



**2021/0297(COD)**

7.2.2022

# **AMENDMENTS**

## **107 - 405**

**Draft report**

**Heidi Hautala**

(PE703.100v01-00)

Applying a generalized scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Proposal for a regulation

(COM(2021)0579 – C9-0364/2021 – 2021/0297(COD))



**Amendment 107**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences ('GSP').

*Amendment*

(1) Since 1971, the Community has granted trade preferences to developing countries under its Generalised Scheme of Preferences ('GSP'). ***Since then, the GSP has covered more than 60 countries, especially developing nations, counting more than 1,7 billion people all over the world. The GSP is a key commercial instrument of the Union to promote human rights, democracy, the rule of law, good governance, gender equality, and sustainable development.***

Or. en

**Amendment 108**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(2) The Union's common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union's external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

*Amendment*

(2) The Union's common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union's external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). ***For that purpose, the Union should ensure that its commercial policy is conducted in close coordination with other external policies, and that regular contact with partner countries foreseen in the framework of the various instruments of the external action duly follow up on the obligations and issues identified in the implementation of the Union's trade relations and trade-related instruments.***

**Amendment 109****Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó****Proposal for a regulation****Recital 2***Text proposed by the Commission*

(2) The Union's common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union's external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

*Amendment*

(2) The Union's common commercial policy shall be guided by the principles and pursue the objectives set out in the general provisions on the Union's external action, laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). ***Therefore, the Union should safeguard its values and principles both inside and outside of its territories, be coherent, set standards, and prioritise full-fledged democracies respecting the rule of law when opening negotiations for any type of economic and trading partnership.***

**Amendment 110****Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider****Proposal for a regulation****Recital 3***Text proposed by the Commission*

(3) The Union's common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and good governance in the developing countries. It

*Amendment*

(3) The Union's common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and good governance in the developing countries. ***In***

is to comply with World Trade Organisation ('WTO') requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the 'Enabling Clause'), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.

***the context of a new, more sustainable growth model, the Union needs a new trade policy strategy and the green transition must go hand in hand with social equity and reciprocity.*** It is to comply with World Trade Organisation ('WTO') requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the 'Enabling Clause'), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries.

Or. en

**Amendment 111**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(3) The Union's common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and good governance in the developing countries. It is to comply with World Trade Organisation ('WTO') requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the 'Enabling Clause'), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable

*Amendment*

(3) The Union's common commercial policy is to be consistent with and to consolidate the objectives of the Union policy in the field of development cooperation, laid down in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular the eradication of poverty and the promotion of ***human rights***, sustainable economic, social, and environmental development and good governance in the developing countries. It is to comply with World Trade Organisation ('WTO') requirements, in particular with the Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the 'Enabling Clause'), adopted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('GATT') in 1979, under which WTO Members may accord differential and more favourable

treatment to developing countries.

treatment to developing countries.

Or. en

## Amendment 112

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 5

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

##### *Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>, ***although noting a limited impact on sustainable development and environmental protection, together with a lack of progress on democracy and human rights.***

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

## Amendment 113

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development **Goal 17.12** and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

*Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development **Goals 1 ('No Poverty') and 17.12 ('Realisation of duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis for all least developed countries under WTO rules')** and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

**Amendment 114**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP

*Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP

are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12, **to encourage exports diversification from GSP beneficiary countries** and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

## **Amendment 115**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 5**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 **and** to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation

##### *Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12, to promote the sustainable development agenda **and to encourage exports diversification from GSP beneficiary countries**, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment



(EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

## Amendment 116

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn, Samira Rafaela, Urmas Paet, Dita Charanzová, Morten Løkkegaard**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 5

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 **and** to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

##### *Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12, to promote the sustainable development agenda **and to encourage exports diversification from GSP beneficiary countries**, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008

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of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

Or. en

## Amendment 117

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 5

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 **and** to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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##### *Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12, to promote the sustainable development agenda, **and to encourage exports diversification from GSP beneficiary countries** while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

**Amendment 118**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's interests. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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*Amendment*

(5) The general objectives of the GSP are to support eradication of poverty in all its forms, in line with Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goal 17.12 and to promote the sustainable development agenda, while averting harm to EU industry's ***and member states national*** interests, ***sourcing from international law***. The 2018 GSP Mid-term Evaluation and the 2021 supporting Study for the Impact Assessment underpinning this Regulation concluded that the GSP framework under Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 has delivered on these main objectives, which were at the core of the 2012 overhaul of Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences from 1 January 2009 and amending Regulations (EC) No 552/97, (EC) No 1933/2006 and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007 (OJ L 211, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

**Amendment 119**  
**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn, Samira Rafaela, Urmas Paet, Dita Charanzová, Morten Løkkegaard**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 6**

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. ***Together with openness to trade, the scheme should support GSP beneficiary countries to develop a strong industrial base and to create an infrastructure that facilitates access to knowledge and information to foster diversification of trade flows.*** Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. ***By prioritising diversification of exports from GSP beneficiary countries, the scheme should focus preferences on less competitive products which should ultimately contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication.*** Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

Or. en

## **Amendment 120**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### **Proposal for a regulation Recital 6**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner,

#### *Amendment*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”.  
***Together with openness to trade, the scheme should support GSP beneficiary countries to develop a strong industrial base and to create an infrastructure that***

including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union's efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

***facilitates access to knowledge and information to foster diversification of trade flows.*** Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. ***By prioritising diversification of exports from GSP beneficiary countries, the scheme should focus preferences on less competitive products which should ultimately contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication.*** Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union's efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: "The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries".

Or. en

## Amendment 121

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 6

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication

*Amendment*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication

Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup> .

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the

Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. ***Together with openness to trade, the scheme should support GSP beneficiary countries to develop a strong industrial base and to create an infrastructure that facilitates access to knowledge and information to foster diversification of trade flows.*** Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. ***By prioritising diversification of exports from GSP beneficiary countries, the scheme should focus preferences on less competitive products which should ultimately contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication.*** Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup> .

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

Or. en

## Amendment 122

Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 6

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s

##### *Amendment*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values ***both inside and outside its territories***. For GSP specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to



Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>. ***Finally, the revised GSP should present strengthened tools to foster positive conditionality, regarded as incentives to actively encourage the beneficiary countries to ratify international conventions to which both the Union and the beneficiary are attached to.***

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

Or. en

## **Amendment 123**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 6**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP

#### *Amendment*

(6) Those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent Commission Communication Trade Policy Review “An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy”<sup>16</sup> (‘TPR’). According to the TPR, the Union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its Single Market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. For GSP

specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable *manner*, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

specifically, the TPR notes its important role in “promoting respect for core *environment*, human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the GSP “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. Moreover, the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the COVID-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable *and diversified manners*, including with respect to international human rights, labour, environmental and good governance standards. Coherence should be ensured between the GSP and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries, in line with Union’s Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), which constitutes a key pillar of Union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> COM(2021) 66 final, 18 February 2021

<sup>17</sup> Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU concerning PCD reads: “The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”.

Or. en

## Amendment 124

Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 6 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(6 a) In addition, the TPR notes that it is appropriate for the Union to require that imported products comply with certain production requirements established by Union regulation and***

*standards. Therefore, the scheme should be revised to support this objective and encourage the progressive introduction of reciprocal environmental and health production standards, so-called mirror clauses, for European products and products imported from beneficiary countries under the standard GSP regime and GSP+, where necessary and feasible, to strengthen the protection of health or the environment on the largest possible scale, in compliance with WTO rules.*

Or. en

**Amendment 125**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 6 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(6 b) The Commission should reach a common understanding with beneficiary countries under the GSP and GSP+ schemes on a roadmap which includes the progressive fulfilment of time-bound milestones which facilitates and creates the economic, social and environmental conditions and infrastructure for the insertion and application of reciprocal environmental and health production standards, which may be part of a future trade agreement that could offer further benefits to parties in commercial terms and not limited to market access for goods.*

Or. en

**Amendment 126**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 6 c (new)**

***(6 c) The Commission, in cooperation with stakeholders and civil society, should monitor the development and export potential of beneficiary countries that could reach the upper middle-income status in the near future and the economic impact of imports under GSP in the Union industry, particularly on competitive products. This monitoring should aim to improve the targeting of sensitive products under the product graduation mechanism, provide clear recommendations on actions to improve export diversification and ensure that tariff preferences under GSP are withdrawn from competitive products in order to provide further opportunities in the Union market for the exports of countries most in need.***

Or. en

**Amendment 127**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 6 d (new)**

***(6 d) Preferential Trade Agreements by their nature, offer substantially more benefits to parties beyond market access for goods and thus, are significantly more advantageous in commercial terms than unilateral preferences which are limited to goods. Consequently, the scheme's tariff preferences should provide incentives for the swift graduation of beneficiary countries, in accordance with the conditions set in this Regulation, in order to focus on countries most in need and to encourage the conclusion of trade agreements with those most advanced and reaching upper middle-income status.***

**Amendment 128**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to **reduce** poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on **those developing** countries **that have greater** development, trade and financial needs.

*Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to **wealth creation and reducing** poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their **production and exports and thus upgrading their** economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on countries **most in** development, trade and financial needs.

**Amendment 129**

**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to **reduce** poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in

*Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to **wealth creation and reducing** poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own

addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on **those developing** countries **that have greater** development, trade and financial needs.

development and, in addition, to diversify their **production and exports and thus upgrading their** economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on countries **most in** development, trade and financial needs;

Or. en

**Amendment 130**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

*Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own **sustainable** development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs. **Beneficiary countries that show an honest and sincere will to reform their political system to more democratic procedures should be always prioritised.**

Or. en

**Amendment 131**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on ***less competitive products originating from*** those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 132**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 7**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

###### *Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on ***less competitive products originating from*** those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 133**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,  
Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 7**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

*Amendment*

(7) By providing preferential access to the Union market, the scheme should assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty and achieve and promote good governance and sustainable development by helping them to generate additional revenue through international trade, which can then be re-invested for the benefit of their own development and, in addition, to diversify their economies. The scheme's tariff preferences should focus on ***less competitive products originating from*** those developing countries that have greater development, trade and financial needs.

Or. en

**Amendment 134**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,  
Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 7 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(7 a) Union policies increasingly entail an escalation in obligations to comply with Union standards on quality and sustainability of production, with a significant impact on production costs, which are not fully taken into account in international trade negotiations or in the GSP, despite the leading role of the Union in these areas. The limits and obligations that European producers have to respect should equally apply to imports into the Union internal market, being also monitored regularly. The latter imports***



*should reflect the soaring requirements that Union farmers are bounded to implement as the GSP must not, under any circumstance, be a tool to promote unsustainable production or triangular trade. This should become a non-negotiable factor in free trade negotiations or access through the Union's GSP, alongside with equivalence which should also be a prerequisite, covering the entire value chain. The creation of a level playing field for production based on an equivalent political approach would strengthen the competitiveness, employment and growth of agri-food production in the beneficiary countries of the GSP schemes, while safeguarding the European producers.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 135**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn, Samira Rafaela, Urmas Paet, Dita Charanzová, Jérémy Decerle, Morten Løkkegaard**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(7 a) The Union has set ambitious goals to promote sustainable development in its human, social, economic and environmental dimensions, notably through the European Green Deal, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Farm to Fork Strategy, or in the areas of sustainable corporate governance and deforestation, which will trigger fundamental changes in trade patterns with relevant impacts on the GSP scheme during the next decade. The GSP could play an important role in promoting trade in sustainably-produced goods, as long as it is compatible with WTO rules, and targeted development and technical assistance should be designed and provided in order to ensure that*

*beneficiary countries can also fully take part in sustainable trade.*

Or. en

**Amendment 136**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(7 a) The Union has set a series of strategies to reach a carbon-neutral, digital and equal future during the first half of the 21st century, namely its Green Deal, the Circular Economy Action Plan, the Farm to Fork Strategy, its Digital strategy, new sustainable corporate governance standards, and deforestation and the Biodiversity 2030 Strategy. The best lessons learned from these strategies should be presented to beneficiary countries, without mandatory application by them, in order for them to implement the most suitable lessons in their economic and social systems. Accordingly, the Union should take note of these implementations and record them in order to revise the scheme for the beneficiary.*

Or. en

**Amendment 137**  
**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(7 a) The GSP scheme should be based on engaging with partner countries in a*

*continuous and cooperative manner to help them develop and enforce international social, human and environmental standards.*

Or. en

**Amendment 138**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(7 a) The GSP scheme should be based on engaging with partner countries in a continuous and cooperative manner to help them develop and enforce international, social, human and environmental standards.*

Or. en

**Amendment 139**  
**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(7 b) The GSP scheme brings also important benefits to Union businesses importing from GSP countries, particularly those with GSP+ and EBA status, as reduction of duties leads to a reduction of costs.*

Or. en

**Amendment 140**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(7 b) The GSP scheme benefits Union business trading with GSP countries, particularly those with GSP+ and EBA status, as reduction of duties leads to a reduction of costs.***

Or. en

**Amendment 141**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 7 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(7 c) GSP beneficiary countries that take decisions that violate directly or indirectly the United Nations Security Council Resolutions should lose their status.***

Or. en

**Amendment 142**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 8**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement ('standard GSP arrangement'), and two special arrangements, namely the 'special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+' and the 'special arrangement for the

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement ('standard GSP arrangement'), and two special arrangements, namely the 'special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+' and the 'special arrangement for the

least-developed countries - EBA'. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, *which is considered a success*, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries.

least-developed countries - EBA'. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries.

Or. en

**Amendment 143**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 8**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement ('standard GSP arrangement'), and two special arrangements, namely the 'special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+' and the 'special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA'. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, which is considered a success, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries.

*Amendment*

(8) The scheme should consist of a basic arrangement ('standard GSP arrangement'), and two special arrangements, namely the 'special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – GSP+' and the 'special arrangement for the least-developed countries - EBA'. It, therefore, continues the structure of the previous ten years, which is considered a success, as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries *and their own regional integration processes*.

Or. en

**Amendment 144**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 9**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar

*Amendment*

(9) The standard GSP arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar

stage of economic development. There is no definition of 'developing country' at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.

stage of economic development. There is no definition of 'developing country' at the level of the WTO, and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of GSP-eligible developing countries. Countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies, and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade, such as China, Hong Kong, Macao and Russia, should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the GSP, and should, therefore, be removed from the list of eligible countries. Countries which are classified by the World Bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. They are at a different stage of economic development and do not, therefore, share the same development, trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. In order to prevent unjustified discrimination, they need to be treated differently; therefore, they do not benefit from the standard GSP arrangement. Furthermore, the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer, more vulnerable countries and, therefore, could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. The standard GSP arrangement should take account of the fact that the development, trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. ***Moreover, this arrangement should not be applied in the event those countries repeatedly show that they fail to ratify the international conventions covered by this Regulation.***

Or. en

## Amendment 145

Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jordi Cañas, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Recital 11

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from

*Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from

the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; ***the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930; the Occupational Safety and Health convention No 155 and the Promotional Framework for Occupational safety and health convention No 187. Moreover, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which take a clear commitment and adopt a roadmap with concrete steps towards the ratification and effective implementation of the Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.***

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at:

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at:



## **Amendment 146**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 11**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective

##### *Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective

implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

implementation ***and to collaborate on the monitoring*** thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; ***the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, the Occupational Safety and Health convention No 155, and the Promotional Framework for Occupational safety and health convention No 187.***

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Or. en

## **Amendment 147**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 11**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective

##### *Amendment*

(11) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development, as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1998 International Labour Organisation (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019, the Outcome Document of the UN Summit on Sustainable Development of 2015 "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Consequently, the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which, due to a lack of diversification, are economically vulnerable, have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights, climate and environmental protection and good governance, and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective

implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

implementation of these conventions. The list of conventions relevant for GSP should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030<sup>18</sup>. In this regard, the following conventions are added: the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (2015) – replacing the Kyoto Protocol; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); the ***First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights***; the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP-CRC-AC); ILO Convention No 81 on Labour Inspection; ILO Convention No 144 on Tripartite Consultation; and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, Transforming our World: the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>

Or. en

#### **Amendment 148**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Recital 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(11 a) The implementation of the generalized scheme of tariff preferences should also integrate the current discussions on reciprocal environmental and health production standards***

*for Union products and products imported from third countries in conformity with the WTO (“mirror clauses”) with the aim of subjecting imported products to certain production requirements applied in the Union in line with the Paris Agreement.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 149**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**

on behalf of the ECR Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, *to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category.*

*Amendment*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, *evaluating, however, capacity of these countries to fulfill necessary conditions i.e. ratify and implement relevant international conventions.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 150**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC)

*Amendment*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC)

category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category.

category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category. ***LDCs should be monitored by the Commission in their progress towards the ratification of international conventions covered by this Regulation. The Commission could structure a distributed ledger technology (DLT) as a base to share good practices among LDCs, the Union, the WTO, UNCTAD and partnering stakeholders.***

Or. en

## **Amendment 151** **Emmanouil Fragkos**

### **Proposal for a regulation** **Recital 12**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries (LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category.

#### *Amendment*

(12) Countries graduating from the Least-Developed Countries(LDC) category established by the UN should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. For this purpose, the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 ***evaluating, however, the capacity of these countries to fulfil necessary conditions i.e. respect international law and ratify and implement relevant international conventions;*** to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the

**Amendment 152**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 13**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(13) Preferences should be designed to promote ***further economic growth and, thereby, to respond positively to the need for*** sustainable development. Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the ad valorem tariffs should, therefore, be suspended for the beneficiary countries concerned. The specific duties should also be suspended, unless combined with an ad valorem duty.

*Amendment*

(13) Preferences should be designed to promote sustainable ***economic*** development. Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the ad valorem tariffs should, therefore, be suspended for the beneficiary countries concerned. The specific duties should also be suspended, unless combined with an ad valorem duty.

**Amendment 153**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 15 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(15 a) The application for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development should comprise, among others, a public plan of action detailing a priority-oriented list of measures to be taken which are considered necessary to effectively implement the relevant international conventions. This plan of action, on which the beneficiary country should have reached a common***

*understanding with the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service, should also include deadlines and identify the relevant bodies of the beneficiary country responsible for its implementation.*

Or. en

**Amendment 154**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 15 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(15 b) The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance. The suspension of tariffs should therefore follow their effective implementation. Consequently, the plan of action should comprise a schedule for the suspension of tariffs (the “tariffs suspension schedule”), based on benchmarks against which the progress in the implementation of the relevant conventions is assessed.*

Or. en

**Amendment 155**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 16**



*Text proposed by the Commission*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every **three** years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

*Amendment*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every **two** years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

Or. en

**Amendment 156**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 16**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a

*Amendment*

(16) The Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation, by examining the relevant information, in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. Every three years, the Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council a

report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.

report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions, the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. ***The Commission, together with the External Action Service, and the Parliament should send missions to the ground to assess, in a transparent and accountable manner, the implementation of such plans. The Commission and the Parliament should make their final reports on this assessment, explaining their findings and recommendations. Finally, the Delegations of the Union in beneficiary countries should assist these missions as well as the overall implementation of this Regulation.***

Or. en

**Amendment 157**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 16 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(16 a) Civil society stakeholders are relevant points of information and contact with the beneficiary countries' societies and should therefore keep being part of the whole monitoring cycle. The Commission and the Parliament should take into account the information submitted by civil society stakeholders involved in the monitoring. The Commission should set up special domestic advisory groups for GSP beneficiary countries, in order for them to assist the Commission in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the progress made by the beneficiary countries. The Parliament's competent committee on international trade should be also present***

*in these groups and set up meetings.*

Or. en

## **Amendment 158**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 17**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission's future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

##### *Amendment*

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, ***related Union agencies, national and regional*** governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. ***These stakeholders could use a database set up and managed by the Commission to include their findings.*** Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission's future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner. ***The Parliament should provide for yearly reports on the matter.***

Or. en

## **Amendment 159**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Recital 17

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission's future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

*Amendment*

(17) For the purposes of monitoring of implementation and, where applicable, **subsequent granting or** withdrawal of tariff preferences, reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. However, such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the Commission, including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes, and through other sources of information, provided they are accurate and reliable. This could include information from the European Parliament and the Council, governments, international organisations, civil society, social partners, or complaints received through the SEP provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. Shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the Commission's future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.

Or. en

### Amendment 160

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Recital 18

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments.

*Amendment*

(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments.

Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation.

Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. ***The SEP is accessible to citizens, entities, trade unions, stakeholders or civil society established in the Union or in the beneficiary countries and complaints may be submitted anonymously.*** Such new system of complaints should be integrated ***and formalised*** within the framework of this Regulation.

Or. en

### **Amendment 161**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Svenja Hahn, Samira Rafaela, Urmas Paet, Dita Charanzová, Morten Løkkegaard**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 18**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation.

###### *Amendment*

(18) In July 2020, the Commission appointed the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. In this connection, in November 2020, the Commission launched a new complaints mechanism, the Single Entry Point ('SEP'), as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. Through the SEP, the Commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy, including breaches of the GSP commitments. ***The SEP is accessible to citizens, entities, stakeholders or civil society.*** Such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this Regulation.

Or. en

### **Amendment 162**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,**

**Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 19**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(19) The special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) should continue to grant duty free access to the Union market for products originating in the least developed countries, as recognised and classified by the United Nations (UN), except for trade in arms. For a country no longer classified by the UN as a least-developed country, a transitional period should be established, to alleviate any adverse effects caused by the removal of the tariff preferences granted under that arrangement. Tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries should continue to be granted for those least developed countries, which benefit from another preferential market access arrangement with the Union.

*Amendment*

(19) The special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) should continue to grant duty free access to the Union market for products originating in the least developed countries, as recognised and classified by the United Nations (UN), except for trade in arms. For a country no longer classified by the UN as a least-developed country, a transitional period should be established, to alleviate any adverse effects caused by the removal of the tariff preferences granted under that arrangement. ***If a beneficiary country of the EBA scheme no longer meets certain economic, environmental and social conditions, that country should be excluded from the list of beneficiary countries of the EBA scheme. If a product imported from EBA beneficiary countries does not meet certain economic, environmental and social production criteria, that product should be excluded from the tariff preference scheme and the Common Customs Tariff should be reintroduced for that product.*** Tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries should continue to be granted for those least developed countries, which benefit from another preferential market access arrangement with the Union.

Or. en

**Amendment 163**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 21**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.

*Amendment*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate ***and maximize the development effect of the mechanism*** while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.

Or. en

**Amendment 164**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 21**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.

*Amendment*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate ***and maximize the development effect of the mechanism*** while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.

Or. en

**Amendment 165**  
**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 21**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive

*Amendment*

(21) Common Customs Tariff duties on non-sensitive products should continue to be suspended, while duties on sensitive

products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union industries.

products should enjoy a tariff reduction, in order to ensure a satisfactory utilisation rate while at the same time taking account of the situation of the corresponding Union **own production** industries **and agriculture**.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 166**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 22**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(22) **Such a tariff reduction** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

###### *Amendment*

(22) Tariff **reductions** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for **leather, leather products,** textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 167**

**Emmanouil Fragkos**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 22**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(22) **Such a tariff reduction** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad

###### *Amendment*

(22) Tariff **reductions** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad



valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 168**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 22**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(22) **Such a tariff reduction** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

###### *Amendment*

(22) Tariff **reductions** should be sufficiently attractive, in order to motivate traders to make use of the opportunities offered by the scheme. Therefore, the ad valorem duties should generally be reduced by a flat rate of 3,5 percentage points from the 'most favoured nation' duty rate, while such duties for textiles and textile goods should be reduced by 20 %. Specific duties should be reduced by 30 %. Where a minimum duty is specified, that minimum duty should not apply.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 169**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 23 a (new)**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

###### *Amendment*

**(23 a) Safeguards are essential mechanisms to reduce beneficiary**

*countries' dependency on a few products, to focus preferences on less competitive products and to stimulate economic growth. The scheme should reinforce the Union's financial and economic interests by providing effective and enforceable safeguards to sensitive products which should at the same time improve the diversification of their economies and the implementation of social and environmental rights in beneficiary countries.*

Or. en

**Amendment 170**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 23 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(23 a) Safeguards are essential mechanisms to reduce beneficiary countries' dependency on a few products, to focus preferences on less competitive products and to stimulate economic growth and SMEs. The scheme should reinforce the Union's financial and economic interests by providing effective and enforceable safeguards to sensitive products which should at the same time improve the implementation of social and environmental rights in beneficiary countries.*

Or. en

**Amendment 171**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 23 a (new)**

***(23 a) Safeguards are essential mechanisms to reduce beneficiary countries' dependency on a few products, to focus preferences on less competitive products and to stimulate economic growth. The scheme should reinforce the Union's financial and economic interests by providing effective and enforceable safeguards to sensitive products which should at the same time improve the implementation of social and environmental rights in beneficiary countries***

Or. en

## **Amendment 172**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 24**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile

*Amendment*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile

rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ

rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base. ***To prevent the misuse of this clause and ensure a diversified economy, the Commission reserves the right to withdraw this exception from those GSP+ countries whose economy depends from a limited number of products, that in this case could be subject to product graduation according to the criteria set up under the standard GSP arrangement.***

The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ

L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893).

L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893).

Or. en

**Amendment 173**  
**Morten Løkkegaard**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 24**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance

*Amendment*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance

with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question. ***Any formal requirements and administrative burdens associated with applying for extended access to regional cumulation should be set proportionately low, to avoid discouraging GSP beneficiaries from investing in regional supply chains.***

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893).

laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558–893).

Or. en

### *Justification*

*Better terms for regional cumulation should be encouraged (as outlined under recital 24 and in article 33 (3)), as it will further enable GSP countries to develop their supply chains and become better integrated with the global economy. Thus, it is important that provisions on cumulation does not afford disproportionate requirements for GSP countries to cumulate their products with regional partners, as this would merely discourage investing into developing more advanced regional supply chains. The current wording asks GSP beneficiaries for "sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs". While it is not quite clear what this entails, the Commission should be encouraged to lower administrative burdens, and formal requirements, to an absolute minimum, to foster the best grounds for GSP partners to cumulate freely.*

## **Amendment 174**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 24**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile

#### *Amendment*

(24) Product graduation should be based on criteria related to sections and chapters of the Common Customs Tariff. Product graduation should apply in respect of a section or sub-section in order to reduce cases where heterogeneous products are graduated. The graduation of a section or a sub-section (made up of chapters) for a beneficiary country should be applied when the section meets the criteria for graduation over three consecutive years, in order to increase predictability and fairness of graduation by eliminating the effect of large and exceptional variations in the import statistics. Product graduation should not apply to the beneficiary countries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+) and the beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (EBA) as they share a very similar economic profile

rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the

rendering them vulnerable because of a low, non-diversified export base.- The tariff preferences provided for in this Regulation apply to products originating in the beneficiary countries in accordance with the rules of origin laid down in the Union Customs Code and the legal acts adopted in accordance with the powers conferred by that Code, in particular Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446<sup>19</sup> . and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447<sup>20</sup> . Regional cumulation between countries of different regional groups and extended cumulation should be granted provided that the applicant beneficiary country brings sufficient evidence that cumulation responds to its development, financing and trade needs, thus leading, amongst others, to economic growth, elimination of poverty, diversification of exports and industrialisation, and provided that it does not impact negatively on the situation of other countries, especially EBA beneficiary countries. **Moreover, regional cumulation should support regional integration.** When assessing whether granting cumulation responds to the requesting country's development, financing and trade needs, the Commission should take into account the beneficiary country's dependency on the supplying country and future perspectives with regard to the products in question.

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<sup>19</sup> Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards detailed rules concerning certain provisions of the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 1).

<sup>20</sup> Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the



**Amendment 175**  
**Saskia Bricmont**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 25**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of

*Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of

goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI. ***Child labour cannot be eradicated overnight, especially in countries where no alternatives such as decent working conditions, free schooling and a social safety net are available. However, favourable framework conditions should progressively be created to sustain a positive dynamic. The International Labour Organisation and the Commission can support the beneficiary countries towards this goal by means of technical assistance, capacity building and other financial aid.***

Or. en

**Amendment 176**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 25**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements

*Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements

imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. ***The temporary withdrawal could have long term consequences for GSP economies as well as Union businesses investing in these countries. It could have severe impacts on workers and the most vulnerable and those suffering of violations. The temporary withdrawal should be used as a last resort provided all other avenues have been explored; it should follow alerts, cooperation and assistance to allow for engagement to effectively address these failings.*** In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 177**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 25**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including

###### *Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including

certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. ***The temporary withdrawal could have long term consequences for GSP economies as well as Union businesses investing in these countries. It could have severe impacts on workers and the most vulnerable and those suffering of violations. The temporary withdrawal should be used as a last resort provided all other avenues have been explored; it should follow alerts, cooperation and assistance to allow for engagement to effectively address these failings.*** In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

## Amendment 178

**Proposal for a regulation  
Recital 25**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

*Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. ***Furthermore, temporary withdrawal should be made possible in case of severe and systemic breach of the obligation of the beneficiary country towards not respecting the Members States' interests and not complying with international trade obligations and creating some retaliatory or discriminatory measures.*** Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include

exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

**Amendment 179**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 25**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child

*Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child

labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI, *in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions.*

Or. en

### *Justification*

*The emerging security threats online and in the sea would require the utilisation of all available instruments, in order to tackle them effectively.*

## **Amendment 180** **Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

### **Proposal for a regulation** **Recital 25**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to

#### *Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to

comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison **labour**, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or **to maintain the effective implementation of the plan of action provided in its request to benefit from the arrangement;** or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child **and forced** labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child **and forced** labour, as well as forced labour including **involuntariness**, slavery, **under threats** and prison **labours**, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

## **Amendment 181** **Emmanouil Fragkos**

### **Proposal for a regulation** **Recital 25**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for

#### *Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include **violation of the UN Security Council Resolutions**, serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences



sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

## **Amendment 182** **Emmanouil Fragkos**

### **Proposal for a regulation** **Recital 25**

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good

#### *Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions), labour rights, climate and environmental protection ***and maritime***

governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

**legislation**, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

**Amendment 183**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 25**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including **certain principles of** international

*Amendment*

(25) The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including international humanitarian law, **women**

humanitarian law *enshrined in those conventions*), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

*and minorities' rights*), labour rights, climate and environmental protection, and good governance, so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions, or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the Union's monitoring procedures as set out in this Regulation. The temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. In situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations, the Commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. Under the Union's zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour, as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour, as identified in the relevant Conventions in Annex VI.

Or. en

**Amendment 184**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 25 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(25 a) Temporary withdrawal of the arrangements should be considered as a last-resort measure. Whenever the record of compliance with the relevant obligations set out in this Regulation***

*seriously deteriorates, the Commission and the EEAS should step up dialogue with the beneficiary countries and launch a process of enhanced engagement where countries commit to actions through the implementation of targeted roadmaps leading to discernible progress generally in the short term or, whenever issues are more complex and sensitive, over the medium term. After the launch and during the overall duration of the withdrawal procedure, beneficiary countries should be given the possibility to start engaging anytime. Whenever the enhanced engagement is extended into a second year, the Commission should add the country onto a public list, with a view to providing predictability and maximising leverage.*

Or. en

**Amendment 185**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 25 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(25 a) Trade defense instruments are becoming increasingly important and should be enforced as soon as imports harm Union producers. Thereunder, the latter instruments should be used to manage situations where unfair trade practices take place in the form of price dumping or public subsidies, not WTO compliant. As trade within agri-food products is increasingly concentrated on processed products, the activation of trade defense instruments is progressively becoming more complex, as evidenced by the evolution of imports of semi-finished or processed rice from Cambodia. For this purpose, a certain establishment of the origin of the raw material used in the*

*transformation of the product should be ensured.*

Or. en

**Amendment 186**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 25 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(25 a) The Commission should initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal when it considers that there are sufficient reasons to believe that a beneficiary country is in breach of its obligations under the current regulation. In determining whether such reasons exist, it should take into consideration all relevant and credible information emanating from, inter alia, the relevant monitoring bodies, civil society organisations, stakeholders and Union institutions. The Commission should initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal when it is requested to do so by the European Parliament in its annual report on the implementation of the generalised scheme of tariff preferences.*

Or. en

**Amendment 187**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 26**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the*

*deleted*

*countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 188**

**Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 26**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) ***Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect,*** it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-

*Amendment*

(26) ***Related to*** migration, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 189**

**Tomas Tobé, Jörgen Warborn, Lena Düpont, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Karlo Ressler, Jeroen Lenaers, Gabriel Mato, Danuta Maria Hübner, Tom Vandenkendelaere, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Liudas Mažylis**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 26**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to **both** the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for **both** origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

###### *Amendment*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin, **transit** and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development **and economic growth** needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to the origin, **transit** and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for origin, **transit** and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 190**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 26**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

*Amendment*

(26) Orderly, ***safe, regular and responsible*** international migration ***and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies, as the Sustainable Development Goals target 10.7 establishes***, can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs . Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies, ***as it has been adopted by several European Council Conclusions, in particular the ones adopted on 16th December 2021***, is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

Or. en

**Amendment 191**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 26**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development

*Amendment*

(26) Orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development



needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity.

needs. Increasing coherence between trade, development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. In this respect, it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges, such as, stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin, in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin, with the ensuing long-term consequences on development, and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. ***Tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be reviewed if the country of origin does not cooperate in a satisfactory manner on the readmission of its own nationals. If the review deems it necessary, these tariff preferences could be temporarily withdrawn until the country of origin cooperates in a satisfactory manner on the readmission of its own nationals.***

Or. en

## **Amendment 192**

**Tomas Tobé, Jörgen Warborn, Lena Düpont, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Karlo Ressler, Jeroen Lenaers, Gabriel Mato, Danuta Maria Hübner, Tom Vandenkendelaere, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Liudas Mažylis**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Recital 26 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(26 a) The Union should favour a constructive engagement on all aspects of migration, forced displacement and mobility, working to ensure that migration takes place in a safe and well-regulated manner. It is essential to further step up cooperation on migration with partner countries, built on the more for more***

*principle and using the full application of the NDICI-Global Europe instrument.*

Or. en

### **Amendment 193**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. In particular, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.**

**deleted**

Or. en

### **Amendment 194**

**Tomas Tobé, Jörgen Warborn, Lena Düpont, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Karlo Ressler, Jeroen Lenaers, Gabriel Mato, Tom Vandenkendelaere, Angelika Winzig, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Liudas Mažylis**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 27**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. *In particular*, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral**

**(27) Return, readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the Union and its partners. *According to the Court of Auditors less than 1 in 5 actually return to their own countries outside of Europe.<sup>1a</sup> The effective return***

international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries.

***of third country nationals who do not have the right to stay is an essential component of a well-functioning Common European Asylum System and for the Schengen Agreement. This requires the Union to cooperate closer with countries of origin and transit to ensure return. In this regard, every State has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law, and multilateral international conventions such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944. Improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries. Shortcomings in third countries related to the readmission of its own nationals need to be prevented to ensure the effective and dignified return of third country nationals who do not have the right to stay in Union.***

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***<sup>1a</sup> European Court of Auditors Special Report 17/2021, [https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21\\_17/SR\\_Readmission-cooperation\\_EN.pdf](https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_17/SR_Readmission-cooperation_EN.pdf)***

Or. en

**Amendment 195**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Recital 31**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(31) The advisory procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts on suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections in respect of beneficiary countries and on the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, taking into account the nature and impact

*Amendment*

(31) The advisory procedure should be used for the adoption of implementing acts on suspension from the tariff preferences of certain GSP sections in respect of beneficiary countries and on the initiation of a temporary withdrawal procedure, taking into account the nature and impact

of those acts.

of those acts. *Finally, the advisory procedure should end with the publication of a list of sustainability certification schemes that recognise products as 'sustainable'.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 196**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 35**

###### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(35) The Commission should also adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to safeguard investigations, imperative grounds of urgency relating to the deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of Union producers which would be difficult to repair so require.

###### *Amendment*

(35) The Commission should also adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases relating to safeguard investigations, imperative grounds of urgency relating to the deterioration of the economic and/or financial situation of Union producers which would be difficult to repair so require. *Safeguards should be promptly activated if there were to exist a substantial negative impact on the Union agri-food production sector. Any delay or hesitation in the application of safeguard measures in the agri-food sector could lead to irreversible economic damage for Union farmers and the agri-food industry overall, with consequent loss of jobs and damage to the local, national and European socio-economic framework.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 197**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Recital 36**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January **2030**, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the development, trade and financial needs of beneficiaries as well as on bilateral trade and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals.

*Amendment*

(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January **2029**, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the development, trade and financial needs of beneficiaries as well as on bilateral trade and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals.

Or. en

**Amendment 198**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Recital 36**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January 2030, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the development, trade **and** financial needs of beneficiaries as well as on bilateral trade and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals.

*Amendment*

(36) The Commission should report regularly to the European Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the scheme under this Regulation through the relevant institutional committees. By 1 January 2030, the Commission should report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the mid-term application of this Regulation and assess the need to review the scheme. The report is necessary to analyse the impact of the scheme on the ***economic diversification and modernisation, democratic reforms, poverty eradication, gender equality, but especially sustainable*** development, trade, financial needs of beneficiaries, as well as on bilateral trade and on the Union's tariff income, with particular attention to the sustainable development goals. ***The***

*Parliament should make its own report.*

Or. en

**Amendment 199**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(9 a) ‘sensitive products’ means goods whose excessively-high utilisation rate by standard GSP beneficiary countries referred to in Article 1(2) could negatively impact the market for basic primary and processed goods and affect the ability and capacity of Union industries to manufacture or process them in the medium and long-run; processed agri-food products, such as rice and sugar, considered for the purposes of this definition are products obtained with basic raw materials whose origin or place of origin is in one of the Member States;*

Or. en

**Amendment 200**  
**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(9 a) "sensitive products" means goods whose excessive utilisation rate by standard GSP beneficiary countries could have a negative impact on the market for basic or processed goods and other European commodities, in the medium and long term. In this regard and for the purposes of this definition, processed*

*agri-food products - such as rice and sugar - are products obtained with basic raw materials whose origin or place of origin is ascertained in a Member State.*

Or. en

**Amendment 201**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(9 a) ‘sensitive products’ means goods whose utilisation rate by standard GSP beneficiary countries could negatively impact the Union industry and primary sector;*

Or. en

**Amendment 202**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(9 b) For the purpose of this Regulation, agricultural and agri-food products are considered sustainable when they are certified in accordance with voluntary sustainability certification schemes recognized by the European Commission on the basis of pre-established sustainability criteria and minimum requirements. The latter should be based, inter alia, in consistency with the ambitious objectives of the European Green deal and the "Farm2Fork" strategy, as well as with internationally*

*recognized standards such as relevant international conventions listed in Annex VI, adequate standards of human rights, environmental sustainability, economic equality and decent income. Criteria is also to include reliability, transparency, traceability, independent and accredited audit and adequate appeal procedures.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 203**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(10 a) ‘plan of action’ means a forward looking and priority-oriented list of measures, including legislative ones, to be adopted and actions to be taken by a beneficiary country which are considered necessary to effectively implement the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI, including a timeframe for each listed measure and action and identifying as precisely as possible the relevant institution or structure responsible for its implementation and oversight;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 204**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(10 a) ‘plan of action’ means a forward*



*looking and priority-oriented list of measures, including legislative ones, to be adopted and actions to be taken by a beneficiary country which are considered necessary to effectively implement the core international conventions referred to in Annex VI, including a roadmap for its implementation and oversight;*

Or. en

**Amendment 205**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(10 b) ‘list of issues’ means a list of the salient issues in relation to attaining effective implementation of the international conventions relevant to the GSP+ arrangement, as identified by the monitoring bodies or based on any accurate and reliable sources of information, including as provided by relevant stakeholders and civil society organisations, and based on the conclusions outlined in the report referred to in Article 14 and relative to the preceding monitoring cycle;*

Or. en

**Amendment 206**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(10 b) ‘tariff suspension schedule’ means*

*the schedule included in the plan of action and according to which the tariff preferences are granted, following the benchmarks and timeframe agreed in the plan of action;*

Or. en

**Amendment 207**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 10 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(10 c) ‘list of issues’ means a list of the salient issues in relation to attaining effective implementation of the international conventions relevant to the GSP+ arrangement, as identified by the monitoring bodies or based on any accurate and reliable sources of information, including as provided by relevant stakeholders and civil society organisations, and based on the conclusions outlined in the report referred to in Article 14 and relative to the preceding monitoring cycle;*

Or. en

**Amendment 208**

**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, thus ensuring fulfilment of

(11) ‘effective implementation’ means the integral implementation of the undertakings and obligations undertaken under the international conventions listed in Annex VI, *in particular the United*

the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country's entire territory;

*Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions*, thus ensuring fulfilment of the principles, objectives and rights guaranteed in these conventions in the beneficiary country's entire territory;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 209**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 11 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(11 a) 'serious and systematic violation' means widespread and systematic violations or abuses, including but not limited to the following:*

- i. genocide;*
- ii. crimes against humanity;*
- iii. torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;*
- iv. slavery or forced labour;*
- v. extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings;*
- vi. enforced disappearance of persons;*
- vii. arbitrary arrests or detentions;*
- viii. trafficking in human beings, including people-smuggling;*
- ix. sexual and gender-based violence;*
- x. other violations of the laws and customs of war;*
- xi. violations or abuses of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association;*
- xii. violations or abuses of freedom of*

*opinion and expression;*  
*xiii. violations or abuses of freedom of religion or belief;*  
*xiv. failure to communicate nationally determined contributions in the framework of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, with the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding;*

Or. en

**Amendment 210**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point.

*Amendment*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint, *either public or anonymous*, submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point *by citizens, civil society stakeholders, or for-profit organisations from the Union or from the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to in Article 1 paragraph 2 and relating to conditions and reasons referred to in Articles 9 and 19;*

Or. en

**Amendment 211**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point.

*Amendment*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted, *also anonymously*, to the Commission through the Single Entry

*Point by citizens, entities, trade unions, stakeholders or civil society from the Union or the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to in Article 1 paragraph 2 and relating to conditions and reasons referred to in Articles 9 and 19;*

Or. en

**Amendment 212**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point.

*Amendment*

(12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the Commission through the Single Entry Point *relating to conditions and reasons referred to in Articles 9 and 19.*

Or. en

**Amendment 213**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 12 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(12 a) 'directly competing products' means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product;*

Or. en

**Amendment 214**

**Morten Løkkegaard, Jordi Cañas**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Article 3 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

#### *Article 3 a*

*The Commission shall make information available on any changes made to the status of GSP beneficiaries by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union, and by notifying relevant Member State authorities, whenever a GSP beneficiary is brought under investigation for violating its GSP commitments, and, ultimately, if the GSP country in question has its GSP benefits withdrawn as a last-resort measure.*

Or. en

#### *Justification*

*Following the Commission's proposal to speed up the process of withdrawing preferences from countries in non-compliance with their GSP commitments, the EU should establish a proper warning system so that companies in GSP countries, as well as European companies, are informed well in advance of any changes that might impact their supply chain – e.g., withdrawal of tariff preferences provided to a GSP partner country. To this, the EU's anti-dumping platform should serve as inspiration for a well-functioning warning system.*

#### **Amendment 215**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

## Proposal for a regulation

### Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(b a) it has not ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') or the Commission has identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions.*

**Amendment 216**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) there is sufficient ground to consider that serious and systematic infringement and violations of the conditions set out in Article 19.1 points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) exist.***

Or. en

**Amendment 217**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) the beneficiary countries show an honest and sincere will to reform their political system to more democratic procedures;***

Or. en

**Amendment 218**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission shall prioritise those beneficiary countries that show an honest and sincere will to reform their***

*political system to more democratic procedures, who take visible steps towards economic diversification and sustainable development, and that take measure to improve gender equality. This provision shall not exclude all those beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to in Article 1 paragraph 2 and relating to conditions and reasons referred to in Articles 9 and 19.*

Or. en

**Amendment 219**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 a. Countries that benefit from the standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI, and adopt a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, within five years upon the application of the preferences.*

Or. en

**Amendment 220**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 a. Countries that benefit from the*



*standard arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall ratify the conventions listed in Annex VI, and adopt a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, within five years upon the application of the preferences.*

Or. en

**Amendment 221**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 b. Union development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation(EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council in support of countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall prioritise ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI and the adoption of a National Action Plan as referred to in paragraph 1a.*

Or. en

**Amendment 222**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 1 b (new)**

**1 b.** *Union development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council in support of countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 shall prioritise ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI and the adoption of a National Action Plan as referred to in paragraph 1a.*

Or. en

**Amendment 223**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 4 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Points (a) **and (b) of paragraph 1** shall **not** apply to least-developed countries, as identified by the United Nations.

*Amendment*

2. Points (a), **(b) and (c) of paragraphs 1 and 2** shall **also** apply to least-developed countries, as identified by the United Nations.

Or. en

**Amendment 224**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 5 – paragraph 2 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. By 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this Regulation the Commission shall review Annex I. To provide a standard GSP

*Amendment*

2. **With regard to the economic criteria referred to in Article 4 paragraph 1 (a) and (b)**, by 1 January of each year following the entry into force of this

beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change of the country's status under the scheme:

Regulation the Commission shall review Annex I. To provide a standard GSP beneficiary country and economic operators with time for orderly adaptation to the change of the country's status under the scheme:

Or. en

## **Amendment 225**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 5 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

#### *Article 5 a*

- 1. The Commission shall monitor, in cooperation with stakeholders and civil society, the development and export potential of Standard GSP beneficiary countries that could reach the upper middle-income status and the economic impact of imports in the Union industry, particularly on competitive products.*
- 2. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the aspects referred to in paragraph 1 and provide clear recommendations on actions to improve export diversification and ensure that tariff preferences are withdrawn from competitive products.*

Or. en

## **Amendment 226**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

***1 a. Products shall be considered sustainable when they are certified in accordance with recognised voluntary sustainability certification schemes. A voluntary sustainability certification scheme shall be recognised by the Commission for the purposes of this Regulation based on established sustainability criteria and minimum requirements based, inter alia, on coherence with internationally recognised standards such as the relevant international conventions listed in Annex VI, adequate standards of human rights, environmental sustainability, economic equality and living income, the specificity of local and traditional productions; reliability, transparency, traceability, independent and accredited auditing and appropriate appeal procedures shall also feature among the criteria.***

Or. en

**Amendment 227**

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 6 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

***1 a. Exporters of certified sustainable products shall, upon request, be granted a “sustainability certificate”, proving the eligibility of their goods for preferential market access.***

Or. en

**Amendment 228**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 6 – paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**1 b. The Commission shall adopt a delegated act establishing, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), a list of sustainability certification schemes that are relevant for the purpose of recognising products as sustainable.**

Or. en

**Amendment 229**

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 6 – paragraph 1 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**1 b. The Commission shall also, as appropriate, periodically verify that recognised voluntary sustainability certification schemes continue to fulfil the criteria that led to their recognition in accordance with paragraph 1a.**

Or. en

**Amendment 230**

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 6 – paragraph 1 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**1 c. The operator of a voluntary sustainability certification scheme for which the recognition was granted in**

*accordance with paragraph 1a shall inform the Commission without delay of any changes or updates made to that scheme.*

Or. en

**Amendment 231**

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 6 – paragraph 1 d (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 d. If there is evidence of repeated or significant cases where economic operators implementing a scheme recognised in accordance with paragraph 1a have failed to fulfil the requirements of this Regulation, the Commission shall examine, in consultation with the operator of the recognised scheme, whether those cases indicate deficiencies in the scheme.*

Or. en

**Amendment 232**

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 6 – paragraph 1 e (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 e. The Commission shall establish and keep up-to-date a register of recognised voluntary sustainability certification schemes. That register shall be made publicly available on the internet.*

Or. en

## Amendment 233

**Bernd Lange, Helmut Scholz, Saskia Bricmont, Joachim Schuster, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Kathleen Van Brempt**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 6 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

#### *Article 6 a*

*Where the Commission identifies deficiencies in a recognised voluntary sustainability certification scheme, it may grant the scheme operator an appropriate period of time to take remedial action.*

Or. en

## Amendment 234

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

1. The tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 shall be suspended, in respect of products of a GSP section originating in a standard GSP beneficiary country, when the average value of Union imports of such products over three consecutive years from that standard GSP beneficiary country exceeds the thresholds listed in Annex IV. The thresholds shall be calculated as a percentage of the total value of Union imports of the same products from all GSP beneficiary countries.

1. The tariff preferences referred to in Article 7 shall be suspended, in respect of products of a GSP section originating in a standard GSP beneficiary country, when the average value of Union imports of such products over three consecutive years from that standard GSP beneficiary country exceeds the thresholds listed in Annex IV. The thresholds shall be calculated as a percentage of the total value of Union imports of the same products from all GSP beneficiary countries. ***Additionally, such a threshold shall be applied to a specific Taric code, or to a restricted number of Taric codes.***

Or. en

## Amendment 235

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 3

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

*Amendment*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act ***in the year preceding the review year***, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

Or. en

## Amendment 236

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 3

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

*Amendment*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act ***in the year preceding the review year***, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

Or. en



## Amendment 237

Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 3

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

##### *Amendment*

3. The Commission shall, every three years, review the list referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and adopt an implementing act ***in the year preceding the review year***, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), in order to suspend or to re-establish the tariff preferences referred to in Article 7. That implementing act shall apply as of 1 January of the year following its entry in force.

Or. en

## Amendment 238

Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 4

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year ***in which the review is conducted and of the two years*** preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

##### *Amendment*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

Or. en

## Amendment 239

Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 4

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year ***in which the review is conducted and of the two years*** preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

*Amendment*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

Or. en

## Amendment 240

Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 8 – paragraph 4

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year ***in which the review is conducted and of the two years*** preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff

*Amendment*

4. The list referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall be established on the basis of the data available on 1 September of the year preceding the review year. It shall take into account imports from GSP beneficiary countries listed in Annex I as applicable at that time. However, the value of imports from GSP beneficiary countries, which upon the date of application of the suspension no longer benefit from the tariff preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken

preferences under Article 4(1), point (b), shall not be taken into account.

into account.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 241**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 8 – paragraph 6 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**6 a. The Commission shall reach a common understanding with beneficiary countries under the Standard GSP on a roadmap which includes the progressive fulfilment of time-bound milestones that facilitates and creates the economic, social and environmental conditions and infrastructure for the insertion and application of reciprocal environmental and health production standards.**

Or. en

#### **Amendment 242**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(a a) it has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;**

Or. en

**Amendment 243**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the 'relevant conventions') and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

*Amendment*

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI, ***in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the 'relevant conventions') and the United Nations Security Council Decisions***, and the Commission has not identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

Or. en

**Amendment 244**  
**Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jordi Cañas, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

***(b a) it has taken a clear commitment and has adopted a roadmap with concrete steps in time and in law towards the ratification and effective implementation of the convention as set in Annex VI, subheading 1a, and the Commission has identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring body under this convention, a clear commitment and a concrete roadmap to effectively implement this convention;***

Or. en

**Amendment 245**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) it has adopted a National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights;***

Or. en

**Amendment 246**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action ***for the effective implementation of*** the relevant conventions;

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action ***and a roadmap of measures that are necessary to effectively implement*** the relevant conventions; ***the beneficiary country and the Commission shall reach a common understanding on the plan of action and relevant roadmap , which shall thereafter be made public;***

Or. en

**Amendment 247**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

## Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the *relevant* conventions;

*Amendment*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the conventions ***referred to in Annex VI; the beneficiary country and the Commission shall reach a common understanding on the plan of action, which shall be time-bound and thereafter be made public;***

Or. en

### Amendment 248

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

#### Proposal for a regulation

## Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point d

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

*Amendment*

(d) it ***cooperates in a satisfactory manner with the Union and its Member States on the readmission of its own nationals and*** gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions;

Or. en

### Amendment 249

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### Proposal for a regulation

## Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point e

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(e) it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by any of the relevant conventions and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions;

*Amendment*

(e) it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by any of the relevant conventions and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review, **by monitoring bodies such as the Commission and the Parliament**, of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions;

Or. en

**Amendment 250**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a The plan of action referred to in paragraph 1 point d) shall:***

***(a) include a timetable of measures that are necessary to effectively implement the relevant conventions;***

***(b) include a tariff suspension schedule, based on the benchmarks against which the progress in the implementation of the relevant conventions is assessed;***

***(c) be jointly agreed between the Commission and the applicant country for a period of two years;***

***(d) serve as a basis for the report referred to in Article 14;***

***(e) be made publicly available.***

Or. en

**Amendment 251**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

*Amendment*

(b) the Commission considers, based on examination of the request, ***including but not limited to the plan of action***, that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9.

Or. en

**Amendment 252**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 12 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended.

*Amendment*

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex III and Annex VII, which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country, shall be suspended ***according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in Article 9(1a) point b***.

Or. en

**Amendment 253**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 12 – paragraph 2**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended ***entirely***, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For

*Amendment*

2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended ***according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in Article 9(1a) point b***, except for products



products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.

for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.

Or. en

## **Amendment 254**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 13 – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

##### *Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall ***assess in a transparent manner and based on objective criteria the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action, and*** examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, ***as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions, other relevant stakeholders and any complaints received. A cycle of three years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established.***

Or. en

## Amendment 255

Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 13 – paragraph 1

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

##### *Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall ***assess in a transparent manner and based on objective criteria the progress made by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action, and*** examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, ***as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens, private sector actors, civil society organisations, representatives of trade unions, other relevant stakeholders and any complaints received. A cycle of two years for the review, monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established.***

Or. en

## Amendment 256

Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 13 – paragraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

*Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. ***The Parliament shall issue an annual report on the GSP.***

Or. en

**Amendment 257**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 13 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

*Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under ***constant*** review and monitor ***in an open and transparent manner*** the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant

monitoring bodies.

Or. en

**Amendment 258**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 13 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

*Amendment*

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall, with regard to each of the GSP+ beneficiary countries, keep under **constant** review and monitor **in an open and transparent way** the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation, as well as the cooperation of the GSP+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing so, the Commission shall examine all relevant information, in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies.

Or. en

**Amendment 259**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 13 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission, together with the External Action Service, and the Parliament shall send missions to the ground to assess, in a transparent and accountable manner, the implementation of the plans set up by the scheme in the***

*beneficiary country. The Delegations of the Union in beneficiary countries shall assist these missions as well as the overall implementation of this Regulation.*

Or. en

**Amendment 260**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*2 a. The Commission, where applicable jointly with the EEAS, shall carry out at least one high-level monitoring mission per monitoring cycle to the beneficiary countries in order to assess progress on the ground, including in line with the plans of action. In the framework of the mission, relevant stakeholders in the beneficiary countries shall be duly consulted. The Commission shall keep the European Parliament and the Council informed of the preparation and outcome of the missions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 261**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*2 a. The Commission shall monitor, in cooperation with stakeholders and civil society, the development and export potential of beneficiary countries that could reach the upper middle-income status in the near future and the economic*

*impact of imports under the GSP+ in the Union industry, particularly on competitive products.*

Or. en

**Amendment 262**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a. At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a list of issues to all GSP+ beneficiary countries outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available.**

Or. en

**Amendment 263**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a. The Commission shall support the necessary capacity-building measures and provide specific technical assistance, expertise and advice in order to help beneficiary countries to comply with international commitments.**

Or. en

**Amendment 264**

**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 13 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a. The Commission shall support the necessary capacity-building measures and provide specific technical assistance, expertise and advice in order to help beneficiary countries to comply with international commitments.**

Or. en

**Amendment 265**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 b. At the end of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall assess which benchmarks have been met by the GSP+ beneficiary country with regard to the implementation of the relevant conventions. Where relevant and based on the tariff suspension schedule, it shall adopt an implementing act establishing, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), on which products tariff duties shall be suspended.**

Or. en

**Amendment 266**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 13 – paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 b.** *At the beginning of each monitoring cycle, the Commission shall send a list of issues to all GSP+ beneficiary countries outlining implementation issues that need to be addressed during the cycle. The lists of issues shall be made publicly available.*

Or. en

**Amendment 267**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 – paragraph 2 c (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 c.** *The plans of action and the Commission and European External Action Service's recommendations on priority implementation actions shall be taken into account in the EU development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council in order to support GSP+ beneficiary countries in attaining their commitments.*

Or. en

**Amendment 268**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 13 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*



*Article 13 a*

*The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of representatives of the Union's stakeholders. The Commission shall consult the advisory body with regard to the plans of action submitted by the GSP+ beneficiary countries in view of their application to the GSP+ scheme; for that purpose, the participation to the advisory body shall be extended to stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. The Commission shall also consult with and report to the advisory body when assessing the implementation of the plans of action during each monitoring cycle and more generally throughout the cycle as regularly as necessary, including ahead of and after monitoring missions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 269**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 13 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*Article 13 a*

*The Commission shall be assisted in reviewing, monitoring and assessing the binding undertakings referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f) by an advisory body composed of representatives of the Union's stakeholders. The Commission shall consult the advisory body with regard to the plans of action submitted by the GSP beneficiary countries in view of their application to the GSP+ scheme; for that purpose, the participation to the advisory body shall be*

*extended to stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. The Commission shall also consult with and report to the advisory body when assessing the implementation of the plans of action during each monitoring cycle and more generally throughout the cycle as regularly as necessary, including ahead of and after monitoring missions.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 270**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. By 1 January **2027**, and every **three** years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions **and** the status of the effective implementation thereof.

##### *Amendment*

1. By 1 January **2026**, and every **two** years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions, the status of the effective implementation thereof, **and a list of products on which tariffs are suspended.**

Or. en

#### **Amendment 271**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall

##### *Amendment*

1. By 1 January 2027, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall

present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

present to the European Parliament and to the Council, ***in the most transparent way***, a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 272**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) the development and export potential of beneficiary countries that could reach the upper middle-income status in the near future and the economic impact of imports under GSP+ in the Union industry, particularly on competitive products, and provide clear recommendations on actions to improve export diversification and ensure that tariff preferences are withdrawn from competitive products;***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 273**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 2 – point b – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with

(b) the Commission's and where appropriate the European External Action Service's conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with

reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;

reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof, ***including from civil society organisations and social partners from the Union and the beneficiary countries;***

Or. en

**Amendment 274**  
**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 14 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***2 a. The Parliament shall also make its own report, whose assessment and recommendations shall be taken into account by the Commission.***

Or. en

**Amendment 275**  
**Helmut Scholz**  
on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 14 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess ***the implementation of the plans of action, also based on*** the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties,

partners.

including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. *The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle, including on the provision of technical assistance and development support, as appropriate. In case of major shortcomings in implementing the plans of action, the report shall indicate which measures the country shall undertake in order to comply with the obligations under Article 9(d).*

Or. en

#### Amendment 276

Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius

#### Proposal for a regulation Article 14 – paragraph 3

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

##### *Amendment*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess *the implementation of the plans of action, also based on* the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners. *The Commission and, where applicable, the European External Action Service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle, including on the provision of technical assistance and development support, as appropriate. In*

*case of major shortcomings in implementing the plans of action, the report shall indicate which measures the country shall undertake in order to comply with the obligations under Article 9(d).*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 277**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

*Amendment*

3. In drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission and where appropriate the European External Action Service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by the European Parliament or the Council as well as third parties, including ***national and, where applicable, regional*** governments and international organisations, civil society, and social partners.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 278**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 14 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***3 a. The Commission shall set up special domestic advisory groups for GSP beneficiary countries, in order for them to assist the Commission in reviewing,***

*monitoring and assessing their progress in achieving the objectives set up by their respective scheme. Members of the Committee on International Trade of the Parliament shall be also present in these groups.*

Or. en

**Amendment 279**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jérémy Decerle**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 14 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*Article 14 a*

*The Commission shall reach a common understanding with beneficiary countries under the GSP+ on a roadmap which includes the progressive fulfilment of time-bound milestones that facilitates and creates the economic, social and environmental conditions and infrastructure for the insertion and application of reciprocal environmental and health production standards.*

Or. en

**Amendment 280**

**Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jordi Cañas, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 15 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred

to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

to in Article 9, points **(ba)**, (d), (e) and (f), **including in a case of serious and systematic violation of the adopted roadmap according to point (ba) with a lack of concrete actions in time and in law** or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

Or. en

### **Amendment 281**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

##### *Amendment*

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products, **including certain sectors or economic operators**, originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c).

Or. en

### **Amendment 282**

**Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Jordi Cañas, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 2**



*Text proposed by the Commission*

2. The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), and its situation as referred to in Article 9, point (c), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country.

*Amendment*

2. The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points **(ba)**, (d), (e) and (f), and its situation as referred to in Article 9, point (c), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country.

Or. en

**Amendment 283**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 15 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions *of* the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

*Amendment*

3. ***When requested by the European Parliament or, on its own initiative,*** where, either on the basis of the conclusions ***and of the GSP+ beneficiary country's follow up to recommendations and priority actions as provided by*** the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and ***(f), including with regard to the implementation of its plan of action,*** or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good

governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

*In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9 point (d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled a potentially serious failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions, based on indicators such as:*

- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;*
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts;*
- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;*
- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*
- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;*
- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance Conventions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 284**  
**Heidi Hautala**  
on behalf of the Greens/EFA Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 3**

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions **of** the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions **and of the GSP+ beneficiary country's follow up to recommendations and priority actions as provided by** the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), **including with regard to the implementation of its plan of action**, or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

***In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9 point (d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled a potentially serious failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions, based on indicators such as:***

***- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or the ILO Governing Body;***

***- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent***

*human rights experts;*  
*- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;*  
*- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*  
*- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;*  
*- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance Conventions.*

Or. en

*Justification*

*Addition of ILO commissions of inquiry in the first indent.*

**Amendment 285**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 15 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions *of* the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the

*Amendment*

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions *and of the GSP+ beneficiary country's follow up to recommendations and priority actions as provided by* the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, including evidence submitted through a complaint, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in Article 9, points (d), (e) and (f), *including with regard to the implementation of its plan of action*, or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention

procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

as established in Article 9, point (c), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. ***In its assessment of whether the GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings referred to in Article 9 point (d), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled a potentially serious failure to effectively implement the relevant conventions, based on indicators such as:***

- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;***
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts; - relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;***
- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;***
- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;***
- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance Conventions.***

Or. en

## Amendment 286

**Helmut Scholz**  
on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it considers that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.**

Or. en

**Amendment 287**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 15 – paragraph 4 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(a) state the grounds for the reasonable doubt referred to in paragraph 3 which may call into question the right of the GSP+ beneficiary country to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance;

(a) **where relevant**, state the grounds for the reasonable doubt referred to in paragraph 3 which may call into question the right of the GSP+ beneficiary country to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance;

Or. en

**Amendment 288**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

## Article 15 – paragraph 6

*Text proposed by the Commission*

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

*Amendment*

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies **and information provided by the Parliament, civil society organisations and social partners**. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

Or. en

### Amendment 289

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

### Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 8

*Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt **an implementing** act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

*Amendment*

8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt **a delegated** act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.

Or. en

### Amendment 290

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou**

### Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 9

*Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers

*Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers

that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). ***In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.***

that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b).

Or. en

#### **Amendment 291**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 9**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers ***that*** the findings ***justify*** temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers, ***based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, and after consulting the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a, that a*** temporary withdrawal ***is justified*** for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). ***The Commission shall publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated.*** In adopting



the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate ***and especially when considering a partial withdrawal***, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, ***including with regard to impacts on women's employment and empowerment, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary country's populations while maximising the leverage on its government.***

Or. en

## Amendment 292

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 9

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers ***that the findings justify*** temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when ***appropriate***, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

#### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers ***a*** temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when ***justified***, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, ***including with regard to impacts on women's employment and unemployment, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the GSP+ beneficiary countries population while maximizing the leverage on its government.***

Or. en

## Amendment 293

Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 15 – paragraph 9

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission **may, when appropriate**, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission **shall** consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

## Amendment 294

Emmanouil Fragkos

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 15 – paragraph 9

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission **may**, when

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission **shall**, when

appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 295**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 9**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers, ***in close cooperation with the Parliament and the Council***, that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 296**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 15 – paragraph 9**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered

##### *Amendment*

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered

to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in Article 1(2), point (b). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, when appropriate, consider the **human rights and** socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 297**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 10**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **six months** after its adoption.

##### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **one month** after its adoption.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 298**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 15 – paragraph 10 a (new)**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

##### *Amendment*

**10 a. A temporary withdrawal shall not mean that the Commission ends all dialogue with the beneficiary country. The Commission, together with the External Action Service, the Parliament and relevant civil society stakeholders or social partners involved, shall set up a**

*dialogue procedure with the government of the beneficiary country with the aim to re-establish the scheme as soon as the beneficiary country complies with the provisions set up in its scheme with the Union.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 299**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country.

*Amendment*

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country *and if it has not ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VI (the "relevant conventions") or the Commission has identified, based on available information, in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions, a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 300**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 17 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country.

1. An eligible country shall benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries referred to in Article 1(2), point (c), if that country is identified by the United Nations as a least-developed country ***and if the country is compliant with the conditions referred to in Article 19 paragraph 1.***

Or. en

### **Amendment 301**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

### **Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI and towards the adoption of National Action Plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights; EU development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI and the adoption of the National Action Plans.***

Or. en

**Amendment 302**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission and, where applicable the EEAS, shall make sure that countries that benefit from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI and towards the adoption of National Action Plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights; EU development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 shall prioritise support to countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 aiming to make progress towards the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI and the adoption of the National Action Plans.***

Or. en

**Amendment 303**

**Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 17 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The Commission, the External Action Service, and the Parliament shall***

*ensure that countries benefitting from the special arrangement referred to in paragraph 1 make continued and sustained progress towards ratifying the conventions listed in Annex VI and towards the adoption of National Action Plans for the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in conformity with the Guidance on National Action Plans of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, as well as with the ILO Conventions, especially Convention 29 on Forced Labour and 182 on Child Labour.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 304**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the *conditions* referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the *conditions* referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

##### *Amendment*

Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the *economic, environmental and social criteria* referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the *economic, environmental and social criteria* referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 305**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**



## Article 17 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

*Text proposed by the Commission*

Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

*Amendment*

Where an EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the ***economic, environment and social*** conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I in order to remove the country from the EBA arrangement following a transitional period of three years as from the date on which the EBA beneficiary country no longer fulfils the ***economic, environment and social*** conditions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Or. en

### Amendment 306

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 18 a (new)

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

#### ***Article 18 a***

***In the framework of a Cooperation, Partnership or Association Agreement that the Union has concluded with a beneficiary country, a general review of the status of the country in the framework of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) shall be conducted yearly. For that purpose, the Commission, and where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall review the issues pertaining to the conditions referred to in Article 19(1), including in relation to any complaints received by the Commission. The Commission, where relevant the European External Action Service, and the beneficiary country shall also review***

*the status of the ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 4(1a) and progress made towards ratification of the conventions listed in Annex VI as referred to in Article 17(1a).*

Or. en

### **Amendment 307**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

##### *Amendment*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products, ***including certain sectors or economic operators***, originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

### **Amendment 308**

**Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

##### *Amendment*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country ***as a last resort***, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

**Amendment 309**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

*Amendment*

1. The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products ***and/or sectors*** originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the following reasons:

Or. en

**Amendment 310**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;

*Amendment*

(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI, ***as long as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Security Council Decisions;***

Or. en

**Amendment 311**  
**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Paolo De Castro, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) serious and systematic violation of

*Amendment*

(a) serious and systematic violation of

principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;

principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI, ***or failure to abide by the obligation to ratify these conventions, as referred to in Article 4(1a);***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 312**

**Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in Annex VI;

(a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the ***core human and labour rights UN/ILO*** conventions listed in Annex VI;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 313**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) failure to ratify the conventions listed in Annex IV following the obligation to present a reasonable timetable for those ratifications,***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 314**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or ***related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals*** or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

Or. en

**Amendment 315**

**Tomas Tobé, Jörgen Warborn, Lena Düpont, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Karlo Ressler, Jeroen Lenaers, Gabriel Mato, Tom Vandenkendelaere, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Liudas Mažylis**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), ***or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country's own nationals*** or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;

Or. en

**Amendment 316**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or ***related to the obligation to readmit the***

(c) serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or serious failure to comply with international

*beneficiary country's own nationals or*  
serious failure to comply with international  
conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money  
laundering;

conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money  
laundering;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 317**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs  
controls on the export or transit of drugs  
(illicit substances or precursors), or *related  
to the obligation to readmit the  
beneficiary country's own nationals or*  
serious failure to comply with international  
conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money  
laundering;

##### *Amendment*

(c) serious shortcomings in customs  
controls on the export or transit of drugs  
(illicit substances or precursors), or serious  
failure to comply with international  
conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money  
laundering;

Or. en

#### **Amendment 318**

**Tomas Tobé, Jörgen Warborn, Lena Düpont, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Karlo Ressler, Jeroen Lenaers, Gabriel Mato, Tom Vandenkendelaere, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Liudas Mažylis**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

##### *Amendment*

*(c a) shortcomings related to the  
obligation to readmit the beneficiary  
country's own nationals;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 319**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices ***including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent WTO body;***

*Amendment*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices ***as established by WTO appeal mechanisms;***

Or. en

**Amendment 320**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the ***competent WTO body;***

*Amendment*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the ***Commission following a Trade Barrier investigation under Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular***

*those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. For the other unfair trading practices, including - but not limited to – breaches of intellectual property rights, trade distorting investment practices, trafficking and smuggling, breaches of competition rules and any other unfair trading practices that may hinder market access and the national treatment principle, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect under the conditions laid down in Paragraph3;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 321**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the *competent WTO body*;

##### *Amendment*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the *Commission following a trade Barrier investigation under Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the WTO. For the other unfair trading practices, including - but not limited to - breaches of intellectual property rights,*



*trade distorting investment practices, trafficking and smuggling, breaches of competition rules and any other unfair trading practices that may hinder market access and the national treatment principle, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect under the conditions laid down in Paragraph 3;*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 322**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the *competent WTO body*;

##### *Amendment*

(d) serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. For those unfair trading practices, which are prohibited or actionable under the WTO Agreements, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the *Commission following a Trade Barrier investigation under Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. For the other unfair trading practices, including - but not limited to - breaches of intellectual property rights, trade distorting investment practices, trafficking and smuggling, breaches of competition rules and any other unfair trading practices that may hinder market access*

*and the national treatment principle, the application of this Article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect under the conditions laid down in Paragraph 3;*

Or. en

**Amendment 323**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*For the purpose of applying point (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:*

*- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;*

*- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent human rights experts;*

*- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;*

*- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*

*- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;*

*- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance*

*Conventions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 324**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(e a) the temporary withdrawal shall be used as a last resort option when all other means to remedy serious violations fail;***

Or. en

**Amendment 325**  
**Heidi Hautala**  
on behalf of the Greens/EFA Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. For the purpose of applying paragraph 1 point (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:***

- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly or the ILO Governing Body;***
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN***

*independent human rights experts;*  
*- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;*  
*- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*  
*- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;*  
*- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance Conventions.*

Or. en

*Justification*

*Addition of ILO commissions of inquiry in the first indent.*

**Amendment 326**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*1 a. For the purpose of applying point (a), the Commission will in particular take into account whether the relevant monitoring bodies, treaty and supervisory mechanisms have signalled potentially serious and systematic violations of the principles of the relevant conventions, based on such indicators as:*

- the establishment of commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, country special rapporteurs, or other monitoring mechanisms by the UN Human Rights Council or General Assembly;*
- findings by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Special Procedures or other UN independent*

*human rights experts;*  
*- relevant procedures in the framework of the ILO Committee of Application of Standards, such as the introduction of a special paragraph;*  
*- rulings and opinions by international human rights courts;*  
*- reports by prominent local and international human rights groups;*  
*- relevant indicators for the effective implementation of Multilateral Environmental and good governance Conventions.*

Or. en

**Amendment 327**  
**Saskia Bricmont**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. Paragraph 1, point (b), does not apply with respect to child labour if:***  
***- the beneficiary country has adopted in consultation with the International Labour Organisation and the Commission a roadmap in order to decrease child labour. The roadmap will lay out measures to be taken to achieve verifiable and quantified objectives under a certain timeframe; and,***  
***- the monitoring report of the Commission in liaison with the ILO shows steady progress towards the agreed objectives.***

Or. en

**Amendment 328**  
**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. The temporary withdrawal shall be used as a last resort option when all other means to remedy serious violations fail;***

Or. en

**Amendment 329**  
**Helmut Scholz**  
on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***2 a. The Commission shall notify the beneficiary country when in particular the seriousness of the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so requires, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on substantiated concerns expressed by the European Parliament, the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint.***

***Starting from the date of the notification and for the duration of one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, whereby the beneficiary country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the serious violations identified. EU development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the***

*Council shall support beneficiary countries in implementing the roadmaps.*

*The Commission shall regularly consult with the European Parliament and the Council during the enhanced engagement process. The Commission shall also consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.*

Or. en

### **Amendment 330**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*2 a. The Commission may notify the beneficiary country when in particular the seriousness of the violations of principles of the international conventions listed in Annex VI so requires, based on available assessments, comments, decisions, recommendations and the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies, or based on substantiated concerns expressed by the Council, international organisations, and civil society including trade unions, or acting upon a complaint. It shall do so when requested by the European Parliament.*

*Starting from the date of the notification and for the duration of one year, the beneficiary country and the Commission shall enter into an enhanced engagement, whereby the beneficiary country commits to adopt time-bound roadmaps providing for concrete actions and sustainable solutions to the serious violations identified. EU development finance programming under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947*

*of the European Parliament and of the Council may support beneficiary countries in implementing the roadmaps.*

*The Commission shall regularly consult with the European Parliament and the Council during the enhanced engagement process. The Commission shall also consult with the advisory body referred to in Article 13a.*

Or. en

**Amendment 331**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 2 b (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*2 b. If considered necessary, the enhanced engagement may be prolonged by another year. The Commission shall publish a list of countries with which enhanced engagement has been prolonged beyond one year and shall regularly update the list as necessary. The roadmaps referred to in paragraph 2a shall be made public.*

Or. en

**Amendment 332**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

3. *Where the Commission*, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there *are* sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the

3. *When requested by the European Parliament or where*, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, *the Commission* considers that there *may be*



tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) ***because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver on its roadmap referred to Article 19(2a), or more generally on the enhanced engagement, or*** on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

Or. en

### **Amendment 333**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 3**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

##### *Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. ***Sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article***

*are prima facie deemed to exist in case a Trade Barrier investigation has already been concluded by the Commission in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 334**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 3**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

##### *Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. ***Sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are prima facie deemed to exist in case a trade barrier investigation has already been concluded by the Commission in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.***

Or. en

#### **Amendment 335**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,**

**Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 19 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

*Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act. ***Sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article are prima facie deemed to exist in case a Trade Barrier investigation has already been concluded by the Commission in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.***

Or. en

**Amendment 336  
Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 19 – paragraph 3**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any

*Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, ***and after duly taking into account the socio-economic effect for a beneficiary country,*** considers that there are sufficient

preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

Or. en

### **Amendment 337**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation** **Article 19 – paragraph 3**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

##### *Amendment*

3. Where the Commission, acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative **and after duly taking into account the socio-economic effect for a beneficiary country**, considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in Article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the adoption of that implementing act.

Or. en

### **Amendment 338**

**Helmut Scholz**

on behalf of The Left Group

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it considers that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.**

Or. en

**Amendment 339**

**Raphaël Glucksmann, Kathleen Van Brempt, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero, Margarida Marques, Agnes Jongerius**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a about the complaints received. The Commission shall inform the complainant, the European Parliament, the Council and the advisory body referred to in Article 13a where it considers that the complaint does not provide sufficient evidence in relation to the indicators referred to in this article.**

Or. en

**Amendment 340**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,**

**Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5.

*Amendment*

(b) state that the Commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in Paragraph 5. ***During this process the Commission shall inform the Parliament and share, in the most transparent way, the relevant information out of the latter monitoring with the Council and the European Parliament;***

Or. en

**Amendment 341**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela, Urmas Paet, Dita Charanzová, Morten Løkkegaard**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 19 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate ***during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.***

*Amendment*

5. ***The monitoring and evaluation period will be of six months from the date of publication of the notice. During this period,*** the Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to ***start engaging and cooperate any time.***

Or. en

**Amendment 342**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation  
Article 19 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate ***during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.***

5. ***The monitoring and evaluation period will be of three months from the date of publication of the notice. During this period,*** the Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate.

Or. en

**Amendment 343**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate ***during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.***

5. ***The monitoring and evaluation period will be of six months from the date of publication of the notice. During this period,*** the Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate.

Or. en

**Amendment 344**  
**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 5**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate ***during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.***

5. ***The monitoring and evaluation period will be of six months from the date of publication of the notice. During this period,*** the Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate.

Or. en

## *Justification*

*The information of the six months period is the most relevant of that paragraph because it is going to receive the references of the rest of the text and should be mentioned first in order to make the text more clear and understandable.*

### **Amendment 345**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 7**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

7. Within **three months** from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

##### *Amendment*

7. Within **the one month** from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. ***This paragraph does not apply in case a trade barrier investigation has already been concluded in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.***

Or. en

### **Amendment 346**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 7**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

##### *Amendment*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month. ***This paragraph does not apply in case a***



*trade barrier investigation has already been concluded in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 347**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 7**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.

##### *Amendment*

7. Within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. The beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. The period for comments shall not exceed one month.  
*This paragraph does not apply in case a trade barrier investigation has already been concluded in relation to the unfair trading practices at stake.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 348**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 8 – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Within *six* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, *point (b)*, the Commission shall decide:

##### *Amendment*

8. Within *two* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall decide:

Or. en

#### **Amendment 349**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 8 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Within *six* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, *point (b)*, the Commission shall decide:

*Amendment*

8. Within *two* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall decide:

Or. en

#### **Amendment 350**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 8 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Within *six* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b), the Commission shall decide:

*Amendment*

8. Within *two* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b), the Commission shall decide:

Or. en

#### **Amendment 351**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 8 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

8. Within *six* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 4, *point (b)*, the Commission shall decide:

*Amendment*

8. Within *three* months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5, the Commission shall decide:

Or. en

## *Justification*

*To make the text more clear and understandable, the references in paragraphs 8 and 16 should refer to paragraph 5, instead of paragraph 4, point b. Additionally, the six months decision making period should be reduced to three month in order to make the temporal withdrawal process more agile, efficient and effective.*

### **Amendment 352**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 10**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). ***In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.***

##### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Or. en

### **Amendment 353**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 19 – paragraph 10**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with

##### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with

Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). *In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.*

Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2).

Or. en

#### **Amendment 354**

**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

#### **Proposal for a regulation** **Article 19 – paragraph 10**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission *may*, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

##### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission *shall*, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 355**

**Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross**

#### **Proposal for a regulation** **Article 19 – paragraph 10**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

##### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission *may, where appropriate*, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

10. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission *shall* consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

Or. en

## Amendment 356

Helmut Scholz

on behalf of The Left Group

### Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 10

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

10. Where the Commission considers *that the findings justify* temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country.

#### *Amendment*

10. Where the Commission considers, *based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6 and 7, that* temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 *is justified* of this Article, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex I and Annex II, in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2). *The Commission shall publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated.* In adopting the delegated act the Commission may, where appropriate *and especially when considering a partial withdrawal*, consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country, *including with regard to impacts on*

*women's employment and empowerment, with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the beneficiary country's populations while maximising the leverage on its government.*

Or. en

**Amendment 357**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **six months** after its adoption.

*Amendment*

12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **one month** after its adoption.

Or. en

**Amendment 358**

**Gabriel Mato, Jürgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 19 – paragraph 12**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **six months** after its adoption.

*Amendment*

12. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall become applicable **three months** after its adoption.

Or. en

*Justification*

*The delegated act should be applicable three months after its adoption instead of six months in order to make the temporal withdrawal process more agile, efficient and effective, as well as providing enough time for economic operators to adapt to the withdrawal of preferences.*

## Amendment 359

Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 19 – paragraph 16

*Text proposed by the Commission*

**16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.**

*Amendment*

*deleted*

Or. en

## Amendment 360

Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela

### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 19 – paragraph 16

*Text proposed by the Commission*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, **point (b)** is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.

*Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 5 is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months. **Where the**

*Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1 point (d) and where the Commission already concluded in a trade barrier investigation that unfair trading practices have taken place, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 15. However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) and paragraph 5 is reduced to 1 month and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 2 months.*

Or. en

**Amendment 361**  
**Emmanouil Fragkos**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 16**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). *However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.*

*Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15).

Or. en

**Amendment 362**  
**Jan Zahradil, Emmanouil Fragkos**  
on behalf of the ECR Group

**Proposal for a regulation**



## Article 19 – paragraph 16

### *Text proposed by the Commission*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). **However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, point (b) is reduced to 2 months and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to 5 months.**

### *Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15).

Or. en

## Amendment 363

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

### **Proposal for a regulation Article 19 – paragraph 16**

### *Text proposed by the Commission*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, **point (b)** is reduced to **2 months** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **5 months**.

### *Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph **5** is reduced to **1 month** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **2 months**.

Or. en

## Amendment 364

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 16**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph 4, **point (b)** is reduced to **2 months** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **5 months**.

*Amendment*

16. Where the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to justify temporary withdrawal for the reason set out in paragraph 1, point (a) and the exceptional gravity of the violations calls for a rapid response in view of the specific circumstances in the beneficiary country, it shall initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with paragraphs (3) to (15). However, the period referred to in paragraph **5** is reduced to **1 month** and the deadline referred to in paragraph 8 is reduced to **3 months**.

Or. en

*Justification*

*To make the text more clear and understandable, the references in paragraphs 8 and 16 should refer to paragraph 5, instead of paragraph 4, point b. Additionally, the new GSP provides a Rapid Response Mechanism and given the exceptional circumstances and degree of urgency under which this mechanism is intended to be used, the current seven- month timeframe is insufficiently rapid and should therefore be further reduced.*

**Amendment 365**  
**Enikő Győri, Ernő Schaller-Baross**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 19 – paragraph 17**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

**17. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal pursuant to paragraph 16 of this Article, such delegated act is adopted in accordance with Article 37 and shall apply one month from its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.**

*Amendment*

**deleted**

**Amendment 366****Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider****Proposal for a regulation  
Article 22 – paragraph 1***Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) is imported in volumes or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to Union producers of *like* or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be wholly or partially reintroduced.

*Amendment*

1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) is imported in volumes or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to Union producers of ***products obtained in the Union for similar*** or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be wholly or partially reintroduced.

Or. en

**Amendment 367****Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso****Proposal for a regulation  
Article 22 – paragraph 1***Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) is imported in volumes or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to ***Union*** producers of like or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be wholly or partially reintroduced.

*Amendment*

1. Where a product originating in a beneficiary country of any of the preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) is imported in volumes or at prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to producers of ***products obtained in the Union in*** like or directly competing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be wholly or partially reintroduced.

Or. en

**Amendment 368**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***"Products obtained in the Union" are the primary basic products, processed products and other goods of EU producers. Processed agri-food products are products obtained with raw materials whose origin or place of origin is ascertained in one of the Member States.***

Or. en

**Amendment 369**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 22 – paragraph 1 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***1 a. 'Products obtained in the Union' means the primary basic products, processed products and other goods of Union producers. Processed agri-food products are products obtained with raw materials whose origin or place of origin is ascertained in one of the Member States of the European Union.***

Or. en

**Amendment 370**

**Paolo De Castro, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a.** *For the purposes of this Chapter, ‘directly competing product’ means a product which, after or prior to industrial processing, has characteristics comparable to those of the product under consideration.*

Or. en

**Amendment 371**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a.** *For the purpose of this Chapter, ‘directly competing products’ means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product.*

Or. en

**Amendment 372**  
**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**2 a.** *“directly competing products” means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product.*

Or. en

**Amendment 373**  
**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,**

**Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 22 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a.** *For the purposes of this Chapter, "directly competing products" means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product.*

Or. en

**Amendment 374**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 22 – paragraph 3 a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**3 a.** *“directly competing products” means a product which, after or prior to an industrial transformation, can be compared to another product.*

Or. en

**Amendment 375**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 24 – paragraph 4**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **12** months from its initiation.

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **9** months from its initiation.

Or. en

**Amendment 376**

**Paolo De Castro**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 24 – paragraph 4**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **12** months from its initiation.

*Amendment*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **9** months from its initiation.

Or. en

**Amendment 377**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 24 – paragraph 4**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **12** months from its initiation.

*Amendment*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **9** months from its initiation.

Or. en

**Amendment 378**

**Gabriel Mato, Jörgen Warborn, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Anna-Michelle Asimakopoulou, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 24 – paragraph 4**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **12**

*Amendment*

4. An investigation, including the procedural steps referred to in Articles 25, 26 and 27, shall be concluded within **9**

months from its initiation.

months from its initiation.

Or. en

*Justification*

*The reduction of the period of investigation is the alignment of this period to the general safeguard procedure timeline provided for in Regulation 2015/478 on common rules for imports.*

**Amendment 379**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 25 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic or financial situation of Union producers, and where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.

*Amendment*

On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic or financial situation of Union producers ***of products obtained in the Union***, and where delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.

Or. en

**Amendment 380**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 25 – paragraph 1**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic or financial situation of Union producers, and where delay might cause damage which

*Amendment*

On duly justified grounds of urgency relating to deterioration of the economic or financial situation of Union producers ***of products obtained in the Union***, and where



would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.

delay might cause damage which would be difficult to repair, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 39(4) to reintroduce normal Common Customs Tariff duties for a period of up to 12 months.

Or. en

### **Amendment 381**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Chapter VI – Section II – title**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors

*Amendment*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
**Footwear, Leather**, Agriculture and  
Fisheries Sectors

Or. en

### **Amendment 382**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Chapter VI – Section II – title**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors

*Amendment*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
**Footwear, Leather**, Agriculture and  
Fisheries Sectors

Or. en

### **Amendment 383**

**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

## Chapter VI – Section II – title

*Text proposed by the Commission*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors

*Amendment*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
**Footwear, Leather** Agriculture and  
Fisheries Sectors

Or. en

### Amendment 384

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini,  
Roman Haider**

#### Proposal for a regulation

##### Chapter VI – Section II – title

*Text proposed by the Commission*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors

*Amendment*

II Safeguards in the Textile,  
**Footwear,** Agriculture and Fisheries  
Sectors

Or. en

### Amendment 385

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

#### Proposal for a regulation

##### Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections **S-11a and S-11b** or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992,

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections **S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a** or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1006, 1701,** 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956,

38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, *and* 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, 38249996 *and 4302-1980* where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

### Amendment 386

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

#### Proposal for a regulation

#### Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections *S-11a and S-11b* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, *and* 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

##### *Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections *S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1006, 1701**, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, 38249996 *and 43021980* where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

##### *Justification*

*We suggest updating the automatic safeguard provisions to make it more effectively used and to respond to the imperative grounds of urgency when a specific threshold is met or exceeded. Consequently, in terms of product covered, we propose to include very sensitive products, such as rice (1006), sugar (1701) footwear (S-12a) and leather (S-8a and S-8b) to better protect sensitive European sectors.*

**Amendment 387**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections **S-11a and S-11b** or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, **and** 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections **S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a** or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1006 1701**, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, 38249996 **and 43021980** where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

**Amendment 388**  
**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from

GSP sections S-11a *and S-11b* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

GSP sections S-11a, *S-11b and S-12a* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1006, 1701**, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

### **Amendment 389**

**Paolo De Castro, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

##### *Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1006, 1701**, 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

##### *Justification*

*The amendments aim at extending the application of the automatic safeguard mechanism to EBA beneficiary countries, as well as to additional EU sensitive products such as rice (code 1006) and sugar (code 1701).*

## **Amendment 390**

**Paolo De Castro, Margarida Marques, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a *and S-11b* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a, *S-11b and S-12a* or to products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

## **Amendment 391**

**Emmanouil Fragkos**

### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to

*Amendment*

1. Without prejudice to Section I of this Chapter, on 1 January of each year, the Commission, on its own initiative and in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), shall adopt an implementing act in order to remove the tariff preferences referred to in Articles 7 and 12 with respect to the products from GSP sections S-11a and S-11b or to

products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **2207 10 00**, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes **1701**, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 where imports of such products, originate in a beneficiary country and their total value:

Or. en

### *Justification*

*There have been several reports of breaches of sustainability provisions by some cane sugar producing countries under the current GSP. In addition, the EBA countries represent most of the beneficiaries of the current regulation. Therefore, the scope of the regulation should be enhanced with the application of article 29 for the EBA countries, while ensuring a level playing field for the EU sugar sector, with the inclusion of sugar in the same article.*

### **Amendment 392**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

#### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, **and** 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **columns A and B**, during a calendar year

##### *Amendment*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 **their total value** exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **column C**, during a calendar year

Or. en

### **Amendment 393**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, **and** 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **columns A and B**, during a calendar year

*Amendment*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993 and 38249996 **their total value** exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **column C**, during a calendar year

Or. en

*Justification*

*Columns A and B include eligible countries, while Column C defines the beneficiary countries of each scheme. Therefore, in article 29 when it refers to columns A and B, it should be replaced by column C. Additionally, the aim of the automatic safeguard mechanisms is to protect EU producers in case of serious market difficulties by allowing for the re-introduction of normal tariff duties. It is important to ensure the protection of the EU industry and that a simplified procedure is provided.*

**Amendment 394**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, **and** 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories

*Amendment*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories



listed in Annex I, columns **A and B**, during a calendar year

listed in Annex I, columns **C**, during a calendar year

Or. en

### **Amendment 395**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, **and** 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **columns A and B**, during a calendar year

*Amendment*

(a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 2207 10 00, 2207 20 00, 2909 19 10, 3814 00 90, 3820 00 00, 38249956, 38249957, 38249992, 38248400, 38248500, 38248600, 38248700, 38248800, 38249993, and 38249996 exceeds the share referred to in point 1 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **column C**, during a calendar year

Or. en

### **Amendment 396**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

#### **Proposal for a regulation**

##### **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

**(a a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 1006 and 1701 their total value exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, column C, during a calendar year;**

**Amendment 397**  
**Paolo De Castro, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 1006 and 1701 exceeds the share referred to in point 2 a of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year***

Or. en

*Justification*

*The amendment aims at applying Article 29 for rice and sugar, when the percentage share referred to in paragraph 1 exceeds 10 %.*

**Amendment 398**  
**Tiziana Beghin, Dino Giarrusso**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(a a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 1006 and 1701 exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, column C, during a calendar year;***

Or. en

**Amendment 399**

**Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

*(a a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 1006 and 1701 exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, column C, during a calendar year;*

Or. en

**Amendment 400**

**Jordi Cañas, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Samira Rafaela, Jérémy Decerle**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-**11a** and S-**11b** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-**11a** and S-**11b** from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, *columns A and B*, during a calendar year.

(b) for products under GSP sections S-**8a**, S-**8b**, S-**11a**, S-**11b** and S-**12a** *their total value* exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-**8a**, S-**8b**, S-**11a**, S-**11b** and S-**12a** from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, *column C*, during a calendar year.

Or. en

**Amendment 401**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis, Seán Kelly**

**Proposal for a regulation**  
**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **columns A and B**, during a calendar year.

(b) for products under GSP sections S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a **their total value** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, **column C**, during a calendar year.

Or. en

#### *Justification*

*We suggest updating the automatic safeguard provisions to make it more effectively used and to respond to the imperative grounds of urgency when a specific threshold is met or exceeded. Consequently, in terms of product covered, we propose to include very sensitive products, such as rice (1006), sugar (1701) footwear (S-12a) and leather (S-8a and S-8b) to better protect sensitive European sectors. Moreover, Columns A and B include eligible countries, while Column C defines the beneficiary countries of each scheme. Therefore, in article 29 when it refers to columns A and B, it should be replaced by column C.*

#### **Amendment 402** **Tiziana Beghin**

#### **Proposal for a regulation** **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b**

##### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-11b exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

##### *Amendment*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-8a, S-8b, S-11a, S-11b and S-12a from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 403** **Marco Campomenosi, Markus Buchheit, Maximilian Krah, Danilo Oscar Lancini, Roman Haider**

#### **Proposal for a regulation** **Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-**11b** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-**11b** from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

*Amendment*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a, **S-11b** and S-**12a** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a, **S-11b** and S-**12a** from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

Or. en

**Amendment 404**

**Paolo De Castro, Margarida Marques, Inma Rodríguez-Piñero**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a and S-**11b** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

*Amendment*

(b) for products under GSP sections S-11a, **S-11b** and S-**12a** exceeds the share referred to in point 3 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of products in GSP sections S-11a and S-11b from all countries and territories listed in Annex I, columns A and B, during a calendar year.

Or. en

**Amendment 405**

**Gabriel Mato, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Massimiliano Salini, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Liudas Mažylis**

**Proposal for a regulation**

**Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)**

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

***(b a) for products falling under Combined Nomenclature codes 1006 and 1701 their total value exceeds the share referred to in point 2 of Annex IV of the value of Union imports of the same products from all countries and territories***

*listed in Annex I, column C, during a  
calendar year.*

Or. en