engaged with human rights defenders and activists.
B. Kyrgyzstan
The current 2019 EU-Kyrgyzstan PCA is to be replaced by the EPCA, which was signed in June 2024, but has not yet been ratified. The EPCA covers a wide range of areas, including political dialogue, trade and investment, sustainable development, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society. It also enables cooperation in foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention, crisis management and regional stability
The EU is one of the main sponsors of sustainable development and reforms in Kyrgyzstan. The 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme responds to the Kyrgyz national development strategy for 2040, which sets out a long-term roadmap to emerge as a strong, self-sufficient and prosperous country.
The current EU-Kyrgyzstan partnership focuses on climate resilience, energy infrastructure and supporting young people. Key initiatives include the Kyrgyz resilient water resources programme, which combines a EUR 42 million loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with a EUR 15 million EU grant to enhance water management. The EU has also adopted a EUR 5 million initiative that focuses on young people, gender equality and human rights. Additionally, the EU continues to offer more than 300 scholarships annually to Kyrgyz students, all in line with the EU’s Global Gateway strategy for sustainable development.
The OSCE/ODIHR regularly observes parliamentary elections and presidential elections. Parliamentary elections were held in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 and were subsequently invalidated following mass protests against irregularities and vote buying. Kyrgyzstan’s President, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, resigned in October 2020 and the country held presidential elections in January 2021, after which Sadyr Japarov took office as Kyrgyzstan’s sixth president. The EU noted low voter turnout, the lack of a level playing field for candidates, violations regarding campaigning procedures and an abuse of administrative resources, as reported by the OSCE/ODIHR.
In a referendum held in April 2021, voters approved a new constitution to reduce the size of the parliament by 25% to 90 seats. It also gave the president the power to appoint judges and the leaders of law enforcement bodies and replaced the law allowing the president one term in office in favour of re-election for a second term. The country’s last parliamentary elections took place in November 2021 and the next parliamentary elections are currently scheduled for 2025.
In November 2024, the EU and Kyrgyzstan held their 14th Human Rights Dialogue, which was the first since the EPCA was signed in June 2024. The EU expressed its concerns about the April 2024 Kyrgyz restrictive bill on foreign agents modelled after Russian legislation and pointed to the potential for public discontent. The EU also raised the topic of the freedoms of expression, media, assembly and association. The EU highlighted the shrinking space for civil society, stressing the vital role that civil society organisations and independent media play in ensuring the stability of a democratic society.
Since 2016, Kyrgyzstan has benefited from tariff-free and quota-free access to the EU market for two thirds of its products under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) arrangement, enhancing economic ties and creating opportunities to increase and diversify exports. In 2024, EU-Kyrgyzstan trade amounted to EUR 2.8 billion. EU exports to Kyrgyzstan were valued at EUR 2.7 billion, primarily consisting of transport equipment, machinery and chemicals. The EU’s imports from Kyrgyzstan were largely made up of precious metals and mineral products.
Parliament is deeply concerned about human rights in Kyrgyzstan. An investigation into the death in custody of human rights defender Azimjon Askarov in July 2020 was closed and then reopened.
Parliament welcomed the ceasefire announced following clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in April 2021, calling on both sides to hold diplomatic discussions instead of engaging in military clashes. The border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has killed and injured hundreds of people, and has displaced thousands. Kyrgyzstan is a crucial partner of European parliamentary diplomacy, with regular contacts and open discussion about the state of human rights in the country, its position on Russia and the war against Ukraine. In July 2023, Parliament passed a resolution on freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan, in response to the controversial Kyrgyz bill on media and NGOs. This was one the main issues of the interparliamentary dialogue when Parliament’s D-CAS visited Kyrgyzstan in December 2023 to hold the 16th EU-Kyrgyz Republic Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.
Parliament expressed concerns at the LGBTIQA+ ‘propaganda’ draft laws in 2015. In August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted a new law that aims to restrict freedom of expression and access to information about LGBTIQA+ people, identities, rights and lives.
Parliament’s resolution on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan in December 2024 raised concerns about the arrest of Temirlan Sultanbekov, the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party, along with other pro-democracy activists, questioning the legitimacy of their detentions ahead of the November 2024 municipal elections. The resolution criticised the decline in democratic practices and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, including the suppression of independent media and opposition parties. Parliament insists on upholding human rights commitments as part of the EU-Kyrgyzstan partnership.
Parliament welcomed cross-border cooperation and the demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek and the Kyrgyz-Tajik borders, confirmed during the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek leaders’ meeting in January 2025.
C. Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan became the ninth beneficiary country of the EU’s GSP+ arrangement in April 2021. By joining this scheme, Uzbekistan receives additional economic benefits due to the cancellation of tariffs for two thirds of the product lines covered by the GSP+. The instrument is a boost to the country’s exports and its ability to attract foreign investment. In turn, Uzbekistan is expected to implement 27 core international conventions on good governance, human and labour rights and environmental and climate protection.
In July 2022, the EU and Uzbekistan completed negotiations for a new EPCA, aimed at providing a new, modern and ambitious framework to step up the EU-Uzbekistan partnership. The 19th EU-Uzbekistan annual Cooperation Committee took place in December 2023 in Tashkent. The two sides exchanged views on the further development of financial, technical, trade, economic and investment cooperation, focusing on measures to liberalise and simplify trade procedures using the benefits of the GSP+. Both parties emphasised efforts to boost energy efficiency and green energy projects, along with cooperation in expanding transportation, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
In 2024, Uzbekistan imported EUR 3.959 million worth of goods from the EU, while its exports to the EU totalled EUR 845 million, reflecting an 8.2% increase from 2023. The GSP+ status has contributed to this growth, with Uzbekistan’s exports to the EU showing substantial increases since 2021.
The EU’s multiannual indicative programme for Uzbekistan 2021-2027 has allocated EUR 76 million for the period of 2021-2024 and an additional EUR 43 million for new bilateral initiatives for 2025-2027, focused on strengthening democratic governance, advancing digital transformation, promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, and fostering the development of an intelligent and environmentally friendly agri-food sector.
Since Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, there have been wide-ranging and rapid democratic changes. These are positive developments, which include several ambitious reforms and internal changes, such as the release of a number of political prisoners.
In February 2021, Mirziyoev signed a law to move the presidential elections to October 2021. The OSCE/ODIHR reiterated its recommendations on political parties’ financing, expediting vote-counting and cutting state resources for electoral campaigns. In July 2023, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was re-elected with 87.1% of the vote. He is continuing with the ambitious reforms planned under the Development Strategy 2022-2026, aimed at achieving genuine change in the country in terms of socio-economic development; efficient administration; a more independent judicial system; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Uzbekistan has engaged with the Taliban on trade issues and economic interaction, ensuring border security and cooperation in energy, transportation and international cargo, as well as the railway project connecting the Uzbek border town of Termez to the Pakistani city of Peshawar via Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul in Afghanistan.
Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia have strengthened under President Mirziyoyev. Uzbekistan abstained in the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, officially adopting a ‘neutral’ position. Russia and Uzbekistan have a military-technical cooperation, covering joint weapons procurement, research and modernisation efforts. Additionally, as a major trade partner, Russia collaborates with Uzbekistan in the oil and gas industry. In January 2025, Russia and Uzbekistan formalised a military strategic partnership, along with broader strategic initiatives extending through 2030.
In January 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. They announced that China and Uzbekistan have decided to develop an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era.
Parliament was invited to observe legislative elections in Uzbekistan for the first time in December 2019, but refused on the grounds that the elections were neither free nor fair, pointing to the fact that all candidates came from pro-regime parties. The elections were therefore only monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR.
Parliament accepted the invitation to monitor the October 2021 presidential elections, even though the five candidates registered by the Central Election Commission were allegedly pro-government.
The 17th meeting of the EU-Uzbekistan PCC took place in December 2024 and the 18th PCC in April 2025, highlighting efforts to enhance partnership and key areas of collaboration. Participants discussed interparliamentary cooperation and joint projects on sustainable development, trade, energy and environmental issues.
D. Turkmenistan
Formal EU-Turkmenistan relations emerged in 1997, and the two parties signed a PCA in 1998. Since 2004, all EU Member States and Turkmenistan have already ratified the PCA. Ratification by the European Parliament is the final remaining requirement to finalise it. Parliament has refused to give its consent to ratification of the EU-Turkmenistan PCA because of its deep concern over the short-term benchmarks for Turkmenistan’s progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, bilateral EU-Turkmenistan relations are currently governed by the 2010 Interim Trade Agreement. In March 2024, Turkmenistan and the EU signed a Protocol to the PCA in Brussels, which marked a crucial step towards strengthening their partnership and paved the way for enhanced cooperation.
Turkmenistan has taken steps to open the country and create more space for civil society organisations. However, the country remains under the authoritarian rule of President Berdymukhamedov. Recent developments show that democratic development has not progressed and the human rights situation has not particularly improved. In 2021, Turkmenistan introduced some constitutional reforms, including the creation of an upper house, but the role of the Turkmen Parliament is still limited.
Apart from the EU-Central Asia regional frameworks, the EU and Turkmenistan maintain annual bilateral dialogues: the EU-Turkmenistan Joint Committee and the EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue. The 23rd Joint Committee was held in December 2024 to further develop partnership and cooperation, in particular in the areas of trade, connectivity, energy and the environment. The EU has reaffirmed that the rule of law and respect for human rights are essential aspects of the EU-Turkmenistan relationship. The 16th annual EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue took place in June 2024. Discussions centred on Turkmenistan’s concrete steps to improve the human rights situation in the country, including for individuals whose human rights have been violated, as well as conditions in detention centres and prisons, and gender-based violence.
In 2014, Turkmenistan and Türkiye agreed to transport gas via the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which currently carries gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field. Additionally, in 2021, the company Trans Caspian Resources presented its proposal for the Trans-Caspian Interconnector, a smaller pipeline designed to carry 10-12 billion cubic metres of gas annually. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU has sought alternative energy sources, including Turkmenistan’s gas. Both sides are negotiating a deal, with Turkmenistan aiming to diversify exports and the EU seeking new supplies.
Parliament has consistently expressed concerns about Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record and, accordingly, has blocked the entry into force of the PCA so far. Parliament has never been invited to observe elections in Turkmenistan. In February 2025, Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Central Asia travelled to Turkmenistan for the 8th Interparliamentary Dialogue. The talks centred on the UN General Assembly resolutions on Turkmenistan, human rights, gender equality reforms and areas of bilateral cooperation. Both parties highlighted Turkmenistan’s neutral stance in regional security and its strategic role in energy and transportation. They reiterated their dedication to environmental conservation, legal reforms and parliamentary collaboration. The delegation also engaged with Turkmen civil society organisations to address human rights, social progress and the enhancement of government-civil society relations.
E. Tajikistan
The EU’s engagement with Tajikistan has developed significantly. The current legal framework for EU-Tajikistan relations is the PCA signed in October 2004, which entered into force in January 2010. Parliament consented to the conclusion of the PCA in 2009, but called for improvements in human rights, corruption, health and education. The PCA contributed to the enhancement of bilateral cooperation and raised the EU’s profile in Tajikistan, setting out a platform for political dialogue and aiming to promote bilateral trade and economic relations. It also includes articles on cooperation, on migration and on the fight against money laundering, drugs and terrorism.
The EU has demonstrated its commitment to supporting Tajikistan’s sustainable development through initiatives focused on key areas such as human development, inclusive green and digital economy, water management, climate change, energy and transport connectivity.
Tajikistan is an important EU partner currently facing several challenges, such as the impact of international sanctions and the return of many Tajik migrants from Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, the critical human rights situation and a strong interest in joining the GSP+ trade preferential scheme. Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has been hosting thousands of Afghan refugees. The country is committed to fighting the spread of extremism and radicalism in Central Asia.
At the beginning of 2023, the EU and Tajikistan started negotiations on an EPCA. The 10th meeting of the EU-Tajikistan Cooperation Council was held in June 2023 in Luxembourg. Since then, contacts have been initiated to begin the EPCA negotiations, following the example of other Central Asian countries. The EU is encouraging Tajikistan to improve its record on fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights. In April 2024, the EU and Tajikistan held the third round of negotiations in Dushanbe. The 15th Human Rights Dialogue took place in November 2024.
In 2024, Tajikistan’s exports to the EU grew by 67%, reaching EUR 291 million, while its imports from the EU totalled EUR 275 million. The EU’s engagement in Tajikistan extends beyond economic ties, encompassing areas such as education, vocational training and support for civil society.
In the parliamentary elections held in Tajikistan in March 2025, the ruling People’s Democratic Party secured 49 out of 63 seats. This marked the first such election in 25 years without independent Western observers, as the OSCE mission was cancelled due to Tajik authorities failing to provide accreditation guarantees. Although five other parties took part in the election, the opposition groups that strongly opposed the regime were excluded.
Parliament is very critical of the deterioration of human rights, the increased number of detentions and arrests of human rights activists, political opponents and their family members and severe restrictions on the independent media.
Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about the clashes at the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and welcomed the ceasefire agreement reached in April 2021. However, in September 2022, violence increased between border guards along various sites. In February 2024, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reached a settlement to end decades of acrimonious disputes by agreeing on the delimitation of 90% of previously contested territory. Parliament welcomed cross-border cooperation and the demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Tajik borders, confirmed during the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek leaders’ meeting in January 2025.
In July 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the deterioration of the situation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province and reiterated its concern over the worsening of the country’s human-rights record in its resolution of January 2024 on the state repression against the independent media.
The 11th EU-Tajikistan PCC met in Brussels in December 2024, covering issues such as Tajikistan’s neutral position on Russia’s war in Ukraine, economic and trade cooperation, the impact of climate change in Central Asia and the human rights situation in Tajikistan.
Parliament is stepping up its scrutiny of the deterioration in human rights in the country. Improvement in this area is essential to further enhance the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and the EU.
F. Mongolia
Mongolia, though not covered by the EU’s Central Asian strategy, is classified by Parliament as part of the region within the framework of its standing delegations. Mongolia shares many cultural, historic and economic aspects with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. During the last three decades, Mongolia has distinguished itself as an ‘oasis of democracy’ with solid economic growth, even though developments in 2019 raised concerns about democratic erosion. In 2017, Parliament gave its consent to the EU-Mongolia PCA.
Mongolian politics are currently dominated by the consolidation of the Mongolian People’s Party with a large majority in the Mongolian Parliament and presidential control. The June 2024 parliamentary elections in Mongolia introduced a constitutional reform, expanding parliament and reintroducing a mixed electoral system. The Mongolian People’s Party won a smaller majority in the 126-seat State Great Hural. Women’s representation increased from 17.3% to 25.4%. Key issues in the elections included corruption, the economy, unemployment and inflation.
The 23rd EU-Mongolia Joint Committee was held in Ulaanbaatar in April 2025 to reaffirm the partnership based on shared values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for the principles of the UN Charter. The committee focused on strengthening collaboration in renewable energy and the green transition, as well as increasing trade turnover by elevating the EU’s GSP+. The two sides also exchanged views on effectively implementing the measures outlined in the roadmap for the Forest Partnership Memorandum of Understanding. The two parties discussed the progress achieved by the implementation of the Mongolia 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme.
Parliament’s statements on Mongolia have been largely related to economic issues, but also to the country’s development and humanitarian needs, linked to extreme weather conditions. A Parliament delegation observed Mongolia’s 2016 parliamentary elections and 2017 presidential elections, noting that the country is developing a solid democracy. However, Parliament did not observe the June 2020 parliamentary election because of the COVID-19 pandemic, nor the June 2021 presidential election.
The 16th EU-Mongolia Inter-Parliamentary Meeting took place in September 2023 in Ulaanbaatar. The delegation commended Mongolia’s encouragement of democracy and had direct contact with various representatives of Mongolian society. This included meetings with students, teachers and the National University; the highest Tibetan Buddhist authorities in the country; many NGOs; and beneficiaries of EU-funded projects. The 17th EU-Mongolia Inter-Parliamentary Meeting, held in March 2025 in Brussels, focused on bilateral relations, geostrategic regional issues, human rights, climate change, connectivity and people-to-people contacts.
Jorge Soutullo / Niccolò Rinaldi