

# **The demographic challenge in Europe**

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## Contents

Preface	2
Summary	3
1. Introduction	6
2. Demographic trends in the European Union	7
3. The background of decreasing total fertility rate	8
4. Migration	10
4.1 Global migration	10
4.2 History of migration into the EU	11
4.3 Position and acceptance of immigrants	12
4.4 Debates on immigration	13
4.5 Views related to Muslim population	15
4.6 Immigration and political parties	18
4.7 The common immigration policy of the EU	19
4.8 Immigration policy of member states	20
5. Demographic forecast	21
5.1 United Nation projections	21
5.2 The forecasting model	23
Literature	30
Sources of figures and tables	31
Glossary	31
Figures	
1. World population (from the ancient ages)	6
2. The World population and its increase (the last 250 years)	6
3. Population growth rate in the European Union	7
4. Total fertility rate (World)	7
5. Total fertility rate (USA and EU)	8
6. Total fertility rate as function of age at first birth and GDP/cap	9
7. Divorces per marriages	10
8. Natural increase in population and net immigration	11
Tables	
1. The change of age specific birth rate in Norway	8
2. Population, total fertility rate and arable land per capita in some countries	17
3. Population of the major areas 2000-2300 (UN projection)	22
4. The "naive" scenario	24
5. Muslim's total fertility rate increases to 2.1	25
6. Basic scenario	26
7. 1.6 million yearly net immigrants	27
8. 0.3 million yearly net immigrants	28
9. 0.3 million yearly net immigrants + higher participation rate	29

## Preface

The European Commission just recently released a Green Paper addressing the demographic situation in the European Union [COM(2005) 94 final] and calls for a discussion on the topic. This study – which is built on a simple demographical model for the EU-25 – is a contribution to the forthcoming debate, but in the same time its intention is to give the possibility to everyone – who wants to do so – to make own calculation on the European demography according to his/her preferred assumptions. The demographic model, that is actually an Excel table, simple enough to handle by everybody who has some experience in such kind of calculations.

The model tries to address the impact of immigration by dividing the model into two parts. One, which describes the demographic tendencies of the non-immigrant and an another one, which address the demographic feature of the immigrant population. The final result is the sum of the two calculations.

From the point of view of calculations "immigrants" might mean all those people who arrive outside the EU-25. Unfortunately statistical data can hardly be found for the demographic characteristic (age distribution, total fertility rate, death rate, longevity) of the immigrants as a whole (for those who are already here and for those who will come). There are only sporadic estimations and first of all for the Muslim population. For this reason and also because in the future we can receive immigrants first of all from the neighbouring North African and Middle Eastern Islam countries, moreover because the demographic characteristic of the Muslim population can be estimated on the basis of statistics for the countries of origin, the model calculates with the Muslim immigrants.

By this way the model can give also an answer how these two cultures, the European and the Muslim can survive and stabilize.

The result of such kind of calculations naturally depends on the initial assumptions, especially on the projected total fertility rate, and immigration. Everybody might have one's own opinion on these questions. For this reason we do not state that our forecast will be the future, just as we do not state that we overviewed all the possible alternatives.

As regards the data used, the model was built first of all on the United Nation demographic database, but Eurostat data and different publications of the Commission were also used. In some there were no official figures (i.e. the ones published by UN, EU, OECD or national statistics offices). In these cases data were collected from any publication which addressed the problem, but in such cases uncertainties are indicated. The model uses a wide range of assumptions to test the sensitivity of these parameters (usually estimates for total fertility rate or immigration) by this way the bigger mistakes originating from the uncertain database can be avoided.

This study does not attempt to say anything new, but it tries to summarise the basic facts and possible future scenarios of the European demographical situation hoping that it might assist Members of the European Parliament in their duties.

## Summary

This study on the demographic developments in the European Union aims to give an overview of the global demographic situation showing the reasons for the acceleration and slow down of the growth of the world population, and how the weights of the different regions changed as a consequence of the uneven growth rate of population.

Also, it tries to unveil the reasons behind the very low total fertility rate in the developed industrial countries, and, particularly in the European Union.

With the help of a simple demographic model this study tries to assess the growth and age distribution of the EU-25 population giving some alternative answers on how the old age dependency ratio may change, which today seems to be one of the most pressing demographic problems and, besides, some calculations are made on the impact of different immigration patterns and the economic impact of the ageing population.

The result of such kind of calculations naturally depends on the initial assumptions, especially on the projected total fertility rate, and immigration.

The negative demographical tendencies are present in the whole of Europe and their symptoms are rather similar. From the second half of the 19th century, since when the demographic tendencies can be followed from official statistics, the yearly growth rate of population in the present European Union oscillated between 0,5 and 1%. However, this trend changed dramatically in the 1960's and within one generation the growth rate slowed down to zero because of the steadily deteriorating total fertility rate. (Total fertility rate "TFR" is the average number of children that a woman, in all her lifetime, will give birth to.) This ratio was around 2,66 in the beginning of the 1960's and fell back to 1,46 by the end of the 1990's.

The decrease in total fertility rate is a global phenomenon. However while in the developing countries – against a substantial fall – it remained well above the critical 2,1 level which is required for the simple reproduction of the population; in the developed world, and especially in the EU-25 the rate of 1,46 is not enough to maintain the society.

Wide international comparisons show that there is a close connection between the age of first birth and the total fertility rate. From a detailed dataset for Norway it can be seen that in a 40 year time frame the total fertility rate decreased in all age groups but the bulk of decrease came from the 20-24 and 25-29 year olds. One of the main reasons behind is the growing level of education. As more and more young men and, especially women acquire higher education the possible date to get married is postponed and with it also the age of first birth. On the other hand, higher youth unemployment rates also contribute to both longer school years and the postponing of marriages and/or first births.

One may think it logical that the birth rate increases in the higher age groups. But as the data for Norway prove, it never happens. The children who were not born when women were in their twenties will never be born.

Europe has been able to uphold the number of its population only by the help of immigration. West-European countries began to "import" guest workers in the early 1960's to fill jobs Europeans would not consider. These guest workers came mainly from the Mediterranean (to France) and from Turkey (to Germany).

Following the first Arab oil embargo and the subsequent economic downturn in the 1970s, most European countries closed their doors to labour immigration, yet some 500,000 immigrants – primarily family reunification cases – and 400,000 asylum seekers arrive into western Europe each year.

Since the 1980's the prospects for immigrants deteriorated. A substantial portion of the jobs the immigrants originally came for – largely in manufacturing – has gone. As a result unemployment rates

among immigrants tend to be very high. Besides, there is a growing concern among the west-European population over the fast-growing Muslim communities.

High profile authorities argue for immigration. A report by the United Nations says that to keep the population at its present level until 2050, Europe would need 1,6 million new immigrants every year, that is to say 80 million people in the whole time period.

The European Commission (EC) has also argued strongly in favour of immigration. In a communication of 2003 the Commission pointed out that the EU population, due to decreased fertility rates and longer life expectancy, is ageing, leading to a likely fall in the working population in the 25 states from 303 million to 297 million by 2020. A smaller labour force means less economic growth: economic migration is therefore necessary for sustained economic growth.

Model calculation give a more detailed and a little bit modified picture. When it is supposed that tendencies characterising the present will prevail long in the future which means that the total fertility rate of the non-Muslim population will be at 1.48 and likewise the Muslim population will remain at the present (estimated) 2.7 level, the total population of the EU-25 will not change significantly (there will be only a 4 million increase) but this almost unchanged population is the outcome of a 71 million decrease in the non-Muslim population and almost the same (75 million) increase in the Muslim population. As a result the share of Muslim population in the EU-25 by 2050 will be around 20% against the current 3.7%. At the same time, the old age dependency ratio (the ratio of population above 64 to that between 15-64) will grow up to 41.7% against the current 24,3%.

With the labour force what is the result of the assumptions made above and supposing a yearly labour productivity growth of 2%, the annual GDP growth rate can be estimated at 1,8% as an average for the coming half century.

If these tendencies prevail on long run in the future, by the end of the 22nd century, the original European population will decrease to one-fifth of the nowadays level, amounting to a mere 10% of the total.

But this scenario, while it can not be entirely ruled out, seems rather unrealistic. The fertility rates are falling all over the world, even in Muslim countries, so it may be a realistic assumption that within one generation the total fertility rate of the European Muslims will decrease to the constant-population level of 2.1. Also – in accordance with the United Nations forecast – we may assume that after 2050 there will be no net immigration.

In this case the Muslim population in Europe will stabilise at around 80 million while, because of the unchanged (1,48) total fertility rate the non-Muslims will be continuously decreasing with a yearly rate of 1%.

If Europeans want to survive, irrespectively whether there is net immigration or not, they have to increase their total fertility rate up to 2.1.

Let us suppose that the native Europeans will somehow find the means to increase their total fertility rate up to the constant-population level of 2.1 within a generation. In this case – with the previous assumptions for immigration (1,2 million in a year) and Muslim fertility rate (decreasing to 2.1) – the European (EU-25) population will be stabilised at the present day level and the ratio of Muslim population will also be stabilised at 16% of the total.

From an economic point of view the strongest argument for immigration is that without immigrants the old age dependency ratio will increase substantially, placing unbearable loads on the pension and health care system. The United Nation forecast and Kofi Annan himself strongly suggest a massive net immigration to avoid the foreseeable troubles.

In the previously mentioned basic scenario (when within one generation the fertility rate of both the non-Muslim and the Muslim population will be stabilised at the constant-population rate of 2.1) the long term

old age dependency ratio will stabilise at around 34% (against the current 24,3%) and the young-age dependency ratio around 31%, against the current 25%. These rates can be taken as natural when a population is stable in its number.

From this comes that the current dependency ratios are exceptional originating from a transition phenomenon when a growing population turns into a decreasing population.

For a stable population the dependency ratio is around 65% which is more or less divided equally between the young and old age.

For testing the impact of immigration two special cases were considered. In the first case a 1,6 million yearly net immigration was supposed as it was suggested by UN forecasts. In this case the old age and total dependency ratio would improve by only one percentage point to the basic scenario. In an opposite case, supposing that there will practically be no net immigration (only 0.3 million a year coming from family unification and asylum seekers) the old age dependency ratio in 2050 will be higher by 3 percentage point against the basic scenario. So the difference between the two extreme cases is 4 percentage point.


In the high immigration scenario the economic growth (calculated on the working-age population and participation rate, with the assumption that the productivity of labour increases by a yearly 2% average in the long run) would reach 2% yearly, while in the no-immigration version the growth rate was only 1.6%. But if in the latest case the participation rate of the working-age population increased to 70% from the current 63%, as assumed in the Lisbon process, economic growth would reach the 1.9% level. From this it results that immigration can easily be compensated by the growing participation rate.

Summing up, from the economic point of view mass immigration cannot be justified. Taking into account all the possible scenarios, the real solution for Europe is to increase the total fertility rate up to the constant-population level, integrating the immigrants and increasing the participation rate to the Lisbon target. The largest challenge is to find the suitable means to reach these goals.

Brussels, April 2005


## 1. Introduction

The estimated world population in Christ's time was around 200 million and it hardly changed during the centuries that followed. When Columbus discovered the New World there were only 450 million people, the average yearly growth rate in the first 15 centuries of our Lord was 0,1% which meant stability for the contemporary societies.



The population began to accelerate in the 18th century, when, partly as a result of improved nutrition and the impact of new discoveries in medical science, like smallpox vaccination, the defeat of cholera (John Snow), germ theory of disease (Louis Pasteur), the discovery of the pathogen of tuberculosis (Robert Koch) and so on, there was a decrease in the crude death rate of the population, while the birth rate remained relatively high. This was the time when Thomas Malthus wrote his famous *Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society*. The population reached one billion

in the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, and the yearly growth rate remained almost unchanged in the next 130 years hovering around 0,6%. The real population blow-up came in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, when the results in medical science began to spread in the Asian, African and Latin American countries (in the former colonies) pressing down the crude death rate while – with the surviving of social traditions – the birth rate remained at its high historical level. The average growth rate reached the yearly average of 2% which – in a generation's time – doubled the world population.




As a result the pattern of the world population changed thoroughly, especially from a European point of view. In the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the European population was close to one quarter that of the world, which share plummeted to one-tenth by the first decade of the new millennium. This change was owing to the differences in the average yearly population growth in the second half of the 20th century, which was 0,6 per cent in the case of Europe and 2,1 per cent in the case of the Third World.

However the demographic situation is worse for Europe than it looks from these data since the 0,6 per cent yearly population growth was only an average of 1 per cent in the 1950's and zero per cent in the 1990's. According to a United Nation forecast,<sup>1</sup> in the next fifty years Europe will lose 100 millions from its current population, and those who remain will be much older.

<sup>1</sup> World Population in 2300, Expert meeting on world population in 2300 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs March 2004


## 2. Demographic tendencies in the European Union

The negative demographical tendencies are present in the whole of Europe including its eastern part with the states of the former Soviet Union and the symptoms are rather similar. However, in the following we want to concentrate on the enlarged European Union (EU-25).



From the second half of the 19th century, since when we can follow the demographic tendencies from official statistics, the yearly growth rate of population in the present European Union oscillated between 0,5 and 1%. However, this trend changed dramatically in the 1960's and within one generation the growth rate slowed down to zero. Even the natural growth (the difference between death and birth number) turned into negative and only the net immigration made the population grow. Looking for the reasons we will discover that

against the fact that there was some improvement in the death rate while the average life span became longer too, these tendencies were unable to balance the steadily deteriorating total fertility rate. Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that a woman, in all her lifetime, will give birth to. This ratio was around 2,66 in the beginning of the 1960's and fell back to 1,46 by the end of the 1990's.




The decrease in total fertility rate is a global phenomenon. However while the total fertility rate in the developing countries – against a substantial fall – remained well above the critical 2,1 level which is required for the simple reproduction of the population, in the developed world, and especially in the EU-25 the rate of 1,46 is not enough to maintain the current society. This rate, in the long run when its impact will fully prevail, produces a yearly decrease of 1% in the population. Parallel to this, the so called old age dependency rate (the ratio of

the population over 65 years to the population aged between 15-64 years) will reach 47% against the current 24% which means that the burden on the working age population to keep the pensioners will be doubled. Figure 4 shows that the total fertility rate for the EU-25 countries is very close to that of the developed countries. It comes from the fact that the EU-25 countries constitute a great part of the developing countries. But if we go into the details it will turn out that, for instance, there is a significant difference between the European Union and the United States. In the United States the total fertility rate decreased parallel to that of the EU-25 in the 1960's and 1970's even going below the EU-25 level in the mid-seventies, but later on it improved and, remaining unchanged in the 1990's, it reached the level of 2,0 which is very close to the constant-population level (2,1). However there are significant differences between races. People of Hispanic origin (mainly Mexicans) have much a higher rate (between 2,5 and



3,0), while the non Hispanic white population has a total fertility rate of 1,8, which is significantly higher than the EU-25 level, but is under the constant-population rate. The rate for the US black, non Hispanic people (African-Americans), after a strong decrease in the 1990's, is just above the white population and reaches the constant-population level of 2,1. These two races, each amounting to some 12% of the total US population, are the ones that increased the total fertility rate of the United States close to the constant-population level. However, the large differences especially between the Hispanic and White non Hispanic races, and the strong immigration, legal or illegal, from Mexico causes a substantial shift in the race pattern of the United States. Samuel P. Huntington, who in his new book "Who are we?" addresses this phenomenon, says that the United States will be divided into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages.



Making a comparison with Canada and Belgium he states: "The transformation of the United States into a country like these would not necessarily be the end of the world; it would however, be the end of the America we have known for more than three centuries. Americans should not let that change happen unless they are convinced that this new nation would be a better one."

There is probably one more thing which is worth mentioning in connection with the US statistics. It was hardly four centuries ago that Peter Minuit the Dutch merchants purchased Manhattan Island from Native Americans for \$24 worth of trinkets, beads and knives, and the last battle between the natives and white immigrants occurred in 1890 at Wounded Knee. Today the ratio of the native Indians in the US population is around 0,8 per cent and their total fertility rate (1,7) is well under the constant-population level.

### 3. The background of decreasing total fertility rate


Wide international comparisons show that there is a close connection between the age of first birth and the total fertility rate (TFR). From a detailed dataset for Norway where the change in the so called age specific birth rates (the number of annual births to 1000 women of a specific age group) and the total fertility rate are given for a forty-year period between 1960-64 and 1996-2000, we can get an explanation.

Table 1

The change of age specific birth rate in Norway

Period	TFR	TFR change	Composition of TFR changes by age groups (Norway)						
			15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49
1961-65	2920								
1966-70	2729	-192	29	-15	-64	-71	-47	-23	-2
1971-75	2247	-482	1	-117	-120	-124	-87	-33	-3
1976-80	1776	-471	-71	-182	-100	-57	-46	-16	-1
1981-85	1681	-96	-47	-81	9	24	1	-3	0
1986-90	1825	145	-14	-31	72	90	25	3	0
1991-95	1894	69	-13	-53	4	75	50	6	0
1996-00	1862	-32	-14	-60	-34	38	32	7	0
1961-00		-1059	-128	-537	-232	-25	-73	-59	-6

As can be seen (from Table 1) in Norway, in a 40 year time frame the total fertility rate (TFR) decreased by 1059 thousands similar to the EU-25 average. There was a decrease in all age groups but the bulk of decrease came from the 20-24 and 25-29 year olds. The reasons behind it in all probability can be found first of all in the growing level of education. As more and more young men and, especially women acquire higher education the possible date to get married is postponed and with it also the age of first birth. Liberal education policies give the possibility to attend high schools and universities for more years. On the other hand, higher youth unemployment rates also contribute to both longer school years and the postponing of marriages and/or first births.




One may think it logical that the birth rate increases in the higher age groups. But as the data for Norway prove, it never happens. The children who were not born when women were in their twenties will never be born. Naturally, Norway is only one example, but an international comparison for 117 countries of higher population than 1 million shows that there is a close correlation between first birth and total fertility rate.

In Figure 6 we divided the countries into three groups according to their development level measured in GDP/capita. In the lowest group one finds those countries where the GDP/capita, expressed in 2002 US dollar and on PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) basis, is lower than \$3000. The medium group stretches between \$3000 and \$13000 and the high income group consists of all the countries with higher than \$13000 GDP/capita. As can be seen from Figure 6 in the low income countries the age of first birth is at the ages between 18 and 20 years and the total fertility rate spreads between 4 and 7. The medium income countries show a very different picture. In these countries the average age of first birth shifted to the 22-24 year zone, and parallel to this the total fertility rate decreased to the 1-3 band with an average above 2,1, which means that the population in these countries increases, but with a moderate rate. Finally in the 28 high income countries where the average age of first birth moves between 26-30 years the total fertility rate is between 1 and 2 with an average of around 1,5, which means that within approximately two generation (60-70 years) the population will be halved.

To better understand this phenomenon it is useful to have a closer look at those countries who are exceptions from the general rule. Such a country is, for instance, Egypt, which is a medium-income country, but the average age of first birth is much higher (27 years) than its' group average, and, at the same time the fertility rate is as high as 3,3. It means that in Egypt, which is a modern Islamic country, the education level of women is relatively high, but at the same time they follow a traditional family pattern with a high number of children. Another exception is Israel, which although it is a developed country, the age of first birth is low (around 21-22 years) and the total fertility rate is 2,7. Presumably the early marriages and high fertility rate are connected to the Israelis' determination to keep pace with the Palestinian population. A further exception is Austria, where the age of first marriage is relatively low (around 23 years) but at the same time the total fertility rate is also low, indicating a rich country where some feature of the traditional family pattern (the early marriage) survived, but otherwise it follows the characteristic lifestyle and value system of the rich countries.

To sum up, according to wide international comparisons (117 countries), a great majority (80-90%) of the countries follow a well established tendency and the few exceptions can be explained by special political

or social conditions. But these exceptions (where the difference goes in the direction of higher fertility) can be used as a compass if Europe wants to look for some solution for its decreasing population.



Some statistics show that in the high income countries the "family crisis" can be found behind the decreasing fertility rate. From the second half of the 1960's the basic indicators for family life deteriorated with a rather fast rate. For instance, in the 1960's there were eight marriages for 1000 population. This rate is now around five. What is more striking is that one in every second or third marriage ends in divorce, while a generation earlier this rate was only one-tenth. The birth rate outside marriage is now 30 per 100 births, which was only five a generation ago. All these indicators

show that the family has become unstable; traditional family values lost their attractiveness resulting in limited space for childbearing and child raising.

## 4. Migration

### 4.1 Global migration<sup>2</sup>

Over the past 15 years, the number of people crossing borders in search of a better life has been rising steadily. At the start of the 21st Century, one in every 35 people is an international migrant. Globally the stock of migrating people increased from 75 million in 1965 to 175 million in 2002. However, compared to the world population the ratio remains constant. It means that growing globalization does not modify the migration tendency.

Global migration affects almost every country – they are all either places of origin, transit and/or destination for migrants. While the major countries of emigration are in the developing world, western industrialised countries absorbed only about 40% of the world's migrants, the remaining part settling also in developing countries or the former Soviet Union. For instance an estimated 1.2 million refugees are believed to live in Pakistan, 1.3 million in Iran, about two million in Tanzania, and so on.

Most of those who have left their countries are motivated by a desire for better opportunities. But there are also millions of people who have been forced to migrate for fear of persecution. The current waves of immigrants and asylum seekers from the Middle East and North Africa are linked much more to the worsening conditions in these countries, than with labour shortages in Europe.

At the end of 2002, 10.4 million people around the world had refugee status, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees. A further one million applied for asylum that year or had their applications still pending.


These figures do not include the 4.1 million Palestinian refugees assisted by the UN Relief and Works Agency.

In the European Union Germany has the largest refugee population with close to one million. Most are from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

<sup>2</sup> Main source: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/world/04/migration/html/migration\\_boom.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/world/04/migration/html/migration_boom.stm)

## 4.2 History of migration into the EU<sup>3</sup>

During the 1950s, most Western European countries still registered a negative migration balance. Some countries (for instance Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) lost a substantial number of their citizens emigrating for economic reasons overseas as well as to other European countries.



Western European countries began to "import" guest workers in the early 1960's to fill jobs Europeans would not consider. These guest workers came mainly from the Mediterranean (to France) and from Turkey (to Germany). The French Muslim communities now in existence trace their origins to a wave of heavy immigration in the twelve years between 1961 and 1973. After France's withdrawal from Algeria more than a million French citizens, Christians and Jews, migrated to France.

Most European countries closed their doors to labour immigration in the 1970s, following the first Arab oil embargo and the subsequent economic downturn, yet some 500,000 immigrants – primarily family reunification cases – and 400,000 asylum seekers arrive in western Europe each year.

Asylum seekers come mainly from black Africa and the Middle East (including north Africa). Over the period 1989-98, four million people applied for asylum in Europe.

In the forty years between 1960 and 2000, Western Europe's population increased by 4.3 per cent through a net inflow of some 16.7 million people. In absolute terms, the main receiving countries were Germany (net migration balance 1960- 2000: +8.5 million), France (+3.9 million), the Netherlands (+1.0 million), the UK (+0.9 million) and Switzerland (+0.8 million).<sup>4</sup>

As regards intra-European mobility, however, despite the progress made in removing obstacles to the free movement of people in the EU, the levels of intra-EU mobility are very low. Today, annual mobility between Member States amounts to between 0.1 and 0.2 % of the population. The most important barriers are the lack of language skills and the problems with finding a job for both spouses.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the "iron curtain" restricted the number of emigrants. Emigration was high only in years of political crises, in "normal" years only members of ethnic or ethnoreligious minorities with strong support from a western nation were able to leave. The situation changed in 1989-90, when the "iron curtain" fell. The travel restrictions ended and civil wars and ethnic cleansing led to massive emigration to neighbouring countries and Western Europe. As a result of economically, politically and ethnically motivated emigration, most countries of Central and Eastern Europe recorded a negative migration balance. Between 1960 and 2000, the whole region lost at least 4.7 million people (almost 3 per cent of its total population) through migration.

<sup>3</sup> Source: World Migration 2003 UN (Chapter 13)

<sup>4</sup> World Migration 2003 UN (Chapter 13)

### 4.3 Position and acceptance of immigrants<sup>5, 6</sup>

There are no comprehensive data on the number and social positions of the immigrants. It is known however that immigrants are geographically clustered particularly in industrialized, urban areas within poorer neighbourhoods.

Since the 1980's with globalisation the prospects for immigrants deteriorated. A substantial portion of the jobs the immigrants originally came for – largely in manufacturing – has gone, replaced by higher-end service sector positions in fields like health care, finance and high technology. But lack of education, and often even language skills, put these new opportunities beyond the reach of many immigrants and their children. As a result unemployment rates among immigrants tend to be very high. The Turkish community in Germany, for instance, has a jobless rate of 24 percent, almost two and-a-half times the national average.<sup>7</sup> In France, the unemployment rate for North Africans hovers around 30 percent, or more than three times the country's over all rate, according to the Montaigne Institute, a Paris-based think tank.

Besides the problems mentioned above, there is a growing concern among the west-European population over the fast-growing Muslim communities. The size of the European Muslim communities has tripled in the last 30 years. This rapid growth is caused both by immigration and high Muslim birth rates. One-tenth of the French population is now Muslim, as is five percent of Germany and six percent of the Netherlands. While the UK's Muslim population is only 2.5 percent, Muslims have become large minorities in some small British towns.

Many European cities already have sizeable Muslim minorities. Currently, they make up at least 25 percent of the populations of Marseille and Rotterdam, 20 percent of Malmo's (in Sweden), 15 percent of Brussels' and Birmingham's, and 10 percent or more London's, Paris' and Copenhagen's. A majority of these immigrants are from North Africa, Turkey and other Islamic countries. Muslims also make up a large share of the continent's illegal immigrants – a group that is estimated to number up to half a million per year.<sup>8</sup> In central and eastern Europe, Muslim populations remain virtually nonexistent.

#### Attitudes of Europeans towards minorities

- **actively tolerant (21%)**: they are not disturbed by minorities, they favour the accommodation of minority cultures by the host society, they support policies in favour of minorities
- **passively tolerant (39%)**: they do not insist on the complete abandonment of minority cultures, but are less supportive of positive actions towards these groups
- **ambivalent (25%)**: they are not disturbed, but they are in favour of complete assimilation into the majority culture rather than of cultural diversity
- **intolerant (14%)**: they have strong negative attitudes, they feel disturbed by minorities, they favour complete assimilation into the major culture and/or repatriation

Source: see Literature (3)

Many Europeans have the feeling that the fast-growing Muslim population will cause social conflicts. Muslims rightly demand political recognition, greater entitlements, and preservation of their Islamic identity. Many European citizens see crime as something which is connected mainly to immigrants. For most within the middle and upper classes in Europe the idea of multiculturalism is rather alien. Whatever the reality, there is a widely held view among Europeans that Muslims are not integrating into the mainstream.

Even the most open Europeans consider that multiculturalism should not become a threat to the

fundamental values of the European model of democracy. This implies that immigrants should give up that part of their culture and religions which may be in conflict with those values.

This perception is expressed in the opinion over the Turkish EU membership. The latest poll conducted for Le Figaro shows 67 percent of the French and 55 percent of Germans are opposed to Turkey's admission.

<sup>5</sup> Source: see literature (1) and (2)

<sup>6</sup> Main source: see Literature (4)

<sup>7</sup> Figures cited in Matt Surman, "Turks Arrived Decades Ago in Germany and Made Themselves at Home, Despite Outsider Status," The Associated Press, Oct. 7, 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Figures cited in Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, p. 25.

In Britain more than 80% of the whole population (and 59% of Black and Asian Britons) saw immigration as out of control.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4.4 Debates on immigration

##### ***Arguments for immigration***

A report by the United Nations<sup>10</sup> makes the strongest argument for the free flow of immigration. The reason is that population growth is crashing throughout the industrialized world. This will either impose an intolerable tax burden on future workers or force more of those over 65 to remain in the labour force. The report says that to keep the population at its present level until 2050, Europe would need 1,6 million new immigrants every year, that is to say 80 million people.

"Opening Europe's borders would be more than a gesture of goodwill—it would also be an act of self-interest. Europe's economies are in dire need of extra manpower. Immigrants can provide Europe with valuable resources as it enters the new economy, by filling the low-wage jobs that Europeans do not want, and injecting the technical expertise that Europeans do not possess."<sup>11</sup>

"Employers want more labour at a low price and people with money want more services—and it's difficult to see how that can come about with a declining population," says Joseph Chamie, director of the U.N.'s population division. "The sooner European governments look at migration as a solution, the easier it will be to adjust.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a speech to the European Parliament on 29 January 2004. In his speech he emphasized that all countries have the right to decide whether to admit migrants, but Europeans would be unwise to close their doors. That would not only harm their long-term economic and social prospects. It would also drive more and more people to try and come in through the back door – by asking for political asylum or by seeking the help of smugglers. "A closed Europe would be a meaner, poorer, weaker, older Europe, an open Europe will be a fairer, richer, stronger, younger Europe" – the UN General Secretary said.

The European Commission (EC) has also argued strongly in favour of immigration. In a communication of 2003 the Commission pointed out that the EU population, due to decreased fertility rates and longer life expectancy, is ageing, leading to a likely fall in the working population in the 25 states from 303 million to 297 million by 2020. A smaller labour force means less economic growth: economic migration is therefore necessary for sustained economic growth.<sup>12</sup>

Germany's Independent Commission on Migration<sup>13</sup> stands also for immigration. In a report in 2001 they concluded: "We need immigration to Germany because the population here is getting older: life expectancy is increasing while the number of children born per family remains low and the number of births is decreasing"

Employers who are experiencing skilled-labour shortages have also been calling on governments to open up new labour migration channels for foreign workers. "Immigration restriction should also be

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<sup>9</sup> Europe's immigration breakdown Mandato da vette67stinger Venerdì, 17 dicembre 2004, 00:34. By Claude Salhani (<http://www.legnostorto.com/node.php?id=23326>)

<sup>10</sup> United Nation Population Division. (2000). Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations?. New York, NY: United Nations

<sup>11</sup> Knocking on Europe's Door. Despite efforts to keep them out, an influx of immigrants is recasting the Continent's identity. European economies need more of them. By Romesh Ratnesar London TIME EUROPE July 03, 2000 VOL. 155 NO. 25

<sup>12</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on immigration, integration and employment. Brussels, 3.6.2003 COM (2003) 336 final

<sup>13</sup> Independent Commission on Migration to Germany, 2001:11 (The so-called Süßmuth Commission, named after its President Rita Süßmuth.).

removed for people with relevant skill" – says the European Round Table of Industrialists in their message to the 2003 Spring European Council.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Arguments against immigration***

#### Europe is overpopulated

The current EU 25 population is too high for long-term sustainability. Europe is one of the most crowded regions on Earth. Recent world growth has put very heavy pressure on the environment. It has driven up the natural carbon, nitrogen and phosphate load in the biosphere, generating fundamental changes the world ecology. A smaller European population will be good for Europe and for the world, and the transitional problems are difficult but not overwhelming. With zero net migration, the Rising Fertility scenario (of the UN study) would lead eventually to a population stabilized at about 40% of the present level, which is not much different from the population at the beginning of the 20th Century. It creates a brief peak in the dependency ratio, but after 2050 the dependency ratio would begin to improve.<sup>15</sup>

#### Labour market does not justify immigration

The high level of unemployment in most European countries shows that there is no general shortage in labour force. Shortages in some sectors are only due to low wages. If the wages were higher, the quantity of work should increase. Consequently, it is false to say that the migrants do the low paid jobs that the natives reject. In fact, the low paid jobs just exist because the migrants are present and ready to accept low wages. Without immigration, and according to the curve, the wages would increase and surely the natives would accept these jobs. The low participation rate – especially among immigrants already present – also contradicts an influx of further immigration. For instance in Italy only 52% of the “working age” population (15–64 years old) are presently employed, because of chronic unemployment coupled with liberal welfare and retirement benefits. For young migrants under 24, the unemployment rate often peaks to 45%. In some suburbs, many young migrants are constantly idle and only receive handouts for their living.<sup>16</sup>

#### Free flow of labour is a false idea

Free trade activists claim that the freedom of mobility of workers must be exactly the same as for goods and services. However we cannot compare a human being with a good, a service or a capital stock. A good is consumed. A good has no family. A good does not need education and health service. Consequently, it is absolutely fruitless to posit that since we are for free trade of goods and capital, we have to support unlimited mobility of people and the abolishment of all borders.

#### Immigration will increase the burden on welfare system

The welfare system is not in accordance with the Standard Free Trade Theory. If health and education were paid by the consumers like any other goods, the problem would not exist. But in most European countries social services are partly free for consumers, yet in reality, these services are paid for by the taxpayers. Cheap-wage immigrants may bring some benefits for entrepreneurs but at the same time they burden the budget.

#### Immigration cannot counterbalance ageing

The Commission, who in general stands for immigration, in a report of 2002 also states that immigration alone can never counterbalance the effects of an ageing population and cannot solve the EU's labour market problems (Social Situation in the European Union 2002). As former Commissioner for Employment, Anna Diamantopoulou, said : " Immigration will help fill some gaps in our labour market but it has no impact on our basic employment policy message : we still need radical reform, with a focus on increased participation rates for women and older workers, if we are to achieve sustainable labour markets and pensions systems."

<sup>14</sup> The European Challenge – Message from the European Round Table of Industrialists to the Spring European Council, March 2003

<sup>15</sup> Lindsey Grant : “Replacement Migration”: The UN Population Division on European Population Decline. Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies Volume 22, Number 4, March 2001

<sup>16</sup> Ibid (Lindsey Grant)

#### 4.5 Views related to the Muslim population<sup>17</sup>

A important issue of disagreement is connected to the presence of a growing Muslim population in Western Europe. Those who are against the perception that a growing Muslim minority would cause social tensions say the following.

(1) *Immigration will not change dramatically the ratio among races*

Immigration will not change the ratio among races. For instance if France's 7% Muslim minority grew for the next 50 years at a rate of 2% per annum (a high rate, and one that doesn't seem to be supported by signs of an ongoing demographic transition), while the remainder of the population shrunk at a rate of 0.5% per annum (also a high rate of decrease) at the end of this 50 year period the total French population would have shrunk by 9%, and France's Muslim population would amount to not more than one-fifth of the total.

(2) *Muslim fertility is decreasing*

The assumption of a high Muslim fertility rate is unrealistic. We have to realise that fertility rate is declining in the countries of origin like Algeria and Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia. Moreover, in Tunisia the fertility rate has fallen below the level of sustenance, and there is no reason to assume that European Muslim fertility rates will behave in another way. Societies with a certain minimal level of female autonomy, fairly low living standards, and access to contraceptive technologies can have rather low birth rates despite being generally conservative. Once the immigrants have settled in Europe, their fertility rate, wherever measurement is possible, tends to 'fall in parallel' with the indigenous population's fertility rate.

(3) *Muslims will not develop a culture of their own*

The assumption of a homogeneity among Muslims is a false idea, because Muslim immigrants hardly came from a single cultural background. Besides, the intermarriage rate is estimated roughly at 40%. If people form relationships and marry across different lines – clan or tribal, ethnic or linguistic, national or religious – it will be decidedly difficult to reproduce ancestral cultures. Building a culture from scratch is always more costly than assimilating into a culture that already exists. This assumption can be underpinned by the fact that only 10 to 20 percent of Muslims practice their religion.

(4) *The main issue is integration*

Europe's problem with its Muslim minority in the early 21st century isn't a civilizational clash. The problem is how a large immigrant population, concentrated in certain geographical districts can be integrated into the European society. The real issue to be debated is how this integration can be carried out in the best way.

Those who are worrying about the growing Muslim population usually emphasize the following arguments.

(1) *Ratio of Muslim population will grow steadily<sup>18</sup>*

Conservative projections estimate that, compared to today's 5 percent, Muslims will comprise at least 20 percent of Europe's population by 2050. Muslims could outnumber non-Muslims in France and perhaps in all of western Europe by mid-century. Waiting to fill the demographical gap in Europe there are an estimated 300 million Muslims under the

<sup>17</sup> France, its Muslims, and the Future: <http://www.livejournal.com/users/rfmcldpei/408410.html>

<sup>18</sup> Timothy M. Savage: Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly • 27:3 pp. 25–50. [http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer\\_savage.pdf](http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer_savage.pdf)



age of 20 who are living along the Mediterranean's "southern rim" – North Africa and the Middle East.

(2) *Muslim fertility will remain high*<sup>19</sup>

Muslim crude birth rate in Europe is currently more than three times that of non-Muslims. For instance in France the fertility rate of the foreigners remains higher (2,8) than those of natives (1,7). As a comparison, the fertility rate is only 2.3 in Turkey and 2.9 in Algeria. At the Beginning of their settlement, and since they enjoy health and free services such as education and nursery, the migrants tend to have more children in Europe than in their home countries.

(3) *Muslim identity is strengthening*<sup>20</sup>

European Muslims are not a monolithic group, however, Europe's Muslims are not so diverse as to entirely exclude commonalities. The most important is Islam. This new interest in faith is especially keen among Muslims born in Europe, mostly the children and grandchildren of the immigrants who arrived in the 1960s and '70s. Indeed, surveys show that many Muslims in Europe, especially the young, now identify with Islam more than the country either of their heritage or birth – feeling accepted in neither place. The Muslim world is overwhelmingly totalitarian; it does not share Western ideals on women or on basic freedoms such as free speech, a free press, and freedom to worship as one sees fit.

(4) *Muslims do not integrate*<sup>21</sup>

Studies in France and Germany find that second- and particularly third-generation Muslims are less integrated into European societies than their parents or grandparents were. The recent headscarf affairs in France and Germany underscore and further exacerbate this basic clash. The influential German nationwide daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung depicts the situation as "frightening," questions the prospects of integrating Germany's growing Muslim population into society, and maintains that at least 10 percent of Germany's Muslim population—400,000 individuals—are followers and supporters of radical Islam, whose aim is the establishment of an Islamic state.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid (Timothy M. Savage)

<sup>20</sup> An Uncertain Road Muslims and the Future of Europe. The PEW FORUM on religion and public life. The Forum is a Project of the PEW Research Center December 2004. <http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=60>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid (Timothy M. Savage)

Table 2

**Population, total fertility rate and arable land per capita in some selected countries**

<i>Country</i>	Population	GDP/cap	<i>Year</i>	<i>TFR</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>TFR</i>	Per capita cropland, (ha)
	2004	2002 PPP\$					2000
<b>EU-25</b>	<b>456,0</b>	<b>22900</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>2,22</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>1,46</b>	<b>0,26</b>
Austria	8,1	28240	1970	2,3	2001	1,3	0,18
Belgium	10,3	27350	1970	2,3	1995	1,5	0,07
Czech Republic	10,2	14500	1970	1,9	2001	1,1	0,32
Denmark	5,4	29450	1970	2,0	2001	1,7	0,48
Finland	5,2	25440	1970	1,8	2001	1,7	0,47
France	60,4	26180	1970	2,5	1999	1,8	0,33
Germany	82,5	26220	1978	2,0	2000	1,4	0,15
Greece	11,0	18240	1970	2,4	1999	1,3	0,37
Hungary	9,8	12810	1970	2,0	2001	1,3	0,53
Ireland	4,0	28040	1970	3,9	2001	2,0	0,25
Italy	57,3	25320	1970	2,4	2000	1,2	0,21
Netherlands	16,2	27470	1970	2,6	2001	1,7	0,06
Poland	38,6	10130	1971	2,3	2001	1,3	0,38
Portugal	10,1	17350	1970	3,0	2001	1,5	0,32
Slovakia	5,4	12190	1970	2,4	2001	1,2	
Spain	41,1	20460	1970	2,9	2000	1,2	0,51
Sweden	8,9	25080	1970	1,9	2001	1,6	0,32
United Kingdom	59,4	25870	1972	2,2	2000	1,6	0,11
Bulgaria	7,8	6840	1970	2,2	2001	1,2	0,51
Romania	22,3	6290	1970	2,9	2000	1,3	0,45
Turkey	72	6120	1970	5,7	2000	2,5	0,42
Russian Federation	142,4	7820	1978	2,0	2001	1,3	
Ukraine	48,2	4650	1970	2,1	1998	1,2	
<b>OTHER DEVELOPED</b>							
United States of America	297	35060	1970	2,5	2000	2,1	0,67
Japan	128	26070	1970	2,1	2000	1,3	0,04
<b>AFRICA</b>							
Nigeria	127	780	1980	6,3	1997	5,1	0,25
Egypt	73	3710	1970	5,4	1999	3,6	0,04
Ethiopia	72	720	1981	6,8	1998	5,9	0,22
Algeria	32	5330	1977	7,4	1996	3,1	0,25
Morocco	31	3690	1977	5,9	1999	3,0	0,33
Ghana	21	2000	1968	7,1	1996	4,5	0,14
Côte d'Ivoire	17	1430	1978	7,4	1997	5,1	0,23
Cameroon	16	1640	1976	6,4	1996	5,2	0,46
<b>ASIA</b>							
China	1313	4390	1970	5,7	2001	1,4	0,08
India	1081	2570	1981	4,9	1997	3,3	0,17
Indonesia	223	2990	1969	5,6	2003	2,6	0,10
Pakistan	157	1940	1970	6,0	1999	4,8	0,16
Bangladesh	150	1720	1973	6,1	1997	3,4	0,07
Viet Nam	83	2240	1977	4,8	1994	2,7	0,08
Philippines	81	4280	1971	6,0	1996	3,8	0,11
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	70	6340	1975	6,4	2000	2,2	0,24
Thailand	64	6680	1967	6,2	1995	2,0	0,38
Republic of Korea	48	16480	1970	4,3	2000	1,5	0,04
Syrian Arab Republic	18	3250	1970	7,7	1991	4,7	0,35

## 4.6 Immigration and political parties

### Public support for immigration

Public opinion polls suggest there is little public support for further immigration. For example, a poll published in the German newspaper *Die Woche* in July 2000 showed that 63 per cent of those interviewed thought that Germany did not need any more immigrants.<sup>22</sup>

"The idea that immigrants might be part of the army of labor that will keep the industrial economy going hasn't caught on yet," says Christopher Husbands, a sociologist at the London School of Economics.<sup>23</sup>

### Political shift to the right<sup>24 25</sup>

In the last decade, the growth and visibility of Europe's Muslim population have also given new life to radical right-wing parties. For instance In 2002, France's anti-immigrant politician Jean Marie Le Pen beat President Jacques Chirac's main opponent, then Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, in the first round of presidential voting. In Italy, the anti-immigration Northern League and Nationalist Alliance performed well in the 2001 elections and remain important partners of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's center-right governing coalition. Pim Fortuyn, a sociologist from the Dutch city of Rotterdam argued that immigration should be halted because much of Islam is "backward" or incompatible with modern, Western values, like tolerance. Holland's core values would be radically altered if it allowed the Muslim population to continue to grow unchecked, he warned. Mr Fortuyn wanted to integrate immigrants already in the Netherlands, rather than expel them.

This rightward shift has been most evident in actions to restrict immigration and an increased emphasis on national interests in EU policy debates, but it is also reflected in recent moves such as those in France and Germany to ban the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in public schools, and by the Netherlands to expel up to 26,000 asylum seekers. The kind of impact that a fast-growing Muslim citizenry will have on national politics in European states remains to be seen. To date, Europe's Muslims have not engaged broadly in European party politics.

### Mainstream politicians on immigration<sup>26 27</sup>

Union leaders as a whole are for immigration, but many of them emphasize the need of higher integration.

In Britain, former Home Secretary David Blunkett proposed a "Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill" which would impose stricter measures against people coming into the country seeking asylum. He wants to better integrate Britain's ethnic communities and says that immigrants should adopt British customs. But at the same time he also plans to allow easier legal immigration for workers whose skills are needed.

In Holland as a consequence of the Van Gogh assassination many commentators and officials have called on Muslims to accept Holland's liberal values – either voluntarily or by government coercion. And this view is supported by a substantial majority, with one recent survey showing that 80 percent of the population favours harsher measures to force integration.

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<sup>22</sup> World Migration 2003: Managing Migration - Challenges and Responses for People on the Move. IOM– International Organisation for Migration Geneva. Chapter 13: International Labour Migration and Demographic Change in Europe

<sup>23</sup> Romesh Ratnesar London: Knocking on Europe's Door. Despite efforts to keep them out, an influx of immigrants is recasting the Continent's identity. European economies need more of them. TIME EUROPE, July 03, 2000 VOL. 155 NO. 25

<sup>24</sup> Ibid (Timothy M. Savage)

<sup>25</sup> Ibid (An Uncertain Road Muslims and the Future of Europe.)

<sup>26</sup> Europe and Immigration. On the BBC web-site  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in\\_depth/world/2002/europe\\_and\\_immigration/france.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2002/europe_and_immigration/france.stm)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid (An Uncertain Road Muslims and the Future of Europe.)

Belgian Interior Minister Patrick Dewael condemned cultures “where women are put in a position of inferiority because they have to cover up their bodies” – a direct reference to Islamic practice. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was more open when he controversially declared that Islamic civilization is inferior to that of the West.

Spanish Interior Minister, Mariano Rajoy, has said: "The hope must be that people integrate. If an immigrant wants to live here and claim his rights, he will have obligations like learning to speak the language we all speak here."

Edmund Stoiber, Bavarian governor, was more determined on the issue: “We can't afford to expand immigration when, in terms of integration, we can't cope with the existing immigration” he said. And former social-democratic chancellor Helmut Schmidt also has the opinion that “too many foreigners had been admitted as a result of idealistic thinking”.

#### **4.7 The common immigration policy of the EU**

With the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, immigration came within the competence of the EU and since then efforts have been underway to formulate common EU rules. The right of each member state to regulate the level of immigration continues to be recognised by the EU and it is emphasized in Article III-267 of the new EU Constitution. The Commission in its January 2005 Green Paper accepts this provision but states that there is a need for a harmonised set of procedures and criteria for admission which would still leave member states' discretion on the number of migrants to admit. The main steps of the common immigration policy are the following.

##### 1997 The Amsterdam Treaty

The first step for a common policy was the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) which called for a common asylum and immigration policy to be drawn up by 2004.

##### October 1999 Tampere summit

At the Tampere Summit of October 1999, EU Member States agreed on four key areas where common policy will be established:

- partnership with the countries of origin;
- a common European asylum system;
- fair treatment of third country nationals;
- more efficient management of migration flows.

##### September 2001 Commission directive

In 2001, the Commission came up with a proposed directive (COM (2001) 386) which sought to lay down common criteria for admission and provide a single national application procedure. However, the proposal did not meet with approval from the Council.

##### June 2002 Seville summit

Concern over immigration has increased in Europe since the 11 September terrorist attacks, as well as, elections in several EU countries which have brought anti-immigration forces to power. These were the main reasons that the June 2002 Seville Council made the common immigration policy a priority issue emphasizing the need for a comprehensive plan to manage migration flows and combat illegal immigration. The summit called on the Council and the Commission to give asylum and immigration policy top priority and to speed up the legislative work in this area.

(Seville Council web-site: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/seville\\_council/index\\_en.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/seville_council/index_en.html))

##### June 2003 Commission communication

In June 2003, the Commission adopted a policy paper on immigration (COM(2003) 336 final), integration and employment in which it calls on the EU Member States to step up their efforts to integrate immigrants.

#### September 2003 EU interior ministers are setting quotas

Immigration quotas have long been a taboo issue but in September 2003 EU interior ministers have decided to study an Italian plan to introduce quotas for immigration into the European Union, designed to control the flow of illegal immigrants. These quotas would be indicative targets saying how many people are needed in certain work sectors. They would not be linked to nationalities. National governments and employers' federations would determine these quotas together.

#### November 2004 the Hague Programme

In November 2004, the Commission adopted the Hague Programme, which pledged to provide an area of freedom, security and justice to citizens of the EU. Among others the program says: "International migration will continue. A comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies is needed. (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 4/5 November 2004 ANNEX I.)

#### November 2004 European Council

EU leaders meeting at the European council from the 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> November agreed a new five-year (2005-2010) Program ("Tampere II") for closer cooperation in asylum, justice and home affairs.

#### January 2005 Green Paper

On 11 Jan 2005 the Commission adopted a Green Paper, "On an EU approach to managing economic migration". The aim is to stimulate a debate on how best to regulate the entry and residence of third-country nationals who are seeking employment in the EU. The Green Paper seeks to open a wide discussion on the scope of entry permission which should be granted at EU level. The possibility is raised of the introduction of a US-style 'green card' which would give an individual the right to work throughout the EU.

### **4.8 Immigration policy of member states** <sup>28</sup>

Since the 70s, legal immigration into the EU has been restricted to cases of family reunification and cases where work (including vocational training and volunteering) or study permits have been granted.

The delay in formulating a common policy stems from conflicting views throughout the bloc. There is particular controversy in Germany where the Social Democrat government and conservative opposition have negotiated their own immigration law.

The European Commission would require member states to take on more immigrants than the current German bill allows.

EU member states' migration policy is influenced by a fear of ageing populations and skills shortages on the one hand, and widespread opposition from Europeans to increased migration on the other hand. For this reason the practice of the individual member states is scattering in a wide range.

#### *Germany*

Germany is a popular destination for migrants, but immigration is becoming increasingly controversial. A law designed to tighten up asylum rules and encourage integration was passed. It provides for German lessons for immigrants already in Germany and aims to give preference to professional workers in future. The law will grant 20,000 green cards to foreign technical persons over the next three years.

#### *France*

Jean Marie Le Pen's relative success in the French presidential election was a sign that in many parts of France there is resentment against immigrants, especially those from North and West Africa. But for many French-speaking immigrants France is a magnet. Visa laws are applied only loosely and many find it easy

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<sup>28</sup> Main source: Europe and Immigration. On the BBC web-site  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in\\_depth/world/2002/europe\\_and\\_immigration/spain.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2002/europe_and_immigration/spain.stm)

to stay. The new right-wing government will try to change that: asylum seekers must wait 12 months for a work permit. Like other European countries, France faces the dilemma of multi-culturalism versus integration. In the past, the value of communities retaining their identities has been stressed. These days, the pendulum has swung, and better integration is the aim.

#### *United Kingdom*

Former Home Secretary David Blunkett's "Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill" would impose stricter measures against people coming into the country seeking asylum. Mr Blunkett also wants to better integrate Britain's ethnic communities, for instance immigrants should adopt British customs. He also plans to allow easier legal immigration for workers whose skills are needed. Today the majority of settlements are for family reasons, typically when someone marries a foreigner. The next largest category of settlement is work-related. People who have been legally resident and working in the UK for five years can ask for permanent residential status. Some 15% of settlements are people who have been accepted as refugees.

#### *Italy*

The lower house of the Italian parliament has passed a series of anti-immigration measures swiftly condemned by opposition groups as "unjust and racist". Known as the Bossi-Fini law after its creators, it must also be approved by the upper house before it can become law. If it passes this second hurdle, non-EU foreigners will only be able to live in the country if they have arranged work before entering, and they will receive a residency permit only for the duration of their employment contracts - up to a maximum of two years. The bill also makes family reunions more difficult - immigrants will only be allowed to bring their children to join them if they are under 18.

#### *Spain*

Spain is considering ending its policy of allowing illegal immigrants to acquire legal status after five years. It is calling its policy "hospitality with responsibility" - acceptance of those who have a right to be there; rejection of those who do not. A May 2002 opinion poll found that 60% of Spaniards link immigrants to increased crime. Two thirds of those said they believed Spaniards were becoming less tolerant of immigrants.

#### *Denmark*

Denmark, traditionally liberal in its immigration policies, has recently adopted a more questioning stance on the issue. New laws designed to make life tougher for immigrants and dissuade others from even thinking of going there were recently approved. Immigrants will have to wait seven years instead of three before they qualify for full welfare benefits. This is supposed to make them seek work. To reduce the number of arranged marriages, the age at which someone can marry a foreigner and bring him or her in is raised from 18 to 24.

#### *Ireland*

Some governments have taken modest steps for immigration: Ireland is weighing proposals for an infusion of 200,000 skilled workers over the next seven years.

## **5. Demographic forecast**

### **5.1 United Nation's projections**

United Nations Population Division carried out a research whether the migration would be a solution to the declining and ageing population of the developed countries.<sup>29</sup> According to the projections (medium variant), Japan and virtually all the countries of Europe are expected to decrease in population size over the next 50 years. In addition these countries are undergoing a relatively rapid ageing process. To

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<sup>29</sup> United Nation Population Division: Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to declining and Ageing Populations? March 2000.

maintain the population at the present level the European Union (EU-15) needs some 47 million net immigrants in the period of 2000-2050. If the goal was to keep the number of the working-age population (15 to 64 years) at the present level the European Union (EU-15) would need 80 million net immigrants. The same goals for the enlarged Union (EU-25) would require additional 10 and 17 million net immigrants respectively. From the unchanged working age population scenario (80 million net immigrants) comes the often mentioned 1,6 million yearly net immigrants Europe is advised to receive.

The Population Division prepared several scenarios also for a longer time-period up to 2300. These projections were built on the results published in World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, which covers the period 2000-2050

All projection scenarios share the assumption that mortality will decline steadily after 2050. In addition, in all scenarios net international migration is assumed to be zero after 2050. (Between 2005-2050 it is assumed that the tendencies characterised at the beginning of the 21st century will continue with some 2 million migrants in a year, approximately half of them to the European Union.)

In the 2300 projection the real differences among scenarios are in the fertility rates. The medium scenario assumes that the total fertility of each country will reach below replacement (constant-population) level and remain at those levels for about 100 years, after which it will return to replacement level and remain there until 2300. In the high scenario total fertility after 2050 is assumed to be a quarter of a child higher than in the medium scenario and to remain constant at 2.35 children per woman when the medium scenario stabilizes at replacement level. Similarly, in the low scenario total fertility is assumed to be 0.25 of a child lower than in the medium scenario, and to remain constant at 1.85 children per woman when the medium scenario settles at replacement level.

According to the medium scenario, world population rises from 6.1 billion persons in 2000 to a maximum of 9.2 billion persons in 2075, declining thereafter to reach 8.3 billion in 2175. Later on, in the 23rd century it stabilises to around 8-9 billion.

Future population size is highly sensitive to small but sustained deviations of fertility from the replacement (constant-population) level. Thus, the low scenario results in a declining population that reaches 2.3 billion in 2300 and the high scenario leads to a growing population that rises to 36.4 billion by 2300 (table 3).

All scenarios result in significant shifts in the geographical distribution of the world population. According to the medium scenario, the share of Africa would double (passing from 13 per cent of the world population in 2000 to 24 per cent in 2300), whereas that of Asia would drop by about ten per cent (from 61 per cent in 2000 to 55 per cent in 2300) and that of Europe by about half (from 12 per cent in 2000 to 7 per cent in 2300).

Table 3

**Population of the major areas according to different scenarios 2000-2300**  
(million)

Major area	2000	Low			Medium			High		
		2050	2100	2300	2050	2100	2300	2050	2100	2300
Africa	796	1516	1508	620	1803	2254	2113	2122	3235	7962
Asia	3680	4274	2864	1143	5222	5019	4943	6318	8060	20994
Latin Am.	520	623	407	163	768	733	723	924	1171	3114
Northern Am.	316	391	318	168	448	474	534	512	695	1998
Europe	728	565	362	200	632	538	611	705	790	2204
Oceania	31	40	31	16	46	46	48	52	67	172
World	6071	7409	5490	2310	8919	9064	8972	10633	14018	36444

Source: United Nation Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World population in 2300 United Nation NY. 2004

## 5.2 The forecasting model

The United Nation's projections do not cover all the possible scenarios. Besides, there are issues – important for the European Union – that are not included in the UN papers. This was the reason why we worked out an own demographic model and made several scenario with it.

Our model brakes down the population into 20 five-year age cohort 0-4, 5-9, 10-14 years and so on up to 95-100 for both sexes. Unfortunately we suppose that everybody will die by the age of 100, but we wish good health to all who in realty don't. From the age-specific death and birth rate plus the net migration the model calculates the population for the following 5-year period. The basic data were taken from different Eurostat and United Nations publications. To present arguments for the current debates regarding the ratio of the Muslim population the model consists of two parts: one, which calculates the developments in the Muslim population, and the other, which does the same for the non-Muslim population. The data for the Muslim population come from Eurostat data for immigrants and UN data for north-African and middle-East countries, and this is supplemented by information from newspaper articles, internet sources and own calculations.

The physical representation of the model is an Excel table where one sheet represents the so-called control panel from where the input parameters can be changed (see table 4). In the same control panel there are also the results (output parameters) of the projection. The changeable parameters are the death and birth rates, the number of immigrants, the ratio of Muslims from the immigrants and the workforce participation rate. In the case of death and birth rate the changes shall be given as a difference from the basic data. The parameter of 1 on the control panel represents that – in the given time-period – the basic parameters are used. If these parameters are changed, for instance, to 1,1 it means that the death or birth rate will increase by 10% linearly along all the age cohorts.

Because the input and output parameters are in the same sheet and window, the results can be seen immediately. In this way, for instance, with the parameters for the birth rate, the total fertility rate can be set to the desired level.

The output is calculated for each fifth year between 2005 and 2050 and, using the unchanged input parameters of 2045-2050, for the year of 2100.

The model also calculates the average GDP growth rate for the period of 2005-2050. In this case we assume that the growth of the GDP/capita will be constantly 2% in the whole 2005-2050 period (2% is the average secular trend for developed countries) and the GDP growth is determined by the working age (15-64 years) population and the participation rate (the ratio of employed and unemployed to the working age population).



Table 4

**"NAIVE" SCENARIO**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2010-15	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2015-20	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2020-25	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2025-30	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2030-35	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2035-40	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2040-45	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2045-50	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	368,6	91,6	460,2	19,9	41,7	66,6
Diff 05-50	-71,0	74,9	3,9	16,2	17,5	17,4
2100	235,4	207,2	442,6	46,8	35,4	65,2

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,8	1,48	17,8	2,3	2,7	5,8
2095-00	-0,9	1,48	19,0	1,4	2,7	9,0

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	63
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	1,77

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,7
2050	77,8

Table 5

**Muslim's total fertility rate decreases to 2,1; no immigration after 2045**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2010-15	1	1	1	0,9	1,20	75
2015-20	1	1	1	0,8	1,20	75
2020-25	1	1	1	0,76	1,20	75
2025-30	1	1	1	0,76	1,20	75
2030-35	1	1	1	0,76	1,20	75
2035-40	1	1	1	0,76	1,20	75
2040-45	1	1	1	0,76	1,20	75
2045-50	1	1	1	0,76	0,0	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	367,1	76,5	443,5	17,2	43,2	66,4
Diff 05-50	-72,5	59,8	-12,7	13,6	19,0	17,2
2100	215,3	76,8	292,1	26,3	45,2	69,2

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,9	1,48	17,8	0,8	2,1	6,4
2095-00	-1,1	1,48	19,9	-0,2	2,1	15,0

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	63
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	1,69

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,70
2050	77,85

Table 6

**BASIC SCENARIO**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	1,20	75
2010-15	1	1,1	1	0,9	1,20	75
2015-20	1	1,2	1	0,8	1,20	75
2020-25	1	1,3	1	0,76	1,20	75
2025-30	1	1,4	1	0,76	1,20	75
2030-35	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,20	75
2035-40	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,20	75
2040-45	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,20	75
2045-50	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,0	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	418,8	76,5	495,3	15,4	39,4	69,4
Diff 05-50	-20,7	59,8	39,0	11,8	15,1	20,2
2100	395,6	76,8	472,4	16,3	33,6	65,0

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,4	2,10	16,1	0,8	2,1	6,4
2095-00	0,1	2,10	13,3	-0,2	2,1	15,0

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	63
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	1,90

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,70
2050	77,61

Table 7

**1,6 million yearly net immigrants**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	1,60	75
2010-15	1	1,1	1	0,9	1,60	75
2015-20	1	1,2	1	0,8	1,60	75
2020-25	1	1,3	1	0,76	1,60	75
2025-30	1	1,4	1	0,76	1,60	75
2030-35	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,60	75
2035-40	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,60	75
2040-45	1	1,42	1	0,76	1,60	75
2045-50	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,0	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	424,4	93,2	517,6	18,0	38,3	68,2
Diff 05-50	-15,2	76,5	61,3	14,3	14,0	19,0
2100	401,3	93,4	494,6	18,9	33,6	65,0

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,3	2,10	16,0	0,8	2,1	6,1
2095-00	0,0	2,10	13,3	-0,2	2,1	15,1

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	63
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	2,01

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,70
2050	77,40

Table 8

**0,3 million yearly net immigrants**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	0,30	75
2010-15	1	1,1	1	0,9	0,30	75
2015-20	1	1,2	1	0,8	0,30	75
2020-25	1	1,3	1	0,76	0,30	75
2025-30	1	1,4	1	0,76	0,30	75
2030-35	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2035-40	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2040-45	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2045-50	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,0	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	406,3	38,8	445,1	8,7	42,4	72,7
Diff 05-50	-33,2	22,1	-11,1	5,1	18,1	23,5
2100	382,9	39,6	422,5	9,4	33,5	65,1

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,4	2,10	16,5	0,6	2,1	8,0
2095-00	0,1	2,10	13,2	-0,1	2,1	14,4

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	63
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	1,61

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,70
2050	78,11

Table 9

**0,3 million yearly net immigrants+higher participation rate**

	Changeable parameters					
	Non Muslim population		Muslim population		Immigrants	
	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Death parameter	Fertility parameter	Immigrants yearly average (million)	Rate of Muslims, %
2005-10	1	1	1	1	0,30	75
2010-15	1	1,1	1	0,9	0,30	75
2015-20	1	1,2	1	0,8	0,30	75
2020-25	1	1,3	1	0,76	0,30	75
2025-30	1	1,4	1	0,76	0,30	75
2030-35	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2035-40	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2040-45	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,30	75
2045-50	1	1,42	1	0,76	0,0	75
2050-2100 IDENTICAL WITH 2045-2050						

	Population (million)			Ratio of Muslims %	Dependency ratio%	
	Non-Muslim	Muslim	Total		Old age	Total
2005	439,5	16,7	456,2	3,7	24,3	49,2
2050	406,3	38,8	445,1	8,7	42,4	72,7
Diff 05-50	-33,2	22,1	-11,1	5,1	18,1	23,5
2100	382,9	39,6	422,5	9,4	33,5	65,1

	Non-Muslims population			Muslim population		
	Average yearly growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %	Yearly average growth rate %	Total fertility rate	Crude death rate %
2005-10	0,1	1,48	11,3	6,5	2,7	4,0
2045-50	-0,4	2,10	16,5	0,6	2,1	8,0
2095-00	0,1	2,10	13,2	-0,1	2,1	14,4

Participation rate, %	
2005	63
2050	70
Average yearly GDP growth rate 2005-2050 (%)	1,85

Life expectancy at birth (year)	
2005	76,70
2050	78,11

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### Figure 3

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## Glossary

**Asylum-seeker** – a person who is seeking asylum. Until a determination is made, it is impossible to say whether the asylum-seeker is a refugee or not.

**Economic migrant** – a person who moves countries in order to take up a job or seek a better economic future.

**Immigrant** – a person who has settled permanently in another country. Immigrants choose to move, whereas refugees are forced to flee.

**Migrant** – a person who is outside their country of origin.

**Refugee** – a person who is forced to flee from persecution.