


# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

2004



2009

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*Session document*

FINAL  
**A6-0060/2005**

21.3.2005

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## **REPORT**

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council  
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic  
cooperation  
(COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))

Committee on Development

Rapporteur: Gay Mitchell

Draftsman (\*) : David Martin, Committee on International Trade

(\*) Enhanced cooperation between committees - Rule 47 of the Rules of  
Procedure

### ***Symbols for procedures***

- \* Consultation procedure  
*majority of the votes cast*
- \*\*I Cooperation procedure (first reading)  
*majority of the votes cast*
- \*\*II Cooperation procedure (second reading)  
*majority of the votes cast, to approve the common position*  
*majority of Parliament's component Members, to reject or amend the common position*
- \*\*\* Assent procedure  
*majority of Parliament's component Members except in cases covered by Articles 105, 107, 161 and 300 of the EC Treaty and Article 7 of the EU Treaty*
- \*\*\*I Codecision procedure (first reading)  
*majority of the votes cast*
- \*\*\*II Codecision procedure (second reading)  
*majority of the votes cast, to approve the common position*  
*majority of Parliament's component Members, to reject or amend the common position*
- \*\*\*III Codecision procedure (third reading)  
*majority of the votes cast, to approve the joint text*

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the Commission)

### ***Amendments to a legislative text***

In amendments by Parliament, amended text is highlighted in ***bold italics***. Highlighting in *normal italics* is an indication for the relevant departments showing parts of the legislative text for which a correction is proposed, to assist preparation of the final text (for instance, obvious errors or omissions in a given language version). These suggested corrections are subject to the agreement of the departments concerned.

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(\*) Enhanced cooperation between committees - Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure



## **DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION**

**on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation**

**(COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))**

**(Codecision procedure: first reading)**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2004)0629)<sup>1</sup>,
  - having regard to Article 251(2) and Articles 179(1) and 181a(2) of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C6-0128/2004),
  - having regard to Rule 51 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budgets, (A6-0060/2005),
1. Rejects the Commission proposal;
  2. Calls on the Commission to withdraw its proposal and to take appropriate steps to submit a new proposal, taking into account Parliament's concerns;
  3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

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<sup>1</sup> Not yet published in OJ..

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The Commission's proposals for a series of regulations to rationalise the legislative instruments relating to external policy are broken down into geographical and thematic instruments, and additional elements.

The Committee on Development is particularly concerned at the Commission proposal to establish a single financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (DCECI). The DCECI would replace 16 existing regulations.

Parliament fully recognises the Commission's concerns regarding the need for an effective European development policy, and agrees that the present structure is in need of rationalisation, and that Parliament should play its part in bringing about all necessary reforms, including any new instruments that may be required. The Committee on Development is willing to work closely and constructively with the Commission and the Council to bring about a reformed structure.

However, if the draft regulation currently proposed were to be adopted, it would have far-reaching political and budgetary management consequences.

The proposed regulation poses two kinds of problems:

- Marginalisation of the role and the powers of Parliament (proposed procedures);
- Merging together in an unnatural alliance two policy domains (economic cooperation and development cooperation) with quite distinct finalities and work methods, to the detriment of development cooperation.

1) The Commission claims that the proposed instruments are policy-driven. This may be the case for other proposals, but it is difficult to discern any single policy, either development or economic, behind the DCECI proposal:

- The existing development policy, as defined in the Development Policy Statement of November 2000, is notably absent - indeed, the proposal runs counter to both the spirit and the letter of that Statement;
- As the November 2000 Statement is currently being revised, and the discussion has only just started, the new Statement can clearly not underpin this legislative proposal.

The Commission should define clearly the policy objectives that give rise to this instrument and engage in debate with Parliament on them.

2) The DCECI proposal covers a wide range of countries, both developing and industrialised, while the Constitution and the EC Treaty provide the basis for a separate development policy for developing countries. It should be of major concern to Parliament that the DCECI contains provisions that fail to distinguish between the two, and which run counter to the principles laid down in the EC Treaty and the Constitution.

The DCECI proposal gives the strong impression that it is intended to serve a "default" function, i.e. encompassing anything not covered by the other regulations, thereby enabling the Commission to carry out a wide variety of actions in all countries not covered under other geographical instruments.

As a result, the only geographical limitation on its scope is a negative list, indicating the countries to which it is *not* applicable (Member States, countries eligible for Community assistance under the Pre-accession or the Neighbourhood and Partnership Instruments, and international measures in multilateral frameworks).

3) Commission sources claim that it is necessary to have an "economic and development instrument" to facilitate economic actions in developing countries. However, in 2001 they themselves proposed under the development legal base (Art. 179 TEC) a regulation for cooperation with Asia and Latin America which included provision for cooperation to "promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system and the implementation of WTO agreements". The Commission clearly considered then that the development legal base was appropriate for actions in the economic sphere in developing countries. However, even if the new Article 181A on economic cooperation is required for economic actions in developing countries, nothing would prevent the Commission from proposing separate instruments for developing and industrialised countries.

4) No general objective is given in the proposal. In its place is a non-exhaustive list giving, in very general terms, the sectors which may be supported. This is given as: "*inter alia*, development cooperation, economic, financial, scientific and technical cooperation and all other forms of cooperation with partner countries and regions, and international measures to promote the objectives of the EU's internal policies abroad". While the Commission, Parliament and the Council have repeatedly insisted that the Millennium Development Goals must be at the core of Community development policy, they are not mentioned as an objective (in fact, they are mentioned only once in the DCECI proposal, in a recital - which is not legally binding). Within the very broad definition of the objectives, decisions on sectors to be supported would be made without need to refer to Parliament. The current proposal therefore leaves open to question whether the Commission would use the very broad powers afforded to it under this text to address the basic objectives of development cooperation (i.e. poverty alleviation through the MDGs).

The proposal gives a detailed list of 31 sectors to which measures may relate, but the inclusion of "*inter alia*" in the introduction makes it non-exhaustive. Furthermore, the final sector, given as "any other area appropriate for achieving the objectives laid down in Articles 177 to 181A of the Treaty", also opens the door for actions in other sectors not included in the list.

As a result, the proposal contains, in terms of political coverage, a mixture of objectives and policies (including encouraging trade between the European Community and industrialised countries, managing asylum and migration flows, as well as counter-terrorism measures, mentioned several times in the Legislative Financial Statement and therefore presumably covered by "*inter alia*" in the legal text).

5) The financial envelope does not earmark funds for specific policy objectives, and the only specific envelope mentioned is that corresponding to the EDF, for ACP countries. Apart from this, the proposal allows for fungibility (interchangeability), so it is not possible to separate the financial allocation for development from that for other objectives, notably economic policy objectives. These allocations are to be determined by "programming documents" over

which Parliament would have no say. Although separate budget lines could be introduced during the annual budget procedure, these may still be subject to transfers without parliamentary approval if they are within the same budget chapter. Parliament should be extremely concerned about the implications of such provisions.

6) Certain consequences of the proposed DCECI are especially serious and would not be acceptable to Parliament. The proposal gives very extensive powers of implementation to the Commission and Council, which also extend to policy formulation and management of resources. This is at the expense of the powers currently exercised by Parliament under the codecision procedure and also its powers under the annual budgetary procedure.

How far Parliament could continue to exercise its current influence under the annual budgetary procedure is open to question. The Commission has not yet released any indication of their likely proposals on the structure of the budget under the new Financial Perspectives. At present many budget lines relate directly to programmes that would be replaced and subsumed into the DCECI. While the Commission has indicated it will not seek to propose a single line to correspond to the DCECI regulation, it has for several years sought to simplify the current structure of the budget by reducing the number of development lines. It will therefore be necessary for Parliament to be very vigilant to forestall erosion of its powers.

At present, most development policy initiatives are based on separate codecided regulations that are usually in force for a limited period, after which time the policy is reviewed and a new regulation adopted. Thus Parliament has its say, on a regular basis, in determining the objectives, scope and methods to be employed for each policy sector. However, the current proposal would itself serve as the legal base for all future actions, whether under new initiatives or not, making new legislation unnecessary. Periodic legislation would give way to a comitology procedure, involving only the Commission and Council, which would adopt strategy and other programming documents. The effect would be that the legislative power of Parliament in this area would be abolished at a stroke. Furthermore, the proposed regulation would be in force for an indeterminate period, and contains a provision for review only at the initiative of the Commission. Parliament would therefore be unable to recover its lost powers.

7) The Commission may view the current revision of the Development Policy Statement as a means to add a development policy orientation to the all-encompassing administrative provisions of the DCECI proposal. However, this is a political statement that is not legally binding and, as mentioned previously, has not been respected at all in the current proposal. Such a Policy Statement would therefore be a poor recompense for relinquishing codecision powers.

8) Under the proposed regulation consultation with civil society on geographic and thematic programmes would only be envisaged by the Commission "when possible", calling into question the Commission's stated commitment to civil society participation in EC aid programming and undermining the basis for non-state actors' participation under the Cotonou Agreement. This is not acceptable.

9) The Commission admits that the structure of the proposed instruments under Heading 4 (dealing with all external action of the EU) means that "a precise figure for ODA under Heading 4 of the new Financial Perspectives cannot be provided as it will depend on the



future programming of funds under the different instruments"<sup>1</sup>. This is largely due to the DCECT's lack of financial visibility for development funding.

## Conclusions

To quote UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, for selfless reasons and for reasons of healthy self interest the needs of the developing world must be at the top of the political agenda. Parliament would therefore welcome a more effective, more efficient, more generous and more targeted commitment on the part of the Union to the developing world. However, marrying economic cooperation with non-developing countries and development cooperation with the poorest countries does not take due account of the needs of the developing world and either selfless duty or "healthy self interest". To meet our objectives, whatever agreed reforms are necessary should be put in place, but reforms must be accompanied by accountability and transparency.

The proposed regulation fails to meet the considerations stated above, notably with regard to transparency, which is linked to democratic oversight. In addition, tying development cooperation to economic cooperation with industrialised countries is neither necessary nor desirable.

It is quite clear that many of the difficulties from a development perspective posed by this draft regulation are a direct consequence of the hybrid nature of the text. The attempted 'tour de force' of merging two different and distinct sets of objectives and tools into a single regulation has detrimental consequences for development cooperation. This is because most of the internationally accepted and adopted best practices in development cooperation have been abandoned in the proposal. This 'acquis' of 35 years of development cooperation has become part of the legal framework governing EU development policy, which is in line with what most donors do. It includes concentration, coherence, coordination, harmonisation, ownership by the beneficiaries and involvement of all stakeholders. The Commission seeks to move outside this framework and, in doing so, has greatly diluted the development focus of the Regulation.

There is a major imbalance between a desire on the part of the Commission for more flexibility at the level of micro-management (which is perfectly understandable) and the need for accountability and for an open and transparent democratic debate on the strategies and priorities of EU aid. Defending Parliament's democratic role and influence can and must be seen as a worthy objective in itself. It may also be necessary for achieving the modifications to the Commission package which Parliament deems necessary. Accountability to the elected representatives of EU citizens should not be abandoned for managerial and efficiency imperatives. A good balance between the two principles is feasible and must be struck.

The proposed regulation is so out of step with the development cooperation policies favoured by the European Parliament and is so inherently deleterious to Parliament's powers as to be unamendable.

It is consequently proposed that the Commission withdraw this draft regulation and replace it

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<sup>1</sup> Technical Fiche 37.

with forward-thinking proposals that would correspond to current thinking on development while respecting the powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament. As a starting point Parliament must insist that the Commission take account of its concerns, as set out in this report, in the drafting of proposals to replace the current draft regulation.

15.3.2005

## **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

for the Committee on Development

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation  
(COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))

Draftswoman: Irena Belohorská

### **SHORT JUSTIFICATION**

After a careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that the proposal in its present form is unacceptable. A number of the ideas contained in the Commission proposal are of considerable interest and, if properly implemented, could grant a new dynamism and provide far more concrete results for the EU's external action policy, and as such they will deserve a proper debate at a later time. However, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument as it stands, the rapporteur recommends that the committee vote against the proposal, specifically for the following reasons:

The Commission is proposing "a new framework for planning and delivery assistance ..... in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective", and is presenting several new financial instruments to do this. The proposed new regulation before the committee is "the third general instrument providing direct support for the European Union's external policies". (The others are: the Instrument for Pre-Accession, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Stability Instrument). It is clear, however, that the four new regulations on external financial instruments have to be seen and treated as part of a package.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs recognises the importance of having in place a rationalised/consolidated approach so that external assistance can be better co-ordinated. However, it also draws attention to the fact that the instruments, as proposed, would erode Parliament's policy-making role very considerably. The result would be that Parliament would no longer be able to exercise its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funding to specific programmes.

It is imperative that the European Parliament be able to exercise the powers accorded it under the Treaties, thus providing any new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy,

democratic control and transparency.

A further - and major - concern is that the new regulations are open-ended as regards timing. Art. 26 of the proposed Regulation under examination here (the financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation) refers to the possibility of a review, but it should be noted that this is only a possibility ("The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2011 any proposals concerning the future of this Regulation and any amendments that may be necessary"). What is needed is a clear specification of a fixed period of application for the regulation so that, when it expires, Parliament will be able to participate fully in a review of the instrument(s).

As the above elements are clearly far from satisfactory, the Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes to endorse the position of the lead committee, the Committee on Development, and recommend that Parliament reject the Commission proposal. At the same time, it calls on the Commission to re-examine the entire "package" without delay, and to take full account of Parliament's concerns.

### **LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL**

The Committee on Foreign Affairs recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.

## PROCEDURE

<b>Title</b>	Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
<b>References</b>	COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD)
<b>Committee responsible</b>	DEVE
<b>Committee asked for its opinion</b> Date announced in plenary	AFET 26.1.2005
<b>Enhanced cooperation</b>	No
<b>Drafts(wo)man</b> Date appointed	Irena Belohorská 30.11.2004
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	15.3.2005
<b>Date amendments adopted</b>	15.3.2005
<b>Result of final vote</b>	for: 38 against: 0 abstentions: 0
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Vittorio Emanuele Agnoletto, Monika Beňová, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Paul Marie Coûteaux, Simon Coveney, Ryszard Czarnecki, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Maciej Marian Giertych, Ana Maria Gomes, Jelko Kacin, Bogdan Klich, Joost Lagendijk, Cecilia Malmström, Willy Meyer Pleite, Francisco José Millán Mon, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Tobias Pflüger, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Ursula Stenzel, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Jan Marinus Wiersma, Josef Zieleniec
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Irena Belohorská, Marielle De Sarnez, Árpád Duka-Zólyomi, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Tunne Kelam, Doris Pack, Athanasios Pafilis, Józef Pinior, Aloyzas Sakalas, Inger Segelström
<b>Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote</b>	

14.3.2005

## **OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE**

for the Committee on Development

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation  
(COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))

Draftsman (\*): David Martin

(\*) Enhanced cooperation between committees - Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

### **SHORT JUSTIFICATION**

After careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument, the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.

While welcoming the overall objective of simplifying and rationalising the legislative instruments relating to external policy, the draftsman believes that the new Commission proposal seriously impinges on the powers currently exercised by Parliament in conformity with the Treaties under the co-decision and the annual budgetary procedures.

The four new proposals on external financial instruments which, according to the very logic of the Commission, should be understood as a package, curb Parliament's role very considerably.

In their current form, the new instruments prevent Parliament from exercising its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funds to concrete programmes.

Moreover, compared with past and standard practice, the new regulations are open-ended and would therefore prevent Parliament from participating in future reviews of the instruments. Parliament should maintain the possibility of fully co-determining, on a regular basis, the objectives, scope and methods to be employed by the different instruments. A fixed period of application is therefore needed.

It is, in short, imperative that, in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective, the European Parliament continues to be able to exercise the powers that have been accorded to it by the Treaties, thus providing the new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.

For all these reasons the Committee on International Trade proposes that the Commission proposal be rejected.

The Committee on International Trade calls on the Commission to take, without delay, appropriate steps together with Parliament to submit a new package of financial instruments that takes into account Parliament's concerns.

### **LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL**

The Committee on International Trade recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.

## PROCEDURE

<b>Title</b>	Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
<b>References</b>	(COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))
<b>Committee responsible</b>	DEVE
<b>Committee asked for its opinion</b> Date announced in plenary	INTA 26.1.2005
<b>Enhanced cooperation</b>	Yes
<b>Draftsman</b> Date appointed	David Martin 16.11.2004
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	22.2.2005      14.3.2005
<b>Date amendments adopted</b>	14.3.2005
<b>Result of final vote</b>	for:                                  16 against:                              0 abstentions:                        0
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Daniel Caspary, Françoise Castex, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Sajjad Karim, Caroline Lucas, Erika Mann, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Peter Šťastný, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke and Zbigniew Zaleski
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Jorgo Chatzimarkakis and Pierre Jonckheer
<b>Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote</b>	



16.3.2005

## OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS

for the Committee on Development

on the proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation (COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD))

Draftsman: Reimer Böge

### SHORT JUSTIFICATION

1. The draftsman notes that the proposed Regulation is a piece of "enabling" legislation (concentrating very much on procedure and only referring to other documents where policy is actually formulated). The Parliament would seem to have little influence of the real policy formulation. The scope of the Regulation is large encompassing 16 current ones and ranging from poverty alleviation in Africa to trade promotion with industrialised countries.
2. From a point of view of parliamentary oversight, clear objectives and transparency the draftsman finds this doubtful although it will be for the lead committees to evaluate. The draftsman notes, however, that the proposal has been met with very grave concerns by the committees responsible in the external field.
3. The proposed Instrument would operate at four different levels:
  - The Co-Decision Financial Framework proposed in Article 24: EUR 44 229 million for 2007-2013 out of which EUR 23 572 for the ACP States (budgetization of the EDF). This framework would replace the budgetary envelopes of 16 current regulations (some co-decisions and some not).
  - A "Strategic Level" at which geographical or thematic programmes will be drawn up (by the Commission in co-ordination with Member States) and under which Strategy Papers will be adopted.
  - Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (normally 3 years) setting the medium-term planning and the priority areas selected. These will set out the indicative financial allocations, overall and per priority area.
  - Annual Action Programmes based on the levels above. These will specify in more detail the objectives and lay down the management procedures and the total amount of

financing planned.

4. Article 14 states that "*Budget commitments shall be made on the basis of decisions taken by the Commission in accordance with Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 11(2)*". This means in accordance with Strategy Papers (art. 7.1), multi-annual indicative programmes (art.8.1) and other support measures (art. 11.2). The Parliament has no say in establishing these.
5. The draftsman has noticed great concern among committees as to the influence the Parliament would have. At the same time, questions have surfaced as to whether the budgetary powers of Parliament could/should offset this perceived lack of influence over policy. The draftsman is not ready to proceed along those lines, as there are limits to what could reasonably be expected through the annual budget. For example, even if the Parliament were to adopt budget appropriations for a particular priority, there could be real problems of implementation if the Commission considered that it was not in line with the letter and objectives of the legal text. This creates some serious problems of interpretation because, as mentioned before, the regulation itself is only of a framework nature and does not really contain the policy.
6. The draftsman must conclude that it would be dangerous to simply hope to use the budgetary powers of Parliament as a "saviour" if there is a serious problem with the legal text as it is proposed.
7. Therefore, the lack of involvement of the Parliament in policy choices would lead the draftsman to support the lead committee's draft report recommending the rejection of the draft regulation, and asking the Commission to bring forward new proposals.
8. Lastly, it should be recalled that the draft Constitution will confer new powers upon the European Parliament during the period covered by the next financial framework ; therefore is determined to reject any legal commitment which would undermine the Parliament's legislative and budgetary prerogatives in future .

### **LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL**

The Committee on Budgets recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.

## PROCEDURE

<b>Title</b>	Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
<b>References</b>	COM(2004)0629 - C6-0128/2004 - 2004/0220(COD)
<b>Committee responsible</b>	DEVE
<b>Committee asked for its opinion</b> Date announced in plenary	BUDG 26.1.2005
<b>Enhanced cooperation</b>	No
<b>Draftsman</b> Date appointed	Reimer Böge 31.1.2005
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	15.3.2005
<b>Date amendments adopted</b>	15.3.2005
<b>Result of final vote</b>	for: 14 against: - abstentions: -
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Reimer Böge, Den Dover, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Markus Ferber, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Dariusz Maciej Grabowski, Catherine Guy-Quint, Anne Elisabet Jensen, Janusz Lewandowski, Jan Mulder, László Surján, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski, Ralf Walter
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Jacek Emil Saryusz-Wolski
<b>Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote</b>	

## PROCEDURE

<b>Title</b>	Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation				
<b>References</b>	COM(2004)0629 – C6-0128/2004 – 2004/0220(COD)				
<b>Legal basis</b>	Articles 251(2), 179(1) and 181A(2) EC				
<b>Basis in Rules of Procedure</b>	Rule 51				
<b>Date submitted to Parliament</b>	1.10.2004				
<b>Committee responsible</b> Date announced in plenary	DEVE 26.1.2005				
<b>Committee(s) asked for opinion(s)</b> Date announced in plenary	INTA 26.1.2005	FEMM 26.1.2005	LIBE 26.1.2005	BUDG 26.1.2005	AFET 26.1.2005
<b>Not delivering opinion(s)</b> Date of decision	FEMM 16.3.2005	LIBE 21.2.2005			
<b>Enhanced cooperation</b>	INTA 24.2.2005				
<b>Rapporteur(s)</b> Date appointed	Gay Mitchell 6.10.2004				
<b>Previous rapporteur(s)</b>					
<b>Simplified procedure</b> Date of decision	Rule 43(1) / Rule 43(2) 0.0.0000				
<b>Legal basis disputed</b> Date of JURI opinion	/				
<b>Financial endowment amended</b> Date of BUDG opinion	/				
<b>European Economic and Social Committee consulted</b> Date of decision in plenary					
<b>Committee of the Regions consulted</b> Date of decision in plenary					
<b>Discussed in committee</b>	18.1.2005	21.2.2005			
<b>Date adopted</b>	16.3.2005				
<b>Result of final vote</b>	for:	33			
	against:	0			
	abstentions:	0			
<b>Members present for the final vote</b>	Alessandro Battilocchio, Margrietus van den Berg, Danutė Budreikaitė, Nirj Deva, Fernando Fernández Martín, Michael Gahler, Hélène Goudin, Jana Hybášková, Filip Andrzej Kaczmarek, Glenys Kinnock, Wolfgang Kreissl-Dörfler, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis, Maria Martens, Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Gay Mitchell, Luisa Morgantini, Józef Pinior, José Ribeiro e Castro, Toomas Savi, Pierre Schapira, Frithjof Schmidt, Jürgen Schröder, María Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco, Anna Záborská and Jan Zahradil.				
<b>Substitutes present for the final vote</b>	Marie-Hélène Aubert, Ana Maria Gomes, Fiona Hall, Manolis Mavrommatis, Miloslav Ransdorf, Anne Van Lancker, Gabriele Zimmer				
<b>Substitutes under Rule 178(2) present for the final vote</b>	Javier Moreno Sánchez.				

<b>Date tabled – A6</b>	21.3.2005	A6-0060/2005
<b>Comments</b>	...	