



NATO Parliamentary Assembly

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

adopted by the

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

in

2006

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* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

DECLARATION 347

on

GEORGIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO*

The Assembly,

1. **Noting** the significant strides that Georgia has made since the Rose Revolution of 2003 in implementing the political, economic and security sector reforms necessary for closer integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;
2. **Recognizing** that the prospect of NATO membership continues to be an important incentive for doing so;
3. **Emphasizing** that the Alliance is open to those countries that share its values and meet its standards, and that enlargement of, or close association with, the Alliance has been and remains an important contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and stability;
4. **Recognizing** that reform of economic, political and security institutions in Georgia is a long-term process and that the determination shown by the leadership to pursue those reforms is an important indicator of its progression toward integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions;
5. **Recognizing** Georgia's wish to engage in a Membership Action Plan as soon as possible and eventually join NATO;
6. **Welcoming** the willingness of Georgia to deploy its forces alongside those of NATO members in difficult and potentially dangerous situations;
7. **Recognizing** the significant progress that Georgia has made in fulfilling the goals set forth in its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP);
8. **Concerned** that the unresolved conflicts in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia continue to provide a source of tension in the region;
9. **Noting** that, given its role in the current negotiation frameworks, Russia should play a more constructive role in the resolution of those conflicts;
10. **Welcoming** the recent agreements on withdrawal of Russian bases and troops from Georgia as a positive step, and **reiterating** the willingness of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to play a role in contributing to its international monitoring;
11. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance :
 - a. to decide positively to begin an Intensified Dialogue with Georgia as soon as possible and preferably by summer 2006;
 - b. to provide technical assistance to Georgia to speed its integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;
 - c. to assist in finding mutually acceptable solutions to the unresolved conflicts that plague the region.

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the plenary assembly in Paris, France, on 30 May 2006

DECLARATION 348

on

SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR ALBANIA, CROATIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognizing** the significant progress made by Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia towards achieving the goal of NATO membership as demonstrated during the Rose-Roth Seminar held in Tirana, Albania from 22-24 April 2006;
2. **Welcoming** the three countries' commitment to strengthening democratic institutions, civil society, rule of law and market economy, and to ensure protection of human rights and liberties on their territories;
3. **Acknowledging** the challenges posed to the stability of the region by the pervasive corruption and organized crime and of the determination to tackle this threat as articulated by the Prime Minister of Albania, Sali Berisha, and the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament, Jozefina Topali at the Assembly's Rose-Roth seminar in Tirana in April 2006;
4. **Recognizing** the key role to be played by Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of the efforts of the international community in resolving the status of Kosovo and in building regional stability, as well as guaranteeing the protection of human rights and minority rights; and
5. **Believing** that, if they continued to pursue a course of ambitious reforms, an invitation to Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to join NATO should be seriously considered no later than 2008 and that signals of this intent should be given at the NATO Summit to be held in Riga in November 2006;
6. **PLEDGES** to render Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia all possible assistance in achieving their goal of NATO membership, and particularly in their fight against corruption and organized crime.

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the plenary assembly in Paris, France, on 30 May 2006

DECLARATION 349

on

BELARUS*

The President and the Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Standing Committee strongly condemn the unacceptable way in which the Presidential elections in Belarus have been conducted. The electoral process was marked by a sharp increase in human rights violations and abuses against opposition candidates and their supporters, including numerous cases of detention, ill-treatment and beatings, as well as the shutting down of independent media and aggression against non-governmental organizations. As international observer missions, including that of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, have reported, the electoral process failed to meet international standards and norms to which Belarus is formally committed. The election of Mr. Lukashenko as president is therefore illegitimate.

The NATO PA Standing Committee also vigorously condemns the actions of the Belarus administration, police and intelligence and security services in their treatment of those opposed to the Lukashenko regime. And it urges the authorities in Belarus to respect Euro-Atlantic democratic standards to which they have committed in joining the Partnership for Peace, and the commitments and standards of the OSCE.

The NATO PA Standing Committee supports the demand to hold a new, free and democratic election.

The Standing Committee unanimously applauds the intention of the European Union and the United States to impose new sanctions on the government of Belarus.

NATO PA members urge all NATO and partner governments to consider what further actions can be taken, including, where appropriate, the use of strict individual sanctions and travel bans against the representatives of the Belarusian regime to impress on the authorities in Belarus their deep concern.

NATO parliamentarians also urge Russia to join the efforts of the international community in condemning the undemocratic conduct of the Belarusian government in order to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime to open up its society to reform.

The Assembly Standing Committee calls upon NATO and partner governments to actively support the democratic forces and promote the development of civil society in Belarus.

* Proposed by the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Mr. Pierre Lellouche (France) and adopted by the Standing Committee in Gdynia, Poland on Saturday 25 March 2006

DECLARATION 350

on

NATO'S SUMMIT IN RIGA*

1. Introduction

1.1 The Riga summit of Alliance Heads of State and Government provides an opportunity for Alliance leaders to reconfirm the continuing importance of NATO as the key transatlantic forum to ensure our collective security. In today's global environment risks and threats to our security are many and diverse. They result from multiple origins: failed or failing states, underdevelopment, bad governance, demographic imbalances, religious radicalization, the resurgence of ideologies hostile to democracy, competition for natural resources and energy, regional instability, transnational organised crime, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. NATO's core mission of collective defence must now address these new threats. The Riga Summit should give leadership and direction to this process.

1.2 NATO's ability to contribute to dealing with these new security challenges will depend on its continuing transformation. It will also require the support of Alliance publics and parliaments. As recent experience has shown this support cannot be taken for granted. As parliamentarians with authorising powers over budgets and deployments and direct accountability to our electorates, we have a unique responsibility to provide direction for Alliance policies and priorities.

1.3 As representatives of Nato's 26 parliaments we call upon Alliance leaders to address as a matter of urgency the following issues:

- a) The use of the Alliance framework for consultation and coordination on all key security issues, including the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Middle East;
- b) The challenging security situation in Afghanistan;
- c) The stabilisation process in the Western Balkans, and in particular in Kosovo;
- d) The need for more appropriate funding arrangements for overseas missions;
- e) The shortfalls and deficiencies in Alliance operational capabilities;
- f) The inadequate levels of defence expenditures;
- g) Terrorism;
- h) The need for more effective cooperation with the European Union;
- i) The further development of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue;
- j) The creation of new forms of association for contributing non-partner countries;
- k) The further evolution of Alliance partnerships;
- l) The future membership of the Alliance.

2. A More Political NATO and the Harmonization of Political Aspirations and Military Capabilities

2.1. A central element of NATO's new role must be the commitment of all the Allies to use the Alliance framework for political consultation and coordination on the most important security challenges. This has to be done more regularly and in the framework of in-depth discussions by our political leaders. We must assess on a case-by-case basis where NATO's collective capabilities and experience can be utilized, either independently or in close cooperation with other international organizations.

* Adopted by the Standing Committee at its meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on Friday 29 September 2006 and endorsed by the plenary assembly in Québec City, Canada, on Friday 17 November 2006.

2.2. In making such assessments, political ambitions must be harmonized with the resources and capabilities available. Nations which have agreed to take part in missions must be willing to produce the capabilities required. Mutual solidarity is urgently called for. Civil and military planning must be done together and in a more integrated manner. At all times, NATO should abide by the principles of international humanitarian law.

3. The Situation in Afghanistan

3.1. The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in recent months. The increasing cost in human lives – and here we would wish to pay homage to the combatants who have fallen for the freedom of Afghanistan – demonstrates that this war is not yet won. NATO's commitment to Afghanistan constitutes a test of its ability to face the challenges of the new security order. In view of NATO's commitment to extend security throughout the country and the challenges it faces as it expands its mission, member countries must decide to redouble their efforts to provide the assets required to achieve this goal. NATO should also redouble its efforts to build trust with the Afghan people and agree on common policies towards the political and reconstruction efforts in the country. More 'boots on the ground' are needed in the southern part of Afghanistan to provide sufficient stability for sustained reconstruction. The Alliance's leaders must stress the need for member states to demonstrate the flexibility and commitment to provide the manpower and material needed for this mission. More synergy among international organizations is needed. A failed Afghanistan will also be a failed NATO.

4. Interoperability and Effectiveness

4.1. Interoperability and compatible communications are essential for Alliance military effectiveness. Fulfilment of the Prague Capabilities Commitments must remain a priority. The emphasis should be on task specialization and investments to ensure that sufficient troops can be deployed for complex stabilization missions.

4.2. Interoperability will also depend on the development and integration of military information networks to share and exploit relevant information in real time. The United States and its Allies must therefore develop technology transfer policies to facilitate the effective sharing of relevant technical information.

4.3. Forces deployed for NATO missions must have the flexibility to perform the range of operations demanded by a particular mission. All efforts should therefore be made to reduce the use of national caveats which all too often restrict national contingents from participating in operations to their full capability.

4.4. In view of the critical role of special forces in NATO's missions, particular attention should be devoted to enhancing their interoperability.

4.5. In addition, NATO should redress its shortfall in long-range, heavy airlift by having available suitable aircraft.

5. Funding Transformation and Operations

5.1. The current system of having the costs of operations borne only by the participants in those operations should cease. The increased use of "on-call" NATO forces such as the NATO

Response Force demands a means of sharing the financial burden of deploying those forces across the Alliance in an equitable manner.

5.2. A mechanism for the common funding of operations should be accompanied by commitments by individual members to devote sufficient resources to defence to meet the global challenges to our security. NATO members should at the very least commit themselves to making no further cuts in their national defence expenditures, and the Riga Summit should give an incentive to a better and more transparent common funding mechanism. Parliamentarians regard the development of a more equitable system as a matter of urgency.

5.3. The transformation of the Alliance and the fulfilment of its commitments will depend upon appropriate levels of spending as well as improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of defence spending. Redoubled efforts should therefore be made to improve the effective use of defence resources through co-operation in all stages of procurement. The Alliance should also set a firm date for all members to achieve the Istanbul usability goals for ground forces of 40 per cent deployability and eight per cent sustainability. Similar targets should be set for air and naval forces.

6. Terrorism

6.1. We continue to support the role of NATO in the fight against terrorism. We believe the Alliance provides the essential transatlantic dimension, but note that terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone.

7. Cooperation with International Organizations

7.1. Current and future security challenges demand the most effective use of collective resources - civil and military - and the closest possible cooperation and coordination with relevant organizations. This means further improvement of NATO's relationships with other international organisations, in particular with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). The Riga Summit should give a firm impetus to developing these relationships in a concrete manner. The NATO Response Force and its potential for use in crisis situations illustrate the urgency of developing such relationships.

8. Relations with the European Union

8.1. The scale and scope of current security threats requires a co-operative NATO-EU relationship that maximizes the assets of both organisations and an end to institutional bickering. A more systematic process of consultation and coordination is now imperative to ensure that resources are used effectively and that the plans and responses of NATO and the EU are better balanced and more harmonized. The summit provides a chance to overcome the stalemate in relations between the two organisations. A constructive relationship between NATO and EU is a key component of a vibrant transatlantic relationship.

9. Partnerships

9.1. NATO's partnership programs perform an important stabilizing function through assistance to countries in different stages of political, economic and social transition. Alliance expertise is effective in helping countries implement much needed reform of their security sectors. The Assembly has itself contributed through parallel programs of assistance to partner parliaments in developing effective parliamentary oversight.

9.2. Funding for NATO's many partnerships remains modest. If NATO's partnerships are to be genuinely deepened and broadened, the Alliance must augment the resources committed.

9.3. Assistance to the Balkans and the South Caucasus must remain a priority. The Alliance should give serious consideration to the requirements of a future military presence in Kosovo, in cooperation with other international organizations.

9.4. The Alliance should continue its partnership with countries of Central Asia and the Alliance should monitor the progress in fulfilling democratic standards of participants in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and use the EAPC to urge partner countries to fully implement those standards.

9.5. In developing partnerships, special emphasis should be placed on the value of NATO's long-standing expertise in the protection of civilian populations against disasters and other civil emergencies in the light of the threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Alliance's planning, logistic and operational capabilities can provide unique support for national preparedness and response efforts.

10. The Middle East and North Africa

10.1. The Middle East and North Africa are regions of critical strategic importance. Again, the Assembly plays a complementary role to NATO's programs by integrating members of parliament from these countries into its many activities. The Alliance should expand its engagement with neighbouring states by developing existing programmes like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative using the experience and assets of NATO's Partnership for Peace. This could include a training initiative involving the creation of a training facility in a Mediterranean Dialogue or Istanbul Co-operation Initiative country. A greater emphasis should be placed on cooperation with countries that develop democratic structures and respect human rights.

11. Russia

11.1. The development of a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia remains essential. The work of the NATO Russia Council represents a considerable achievement and should be strengthened. However, the development of genuine partnership continues to be hindered by deep-rooted suspicions and misperceptions. Issues such as human rights, energy security and the situations in neighbouring countries should be discussed in an open and confidence-building manner. Issues of common interest must be addressed in order to create the necessary foundation of confidence. In enhancing its own relationship with the Russian parliament, the Assembly will play its part in reconciling misperceptions and creating a much-needed basis of mutual trust.

12. Ukraine

12.1. Recognizing Ukraine's importance as a strategic partner and noting that Ukraine remains committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, NATO should continue to develop its relationship with Ukraine through the Ukraine-NATO Action Plan, Intensified Dialogue and the PfP Trust Fund.

12.2. The role of public opinion regarding NATO should be addressed, and NATO should assist the Ukrainian government to the maximum extent possible in disseminating information about the Alliance's role and activities.

13. New Partnerships

13.1. The Alliance should give attention to developing more formal co-operation mechanisms with geographically distant partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, who share the Alliance's values and also participate alongside NATO forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. At the same time, NATO should be alert to the need to safeguard its cohesiveness, particularly within its decision-making structures.

14. Enlargement

14.1. Membership of the Alliance must remain open to those aspirants who demonstrate their adherence to the common values of the Alliance and are assessed by member countries as being ready for membership.

14.2. At the Riga Summit Alliance leaders should provide clear guidance to Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as to when they can expect invitations to join the Alliance.

14.3. Encouragement and support should be given to Georgia's aspirations to NATO membership.

14.4. Alliance leaders should begin to formulate a strategic vision on the long-term future of enlargement.

15. Relations between NATO and the NATO PA

15.1. The Assembly is a visible manifestation of the Alliance's shared commitment to parliamentary democracy. Its activities enhance the collective accountability of NATO. They also contribute to the transparency of NATO and its policies and to improving public scrutiny and awareness. Assembly activities in outreach and partnership reinforce and complement parallel activities by NATO. The Assembly welcomes its growing cooperation with NATO and enhanced dialogue with the North Atlantic Council. We welcome the complementarity between the work of the Assembly and NATO particularly regarding partner nations. The Assembly urges Heads of State and government to acknowledge this role in their Riga Declaration and to reaffirm their support for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the shared goal of promoting democratic values.

RESOLUTION 351

on

THE FUTURE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY*

The Assembly,

1. **Reaffirming** its strong commitment to peace and stability in the Balkans;
2. **Convinced** that the future of the Balkans lies in their full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;
3. **Commending** the role played by the international community, under the leadership of the High Representative, in support of the stabilisation and reform processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
4. **Praising**, in particular, the close co-operation between NATO and the European Union in managing the transition from SFOR to EUFOR;
5. **Acknowledging** the many steps that the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has already taken to promote and institutionalise political, economic and social reform;
6. **Welcoming** the successful organisation of October's free and fair general elections;
7. **Concerned**, however, by reports of a tense and radicalised election campaign, including statements which put into question the very foundations of the Bosnian state; and
8. **Regretting** that an agreement on constitutional reform could not be secured before the elections;
9. **Emphasising** that the continuation of the reform process and closer co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are required for the further development of the country's relations with Euro-Atlantic institutions; and
10. **Reiterating** the central responsibility and accountability of parliamentarians;
11. **URGES** the new government and parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
 - a. to demonstrate their firm commitment to the consolidation of a functioning multi-ethnic state through the continuation of the reform process;
 - b. to address the pressing needs of their citizens by passing the essential political, economic and social reforms, in particular in the fields of police, education, public administration, and economy;

* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

- c. to re-engage as soon as possible in talks on a future constitutional framework, which should ensure the supremacy of citizenship over ethnicity, as well as the full protection of minority rights, in accordance with international standards;
- d. to enhance co-operation with the ICTY and improve further the process for trying war criminals in Bosnia and Herzegovina's courts system;

12. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to assist further the government and parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the reform process;
- b. to support the inclusion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, pending its full co-operation with the ICTY and the continuation of its defence reform;
- c. to support the progressive redefinition of the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as warranted by political developments in the country;
- d. to promote the closest possible co-operation between relevant international organisations, particularly the United Nations, the European Union, the OSCE and NATO, in managing this transition;
- e. to support the decision of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union to reduce the troops in 2007 in the light of the positive results of the presidential and parliamentary elections at the beginning of October while having regard to the regional situation.

RESOLUTION 352

on

RELATIONS BETWEEN GEORGIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION*

The Assembly,

1. **Reaffirming** its commitment to the promotion of good neighbourly relations in the South Caucasus region;
2. **Welcoming** NATO's decision to start an "Intensified Dialogue" with Georgia on its aspirations for membership;
3. **Welcoming also** the signing by Georgia and the European Union of a European Neighbourhood Action Plan on 14 November 2006;
4. **Recalling** that the process of Euro-Atlantic integration and enlargement is not directed against any particular country, but goes hand in hand with the promotion of good neighbourly relations among partner countries;
5. **Regretting** the escalation of tensions between Georgia and the Russian Federation following the arrest by Georgian authorities of four Russian officers and their release at the end of September 2006;
6. **Concerned**, in particular, by the interruption of all land, air and sea links between the two countries, as well as the continued ban on the import of agricultural products from Georgia to the Russian Federation;
7. **Reaffirming** the right of every nation to counter illegal immigration but **condemning** any discriminatory measures taken against civilians based solely on their ethnicity or citizenship;
8. **Welcoming** the declarations of good intention made by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Russian Federation following their meeting on 1 November 2006;
9. **Reaffirming** its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and for the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
10. **Convinced** that the non-resolution of these conflicts represents a serious impediment to peace and stability and to the establishment of good neighbourly relations in the region;
11. **Acknowledging** the new proposals and initiatives presented by the President of Georgia at the UN General Assembly; and

* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

12. ***Insisting*** that, given its role in the current negotiation formats, and its obligations under the UN Charter and the OSCE, the Russian Federation has a special responsibility to promote a peaceful resolution of these conflicts and should play a more constructive role;

13. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of Georgia and the Russian Federation:

- a. to refrain from any steps which would damage further relations between the two countries;
- b. to start without further delay discussions on the re-establishment of normal communications and economic relations between the two countries;
- c. to comply fully with their respective commitments regarding the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and with UN Security Council Resolution 1716 dated 13 October 2006;

14. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to use every opportunity to facilitate and encourage dialogue between Georgia and the Russian Federation, with a view to re-establishing confidence and de-escalating tensions;
- b. to support ongoing negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the extent of their competence, and encourage reflections on ways to enhance current negotiation formats;
- c. to support fully Georgia's aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration and its wish to move, in due course, to the next level of co-operation with NATO, namely the Membership Action Plan.

RESOLUTION 353

on

REAFFIRMING NATO'S UNITY OF PURPOSE IN AFGHANISTAN*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan is one of NATO's most important operations and that the result will have a heavy impact upon the Alliance and its credibility as an international actor;
2. **Paying homage** to the members of our armed services serving in Afghanistan and **commemorating** those who have lost their lives in this mission;
3. **Stressing** that providing security across the whole country is absolutely crucial to conquer insurgency, to stabilise the country and to prevent the region from becoming a haven for international terrorism;
4. **Welcoming** the strategic partnership signed with the government of Afghanistan;
5. **Recognising** that Afghanistan's long-term security and stability cannot and will not be ensured by military means alone, and also recognising that it requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development, as well as international and, in particular, regional co-operation;
6. **Stressing** that this is inherently a long-term and multifaceted mission;
7. **Recognising** that the successful stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan requires winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people;
8. **Concerned** about the lack of security and the weakness of Afghanistan's government institutions, particularly in remote regions and **recognising** that, as it struggles to rebuild its shattered society, Afghanistan needs the continued and even increased involvement of NATO and the international community;
9. **Understanding** that NATO is charged with assisting the legitimate and elected government of Afghanistan in securing the national territory from illegitimate armed groups that threaten the progress achieved so far;
10. **Welcoming** the improvements of NATO's efficiency in Afghanistan and the expansion of its mission to include the most troubled parts of the country, but **regretting** that serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitments by NATO member states continue to limit the operations of its forces;
11. **Welcoming** the additional contributions of some members, but **encouraging** all members to share in the risks and costs of our collective decision;

* Presented by the Political and Defence and Security Committees and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

12. **Noting** that this mission is an important indication of the ongoing transformation of the Alliance and the capabilities improvements undertaken by individual members that allow such a mission to be possible; but,
13. **Also noting** that NATO has struggled to persuade members to provide adequate personnel and equipment to perform the tasks at hand, and **deploring** the failure to supply additional forces as requested;
14. **Concerned** about the continuing high level of drug production and the lack of a comprehensive and coherent policy that includes Afghan authorities as well as the international community and the neighbouring countries;
15. **Noting** that Pakistan is itself affected by the insurgency and has a key role in its defeat of the insurgency and **deeming necessary** stronger co-operation by Pakistan in order to tackle this challenge;
16. **Recognising** and **commending** the important contributions by NATO as well as partner nations to the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan but also **aware** that the continued and increased economic, financial, legal and other assistance provided by the United Nations and the EU is essential to the success in Afghanistan;
17. **Regretting** that NATO's relationship with the EU continues to improve only slowly and **stressing** the need for a more effective partnership that establishes a formal NATO-EU framework which includes all security-relevant strata of the EU;
18. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to increase further the effectiveness of NATO's joint operations by removing those national caveats that are currently impeding the prompt and effective utilisation of some NATO forces currently deployed in Afghanistan and by improving funding mechanisms for joint operations;
 - b. to improve our interoperability in communications and weapons systems as well as in training;
 - c. to supply the personnel and equipment that our military commanders deem necessary to perform this mission;
 - d. to implement the commitments made to NATO, including providing for sufficient investment budgets and following up on force generation promises and, in particular, to supply sufficient, robust, combat-capable troops to fight the insurgents in the South and East of Afghanistan;
 - e. to better balance offensive security operations with reconstruction efforts and to provide more focus to ongoing reconstruction by giving priority to projects in the sectors of irrigation, roads and energy supply, and to develop and implement a common and comprehensive policy to tackle drug production;
 - f. to co-ordinate better the efforts of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams across Afghanistan;
 - g. to devise and implement a strong policy towards the government of Afghanistan with the aim of speeding up reform processes that tackle more effectively the problems of underdevelopment and corruption, particularly in the police force;
 - h. to apply strictly humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions in order to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people;

- i. to expand and develop further the co-ordination and co-operation with other actors by formalising partnerships with countries that share the values of the Alliance;
 - j. to continue and deepen the political transformation of the Alliance by strengthening the role of NATO as a forum for political dialogue and decision-making by empowering the North Atlantic Council to discuss the relevant issues that can impact upon the security of NATO member and partner countries;
 - k. to reaffirm our unity of purpose in assisting the government of Afghanistan to provide a secure and stable environment for its citizens;
19. **ENCOURAGES** the United Nations:
- a. to improve NATO-UN co-ordination in order to provide a deeper and more structured relationship between the two organisations;
20. **URGES** the government of Pakistan:
- a. to improve its co-operation with the government of Afghanistan and the international community to combat the insurgency and to do its utmost to deny Taliban forces a safe haven;
21. **URGES** the government of Afghanistan:
- a. to pursue energetically domestic reform and reconstruction efforts in line with the Afghanistan Compact.

RESOLUTION 354

on

IMPROVING GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that energy security has moved to the centre of the contemporary strategic and political debate both in the United States and Europe;
2. **Aware** that national approaches to energy security are not sufficient to cope with the global and multifaceted nature of these security challenges;
3. **Observing** that these challenges include: soaring demand; supply bottlenecks; mounting competition for scarce energy resources; energy price volatility; the limited number of suppliers; political instability in major oil and gas producing countries; terrorist targeting of energy infrastructure; inadequate exploration, extraction, transit and refining capacity; state ownership of key energy assets; the employment of energy resources for expressly political and sometimes destabilising purposes; and mounting environmental concerns, particularly surrounding the use of carbon-based fuels;
4. **Noting** that energy demand continues to rise in all regions of the world, with Asia accounting for much of the increase due to its explosive and generally beneficial growth;
5. **Understanding** that there are ongoing concerns about the safety of nuclear power but **recognising** its potential to produce energy without emitting greenhouse gases;
6. **Acknowledging** that the use of renewable resources accounts only for a small percentage of world energy production, while fuel-efficient technologies and bio-fuels are handicapped by insufficient public funding and costing systems that fail to capture the true environmental and security costs of using carbon-based fuels;
7. **Recognising** that rising energy prices hit developing countries particularly hard and can undermine efforts to bring people out of poverty, a phenomenon that ultimately undermines global security;
8. **Noting** that energy prices can also have a particularly adverse effect on already overstretched NATO member country military budgets;
9. **Lamenting** the lack of agreement among Allied governments to discuss seriously the ways in which NATO might contribute to energy security as well as the very limited dialogue between NATO and the European Union, which could make it more difficult to respond to a genuine energy emergency in the Euro-Atlantic space; but,
10. **Applauding** the EU's recent decision to adopt a Common European Energy Policy;

* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

11. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- a. to initiate an Energy Security Dialogue within NATO in order to identify common energy security interests and challenges, and to define those specific areas in which NATO assets and political structures might help reinforce the defence of Western energy interests;
- b. to encourage NATO to consider how it might play an active role to defend energy infrastructure like pipelines, refining facilities and ports from terrorist or military attacks; to build upon its capacity to monitor the sea lanes of communication to ensure the safe passage of tanker traffic; and to develop a contingency planning capacity for potential energy emergencies;
- c. to promote an Energy Security Dialogue between NATO and the EU in order to enable energy crisis planning and to facilitate co-operation in the event of such a crisis;
- d. to redouble support for research, development and investment in renewable resources, as well as fuel-efficient technologies, while encouraging best energy conservation practices and more comprehensive multilateral and trans-Atlantic co-operation in all of these areas;
- e. to advance research efforts designed to promote safe nuclear power and to consider developing a multilateral approach to an enriched uranium stockpile;
- f. to diversify the sources of energy in national energy mixes and to look at infrastructure and technical solutions to ensure that no NATO country is fully dependent on any single or small group of suppliers;
- g. to support the G8, EU-Russia and the US-Russia Energy Security Dialogue and the work in the NATO-Russia Council on terrorist threats to critical infrastructure; to help improve energy infrastructure; to promote adequate functioning of market mechanisms; and to encourage mutual responsibility of suppliers and consumers of energy resources while avoiding the use of energy assets for diplomatic leverage;
- h. to enhance multilateral energy dialogue with important emerging consumer countries such as China and India, perhaps within the OECD/International Energy Agency framework, in order to identify common interests and lower the risk of energy-driven rivalries;
- i. to work with developing country governments, business leaders and civil societies to advance energy efficiency in the world's less developed regions in order to reduce global energy demand while recognising that increased energy use in these regions is essential to their development;
- j. to help developing countries utilise their capacities to produce bio-fuels, in which they might enjoy comparative advantages while rejecting protectionist measures that hinder free trade in clean and increasingly cheap bio-fuels and synfuels, which can be sourced from a variety of suppliers;
- k. to ensure that parliaments and parliamentary assemblies, such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, are actively engaged in all of these efforts.

RESOLUTION 355

on

THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1956 HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION AND FIGHT FOR FREEDOM*

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and fight for freedom as one of the milestone events of 20th century history;
2. **Paying tribute** to the heroic fight of the Hungarian people for independence and democracy;
3. **Remembering** all those who lost their lives during Hungary's revolution, in subsequent acts of retaliation, or as a result of the uprisings in Berlin and Poznan;
4. **Stressing** the key role that the 1956 Hungarian Revolution played in revealing the true nature of the totalitarian regimes imposed on Central and Eastern Europe;
5. **Acknowledging** the Hungarian people's enduring commitment to the principles and values of free, democratic societies, a commitment that ultimately led to the spread of democracy and the reintegration of Central and Eastern Europe into the Euro-Atlantic community;
6. **EMPHASISES** that 23 October 1956 and the events of the Hungarian Revolution form an integral part of our common historic heritage and serve as a constant reminder for future generations that our common values and beliefs must not be taken for granted;
7. **HONOURS** the sacrifices of all those who gave their lives to establish and preserve those values and beliefs.

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

RESOLUTION 356

on

THE FUTURE STATUS OF KOSOVO *

The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that Kosovo's current status is temporary and cannot be maintained indefinitely, and also **recognising** that any agreement on the future status of the province will have an important impact on the stability of South-East Europe as a whole;
2. **Commending** the Alliance, and in particular the Kosovo Force (KFOR), for successfully securing and stabilising the UN-administered province;
3. **Supporting** UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's efforts to find a solution for the future status of Kosovo and **hoping** for early results that would end the current uncertainty;
4. **Noting** that the mandate for the international community's continued military and civilian presence must be based on a resolution by the UN Security Council;
5. **Emphasising** that a final solution to the status of Kosovo must allow the establishment of a stable multi-ethnic society;
6. **Recognising** that the international community must continue to support and monitor the full implementation of the standards it has established;
7. **Understanding** that any institutional arrangement on the future status of Kosovo will have to be supported by the people of Kosovo and improve living conditions for all;
8. **Recognising** that the common future of Kosovo and the region lies in their full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, which rules out any form of discrimination and which requires the establishment of the rule of law;
9. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to support Martti Ahtisaari's efforts in the negotiations on Kosovo's future status based on Contact Group Guiding Principles and to help ensure that any institutional settlement will allow for the establishment of a stable multi-ethnic society in Kosovo;
 - b. to remain committed to securing peace and stability in Kosovo and South-East Europe as a whole by ensuring an international military and civilian presence as long as the situation requires;

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- c. to support and monitor the further implementation by the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of the standards established by the international community;
 - d. to monitor developments closely in Kosovo and in Serbia and to contribute to the integration of the entire region in Euro-Atlantic institutions on the condition of full co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
 - e. to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance with the provisions of the Status Settlement, to ensure security and, in particular, to protect minorities, as well as to monitor and to support the authorities in the continued implementation of standards;
 - f. to assist further the democratisation of Kosovo and the building of institutional capacities;
 - g. to secure the necessary military presence of NATO after the end of the Status Talks and to ensure the best possible co-operation with the European Union whose civil engagement will be extended;
10. **URGES** the government, the parliament and all political forces in Kosovo and Serbia:
- a. to engage fully in the status process and related technical talks which cannot be blocked by any party, and to explain to the electorate that any compromise will require sacrifices from both sides and continued progress on standards;
 - b. to respect and protect fully the rights of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, as well as the cultural and religious heritage of Kosovo;
 - c. to spare no effort to rebuild mutual confidence and to create conditions that would allow displaced Serbs and other minorities to return to the province and live in peace.

RESOLUTION 357

on

INTEROPERABILITY IN NETWORK-ENABLED OPERATIONS*

The Assembly,

1. **Observing** that the ongoing revolution in information and sensor technologies generates profound changes in the domain of defence and security by accentuating network-enabled capabilities (NEC);
2. **Recognising** that NEC promises to provide armed forces with exceptional situational awareness, increased operational tempo, accuracy and survivability by linking all military assets and entities within an interactive network;
3. **Convinced** that interoperability of allied forces will increasingly depend on the ability to "plug" into partner nations' networks and receive and share relevant information in real time;
4. **Realising** that NEC is only effective if proper attention is paid to doctrinal, organisational and personnel dimensions, in addition to harnessing cutting-edge technologies;
5. **Concerned** that without proper attention given to NEC, the transatlantic capability gap is likely to widen;
6. **Welcoming** the efforts of NATO agencies to develop the concept of NATO Network-Enabled Capabilities (NNEC);
7. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to regard NEC as one of the cornerstones of NATO transformation;
 - b. to consider the possibility of key network-enabled systems coming under direct NATO control and being eligible for NATO common funding;
 - c. to endorse adequate funding of national NEC programmes;
 - d. to foster dialogue between the United States and its allies in order to ease NEC-related technology transfer policies and facilitate effective sharing of relevant technical information;
 - e. to seek compatibility of different networks by embracing the experience of the private sector and commercially-developed standards;
 - f. to realise the importance of multinational military exercises to master NEC procedures;
 - g. to accept fully NATO Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) on interoperability and to work towards meeting them.

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the plenary assembly on Friday 17 November 2006, Québec City, Canada

RESOLUTION 358

on

THE NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA*

The Assembly,

1. **Profoundly alarmed** by the reported underground detonation of a nuclear device conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 9 October 2006, in defiance of several international agreements and documents, including the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Parties, the UN Security Council Resolution 1695 and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula of 1992;
2. **Regarding** this test, conducted in total disregard for the concerns of the entire international community and the existing universal moratorium on nuclear weapon tests, as a reckless and provocative act which jeopardises the security situation in the region and seriously undermines global nuclear non-proliferation efforts;
3. **Commending and fully supporting** the unanimous, swift and robust reaction by the UN Security Council, which was expressed in its Resolution 1718, based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
4. **Deeply regretting** that the DPRK violated its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), announced its withdrawal from that Treaty and ceased co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
5. **Condemning** the series of ballistic missile launches in July 2006, which accentuated concerns about the DPRK's intentions;
6. **Believing** that resuming the Six Party Talks is the most effective way to seek stability in the region and to bring economic benefits to the people of the DPRK;
7. **URGES** governments and parliaments of member and partner countries of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to use all political and diplomatic means to persuade the DPRK authorities to halt permanently their country's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes and to refrain from any further nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests;
 - b. to call on DPRK leaders, as a matter of urgency, to begin the Six Party Talks to which they have pledged to return without preconditions;

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- c. to put all possible pressure on the DPRK to fulfil its obligations under the NPT and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
 - d. to implement vigorously the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 to prevent the trafficking of sensitive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related material, technologies and know-how to and from the DPRK;
 - e. to strengthen further multinational non-proliferation mechanisms, particularly the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime;
 - f. to promote the notion of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and to endorse a system of security guarantees for both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.
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