Central Asia
The EU recognises the strategic importance of Central Asia, which links the huge Asian continent with Europe. In 2019, the EU updated its Central Asia strategy to focus on resilience (covering areas such as human rights, border security and the environment), prosperity (with a strong emphasis on connectivity) and regional cooperation. The EU and Central Asia have taken important steps through the EU Global Gateway to develop the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. Parliament highlights the importance of human rights, good governance and social development, underlining the role of parliamentary diplomacy. Parliament strongly supports democracy and the rule of law with concrete initiatives such as democratisation in Central Asia. In the light of the situation in Afghanistan, Central Asia has become crucial for security and stability. The January 2022 riots in Kazakhstan (which ended after the Collective Security Treaty Organization sent Russian-led troops) and the border clashes between Central Asian countries show the risk of instability in a region under Moscow’s influence. This influence in Central Asia is however weakening as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the concentration of troops at the front. However, Russia remains a key security provider in the region, with military facilities in three of the five Central Asian countries, and it controls two thirds of arms’ imports and supports the region’s governments. For trade and investment, the Chinese influence is growing with its Belt and Road initiative.
Given the geostrategic importance of the region, Parliament strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia. The EU should promote political and economic reforms that strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights. Parliament is willing to promote parliamentary cooperation and parliamentary diplomacy with Central Asia.
Legal basis
- Title V of the Treaty on European Union: ‘external action’;
- Articles 206-207 (trade) and Articles 216-219 (international agreements) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;
- Partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs) covering bilateral relations, with the exception of Turkmenistan for which an interim trade agreement is in place. The new enhanced PCA (EPCA) with Kazakhstan fully entered into force on 1 March 2020. The EPCA with Kyrgyzstan was initialled in July 2019 and negotiations with Uzbekistan are under way. Tajikistan has also expressed an interest in an EPCA.
The Central Asian countries and EU-Central Asia relations
For years, relations between Central Asian countries were generally poor, owing to border and resource disputes. Nevertheless, the situation changed rapidly following the change of leadership in Uzbekistan in 2016, opening up new possibilities for regional cooperation.
The first Central Asian leaders’ summit on regional cooperation since the 1990s was held in Astana in March 2018 and the fifth Central Asia summit took place in September 2023 in Dushanbe. Renewable energy sources are another focus of attention in view of the enormous potential for regional cooperation and investment. The regional economy currently faces uncertainty as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global inflation and rising commodity prices.
All the Central Asian countries follow multi-vector foreign policies, seeking to balance ties with Russia, China, the EU and the United States in particular. Relations with Türkiye and Iran are also important. Turkmenistan has been largely closed to the outside world, and its ‘permanent neutrality’ status is even recognised by the UN.
There are EU delegations in all Central Asian countries, since the Delegation to Turkmenistan was opened in July 2019. The EU Delegation to Mongolia was opened in 2017. The EU welcomed the accession of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Economic Union. EU trade with Kazakhstan, mainly in mineral resources, is significant, and that with Uzbekistan is growing.
In 2016, Parliament supported the EU’s Central Asia strategy, calling for it to be more focused. The EU Central Asia strategy was endorsed by the Council in June 2019. The scope of the EU’s relations is linked to the readiness of individual Central Asian countries to undertake reforms and strengthen democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. Countries must also be prepared to modernise and diversify their economies, including by supporting the private sector and small and medium-sized enterprises. The EU-Central Asia International Conference on Connectivity (Global Gateway) was held in November 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The importance of a regional approach and regional cooperation has also been stressed at the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meetings. The 19th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting took place in October 2023.
In 2022, two-way trade in goods amounted to EUR 47.6 billion, with a EUR 15.2 billion trade surplus in favour of Central Asia. Central Asian countries received EUR 1.02 billion in funding for 2014-2020 from the Development Cooperation Instrument, which included both bilateral assistance and regional programmes (EUR 360 million). Horizon Europe is the EU’s new key funding programme for research and innovation, with a budget of EUR 95.5 billion worldwide available over a period of seven years under the 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme. Assistance has focused on education, regional security, sustainable management of natural resources and socio-economic development. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are no longer eligible for the bilateral parts of the instrument since they have gained upper-middle-income-country status, but they continue to have access to the regional programmes. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights operates in all the Central Asian states except for Turkmenistan, where civil society organisations are too few in number, too poorly organised and too strictly controlled.
Following the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the situation in Afghanistan has become not only a global issue but also the leading concern of Central Asian governments. The entire Central Asian region has become a crucial area for containing religious extremism and terror networks, together with drug trafficking within its borders. Because of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Central Asia has become a destination for large numbers of Afghan refugees, who are therefore potential recipients of additional EU support, with bilateral and regional programmes as part of the 2021-2027 EU multiannual indicative programme.
Parliament’s activities with Central Asia are conducted mainly by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Committee on International Trade (INTA), the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE), the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the Delegation for Relations with Central Asia (D-CAS), and through the Parliamentary Cooperation Committees (PCCs) and the Delegation for relations with Afghanistan (D-AF), among other bodies. PCCs with the majority of Central Asian countries meet every year. MEPs oversee the implementation of the agreements and focus on human rights issues, the political situation, economic and development cooperation, and electoral processes.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the EU decision to impose a number of sanction packages on Russia, some Central Asian countries and particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, became possible hubs for circumventing sanctions, as denounced by Parliament resolutions.
Parliament passed a resolution in January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia, updating its comprehensive approach to the region and welcoming the fact that the first EU-Central Asia summit is planned for 2024. The resolution also endorses the October 2023 Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which serves as a strategic blueprint to advance dialogue and cooperation.
A. Kazakhstan
Parliament gave its consent to the EPCA with Kazakhstan in December 2017, stressing the importance of the ‘more for more’ principle to stimulate political and socio-economic reforms.
Former President Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019 after three decades in power, but as ‘Supreme Leader’ and ‘Father of the Nation’ he maintained significant influence and formal powers until 2022.
In 2020, Kazakhstan joined the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty that is included in the International Bill of Human Rights. In January 2021, Kazakhstan abolished the death penalty after ratifying the UN’s Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The European External Action Service lauded the step.
After protests broke out following a spike in liquefied gas prices in January 2022, violence was provoked by unknown, well-trained and organised armed persons. President Tokayev declared a state of emergency. In response to President Tokayev’s request, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a military alliance led by Russia, agreed to send soldiers (‘peacekeeping forces’) to Kazakhstan from Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
President Tokayev used the crisis to blame the previous administration, consolidate his power and end the dual-power arrangement forced on him by Nazarbayev. Tokayev assumed the office of the Chair of the Security Council and appointed a new prime minister. Key members of Nazarbayev’s family lost their positions of influence. In September 2022, Kazakhstan’s Parliament renamed the nation’s capital from Nur-Sultan to Astana, the latest move to distance the country from the former Soviet republic’s first president Nursultan Nazarbayev. In January 2022, Tokayev announced a package of substantial reforms. Kazakhstan has recorded high economic growth in the past, becoming an upper-middle-income country in 2006. This economic progress was challenged by the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and by the country’s growing political and economic dependence on China. GDP growth in 2024 is expected to be around 4% particularly due to forecast uncertainties of oil production in 2024-2025.
In June 2022, Kazakhstan held a constitutional referendum that introduced substantial changes to the existing institutional balance of power, including by curtailing the power of the president and strengthening the role of the parliament. Official turnout was high (68%) and 77.1% of those who cast ballots voted in favour of the changes.
The EU is Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner and foreign investor, and Kazakhstan remains the EU’s leading trade partner in Central Asia. In 2022, the trade balance reached EUR 19.5 billion in Kazakhstan’s favour. The 10th EU-Kazakhstan High-Level Business Platform held in Nur-Sultan in July 2022 was focused on cooperation in the area of raw materials and sustainable mining.
Parliament has not observed elections in Kazakhstan since 2005. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE/OIDHR) has sent election observers to Kazakhstan. OSCE/ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission to the early parliamentary elections in March 2023 in response to concerns about the lack of genuine opposition to the Amanat (ex Nur-Otan) party and due to Kazakhstan’s non-compliance with recommendations relating to fundamental freedoms, impartiality of election administration and eligibility.
Parliament has highlighted the need to guarantee fundamental freedoms, end the arbitrary detention of human rights activists and members of political opposition movements, and ensure the rights of LGTBIQA+ people and the safety of Kazakhs and other ethnic minority groups. Moreover, it has called for possible individual sanctions against Kazakhstan’s officials who are directly responsible for human rights abuses.
Parliament adopted a resolution on the protests and violence in Kazakhstan in January 2022, reiterating its concern over human rights abuses following the outbreak of protests in the country, including the widespread use of torture and disregard for democracy.
A number of internal reforms in Kazakhstan were discussed through regular bilateral interparliamentary dialogue during the 19th Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (Astana and Almaty, April 2022) and the 20th EU-Kazakhstan Cooperation Council, which took place in October 2023 to review the progress made in implementing the EU-Kazakhstan EPCA. During the meeting, the EU welcomed the high level of economic relations.
B. Kyrgyzstan
The EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA was signed in July 2019. Parliament had issued recommendations in January 2019 for the negotiation of a new bilateral agreement. The EU is one of the main sponsors of sustainable development and reforms in Kyrgyzstan. Between 2014 and 2020, the EU allocated EUR 174 million in grant-based development assistance directed at three main sectors and support measures: the rule of law, integrated rural development and education. The 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme responds to the Kyrgyz national development strategy for 2040, which sets out a long-term roadmap to emerge as a strong, self-sufficient and prosperous country.
The OSCE/ODIHR regularly observes parliamentary elections and presidential elections. Parliamentary elections were held in Kyrgyzstan in October 2020 and were subsequently invalidated following mass protests against irregularities and vote buying. Kyrgyzstan’s President, Sooronbay Jeenbekov, resigned in October 2020 and the country held presidential elections in January 2021, after which Sadyr Japarov took office as Kyrgyzstan’s sixth president. The EU noted low voter turnout, the lack of a level playing field for candidates, violations regarding campaigning procedures and an abuse of administrative resources, as reported by the OSCE/OIDHR.
In a referendum held in April 2021, voters approved a new constitution to reduce the size of the parliament by 25% to 90 seats. It also gave the president the power to appoint judges and the leaders of law enforcement bodies and replaced the law allowing the president one term in office in favour of re-election for a second term. The EU issued a statement on constitutional reform in Kyrgyzstan in April 2021, expressing its regret at the lack of inclusive dialogue involving civil society. The 19th EU-Kyrgyz Republic Cooperation Council in November 2022 discussed the strengthening of the rule of law, human rights, including the freedom of the media, progress made in the judiciary and good governance. The 13th EU-Kyrgyz Republic annual Human Rights Dialogue took place in November 2023 in Brussels.
Following clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border in April 2021, the Chair of Parliament’s AFET Committee David McAllister and D-CAS Chair Fulvio Martusciello issued a statement in May 2021 welcoming the ceasefire and calling on both sides to hold diplomatic discussions instead of engaging in military clashes. The border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has killed and injured hundreds of people, and has displaced thousands.
Parliament is deeply concerned about human rights in Kyrgyzstan. An investigation into the death in custody of human rights defender Azimjon Askarov in July 2020 was closed and then re-opened. Several foreign human rights activists and foreign media correspondents remain banned from Kyrgyzstan. Domestic violence remains widespread.
In July 2023, Parliament passed a resolution on freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan, in response to the controversial Kyrgyz bill on media and NGOs. This was one the main issues of the interparliamentary dialogue when Parliament’s D-CAS visited Kyrgyzstan in December 2023 to hold the 16th EU-Kyrgyz Republic Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. Kyrgyzstan is a crucial partner of European parliamentary diplomacy, with regular contacts and open discussion about the state of human rights in the country, its position on Russia and the war against Ukraine. Parliament has expressed concerns at the LGBTIQA+ ‘propaganda’ draft laws in 2015. In August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted a new law that aims to restrict freedom of expression and access to information about LGTBIQA+ people, identities, rights, and lives.
C. Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan became the ninth beneficiary country of the EU’s sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) arrangement in April 2021. By joining this scheme, Uzbekistan receives additional economic benefits due to the cancellation of tariffs for two thirds of the product lines covered by the GSP+. The instrument is a boost to the country’s exports and its ability to attract foreign investment. In turn, Uzbekistan is expected to implement 27 core international conventions on good governance, human and labour rights and environmental and climate protection. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, helped to further develop cooperation during his visit to Uzbekistan in 2022. Negotiations and significant agreements were reached during the President’s participation in the first EU-Central Asia meeting in Astana in October 2022.
In July 2022, the EU and Uzbekistan completed negotiations for a new EPCA, aimed at providing a new, modern and ambitious framework to step up the EU-Uzbekistan partnership. The 19th EU-Uzbekistan annual Cooperation Committee took place in December 2023 in Tashkent. The two sides exchanged views on the further development of financial, technical, trade, economic and investment cooperation, focusing on measures to liberalise and simplify trade procedures using the benefits of the GSP+. The 19th annual meeting emphasised efforts to boost energy efficiency and green energy projects, along with cooperation in expanding transportation, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.
Since Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev took office in 2016, there have been wide-ranging and rapid democratic changes. These are positive developments, which include several ambitious reforms and internal changes, such as the release of a number of political prisoners. Parliament was invited to observe legislative elections in Uzbekistan for the first time in December 2019, but refused on the grounds that the elections were neither free nor fair, pointing to the fact that all candidates came from pro-regime parties. The elections were therefore only monitored by the OSCE/ODIHR.
In February 2021, Mirziyoev signed a law to move the presidential elections to October 2021. The OSCE/ODIHR reiterated its recommendations on political parties’ financing, expediting vote-counting and cutting state resources for electoral campaigns. Parliament accepted the invitation to monitor the October 2021 presidential elections even though the five candidates that were accepted and registered by the Central Election Commission were allegedly pro-government, while two credible opposition candidates from the Liberal Democratic Party and the Truth and Progress Social Democratic Party had been denied registration.
In July 2023, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was re-elected with 87.1% of the vote. He intends to continue the ambitious reforms planned under the Development Strategy 2022-2026, aimed at achieving genuine change in the country in terms of socio-economic development; efficient administration; a more independent judicial system; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Uzbekistan has engaged with the Taliban on trade issues and economic interaction, ensuring border security and cooperation in energy, transportation and international cargo, as well as the railway project connecting the Uzbek border town of Termez to the Pakistani city of Peshawar via Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul in Afghanistan.
Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia have strengthened under President Mirziyoyev. Uzbekistan abstained in the UN General Assembly to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, officially adopting a ‘neutral’ position. The two countries signed an agreement on the extension of military-technical collaboration with a commitment to jointly procuring military goods, military equipment, research and assistance and to renewing outdated weapons. Russia is one of Uzbekistan’s biggest trading partners and Russian investors are particularly interested in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector. Russia’s Gazprom cooperates with hydrocarbons producer Uzbekneftegaz on gas production in Uzbek gas fields, and it also purchases Uzbek gas.
In January 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. They announced that China and Uzbekistan have decided to develop an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for a new era.
The 15th EU-Uzbekistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee took place in January 2022 in Brussels and the 16th EU-Uzbekistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee took place in April 2023 in Tashkent, Nukus and Munyak. Topics of discussion included Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the forthcoming Constitutional Referendum in Uzbekistan, and the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It also assessed the situation in Karakalpakstan after the July 2022 protests, as well as the environmental situation of the Aral Sea.
D. Turkmenistan
Formal EU-Turkmenistan relations emerged in 1997, and the two parties signed a PCA in 1998. Since 2004 all EU Member States and Turkmenistan have already ratified the PCA. Ratification by the European Parliament is the final remaining requirement to finalise it. Parliament has refused to give its consent to ratification of the EU-Turkmenistan PCA because of its deep concern over the short-term benchmarks for Turkmenistan’s progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, bilateral EU-Turkmenistan relations are currently governed by the 2010 Interim Trade Agreement.
Turkmenistan has taken steps to open the country and create more space for civil society organisations. However, the country remains under the authoritarian rule of President Berdymukhamedov. Recent developments show that democratic development has not progressed and the human rights situation has not particularly improved. In 2021, Turkmenistan introduced some constitutional reforms, including the creation of an upper house, but the role of the Turkmen Parliament is still extremely limited.
Apart from the EU-Central Asia regional frameworks, the EU and Turkmenistan maintain annual bilateral dialogues: the EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue and the EU-Turkmenistan Joint Committee. The 22nd Joint Committee was held in December 2023 to further develop partnership and cooperation, in particular in the areas of trade, energy, and development cooperation. The EU has reaffirmed that the rule of law and respect for human rights are essential aspects of the EU-Turkmenistan relationship. The 15th annual EU-Turkmenistan Human Rights Dialogue took place in December 2023. Discussions centred on Turkmenistan’s fulfilment of its international legal obligations, in particular respect for human rights, socio-economic issues and cooperation in multilateral platforms.
Parliament has consistently expressed concerns about Turkmenistan’s poor human rights record and, accordingly, has blocked the entry into force of the PCA so far. Parliament has never been invited to observe elections in Turkmenistan. The sixth EU-Turkmenistan Interparliamentary Meeting was held in June 2023 in Ashgabad and Mary to relaunch the direct dialogue.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, EU countries are trying to increase their access to Turkmenistan’s gas resources to ensure their energy security. As a result, Turkmenistan and the EU are currently working on a gas deal, as Turkmenistan wants to diversify its energy exports, while the EU wants to diversify its energy imports. In November 2014, Turkmenistan signed a framework agreement with Türkiye to supply its gas through the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline, which now receives gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field in the Caspian Sea. In 2021, Trans Caspian Resources presented its project for the Trans-Caspian Interconnector, a smaller gas pipeline (compared to the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. Once completed, it will supply between 10 and 12 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year.
E. Tajikistan
The EU’s engagement with Tajikistan has developed significantly since the country’s independence from the USSR in 1992. The current legal framework for EU-Tajikistan relations is the PCA signed in October 2004, which entered into force in January 2010. Parliament consented to the conclusion of the PCA in 2009, but called for improvements in human rights, corruption, health and education. The PCA contributed to the enhancement of bilateral cooperation and raised the EU’s profile in Tajikistan, setting out a platform for political dialogue and aiming to promote bilateral trade and economic relations. It also includes articles on cooperation on migration and on the fight against money laundering, drugs and terrorism.
Tajikistan is an important EU partner currently facing several challenges, such as the impact of international sanctions and the return of many Tajik migrants from Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, the critical human rights situation and a strong interest in joining the GSP+ trade preferential scheme. Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Tajikistan has been hosting thousands of Afghan refugees. The country is committed to fighting the spread of extremism and radicalism in Central Asia.
At the beginning of 2023, the EU and Tajikistan started negotiations on an EPCA. The 10th meeting of the EU-Tajikistan Cooperation Council was held in June 2023 in Luxembourg. Since then, contacts have been initiated to begin the EPCA negotiations, following the example of other Central Asian countries. The EU is encouraging Tajikistan to improve its record on fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights. The 14th Human Right Dialogue took place in December 2023 and focused on strengthening cooperation between the Government of Tajikistan and civil society.
Parliamentary elections were held in Tajikistan in March 2020. The ruling People’s Democratic Party won by overwhelming majority. The presidential election was held in October 2021 amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As expected, Emomali Rakhmonov (Rahmon) easily won the election, securing him another seven years as President.
In June 2016, the European Parliament adopted a very critical resolution on the situation of prisoners of conscience in Tajikistan, expressing deep concerns about the deterioration of human rights, the increased number of detentions and arrests of human rights activists, political opponents and their family members and severe restrictions on the independent media.
Parliament has repeatedly expressed concern about the clashes at the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and welcomed the ceasefire agreement reached in April 2021. However, in September 2022, violence increased between border guards along various sites. In February 2024, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan reached a settlement to end decades of acrimonious disputes by agreeing on the delimitation of 90% of previously contested territory.
In July 2022, Parliament adopted a resolution on the deterioration of the situation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province and reiterated its concern over the worsening of the country’s human-rights record in its resolution of January 2024 on the state repression against the independent media. Political parliamentary dialogue remained intense, through the 9th EU/Tajikistan parliamentary Cooperation Committee in May 2022 (Brussels) and the 10th EU/Tajikistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee in May 2023 (Dushanbe and Bokhtar). Parliament is stepping up its scrutiny of the deterioration in human rights in the country. Improvement in this area is essential to further enhance the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and the EU.
F. Mongolia
Mongolia, though not covered by the EU’s Central Asian strategy, is classified by Parliament as part of the region within the framework of its standing delegations. Mongolia shares many cultural, historic and economic aspects with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. During the last three decades, Mongolia has distinguished itself as an ‘oasis of democracy’ with solid economic growth, even though developments in 2019 raised concerns about democratic erosion. In 2017, Parliament gave its consent to the EU-Mongolia PCA.
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mongolia still held its regular parliamentary elections and saw Ukhnaa Khürelsükh elected President. As the new, amended constitution requires the president not to be affiliated to a political party, in June 2021, Ukhnaa was replaced as leader of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) by incumbent Mongolian Prime Minister Luvsannamsrai Oyun-Erdene. Mongolian politics are currently dominated by the consolidation of the MPP party with a large majority in the Mongolian Parliament and presidential control. There will be a parliamentary election in June 2024, which will be a pivotal moment for the country’s democracy because it will be the first since Mongolia’s constitutional reform in May 2023, which enlarged the parliament from 76 to 126 members.
The EU-Mongolia annual Joint Committee meeting was held in July 2023 to reaffirm the partnership based on shared values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for the principles of the UN Charter. Mongolia and the EU agreed on the need to combat climate change and protect the environment, fully supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The EU-Mongolia Working Group on Development Cooperation met in July 2023 to look ahead towards future challenges and opportunities and to discuss the progress achieved by the implementation of the Mongolia 2021-2027 multiannual indicative programme. The meeting of the EU-Mongolia Subcommittee on Trade and Investment was held in November 2023 to discuss the current economic situation, investment environment and trade policies.
Parliament’s statements on Mongolia have been largely related to economic issues, but also to the country’s development and humanitarian needs, linked to extreme weather conditions. A Parliament delegation observed Mongolia’s 2016 parliamentary elections and 2017 presidential elections, noting that the country is developing a solid democracy. However, Parliament did not observe the June 2020 parliamentary election because of the COVID-19 pandemic, nor the June 2021 presidential election. In 2022, due to the exceptional international situation following the outbreak of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, for the first time two full EU-Mongolia interparliamentary meetings were held in the same year: the 14th in Ulaan Baator in February 2022 and the 15th in Brussels in June 2022. The 16th EU-Mongolia Interparliamentary Meeting took place in September 2023 in Ulaan Baator. The delegation commended Mongolia’s encouragement of democracy and had direct contact with various representatives of Mongolian society. This included meetings with students, teachers and the National University; the highest Tibetan Buddhist authorities in the country; many NGOs; and beneficiaries of EU-funded projects.
Jorge Soutullo / Niccolò Rinaldi