Transborder Data Flows and Extraterritoriality: The European Position

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Introduction

The questions I have to deal with might be summarized as follows. Does the EU Privacy regulatory framework in respect at least of the first pillar have an impact beyond the EU frontiers? And if yes, which are the fundamentals of this attitude might one speak about extraterritoriality of EU laws?

In order to answer to these questions, I will start with a brief reminder of the historical background of the present EU Privacy regulation on TBDF: “From article 8 of the European Convention (ECHR) to the TBDF issues”. Thereafter, we will analyse more deeply the

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1 This paper does reflect the personal views of the authors and does not commit any institution whereto he belongs.

2 The distinction between the three pillars is quite important insofar different procedural rules must be followed for the adoption of EU regulations according to these pillars. The present EU Privacy Directive is only applicable to the first pillar and not to the second pillar (External relationships) or the third pillar (Interior Security, Police and Judicial cooperation). Regarding the Second pillar, in Article 11 of the TEU, it is stated: “I. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: -to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter, -to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, -to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders, -to promote international cooperation, -to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” As far as the Third pillar is concerned, Article 29 states: “Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, (...)”. As one knows, the European Union envisages to enact a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (COM (2005) 475 final) (2006/C 47/12). This Decision will have for effect to introduce in the Third Pillar the same concepts than in the first on and definitively to extend the same regulatory framework as regards the TBDF than that provided by the 92’ Directive on Data Protection. On that point, see the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) opinion available on the EDPS website: http://www.edps.europa.eu/.
extraterritorial impacts of the two main EU Directives: the first one, dated from 95\(^3\) and called the General Directive and the second one, dated from 2002\(^4\), a more specific directive on “Electronic Communications and Privacy”.

**I. From European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the TBDF issues\(^5\)**

As regards the first point, just few considerations about the Council of Europe and EU approaches.

As regards the Council of Europe, article 8 ECHR\(^6\) enumerates explicitly Privacy as a fundamental Human Right. Definitively, this Right was conceived in 1950 mainly as the protection of intimacy, in other words, a “right to opacity”\(^7\) and intended to ensure the protection of sensitive data. Progressively, the right to privacy has become the right to self-determination. It means the possibility for everyone to determine him or herself the way by which he would like to find his or her way in the society. This extension has been made possible because the Convention is deemed as a “living instrument” which ought to be interpreted only in an extensive way (see on these points, notably Tyrer\(^8\) and Selmouni\(^9\) cases).

It leads progressively to consider that the protection of all data, what might be viewed as “the informational image of the individuals”, has to be ensured, and not only the sensitive ones. On that point, the Rotaru Case\(^10\) judged in ’99 by the European Court of Justice might be quoted.

Having defined very broadly the scope of the “Privacy” Right, the Court adds that its protection must be “practical and effective” and must not be kept as “theoretical and illusory”.

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This assertion is very important in the context of the TBDF regulation as it will shown.

Last point, Council of Europe does consider that the State is the first guarantor of its citizens’ data protection. The State is the ultimate guarantor of H. Rights and Freedoms: « the State has a positive obligation to ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction enjoys in full, and without being able to waive them, the rights and freedom guaranteed by the Convention. » (Refah, 2003)

It means that the States have not only a negative obligation not to interfere, with Privacy, except definitively in the strict conditions of article 8.2., but also and overall that they have positive obligation to ensure that their citizens’ Privacy will be protected vis-à-vis third parties, this protection thus is available against private bodies (companies or associations) or persons located in third countries insofar our Privacy might be put at risk by the processing operated by these data controllers. That is the main reason why Convention n° 108 and all European Legislation have been adopted creating a public regulatory framework enforceable not only in the public sector but also in the private one and regulating explicitly the TBDF.

As regards the EU approach, firstly, we have to underline that the European Union has been declared competent as regards Human Rights protection and regulation, only since the Treaty of Amsterdam. This Treaty makes large reference to the European Convention of Human Rights, by asserting that the EU has to guarantee the respect of the H.R. enumerated by the ECHR.

11 ECtHR, 9 Oct. 1979, Airey v. Ireland. See also ECtHR, 23 March 1995, Loizidou v. Turkey.
12 ECtHR, 31 July 2001, Refah Partisi v. Turkey.
13 We have to bear in mind that otherwise, member States would be passive of liability for violation of the ECHR. See supra: D. YERNAULT “L’efficacité de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’homme pour contester le système ‘Echelon’ ”, in Sénat et Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Rapport sur l’existence éventuelle d’un réseau d’interception des communications, nommé ‘Echelon’, Feb. 25, 2002. In this article, the author studies the nature of the ECHR: (1) as an instrument guaranteeing “European public order”, considered as a coherent whole, in the sense that it was qualified by the Strasbourg Court in 1995; (2) as an international treaty that gives place to the State’s international liability; and (3) as an international treaty of a particular nature, due to its Article 53, by virtue of which adherent States recognise its legal pre-eminence over any other internal or international regulation that would be less protective of Fundamental Rights than the Convention itself.
14 It seems that this intervention of the States in protecting Privacy distinguishes fundamentally the US and EU approach. On that point, see C.MANNY: “When European state that Privacy is a fundamental right, the effect among American is to frame questions of consumer information Privacy in terms of Privacy interests of individuals against organisational or societal interference.” ( “European and American Privacy Commerce, Rights and Justice”, in Proceedings of the Academy of Legal studies, Business Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Aug. 2001 and J. REIDENBERG, “The background and underlying philosophy of the European Directive differs from that of the United States. While there is a consensus among democratic society that Information Privacy is a critical element of civil, society, the US has, in recent years, left the protection of privacy to markets rather than law. In contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in fundamental human rights.” ( J. REIDENBERG, “ E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy”, 38 Houston Law Review, 2001, p. 731.)
15 Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam allows for measures against a Member States if there is as serious and persistent breach of the fundamental values on which EU is based notably human rights as they are enacted by the Council of Europe Convention on human right. For a first explanation on how this article might function, see the Commission’s Communication on Art.7 EU- Respect for and promotion of the values on which the Union is based, COM (2003) 606 final ( Oct. 15, 2003).
16 A recent trend from ECJ to make a systematic reference to the Jurisprudence established by the European Court of Human Rights is quite noteworthy in that respect (see e.g. the E.C.J. K.B, case (C-1171/01) Jan. 7, 2004 and the Pupino case (C-105/03), June 16, 2005).
The European Court of Justice in the Loizidou case\(^\text{17}\) has explicitly recognized the European Convention as a “constitutional instrument of the EU public order”, having according to ECJ decision in the Matthews case\(^\text{18}\) the priority on all other international (e.g. the WTO Agreements) and national European or foreign countries legislations,

As regards Privacy, in order to take fully in consideration the extension of the article 8 ECHR scope, the EU Charter on Human Rights adopted in 2000 by the Treaty of Nice\(^\text{19}\) has distinguished the Data Protection from the Privacy Right in order to consecrate the right of each EU citizen to have all his or her personal data protected both firstly, by limiting the processing of these data only to legitimate purpose including the consent, secondly, by granting to the data subject a right to access and thirdly, by recognizing to the Data Protection Authorities a prominent role for ensuring the respect of the different DP principles\(^\text{20}\).

Having recalled all that, we might know envisage the specific attitude of our EU authorities vis-à-vis the TBDF.

In order and before analysing that, I would like to clearly distinguish two situations where European personal data are at risk due to TBDF.

II. A fundamental distinction between two kinds of TBDF. How the Directive 95/46 regime is insufficient?

The first TBDF situation is traditional and obvious. A person, company or administration even an individual, located in Europe is exporting data for various reasons, e.g. to perform a contract on behalf of his/her customer, to ensure in a third country the processing of certain technical applications (back up or storage of data), to build up a common data base concerning employees located in different countries, etc..

The second situation is less obvious: due to the global nature of the modern networks and the absence of as regards the infrastructure frontiers, the processing operated by persons located

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\(^{17}\) Already quoted footnote 10

\(^{18}\) ECtHR, 18 Feb. 1999, *Matthews v. UK*


\(^{20}\) Article 8: Protection of personal data: “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”
outside of the EU might directly affect our privacy by sending spywares, transmitting data to third parties through invisible hyperlinks or addressing unsolicited mails through the web, etc.

These last cases are quite different from the first one, the privacy risks are directly caused by parties located in third countries without data necessarily having been transferred consciously by data controller located within Europe, as it was the case traditionally.

The distinction between the two TBDF hypotheses will lead to different provisions. The first situation is regulated by the General Directive and its two main principles asserted by the Recital, n° 56 and 57: “Whereas cross-border flows of personal data are necessary to the expansion of international trade; whereas the protection of individuals guaranteed in the Community by this Directive does not stand in the way of transfers of personal data to third countries which ensure an adequate level of protection; whereas the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the transfer operation or set of transfer operations; Whereas, on the other hand, the transfer of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection must be prohibited.”

In other words, if the Directive recognizes the positive TBD F input as regards the development of the commerce. In the same time, it underlines the EU commitment to ensure the protection of the Privacy considered as a Human Right and thus justifies the legitimate restrictions and conditions embodied in the two already quoted articles.

Always on that point recently, a question has been raised before the European Court of Justice, the famous Lindqvist case21 in the context of a web site created by a European citizen and revealing and containing Data about third parties. Insofar the web site might be consulted from terminals located outside of Europe, can we consider that the EU Data Directive provision on TBDF are applicable? The European judges answer by the negative but this negative answer is founded on weak arguments. Our opinion is different. Even if the website is not as such exporting data, by his/her conscious operation, although he/she has deliberately created the risk of exportations by placing personal data on his/her website. Therefore, we consider that articles 25 and 26 are applicable.

At the contrary, certain situations might not very easily fall under the application of the articles 25 and 26 of the so-called General Directive insofar they are not the consequences of a directly or indirectly voluntary data transmission by a person located in Europe. In that respect, I just will quote the “Echelon case”22, insofar it is a question of the third pillar. In that case due to the characteristics of the communications by satellite, the US and UK governments have developed a system of electronic surveillance able to read the communications passing through this way of communication including a communication sent by a person located within Europe and having as receiver another European citizen. So it was possible to the UK and US Intelligence Services to spy every European citizens, companies or administrations whose communications were circulating through satellites, without trespassing the E.U borders. The European Parliament23, six days before the 11th of September nightmare, has strongly reacted to these new privacy threats and to this violation of

21 ECJ Nov. 6 2003, published notably in RDTI., note C. de TERWANGNE
22 This case has been revealed by different documents like J. BAMFORD’s one: “The puzzle Palace” or N. HAGER’s one “The Secret power”. The STOA (Advisory Committee of the EU Parliament on Technology Assessment) has published different reports on ECHELON
its sovereignty by claiming the adoption by the E.U of new tools in order to better ensure its citizens’ privacy and its sovereignty.

In that case, the transmission outside of Europe is the result of the global and interactive nature of the networks used by the European residents. There was no transfer in the sense of the 95’ Directive. Still as regards these second kind of hypotheses, more interesting for our reflections is the present development and growth of the Internet infrastructure which potentially ensures a global and interactive circulation of all messages. This situation leads the E.U to enact, in 2002, a specific Directive as regards “Data Protection and the electronic communications sector” in order to face these new risks. In that respect, we will analyse the provisions of the Directive 2002/58, which implicitly but definitively regulate certain activities of data controllers notwithstanding the fact they are located inside or outside of Europe. So, activities like electronic communications interceptions, use of traffic or location data, sending of unsolicited communications are under the EU regulations even if they are operated from outside the European Union.

The following reflections will thus analyse separately the two situations.

III. TBDF and the Directive 95/46

The basic principles of the TBDF regime

The basic principle as regards the territorial scope of the Directive 95/46 is enacted by the article. 4.1. The Directive is applicable if and only if “the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State”. So, the criterion to determine the geographical scope of the Directive is the physical link between the activities of the data processor and the EU territory, where the real activities of the data processor effectively are taking place. On that point, we might conclude about the non extraterritoriality of the Directive 95/46 insofar only the activities located in Europe even if it concerns the data transmission to third countries are regulated even if that regulation especially the TBDF provisions have an impact outside European borders. To have an extraterritorial impact does not mean an extraterritorial scope of your legislation. As it has been recently pointed out by a Canadian Report about precisely the question of extraterritoriality in the age of Globalization, “in some cases, measures are designed to have extraterritorial reach by influencing the actions of other Nations. For example, the European Data Protection Directive specifically provides that EU member states must legislate so that

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there could be no trans-border movement of data for processing abroad unless the target country had enacted legislation establishing substantially equivalent data protection norms. Although such legislation would have no overt extraterritorial reach, the threat of loss of trade as a result of the Data Protection Directive was a strong motivating factor for the Canadian Government’s decision to enact the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.”

Only, one exception[^27] is foreseen by the Directive, even if its meaning is ambiguous is interesting to quote in the perspective of our considerations about the EU Directive 2002/58. “The Directive is applicable when the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State,...” In that cases, the Data controller located outside of the European Community has then the obligation to designate a representative established in the territory of that Member State. Number of commentators[^28] has underlined the ambiguous meaning of this provision. Either, the provision is just making a reference to the articles 25 and ff.; either, this article deals with cases of at distance usage of automated processing apart from controllers outside of EU (cookies, spyware, etc.), and intends to put on the direct application of the Directive the processing which are under a total control of Data controllers located outside of Europe. In other words the criterion to be applied is the master ship of the functioning of the equipment. At our opinion[^29], this second interpretation must be followed. The provision refers precisely to cases where a data processor located outside of Europe has or takes the full control of the equipment located in Europe and so makes use of this equipment collecting by this use directly within this equipment certain data without voluntary authorization or without conscious transmission by the terminal equipment possessor. Cookies or spyware are examples of these collections of data directly generated by at distance usage of equipment but we might also think about pre-programming of certain applications which permits direct access from outside to certain Data files without authorization of the data possessors. It is quite clear that in these circumstances, the extra territorial applicability of the Directive might be considered as a way to prevent the specific risks linked with this kind of transmission insofar the articles 25 and ff. are not applicable. As we will see thereinafter, the article 4.1.c) might be considered as a pre-figuration of the new provisions enacted under the Directive 2002/58.

**The TBDF regime**

Let us come back to the main TBDF principles, which are applicable only to data controllers located within the EU territory. TBDF are forbidden except if an “adequate protection” is offered by the recipient of the flow located in a third country. According with the famous

[^27]: See about the Article 4.1 c), the assertion stated by TERSTEGGE : “This rule leads to some odd extraterritorial side effects.” (“Directive95/46/EC, art. 4” in Concise European IT Law, (A.BULLESBACH, Y.POULETTE and C.PRIENS (eds.)), Kluwer Law Int., 2006, p. 164).

[^28]: So, the Article 29 Working Party discussing about the meaning of this provision recommends a cautious application of this article, which should be applied only in cases “where it is necessary, where it makes sense and where there is a reasonable degree of enforceability having regard to the cross-frontier situation involved.” (Article 29 Working Document on the applicable law in case of personal data processing by non-EU web sites, May 30, 2002, WP.56.

“Methodology Paper”, adopted by the Article 29 Working Group in ‘98, the concept of adequate protection has to be distinguished from other concepts like the concepts of “equivalent protection” or “sufficient protection”. Indeed, according with the “Methodology Paper”, “adequate protection” does not mean “equivalent protection”. Equivalency would have required a strict analytical comparison between two documents of similar nature that means between the foreign legislative Act and the EU one. In other words, the criterion of an equivalent protection would have required the adoption by the third country of a legislation, which might be considered less as a copy of the Directive. With the adequate protection requirement, the question to be solved is different and might be expressed as follows: considering the specific privacy risks linked with a TBDF and taking into consideration the number and quality of the data transferred, the types of usages pursued by the transfer, the eventual onward transfers, etc., can we consider that the Data Protection of the data subjects is or not effectively followed following the main requirements of the EU directive.

The approach takes into account both, from one side, the conformity of the object of the protection, that means the content of the protection afforded by the regulatory environment of the TBDF and, from the other side, its effectiveness. If it is important that the regulatory provisions surrounding the TBDF, no matter their nature (self-regulatory, contractual or legislative nature) assert the security, access, fairness and proportionality principles, it is even important that the Data subjects might take benefit of support and assistance mechanisms in order to ensure the respect of these principles, that their complaints might be suited, investigated, judged and enforced by really independent, easily accessible and competent authorities.

So the EU approach is very open.

- Firstly, it forbids any judgment a priori. The fact that a country has ratified the Convention n° 108 is not per se a guarantee that the country offers an adequate protection. A case by case approach is needed taking into account fully the characteristics of the flow to be analyzed and the protection effectively offered by the recipient. The use of the term “adequate” is meaningful and perfectly translates the pragmatism of the European approach that might be characterized as not ideological or theoretical.

- Secondly, this attitude is the contrary of any E.U. imperialism as regards the way by which the protection would have to be ensured. Under article 25.2 and 26.2 wording, any regulatory way including contractual provisions, self-regulatory systems or even the technology itself might be taken into consideration for ensuring an adequate protection. As regards the value of self-regulatory norms, we might quote the decision.
taken by the Commission in 2000 about the TBDF towards US\textsuperscript{33} and the article 29 opinions on “Binding Corporate Rules” (B.C.R.)\textsuperscript{34}.

- Thirdly, the European approach has to be viewed as a “functional” and “risk oriented” approach. The question to be addressed in case of a TBDF might be expressed as follows: “Which kind of mechanisms effectively might protect against the precise risks linked with the TBDF at stake?”

The “effectiveness” and “conformity” of the protection might be ensured by various regulatory methods implies the existence of a complaint’s mechanism and the possible intervention if needed of an independent authority (not necessarily a public one, it might be a private ADR). This authority must have competence to investigate and to pronounce dissuasive sanctions. All these conditions of effectiveness might eventually be realised in the context of a self-regulatory system like a code of conduct. This focus on the effectiveness explains that recently, the Article 29 Working Group has judged that the adequacy offered by the US “Safe Harbour Principles” might be questioned not because the self-regulatory nature of the protection afforded but because its lack of actual effectiveness\textsuperscript{35}.

According to this approach, the EU competent authorities have multiplied the ways whereby an adequate protection might be offered.

- So, the first way under article 25 al. 2 is definitively the regulatory (at the broadest sense) environment surrounding the activities of the recipient and available in the recipient’s country, whatever the regulatory quality of this environment. On that respect, let us add that in order to prevent discrepancies between the attitudes of the different Member States, the EU Commission might intervene, according to the articles 25.4 and 6 (the “white” or “black” lists’ systems), by a decision in order to substitute to national decisions, a European one\textsuperscript{36}.

- The article 26.1. joins together different exceptional cases\textsuperscript{37} where due to the very specific nature or the precise content of the TBDF, no major privacy risks do exist.

\textsuperscript{34} Working Document on Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Article 26 (2) of the EU Data Protection Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, 03.06.2003, - WP 74
\textsuperscript{35} On that point, see the recent report prepared in the context of the Safe Harbour revision, J. DHONT, M.V. PEREZ-ASINARI, Y. POULLET with the collaboration of J. REIDENBERG and L. BYGRAEVE, Safe Harbour Decision Implementation Study, at the request of the E.U Commission, published on the web site of the Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy
\textsuperscript{36} A complete list of the decision taken by the Commission under this provision is available at the EU Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/. 
\textsuperscript{37} A set of derogations to the general principle is enacted by the Directive, so the transfer will be possible when: “(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer, or (b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller or the implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response to the data subject's request; or (c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party; or (d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or (e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or (f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.”.
- Contractual provisions between the sender and the recipient might offer appropriate security measures, under art. 26.2. According to article 26.4., contractual models have been proposed by the EU Commission.

- Finally, provided the organisational specificities of the multinational companies, it might be possible to take benefit of these specificities (internal audit, common privacy policies, and corporate sanctions) for guaranteeing an adequate protection, as proposed by the Article 29 Working Group in 2005.

Apart from the considerations, we might address certain findings about the TBDF regime set up the Directive 95/46.

Definitively through these different documents, one might pinpoint the main concerns expressed by the E.U. Most of the attention is put on the “effectiveness” of the protection afforded, no matter the regulatory instrument chosen. This effectiveness is obtained both by the responsibility given to the European data transmitter who will have to take in charge the consequences of the privacy violation and ultimately by the possibility of judicial recourse by the data subjects before an EU jurisdiction applying the EU Data Protection Directive’s provisions.

**TBDF regime and WTO**

The great suppleness used to appreciate the “adequate protection” is definitely a good thing but might lead to risks of discrimination between third countries. So, Australia might...
consider that its country has been discriminated by the refusal of the EU Commission to consider its legislation as not adequate whilst, at the same time, the “US Safe Harbour Principles” have been considered as adequate.

This risk of a discriminatory application is coupled with a great risk concerning a lack of effective control by the national authority as regards the quality of the instruments offered for the recipient. So, how to control whether the privacy policy taken by a multinational company as IBM is really applied by the different IBM national subsidiaries? The resources of the DP Authorities in controlling all TBDF are definitively insufficient.

Another criticism is addressed by the private sector to the DPA. So, the absence of a unique locket and the diversity of attitudes between each of them create problems for companies operating in different when they have to introduce demands for TBDF.

In conclusion, if undoubtedly, one might speak about a real extraterritorial impact of the directive. No provisions contained in this directive except the case foreseen art. 4.1.c) might be analyzed as having an extraterritorial scope. The targeted situations are only ones clearly located in Europe, as regards the actors targeted and the operations they are undertaking.

**TBDF regime and web sites : A challenged ECJ decision**

Always, as regards the Directive 95/46 and its provision about TBDP, a second point must be studied particularly in the context of a recent decision taken by the European Court of Justice in 2003: the famous Linqvist case.

A Swedish parochian has created a web site containing useful information especially for the parochians but including personal data (Members of the Parochy’s council), contact addresses, etc) including sensitive ones (notably the disease of one member of the Parochy’s council). Among the prejudicial question raised by the Swedish Court to the E.C.J. was the following one: “Are the articles 25 and 26 of the D.P. Directive applicable to web sources”?

The European Court’s answer is negative but its arguments might easily receive objections.

Under the judges’ opinions, TBDF means active transmission towards third countries and not consultation apart from abroad. This distinction between “transmission” and “consultation” remains from a technological point of view quite ambiguous. What is the difference between, on one side, the situation where a sender, through his/her computer programming, send data to a recipient or, on the other side, the one where by another programming, the sender makes accessible certain data to this recipient. The difference between the “push” and the “pull”
systems makes no sense except if the sender has no technical possibility to avoid the transfer by blocking the access, losing any master ship of the sending. It must be noticed that in this exceptional case, the directive would be anyway applicable under article 4.1.c) as previously explained. In the case of a website, accessible through the Internet, the creator of this website has willingly made the data available and has the possibility to restrict the access.

The second argument is still weaker. Following the judges the transfer if it exists, is a transfer operated by the hosting service and not by the website creator. This argument might not be accepted. The hosting server is not a data controller but a data processor insofar he is acting on behalf of the website creator. Anyway, this argument does not contradict the existence of a TBDF.

The last point is undoubtedly the major argument. In the context of the worldwide web development, each possible consultation of a website would be considered as a TBDF and so the TBDF rules would become a general rule, impracticable insofar the website’s visits might happen from all the countries and would require an analysis of all national regimes and, if this analysis is negative as regards certain countries, an effective and selective implementation of its outcomes.

On that point, however, it might be opposed that the TBDF rules contain already a long list of exceptions available in most of the websites creation does constitute a result of his/her author’s freedom of expression, the European Union does provide the need to balance in an appropriate way the Right to Privacy and this Right to a free and without frontiers expression.

Having taken into account these exceptions which considerably reduce the weight of the ECJ’s arguments, it must be recognized in favour of an application of the TBDF provisions that the publication on websites of certain information and their availability throughout the world create definitively a major privacy risk which justifies the application of the articles 25 and 26. So, we might imagine that certain duties of care would be imposed to the website creators and to their hosting providers and that the possibility of intervention by the public authorities ought to exist in case of major risks.

IV. The Directive 2002/58 and the TBDF

As previously said, this directive fully takes into consideration the recent development of Internet services and the global nature of its infrastructure. As regards the nature of the privacy risks linked with TBDF, it means that the International and global infrastructure of the Internet constitutes as such as such for its European users far beyond the specific risks generated by the operations of Trans-border Data Flows by data controllers established in E.U. countries. Moreover due to the fact that Internet but more generally all telecommunications networks are offered on a worldwide basis, the European Union has to

47 On that point, see our reflections in M.V. PEREZ ASINARI and Y. POULLET, op. cit., p. 101.
48 So, by avoiding the posting of sensitive data, by imposing certain restrictions of access, …
49 …by blocking the access to websites to certain visitors nominated or coming from certain countries.
take into account the global character of these networks. As it has been revealed by the recent Echelon case\textsuperscript{50}, number of privacy threats against data covered and protected by the European Union directives might occur in the cyberspace by Data controllers located outside Europe. It would be a non-sense to restrict the European Union Protection to the European Borders. To take an example, more than 60 percent of the web sites are located in U.S. It is thus crucial to envisage the protection of European Internet users surfing on web sites located in U.S.

So, the traffic or location data might be transmitted and processed unlawfully by Telecommunications services providers established outside of the E.U. European Data subjects might be victims of unsolicited mails or by illicit and unfair Data collected through cookies or spywares installed on his hard disk by processors established anywhere throughout the world.

Therefore, provisions of the Directive 2002/58 target all Electronic communications services without taking into account the nationality or the establishment of their providers. In that sense, one might speak clearly about the \textit{extraterritoriality} of this Directive\textsuperscript{51}.

So, we might quote: the obligation for anybody provider to respect the opt-in system as regards the unsolicited communications even if his/her own national legislation foresees the opt-out system, like the US Spam Act. The article 5.3., which severely limits the use of electronic communications services for providing access to information stored into the terminal equipment, is applicable to all electronic communications services providers no matter where these providers are established. Other examples might be given. No territorial limits are restricting the scope of the provisions of this Directive. This position does represent a clear answer to the disappearance of the national borders. \textit{“But in the 21st Century, border security can no longer be just a coastline, or a line on the ground between two nations. It’s also a line of information in a computer, telling us who is in the country, for how long, and for what reason? In the 21st Century it is not enough place to place inspectors at our ports of entry to monitor the flow of goods and people. We must also have a ‘virtual border’ that operates far beyond the land border of the United States”\textsuperscript{52}.}

\section*{V. The European TBDF regime and the WTO rules}

Our reflections lead naturally to the following questions. Is the twofold European TBDF regime compatible with the WTO rules? Especially, is the extraterritorial application of the Directive 2002/58 complying with the WTO rules? The question might be raised for other national Privacy legislations like the 98’ US COPPA (Children Online Privacy Protection Act) or the 2003’US SPAM Act, which also have extraterritorial effects. It has been explicitly

\\textsuperscript{50} About Echelon, the global surveillance system of satellite communications and the European Debate thereabout, see J-M. DINANT- Y. POULLET, \textit{Le réseau Echelon, Existe-t’il ? Que peut-il faire ? Peut-on et doit-on s’en protéger?}, Rapport rédigé pour à l’attention du Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements, March 7, 2000, published in the annual report of the « Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements », 2000, p. 13 and ff.

\textsuperscript{51} “Some of the services covered by the Directive might be offered to a subscriber or a use inside the European Union from a provider located outside the Community; for example as Internet access provider. In that case, the text states clearly that the European Directive is applicable. The criterion fixed by the Directive is not the same as the criterion of establishment retained by the General Directive and will thus permit an extraterritorial effect of this Directive.” (Y.POULLET, “Directive 2002/58/EC, art. 4”, in \textit{Concise European IT Law}, (A.BULLESBACH, Y.POULLET and C.PRIENS (eds.)), Kluwer Law Int., 2006, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{52} This declaration has been pronounced in the PNR context. This reasoning has been also held in the context of the ECHELON case quoted above.
raised before and solved by the WTO appellate body in a decision concerning the US legislation on Internet Gambling\textsuperscript{53}. At our opinion, the same arguments might the applied here.

The Dispute Settlement Body of the W.T.O. in a first moment and the Appelate Body in a second time\textsuperscript{54} were requested to solve the dispute between Antiqua and US concerning the limitations created by the US Wire Act upon cross-border provision of Internet Gambling and betting services. The “public morals” exception was invoked by US. The WTO Appelate Body’s opinion might be summarized as follows. Effectively, the Wire Act and the measures taken under this basis affect directly the cross border supply of gambling services through Internet. These measures, to be acceptable, must be necessary to protect public morals or to maintain the public order, under Act XIV of the GATS. In other words, “the public order exception might be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interested of the Society”.

Precisely, as regards the legislation attached, the WTO Appelate Body considers as “vital and important at the highest degree” the necessity of the Wire Act. That necessity is due to the peculiarities of the remote supply of gambling services by the Internet which put at additional risks the US Internet User. Finally, the WTO Appelate Body underlines the absence of reasonable alternative existing for the US legislator in order to ensure the defence of national values.

Apart from the reasoning held by the WTO judges in this gambling case, one might conclude that despite its extraterritorial impact or dimension and its effects on the free cross border market, the provisions on TBDF enacted by the Directive 95/46, which definitively have an extraterritorial impact, and the extraterritorial scope of application of the Directive 2002/58 would be considered as not infringing the WTO rules.

Indeed, Privacy is expressly mentioned in art. XIV of the GATS as a possible exception to this free cross-border market if no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination exists and the WTO Preamble highlights the importance “of giving due respect to national policy objectives” and “the right of (WTO) Member States to regulate and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within their territory in order to meet national policy objectives (...)”. At this respect, nobody will contest that Privacy is considered by European Union and most of the EU Member States Constitution as a Human Right and its protection is deemed as of “public order” and, as previously said under the ECHR case law, it is the absolute duty of the European Union Members States to ensure this right effectively in the new ICT context and to give the absolute priority to the ECHR rules vis-à-vis any other rules, including international commitments and conventions, like WTO\textsuperscript{55}.

Having said that, it remains necessary to check if the European Union does respect the limits imposed by the WTO to the implementation of this public order exception. Recently, PEREZ

\textsuperscript{53} On that decision, M.V. PEREZ-ASINARI,” Internet gambling and betting services: When the GATS’ rules are not applied due to the public morals/public order exception. What lessons can be learnt?”, CL&SR, 2006,


ASINARI\textsuperscript{56} has proposed a “four-steps-methodology” in applying the exceptions of privacy and public order. That methodology is under her opinion perfectly respected by the E.U. in the context of the Directive 95/46. Particularly, she pinpoints the fact that the E.U has justified fully the restriction imposed by the article 25 and 26 in underlining how it would be easy to circumvent the EU Data Protection laws by transferring the data to third countries offering no or less protection. The measures might so be deemed as “necessary to secure compliance” with the EU public national objectives. Furthermore, the EU has developed precise criteria by the famous Working Paper n° 12 of the Working Group\textsuperscript{57} to assess the adequacy of the solutions proposed by the recipient and the sender in order to offer an adequate protection. The respect of these criteria and the motivation of each decision as regards the quality of the protection offered by a third country ensures that the measures will not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction of international trade”\textsuperscript{58}. Perhaps we might add that the contractual and B.C.R. solutions, proposed as possible alternatives when no adequate protection is offered by the regulatory regime existing in the third country, enlarge the possible ways for senders and recipients to find an appropriate solution, corresponding to their needs.

The extraterritorial scope of the 2002/58 Directive is justified by the necessity of taking into consideration the characteristics of the global and interactive Internet network. Insofar these characteristics multiply the possibility of privacy threats by trans-border and uncontrollable Data flows, the EU position and its adoption of certain restrictive measures might be deemed as necessary even if they are affecting the cross-border supply of the Internet services. No possible discrimination will exist insofar the EU authorities might intervene towards any infringing service supplier wherever he is located. It might be underlined that no prior authorization for the supply of electronic communication services is required, what would have created major concerns about the proportionality of this regulatory system and would have been judged as discriminatory by giving privileges to the EU suppliers. The obligation imposed to every supplier and the \textit{a posteriori} intervention even if they have impact on the cross-border trade ought to be considered as necessary to secure compliance with the EU requirements and create no risks of discriminatory application between countries.


\textsuperscript{58} One might not exclude that even if the risks of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination are to a great extent reduced by a strict application of this assessment’s methodology, there is still a part of subjectivity in this analysis, which might lead \textit{in casu} to possible discriminatory decision even if the Commission recalls its concern to avoid any discrimination. See, in the US Safe Harbor Decision, the Recital 4 of the Commission Decision says : « Given the different approaches to data protection in third countries, the adequacy assessment should be carried out and any decision based on Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46/EC should be enforced in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against or between third countries where like conditions prevail nor constitute a disguised barrier to trade taking into account the Community’s present international commitments. »
Conclusions

Recently the WSIS has pleaded for “global” norms for privacy: “We call upon all stakeholders to ensure respect for privacy and the protection of personal information and data, whether via adoption of legislation, the implementation of collaborative frameworks, best practices and self-regulatory and technological measures by business and users.” Even if this global solution is not easy to build up due to the fact that Privacy is definitively enshrined in the cultural, historical and cultural background of each society, it seems that no other alternative exists in response to the characteristics of the Data flows at the digital age.

Definitively, even in that context, one might not deny that the European Union is committed and has the obligation, according to the EU treaties to ensure its residents’ privacy as an element of its fundamental Human Right value. This defence might not be ensured as it was the case before the expansion of the Internet, which means in the context of the adoption of the Directive 95/46, by controlling certain TBDF mostly identifiable. Experienced in the very disparate contexts of our daily life, the progressive invasion in our life and in our terminals by the worldwide and ubiquitous Internet technology requires from the European authorities new regulatory measures which will be applied notwithstanding the location of the intruder. “Globally and locally, today’s information societies are underpinned by digital technologies...Ubiquitous networks are at the heart of the digital age.” The adoption of these new measures and their application must fully take into account the legitimate limitations imposed by the rules of the international trade in the same manner this international trade might not alleviate the rules dictated by the public order objectives pursued by the EU authorities in protecting Privacy.

This EU intervention is not per se incompatible with the adoption of an international instrument, which will represent a global consensus on Data Protection. This consensus has been achieved twice in the 80’s both at the OECD level and at the Council of Europe level. Recently, as regards another topic, a consensus about the fight against the Cyber criminality has been obtained by the adoption in 2001 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime signed not only by Europe but also notably by US and Japan. A precedent might be invoked in the Privacy context insofar Privacy invasion might to a certain extent be considered as a Cyber crime which needs to be fought by an international cooperation between different national law enforcement authorities.

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59 As regards this assertion, amongst others, the reflection of J.DHONT and M.V. Perez ASINARI, “New Physics and the Law. A comparative Approach to the EU and US Privacy and Data Protection Regulation looking for Adequate protection” in L’utilisation de la méthode comparative en droit européen, PUN (Univ. of Namur), 2004.. See also, J.Q. WHITMAN, “The two western Cultures of Privacy. Dignity v. Liberty.”, 113 Yale Law Journal,(2004), p. 1151 and ff.. In the context of the assessment devoted to the analysis of the Indian, Japanese or other far located countries, we had the opportunity to verify the truth of this assertion.
61 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime Nov. 15th 2001, . It might be added that the violation of the privacy legislation through the Internet might be deemed as a Cybercrime and that the intrusion in a terminal might be qualified to a certain extent as a “hacking” in the sense of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
Other authors have proposed the adoption in the context of the WTO the adoption of a “General Agreement on Information Privacy” (GAIP)\textsuperscript{62}, taking fully into consideration the economic value of the personal data and the impact of their regulation on the International trade. Undoubtedly the economic dimension of the Human right might not be denied. But to what extent, certain countries would like to enlarge the WTO competences in that direction? So, the solution resides in a multilateral and multi stakeholders’ discussion clearly encouraged by the WSIS. It is quite clear that an integral approach to privacy would be preferable. UN intervention seems to be required\textsuperscript{63} at this stage insofar all cultural, philosophical, social and not only economic aspects must be envisaged in discussing about the Privacy as Human right. Furthermore, it might be recalled that UN has adopted in 90 “Guidelines on computerized personal data files”\textsuperscript{64}, according to the Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\textsuperscript{65}.

Trust in our technologies without borders is at this prize.

\textsuperscript{64} Guidelines for the Regulation of Computerized Personal Data Files, adopted by General Assembly, Resolution 45/95 of 14 December 1990.
\textsuperscript{65} …that stipulates : « No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”