Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware

RECOMMENDATION of the European Parliament to the Council and the Commission of the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (2023/2500(RSP))

Rapporteur: Sophie in ‘t Veld

Document of compromises

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Compromise 1 to Compromise 12

COMP 1 (Paragraph 1)

Covered: 149 (Rapporteur), 150 (Left), 151 (EPP)
Falls:

1. Highlights the undeniable importance of protection of privacy, and the right to dignity, and private and family life, freedom of expression and information, freedom of assembly and association, right to a fair trial, in particular in an increasingly digital world where more and more of our activities take place online;

COMP 2 (Paragraph 2)

Covered: 152 (Greens), 153 (EPP), AM 199 (Left),
Falls: 154 (Left)

2. Takes the firm position that breaches of these fundamental rights and freedoms, right to dignity, privacy and private life is are not only a question of key for the respect for the common legal principles set out in the Treaties and in other sources, and but a fundamental question of whether future human life will be free and democratic or controlled by digital processes; notes that democracy itself is at stake, as the use of spyware on politicians, civil society and journalists has a chilling effect and severely affects the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and public participation; (152, 199)

COMP 3 (Paragraph 3)

Covered: 155 (S&D), 156 (Left), 157 (Greens), 158 (EPP)
Falls: 159 (NI), 160 (ECR),

3. Strongly condemns the use of spyware by Member State governments, or members of government authorities or state institutions for the purpose of monitoring, blackmailing, intimidating, manipulating and discrediting opposition, and critics and civil society, eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press, and manipulating elections, and undermining the rule of law by targeting judges, prosecutors and lawyers for political purposes.

COMP 4 (Paragraph 4)

Covered: 163 (rapporteur), 165 (rapporteur), AM 372 (Greens)
Falls: 161 (ID), 164 (ECR)

4. Points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by national and third country governments directly and indirectly affects the Union institutions and the decision making process, thus undermining the integrity of European Union democracy;

COMP 5 (Paragraph 5 to Paragraph 5 a (new))
5. Notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current Union governance structure to respond to attacks on democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law from within the Union, and the lack of action taken by many Member States; notes that when these are threatened in one Member State, the entire Union is put at risk;

5 a (new). Stresses that digital standards governing technological developments in the Union must respect fundamental rights; (AM 170)

COMP 6 (Paragraph 6)

Covered: AM 173 (S&D),
Falls: AM 172 (EPP), AM 174 (Left),

6. Takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the Union to dictatorships and repressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and a gross violation on Union export rules;

COMP 7 (Paragraph 7)

Covered: 175 (ECR), 176 (ECR),
Falls: 177 (S&D), 178 (EPP), 179 (EPP), 180 (Left)

7. Is of the opinion that contraventions, or maladministration in the implementation of Union law with regard to the use of, and trade in spyware, have taken place in Poland, Hungary, Greece, Spain and Cyprus;

COMP 8 (Paragraph 8)

Covered: 181 (RE), 182 (EPP)
Falls: 183 (S&D), 184 (ECR),

8. Expresses furthermore concern about the illegitimate use of, and illicit trade in spyware by other Member States, who collectively nurture the Union as a safe haven destination for the spyware industry, often in violation of Union laws and standards (182);

COMP 9 (Paragraph 9)

Covered: 186 (Left), 187 (rapporteur), 188 (S&D), 197 (EPP)
Falls: 185 (ID), 189 (ECR)
9. Is furthermore of the view that government parties of third countries have targeted Expresses concern about the targeting of (188) high profile personalities, human rights defenders and journalists (186) in the Union with spyware, by third countries;

COMP 10 (Paragraph 10 to Paragraph 10 a (new))

Covered: 190 (Left), 193 (Greens), 194 (S&D), 195 (RE), 196 (Left)
Falls: 191 (ECR), 192 (EPP)

10. Is equally concerned at the apparent reticence to investigate the spyware abuse attacks, both if the suspect is a Union Member State or third country government body; notes the very slow progress and lack of transparency in the judicial investigations into spyware abuse of attacks on government leaders and ministers of EU Member States, the Commission (194), as well as on civil society members, journalists or political opponents (193);

10 a (new). Notes that the legal framework of some Member States does not provide precise, effective and comprehensive safeguards on the ordering, execution and potential redress mechanisms against surveillance measures; notes that such measures must serve a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate (196);

COMP 11 (Paragraph 11)

Covered: 198 (EPP), 203 (S&D), 204 (EPP), 205 (S&D)
Falls: 200 (ECR), 201 (ECR),

11. Condemns Regrets the refusal failure of Member State governments, the Council and the Commission, to fully cooperate with the inquiry and to share all relevant and meaningful information, in order to help the inquiry committee fulfill its tasks stated in the mandate (204); Acknowledges that some of this information may be bound by strict legal requirements of secrecy and confidentiality (198, 203); considers the collective reply by the Council wholly inadequate and contrary to the principle of loyal sincere cooperation as enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU (205);

COMP 12 (Paragraph 12)

Covered: 212 (RE)
Falls: 206 (ID), 207 (ECR), 208 (EPP), 209 (EPP), 210 (ECR), 211 (S&D)

12. Concludes that no the Member States, nor the Council, nor and the Commission did not all seem to be interested has any desire to in maximising their efforts to fully investigate shed light on the spyware abuse scandal, thus knowingly protecting Union governments who violate human rights within and outside of the Union;
Compromise on Poland

Compromise on Poland (Paragraph 13 to Paragraph 14a (new))

Covered: 215 (EPP), 217 (EPP), 218 (EPP), 220 (EPP), 221 (RE), 222 (EPP), 224 (RE), 227 (S&D), 228 (S&D), 231 (EPP), 233 (RE), 234 (S&D), 235 (RE), 236 (EPP), 238 (EPP), 240 (EPP), 242 (rapporteur), 243 (RE), 244 (RE), 245 (RE), 246 (EPP), 247 (S&D), 248 (RE), 249 (rapporteur)

Falls: 213 (ID), 214 (ECR), 216 (ECR), 219 (ID), 223 (ID), 225 (ID), 226 (RE), 229 (ID), 230 (ID), 232 (ID), 237 (ID), 241 (ID)

13. Concludes that major (215) contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Poland;

14. Calls on Poland to:

(-a) new urge the Public Prosecutor General to launch inquiries into the abuse of spyware;

(a) urgently restore sufficient institutional and legal safeguards, including effective binding (218) ex ante and ex post scrutiny as well as independent oversight mechanisms, including judicial review of surveillance activities (217, 236); stresses that in the context of effective ex ante scrutiny, the request to the court for operational surveillance, as well as the court order for such surveillance, should contain a clear justification (240) and indication of the technical means to be used for the surveillance (222), and that in the context of effective ex post scrutiny, the obligation should be established to inform the person subject to surveillance of the fact, duration, scope and manner of the processing of the data obtained during the operational surveillance (220);

(aa) new introduce consistent legislation protecting citizens, regardless of whether the operational surveillance is carried out by the public prosecution service, the secret services or any other state body (231);

(b) comply with the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal on the 1990 Police act;

(c) comply with the opinion of the Venice Commission on the 2016 Police act;

(d) comply with the various judgements of the ECtHR, like the judgement of the Roman Zakharov v. Russia case in 2015 that underlines the necessity for strict surveillance criteria, proper judicial authorisation and oversight, the immediate destruction of irrelevant data, judicial scrutiny over urgency procedures and a requirement for the notification of victims persons targeted (227) as well as the judgement in the Klass and others v. Germany case in 1978 that outlines that surveillance must be of sufficient importance to necessitate such an invasion of privacy;
(d a) new comply with all the CJEU and ECtHR rulings related to the independence of justice and primacy of EU law (228);

(e) withdraw Article 168a of the rewritten Act Amending the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2016;

(f) restore full independence of the judiciary and respect statutory powers of all relevant oversight bodies, such as the Ombudsman, and the President of the Personal Data Protection Office, and the Supreme Audit Office (233), to ensure all oversight bodies get full cooperation and access to information and to provide full information to all victimspersons targeted;

(g) urgently install the random allocation of cases to the judges of the courts for every application that is submitted, even on the weekend and outside of normal business hours to avoid the selection of ‘friendly judges’ by the secret services, and ensure the transparency of such a system by, inter alia, making publicly available the algorithm on the basis of which a judge is randomly allocated to a case (238);

(h) reinstate the traditional system of parliamentary oversight wherein the opposition party takes on the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Oversight Committee for the Special Services (KSS);

(h a) new urgently clarify the situation around the misuse of spyware in Poland, so as not to cast any doubt on the integrity of the upcoming elections (242);

(h b) new properly implement and enforce Directive 2016/680 (Law Enforcement Directive), and ensure that the data protection authority will have the power of supervision over the processing of personal data by, inter alia, authorities such as the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Internal Security Agency (244, 246, 247);

(i) urge the Polish prosecutor to launch inquiries into the abuse of spyware;

(j) implement the Whistleblowers Directive;

(j a) new refrain from adopting provisions of new laws on electronic communication that contravene the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (245)

(j b) new ensure availability of effective legal remedies for the citizens of Poland affected by implementation of laws contravening the Constitution of Poland and the ECHR (248)

(k) invite Europol to investigate all cases of alleged abuse of spyware;

(k a) new guarantee independent constitutional review of laws in Poland (221);

(k b) restore independence of the role of the Public Prosecutor General from the Minister of Justice in order to guarantee that investigations into alleged breaches of fundamental rights are free from political considerations;
14 a (new). Urges the Commission to assess the compatibility of the Polish 2018 Act on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in Connection with the Prevention and Combating of Crime with the EU Law Enforcement Directive and, if necessary, to start an infringement procedure (249);
Compromise on Hungary

COMP on Hungary (Paragraph 15 to Paragraph 16)

Covered: 251 (EPP), 253 (EPP), 258 (S&D)
Falls: 250 (ID), 252 (ECR), 254 (ID), 255 (ID), 256 (ID), 257 (ID), 259 (ID)

15. Concludes that major contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Hungary;

16. Calls on Hungary to:

(a) urgently restore sufficient institutional and legal safeguards, including effective, binding (253) ex ante and ex post scrutiny as well as independent oversight mechanisms; including judicial review of surveillance activities; stresses that in the context of effective ex ante scrutiny, the request to the court for operational surveillance, as well as the court order for such surveillance, should contain a clear justification and indication of the technical means to be used for the surveillance, and that in the context of effective ex post scrutiny, the obligation should be established to inform the person subject to surveillance of the fact, duration, scope and manner of the processing of the data obtained during the operational surveillance;

(b) comply with the various judgements of the ECtHR, like the judgement of the Roman Zakharov v. Russia case in 2015 that underlines the necessity for strict surveillance criteria, proper judicial authorisation and oversight, the immediate destruction of irrelevant data, judicial scrutiny over urgency procedures and a requirement for the notification of victims persons targeted as well as the judgement in the Klass and others v. Germany case in 1978 that outlines that surveillance must be of sufficient importance to necessitate such an invasion of privacy and that outlines the requirement for the notification of surveillance subjects;

(b a) new comply with all the CJEU and ECtHR rulings related to the independence of justice and primacy of EU law;

(c) reinstate independent oversight bodies in line with the judgement of the ECtHR in the case of Hüttl v. Hungary wherein the court stated that the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH) are incapable of conducting independent oversight of the use of spyware given that the secret services are entitled to deny access to certain documents on the basis of secrecy;

(d) restore full independence of the judiciary and all relevant oversight bodies, such as the Ombudsman and the Data Protection Authorities, to ensure all oversight bodies get full cooperation and access to information and to provide full information to all victims persons targeted (258);

(e) reinstate independent employees into leading roles in oversight bodies such as the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Court of Auditors, the
prosecution service, the National Bank of Hungary and the National Election Committee;

(e a) new implement the Whistleblowers Directive;

(f) invite Europol to investigate all cases of alleged abuse of spyware;

(f a) new refrain from adopting provisions of new laws on electronic communication that contravene the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);

(f b) new ensure availability of effective legal remedies for the citizens of Hungary affected by implementation of laws contravening the Constitution of Hungary and the ECHR;
Compromise on Greece

COMP on Greece (Paragraph 17 to Paragraph 18)

Covered: AM 265 (Left), AM 267 (Left), AM 269 (Greens), AM 271 (Rapporteur), AM 272 (S&D), AM 273 (Greens), AM 275 (Rapporteur), AM 276 (Left), AM 277 (Greens), AM 280 (Left), AM 287 (Left), AM 288 (Greens)
Fall: AM 260 (ID), AM 261 (EPP), AM 262 (ECR), AM 263 (EPP), AM 264 (ID), AM 266 (ID), AM 268 (EPP), AM 270 (ID), AM 274 (EPP), AM 278 (ID), AM 279 (EPP), AM 281 (Left), AM 282 (EPP), AM 283 (Left), AM 284 (ID), AM 285 (EPP), AM 286 (EPP),

17. Concludes that contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law have taken place in Greece;

18. Calls on Greece to:

(a) urgently restore and strengthen the institutional and legal safeguards, including effective *ex ante* and *ex post* scrutiny as well as independent oversight mechanisms;

(b) urgently repeal all export licences that are not fully in line with the Dual-Use Regulation and investigate the allegations of illegal exports, among others to Sudan;

(c) ensure that the authorities can freely and unhindered investigate all allegations of the use of spyware;

(d) urgently withdraw Amendment 826/145 of Law 2472/1997, which abolished the ability of the *Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy* (ADAE) *(AM 269)* to notify citizens of the lifting of the confidentiality of communications; *amend Law 5002/2022 in order to restore the right of persons targeted to immediate information, upon his request, as soon as the surveillance has been completed (AM 267) as well as other provisions that weaken safeguards, scrutiny and accountability*

(e) restore full independence of the judiciary and all relevant oversight bodies, such as the Ombudsman and the Data Protection Authorities, and fully respect the *independence of the ADAE (AM 271)*, to ensure all oversight and supervision *(AM 273)* bodies get full cooperation and access to information and to provide full information to all victims—persons targeted *(AM 272)*;

(e a) new ensure that ADAE can set up an electronic archive to be able to perform its task *(AM 277)*;

(e b) new urgently clarify the situation around the misuse of spyware in Greece, so as not to cast any doubt on the integrity of the upcoming elections *(AM 275, AM 287)*;
(f) reverse the legislative amendment of 2019 that placed the EYP under the direct control of the Prime Minister; *ensure constitutional guarantees and allow parliamentary control of its operation, without the pretext of the confidentiality of information (AM 280)*;

(g) urgently implement the Whistleblowers Directive;

(h) ensure the independence of the EAD leadership;

(i) urgently launch a police investigation *ensure the judiciary has all the necessary means and support for the investigation* following the alleged abuse of spyware and seize physical evidence of proxies, broker companies and spyware vendors that are linked to the spyware infections;

(j) invite Europol to immediately join the investigations

(j a) new *refrain from political interference in the work of Chief Prosecutor (AM 288)*;
Compromise on Spain

Compromise on Spain (Paragraph 19 to Paragraph 20)

Covered: AM 291 (EPP)
Fall: AM 289 (ID), AM 290 (ECR), AM 292 (NI), AM 293 (ECR), AM 294 (S&D)

19. Concludes that overall although the regulatory framework in Spain is seems to be in line with the requirements set by the Treaties and by judgements by the CJEU and the ECtHR, However, some reforms are needed, and the implementation in practice must be fully in line with fundamental rights and ensure the protection of public participation; the factual implementation raises questions, as Members of Parliament have been targeted and that lawyers, politicians, activists and journalists were targeted when there was no criminal charge or evident imminent threat to national security;

Paragraph 20

Covered: AM 296 (S&D), AM 298 (Greens), AM 301 (Left), AM 303 (Greens), AM 304 (Left), AM 306 (ECR), AM 308 (S&D), AM 309 (Left), AM 317 (Greens), AM 318 (Left), AM 319 (Greens), AM 321 (Greens), AM 322 (Rapporteur), Fall: AM 295 (ECR), AM 297 (S&D), AM 299 (ECR), AM 300 (NI), AM 302 (EPP), AM 305 (NI), AM 306 (ECR), AM 307 (EPP), AM 310 (Left), AM 311 (Left), AM 312 (Left), AM 313 (Left), AM 314 (ID), AM 315 (S&D), AM 316 (NI), AM 320 (Greens) AM 323 (ID),

20. Calls therefore on the government of (AM 296) Spain to:

(a) conduct a full, fair and effective investigation, in which provide full clarity is provided on all alleged cases of the use of spyware (308), including the 47 cases for whom it remains unclear whether or not they were targeted by the CNI with a Court order or whether or not another authority had received Court orders to legally target them (AM 298), as well as on the use of spyware against the Prime Minister and members of the government, and to present the findings as broadly as possible in line with the applicable laws (322);

(a a) new provide adequate access for the persons targeted to the judicial authorisation issued by the Supreme Court to the Spanish National Intelligence Agency (CNI) to target 18 persons (301, 309, 317);

(b) cooperate with the courts (319) as to ensure that individuals targeted with spyware have access to real and meaningful legal remedy for all victims, and for that judicial inquiries to be are concluded without delay in an impartial and thorough manner, for which sufficient resources should be allocated (303, 304);

(c) urgently resolve the ongoing crisis in the judiciary;

(c a) new start the reform of the legal framework of the CNI, as announced in May 2022;
(c b) new invite Europol to join the investigations, which could contribute with technical expertise (318, 321);
Compromise on Cyprus

Compromise on Cyprus (Paragraph 21 to Paragraph 22)

Covered: AM 327 (S&D)
Fall: AM 324 (ID), AM 325 (ECR), AM 326 (EPP),

21. Concludes that there is evidence of contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of the EU Dual-Use Regulation Union law are likely to have taken place in Cyprus which requires close scrutiny (AM 327);

Paragraph 22

Covered: AM 329 (S&D), AM 330 (Rapporteur), AM 332 (Left), AM 335 (Left),
Fall: AM 328 (ECR), AM 331 (EPP), AM 333 (EPP), AM 334 (S&D),

22. Calls on the government of (AM 329) Cyprus to:

(a) thoroughly assess all export licences issued for spyware and repeal them where appropriate;

(a a) new thoroughly assess the shipment of spyware material within the EU’s internal market between Member States and map the different Israeli companies or companies owned and run by Israeli citizens that are registered in Cyprus and that are involved in such activities (AM 330);

(b) release the report of the special investigator on the ‘Spyware Van’ case; as requested by the Committee during the official mission to Cyprus (AM 332);

(c) fully investigate, with the assistance of Europol, all allegations of illegitimate use of and exports of spyware, notably on journalists, lawyers and civil society actors, and Cypriot citizens (AM 335);
Compromise on other Member States

**COMP on other Member States (Paragraph 23)**

Covered: AM 337 (S&D), AM 338 (EPP), AM 339 (S&D)
Fall: AM 336 (ECR), AM 340 (ID)

23. Is of the view that the situation in some (AM 339) other Member States is also reason for concern, in particular given the presence of a lucrative and expanding spyware industry benefiting from the good reputation, the single market and free movement of the Union, enabling some (AM 338) Member States like Cyprus and Bulgaria to become an export hub for spyware to repressive (AM 337) regimes around the world;

Compromises on European Union

**COMP Paragraph 24 to Paragraph 26**

Covered: AM 343 (Greens), AM 344 (EPP), AM 345 (EPP)
Fall: AM 341 (ECR), AM 342 (ID), AM 346 (Greens)

24. Is of the opinion that the failure or refusal of some national authorities to ensure the proper protection for the citizens of the Union, including regulatory gaps and proper legal instruments (344), demonstrates with all necessary clarity that action at Union level is indispensable to ensure that the letter of the Treaties is upheld and that Union legislation is respected, so that the right rights of citizens to living in a safe environment where human dignity, private life, personal data and property are is (AM 345) respected, as required by the Directive 2012/29/EU according to which every victim of crime has a right to receive support and protection in accordance with his or her individual needs (AM 343);

Covered:
Fall: AM 347 (EPP)

25. Concludes that contraventions and maladministration serious shortcomings in the implementation of Union law have taken place has been committed by when the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) when provided support to third countries, including but not limited to 10 such countries in the Sahel, to enable them to develop surveillance capabilities¹a;

Footnote:

26. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to:

(a) immediately halt any support to third countries aimed at to enabling them to develop surveillance capabilities or that otherwise facilitate such development;

(b) develop an appropriate human and fundamental rights impact assessment procedure that fully takes into account Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;
(e) present the human and fundamental rights impact assessment procedure to Parliament and the Council;

(d) carry out the human and fundamental rights impact assessment;

(e) discontinue any support to third countries aimed at enabling them to develop surveillance capabilities or that otherwise facilitate such development if the respect for human and fundamental rights, including rule of law, protection for democratic principles, politicians, human rights defenders and journalists cannot be guaranteed

COMP Paragraph 27 to Paragraph 28

Covered: 392 (S&D), 398 (EPP), 405 (EPP), 406 (S&D), 413 (The Left), new text by rapporteur

Fall: 384 (EPP), 385 (RE), 386, 387 (ID), 388 (Greens), 389 (Puigdemont), 390 (EPP), 391 (The Left), 393 (ECR), 394, 395 (ID), 396 (ECR), 397 (Greens), 399 (ECR), 400 (The Left), 401, 402 (EPP/S&D id.), 403 (ECR), 404 (The Left), 407 (S&D), 410, 411 (ECR/ID, id.), 412 (Greens)

27. Takes the position that the trade in, and use of spyware needs to be regulated strictly; recognising however, that the legislative process will take considerable time, whilst abuse must be stopped immediately, calls for the immediate adoption of conditions a conditional moratorium on the for legal use, sale, acquisition, and transfer and use of spyware, that must be lifted on a country-by-country basis if the following conditions have been met by December 31st 2023:

(a) all cases of alleged abuse of spyware have to be fully investigated and resolved without delay by the appropriate law enforcement, prosecutorial, as well as judicial and government authorities; and

(b) proof they prove that the framework governing the use of spyware is in line with the standards laid down by the Venice Commission and relevant case-law by the CJEU and ECtHR; and

(c) the explicit commitment to involve any request by Europol pursuant to Art 4, 5 and 6 (1a) of the Europol Regulation relating to investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware; and

(d) repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the Dual-Use Regulation are repealed;

28. Considers that the fulfilment of the conditions must be assessed by the Commission by November 30th 2023; the findings of the assessment shall be published in a public report;
Stresses that while fighting serious crime and terrorism, and the ability to do so is critically important for Member States, the protection of fundamental rights and democracy is essential. The use of spyware by Member States must be proportionate, must not be arbitrary, and surveillance must only be authorised in narrowly, pre-determined circumstances. Effective ex-ante mechanisms to ensure judicial oversight is critical to protecting individual freedoms. Individual rights cannot be put at risk by unfettered access to surveillance. The ability of the judiciary to perform meaningful and effective ex-post oversight in the area of requests for surveillance for national security is also important, to ensure that disproportionate use of spyware by governments can be challenged (AM 415);

Underlines that the use of spyware for law enforcement should be directly regulated through measures based on Chapter 4 of Title 5 TFEU on Judicial cooperation in criminal matters; emphasises that in the configuration of spyware that is imported to the EU and otherwise placed on the market should be regulated by way of a measure based on Article 114 TFEU; notes that the use of spyware for national security purposes may only be indirectly regulated through for instance fundamental rights and rules relating to data protection.
29. Considers that due to the transnational and EU-dimension of the use of spyware, coordinated and transparent scrutiny at EU-level is necessary to ensure protection of EU citizens but also validity of evidence gathered by way of spyware in cross-border cases; (AM 419) and there is a clear need for common EU standards on the basis of Chapter 4 of Title 5 TFEU regulating the use of spyware by Member State bodies, drawing from standards laid down by the CJEU, ECtHR and the Venice Commission and Fundamental Rights Agency (AM 497); considers that such EU standards should cover at least the following elements:

(a) the envisaged use of spyware must be authorised only in exceptional and specific cases in order to protect national security and (AM 430, AM 432) be subject to an effective, binding and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority or other independent democratic oversight body, having access to all relevant information, demonstrating the necessity and proportionality of the envisaged measure;

(b) the targeting with spyware should only last as long as is strictly necessary, the judicial authorisation beforehand should define the precise scope and duration for every device accessed and the hacking may only be extended when further judicial authorisation is granted for another specified duration, given the nature of spyware and the possibility of retroactive surveillance; Member State authorities should further only target individual end-user devices or accounts and refrain from hacking internet and technology service providers to avoid affecting non-targeted users (AM 436);

(c) the authorisation for the use of spyware may only be granted in exceptional cases (AM 439, AM 442) with respect to investigations into a limited and closed list of clearly and precisely defined (AM 239, AM 441) serious crimes that represent a genuine threat to national security (AM 439), and spyware may only be used towards persons in relation to which there is sufficient indications that they have committed or are planning to commit such crimes serious criminal offences (AM 439);

(d) data, which is protected by privileges or immunities referring to categories of persons (such as politicians, doctors, etc.) or specifically protected relationships (such as lawyer-client privilege) or rules on the determination and limitation of criminal liability relating to the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other media, must not be sought through spyware (AM 449, AM 450, 453) unless there are sufficient grounds established under judicial oversight, confirming the involvement in criminal activities or national security matters, which should be subject to a common framework (AM 449, 450, 451, 452, 454); there should be a non-exhaustive but binding list of privileged and sensitive professions, such as lawyers, journalists, politicians, and doctors that may not be targeted by spyware;

(e) specific rules must be drawn up for surveillance with spyware technology given that it allows for unlimited retroactive access to messages, files and metadata;

(f) Member States should publish, as a minimum, the number of requests for surveillance approved and rejected, and the type and purpose of the investigation and anonymously register each investigation in a national register
with a unique identifier so that it can be investigated in case of suspicions of abuse;

**new** National scrutiny bodies should report to the Member States and the Member States should thereafter notify the Commission on of this information on a regular basis; the Commission should use this information in its annual rule of law report to allow the comparison of spyware use in the Member States (AM 421);

(g) the right of notification for the targeted citizen person (AM 463, AM 465): after the surveillance has ended, the authorities should notify the citizen person of the fact that they were subject to the use of spyware by the authorities, including information regarding the date and duration of the surveillance, the warrant issued for the surveillance operation, data obtained, information on how that data has been used and by which actors as well as, the date of deletion of the data as well as the right and modalities to seek administrative and judicial remedies before competent authorities (AM 463); notes that such notification should be done without undue delay, unless an independent judicial authority grants delay of notification, in which case immediate notification would seriously jeopardise the purpose of the surveillance;

(g a) new the right of notification for non-targeted persons whose data were accessed: after the period for which the surveillance had been authorised has ended, the authorities should notify the persons whose right to privacy has been severely interfered with through the use of spyware but were not the target of the operation; the authorities should notify this person of the fact that their data was accessed by the authorities, information regarding the date and duration of the surveillance, the warrant issued for the surveillance operation, data obtained, information on how that data has been used and by which actors as well as the date of deletion of the data; notes that such notification should be done without undue delay, unless an independent judicial authority grants delay of notification, in which case immediate notification would seriously jeopardise the purpose of the surveillance (AM 466);

(h) an effective, binding and independent ex post oversight over the use of spyware which must have all required means and powers to exercise a meaningful oversight and be coupled with a parliamentary oversight based on cross-party membership and with appropriate clearance and with full access to sufficient information to ascertain that the surveillance was lawfully and proportionally conducted (AM 468), and parliamentary oversight of sensitive confidential information should be facilitated through the necessary infrastructure, processes and security clearances (AM 467); regardless of the definition or demarcation of the concept of national security, national oversight bodies must be competent for the full scope of national security (668);

(h a) new fundamental principles of due process and judicial oversight must be central to the regime surrounding surveillance spyware (AM 469);

(i) a meaningful legal remedy for direct and indirect targets and that individuals who claim to be adversely affected by surveillance must (AM 472) should have
access to redress through an independent body; calls, therefore, for the introduction of a duty of notification for state authorities, including appropriate timeframes for notification, whereby delivery occurs once the security threat has passed;

(j) legal remedies must be effective in both law and fact and that they must be known and accessible; stresses that such remedies require swift, thorough and impartial investigation by an independent oversight body and that this body should have access, expertise and technical capabilities to handle all relevant data to be able to determine whether the security assessment made by the authorities of an individual is reliable and proportionate; in cases where abuses have been verified, adequate sanctions of either criminal or administrative nature according to the relevant national law in the Member States should apply (AM 473);

(k) the improvement of (AM 476) need to improve victims’ free of charge access of persons targeted to technological expertise at this stage, since increased availability and affordability of technological processes, such as forensic analysis, would allow persons targeted (AM 475) victims to present stronger cases in court and would improve representation of persons targeted in court through technological capacity building of legal representation and the judiciary to better advise persons targeted, identify violations, improve oversight and accountability of spyware abuse (AM 478);

(k a) the reinforcement of the rights of the defence and the right to a fair trial by ensuring that those accused of crimes are allowed and able to check the accuracy, authenticity, reliability and even the legality of the evidence used against them and therefore rejecting any blanket application of national defence secrecy rules (AM 479);

(l) during surveillance, authorities should delete all data that is irrelevant to the authorised investigation (AM 483) data and after the surveillance and the investigation for which the authorisation was granted has ended, authorities should delete the data as well as any related documents, such as notes that were taken during that period, such deletion must be recorded, and be auditable;

(l a) new relevant information that is obtained by spyware should only be accessible to authorised authorities and solely for the purpose of an operation. This access should be limited to a particular period of time as specified in the judicial process (AM 487);

(l b) new minimal standards for rights of individuals in criminal proceedings on the admissibility of evidence collected with the help of spyware need to be established; the possibility of false or manipulated information produced as a result of the deployment of spyware (impersonation) needs to be included in criminal procedural law (AM 486);

(m) Member States must notify each other in case of surveillance of citizens or residents of another Member State or of a mobile number of a carrier in another Member State;
a marker needs to be included in the surveillance software so that oversight bodies can unambiguously identify the deployer in case of suspicion of abuse; the mandatory signature for each spyware deployment should consist of an individual label for the acting authority, the type of spyware used and an anonymised case number (AM 490);

Calls on Member States to undertake public consultations with stakeholders, secure transparency of the legislative process, and include EU standards and safeguards when drafting new legislation on the use and sale of spyware (AM 492);

Footnotes:
COMP Paragraph 30 to Paragraph 30 a (new)

Covered:

Fall: AM 373 (Greens), AM 374 (Left), AM 375 (Left), AM 376 (Greens), AM 377 (Greens), AM 378 (Greens), AM 379 (Greens), AM 380 (Greens), AM 381 (Greens), AM 382 (Greens), AM 383 (Greens), AM 493 (EPP), AM 494 (ECR), AM 495 (Left)

30. Emphasises that only spyware that is configured **designed** so that it enables and facilitates the functionality of spyware according to the legislative framework according to Article 82 TFEU as set out in Paragraph 29 and in particular supporting the different roles of the authorities involved may be placed on the internal market, developed or used in the Union; affirms that such a regulation on the placing on the market of spyware that provides for ‘rule-of-law-by-design’ based on Article 114 TFEU should grant Union citizens a high level of protection; considers it unjustifiable that, while the Dual-use Regulation provides citizens of third countries protection against spyware exports from the EU since 2021, no equivalent protection is offered to EU citizens;

30 a (new). Considers that only the interception and extraction technology may be sold by companies in the EU and acquired by Member States, as and not "hacking as a service", which includes the supply of technical, operational and methodological support of surveillance technology, and allows the provider access to a disproportionate amount of data that is incompatible with principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; calls on the Commission to propose a legislative proposal in this regard;

COMP Paragraph 31

Covered: AM 497 (Greens), AM 499 (Renew)
Fall: AM 498 (EPP)

31. Stresses that spyware may only be placed on the market for sale to and use by a closed list of public authorities, based on a closed list, whose instructions include investigations of crimes or the protection of national security (AM 499) for which the use of spyware may be authorised; considers that security agencies should only use spyware when all recommendations laid out by the Fundamental Rights Agency have been implemented.\footnote{1a https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-surveillance-intelligence-services-vol-2-summary_en.pdf}

Footnote:

COMP Paragraph 32

Covered: AM 502 (Renew), AM 503 (Left)
Fall: AM 500 (EPP), AM 501 (ECR),

32. Highlights the obligation to use a version of spyware that is programmed **designed** in such a way that it minimises the access to all data stored on a device, that the spyware should not have access to all data stored on a device, but should be designed in such a way that it limits
access to data to the minimum of what is strictly necessary *for the purpose of the authorised investigation (AM 502)*;

**COMP Paragraph 33**

Covered: AM 506 (EPP)
Fall: AM 504 (ID), AM 505 (ECR)

33. Concludes that when a Member State has purchased spyware, the acquisition must be auditable by an independent, impartial audit body *with appropriate clearance (AM 506)*;

**COMP Paragraph 34 to Paragraph 34 b (new)**

Covered: AM 423 (Greens), AM 507 (Greens), AM 511 (Renew), AM 512 (Renew), AM 513 (Renew),

Fall: AM 508 (ECR), AM 509 (ID), AM 510 (EPP)

34. Stresses that all entities placing spyware on the internal market should comply with strict due diligence requirements, including vetting of potential clients and *companies applying in a public procurement process to be suppliers should undergo a vetting process which includes the company’s response to human rights violations committed with their software and whether the technology relies on data gathered in undemocratic and abusive surveillance practices (AM 423); underlines that the competent national supervisory authorities should report to the Commission on an annual basis on compliance*;

34 a (new). *Stresses that companies offering surveillance technologies or services to state actors should disclose to the competent national supervisory authorities the nature of the export licences (AM 511)*;

34 b (new). *Underlines that Member States should establish a cooling-off period, temporarily preventing former governmental bodies or agencies employees from working for spyware companies (AM 512, AM 513)*;
Compromises on National Security

COMP Paragraph 35 to Paragraph 37 f (new)

Covered: 520 (S&D), 521 (Renew), 522 (Left), 523 (Rapporteur), 530 (Rapporteur), 531 (Left), 540 (Greens), 542 (EPP), 543 (EPP)

Fall: 514 (ID), 515 (Left), 516 (ID), 517 (ECR), 518 (ECR), 519 (EPP), 524 (ID), 525 (Renew), 526 (ECR), 527 (ECR), 528 (ECR), 529 (ID), 532 (EPP), 533 (ID), 534 (ECR), 535 (Left), 536 (ECR), 537 (EPP), 538 (S&D), 539 (Renew), 541 (Left),

Need for boundaries a definition of national security

35. **Condemns Is concerned about cases of unjustified** the invocation of ‘national security’ to justify the deployment and use as a pretext for the abuse (AM 520) of spyware and for absolute secrecy and lack of accountability; welcomes the Commission statement, in line with the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence\footnote{Judgment of 6 October 2020, Case C-623/17, Privacy International, para 44 and Judgments of 6 October 2020, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, Quadrature du Net, para 99: “The mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law.”}, that a mere reference to national security cannot be interpreted as being an unlimited carve out from the application of EU law normal rules and should require a clear justification (AM 521), and calls on the Commission to follow up on that statement in the cases where there are indications of manifest abuse (AM 522); **Considers that in a democratic transparent society that abides by the rule of law, such limitations in the name of national security will be rather the exception than the rule**;

\footnote{Judgment of 6 October 2020, Case C-623/17, Privacy International, para 44 and Judgments of 6 October 2020, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, Quadrature du Net, para 99: “The mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law.”}

35 a (new). **Considers that the notion of national security must be contrasted with the more restricted scope vis-a-vis internal security (AM 530), whereby the latter has a broader scope, including the prevention of risks to citizens, and in particular the enforcement of criminal law (AM 523)**

36. **Regrets the difficulties stemming from the lack of** Calls for a common legal definition of national security, laying down criteria to determine what legal regime applies may apply (AM531) in matters of national security as well as a clear demarcation of the area where such a special regime may apply;

37. Considers that the use of spyware constitutes a limitation of fundamental rights; further considers that where a concept is used in legal context, entailing the transfer of rights and the imposition of obligations (and in particular limitations of fundamental rights of individuals), the concept needs to be clear and foreseeable to all persons affected by it; recalls that the Charter of Fundamental Rights provides that any limitation to fundamental rights according to Article 52(1) must be set out in law; considers therefore that it is necessary for to define—national security’ to be clearly defined; underlines that regardless of the precise demarcation, the domain of national security shall be subject to independent, binding and effective oversight in its entirety;
37 a (new). Stresses that if authorities invoke national security grounds as justification for using spyware, they should, in addition to the framework laid down in paragraph 29, demonstrate compliance with EU law including adherence to the principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; highlights that the justification (AM 521) should be easily accessible and made available to a national scrutiny body for assessment (AM 540).

37 b (new). Reiterates, in this regard, that all Member States signed Convention 108+, which lays down standards and obligations for the protection of individuals concerning processing of personal data, including for national security purposes; (AM 542) points out that Convention 108+ is a binding European framework dealing with the processing of data by intelligence and security services; urges all Member States to ratify this Convention without delay and to already implement its standards in national law and act accordingly over national security; (AM 542)

37 c (new). Emphasises that exceptions and restrictions to a limited number of provisions of the Convention are only permitted when they are in accordance with the requirements referred to in article 11 of the Convention, meaning that when implementing Convention 108+, each specific exception and restriction must be provided for by law, must respect the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms and must justify that it ‘constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society’ for one of the legitimate grounds listed in Article 11¹a and that such exceptions and restrictions must not interfere with the ‘independent and effective review and supervision under the domestic legislation of the respective Party’; (AM 543)

Footnote:
¹a This assessment is provided for in the case law of the ECtHR that lays the burden of proof with the State/Legislator. Relevant ECtHR case law includes: Roman Zakharov v. Russia (Application No. 47143/06), 4 December 2015; Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (Application No. 37138/14), 12 January 2016; Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (application nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24969/15), 25 May 2021 and Centrum För Rättvisa v. Sweden (application no. 35252/08), 25 May 2021

37 d (new). Further notes that Convention 108+ stresses that the oversight ‘shall have powers of investigation and intervention’; considers that effective review and supervision implies binding powers where the impact on the fundamental rights is the greatest, particularly in the accessing, analysis and storage phases of processing personal data;

37 e (new). Considers that the lack of binding powers of oversight bodies within the domain of national security is incompatible with the criterion laid down in Convention 108+ that this ‘constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society’;

37 f (new). Points out that Convention 108+ allows for a very limited number of exceptions with regard to its Article 15 but it does not allow such exceptions notably regarding paragraph 2 [awareness raising duties], paragraph 3 [consultation on legislative and administrative measures], paragraph 4 [requests and complaints by individuals], paragraph 5 [independence and impartiality], paragraph 6 [necessary resources for effective performance of tasks], paragraph 7 [periodic reporting], paragraph 8 [confidentiality], paragraph 9 [possibility of appeal], and paragraph 10 [no power regarding bodies when acting in their juridical capacity];
Compromises on Better implementation and enforcement of existing legislation

COMP Paragraph 38

Covered: AM 544 (Left), AM 547 (Left), AM 548 (EPP), AM 550 (Renew),
Fall: AM 545 (ECR), AM 546 (S&D), AM 549 (EPP), AM 551 (Rapporteur), AM 552 (EPP),

Better implementation (AM 544) and enforcement of existing legislation

38. Underlines the shortcomings in national legal frameworks and the necessity for better enforcement of existing Union legislation to counterpose these deficiencies; identifies the following Union laws as relevant \textit{but too often} improperly \textit{implemented (AM 547) and/or enforced: the Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Law Enforcement Directive (AM 548), procurement rules, Dual-use Regulation, case-law (rulings on surveillance and national security), and the Whistleblower Directive; calls on the Commission to investigate and report on the shortcomings in implementation and enforcement and put forward a roadmap to correct them, by \textit{summer 1 August (AM 550) 2023} at the latest;)

COMP Paragraph 39 to Paragraph 40

Covered: AM 555 (EPP), AM 556 (S&D)
Fall: AM 553 (ECR), AM 554 (ID),

39. Considers the \textit{strict proper} implementation and \textit{strict enforcement} of the Union legal framework on data protection, especially the Law Enforcement Directive, General Data Protection Regulation and e-Privacy Directive, \textit{a critical prerequisite are crucial}; considers equally important the full implementation of the relevant CJEU judgements, which is still lacking in several Member States; in which \textit{recalls that} the Commission has a central role in enforcing EU law and ensuring its uniform application throughout the Union, \textit{and should make use of all tools available including infringement procedures in cases of persistent non-compliance (AM 555, AM 556)};

40. Calls for the Wassenaar Arrangement to become a binding agreement on all its participants, with the aim of making it an international treaty;

COMP Paragraph 41

Covered: AM 559 (Renew),
Fall: AM 557 (ECR), AM 558 (Left),

41. Calls for Cyprus \textit{and Israel} to become a participating state of the Wassenaar Arrangement, reminds the Council, the Member States and the Commission that all efforts must be made to enable Cyprus \textit{and Israel} to join the Wassenaar Arrangement (\textit{AM 559});

COMP Paragraph 42

Covered:
Fall: AM 560 (ECR), AM 561 (EPP), AM 562 (Renew),

26
42. Stresses that the Wassenaar Arrangement should include a human rights framework that embeds the licensing of spyware technologies, assesses and reviews the compliance of companies producing spyware technologies and that participants should prohibit the purchase of surveillance technologies from states that are not part of the Arrangement;

COMP Paragraph 43 to Paragraph 43 a (new)

Covered: AM 565 (Left), AM 566 (EPP), AM 567 (Greens),
Fall: AM 563 (ID), AM 564 (Greens)

43. Stresses that in light of the spyware revelations, the Commission and Member States (AM 566) should conduct an in-depth investigation of export licences granted for the use of spyware under the Dual-use Regulation and the Commission should share the results of this assessment with Parliament (AM 565);

43 a (new). Underlines the need for traceability and accountability of spyware exports and recalls that EU companies should only be able to export spyware demonstrating sufficient traceability properties to ensure that responsibility can always be attributed (AM 567);

COMP Paragraph 44 to Paragraph 44 a (new)

Covered:
Fall: AM 568 (Renew), AM 569 (ECR), AM 570 (EPP),

44. Emphasises that the Commission needs to regularly check and properly enforce the Recast Dual-use Regulation to avoid ‘export regime shopping’ throughout the Union, as is currently the case in Bulgaria and Cyprus, and that the Commission should have adequate resources for this task;

44 a (new). Calls on the Commission to ensure sufficient staff capacity for the units responsible for the oversight and enforcement of the Dual Use Regulation;

COMP Paragraph 45 to Paragraph 46

Covered: AM 571 (Greens), AM 572 (Rapporteur),
Fall:

45. Calls for amendments to the Dual-use Regulation to clarify in Article 15 that export permits of dual-use goods must not be given where goods are or may be intended for in connection with internal repression and/or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; calls for the full implementation of human rights and due diligence checks in the licensing process (AM 572) and further improvements such as remedy for targets of human rights abuses and transparent reporting of performed due diligence (AM 571);
Paragraph 46

46. Calls for changes to the Dual-use Regulation to ensure that transit is prohibited in cases where goods are or may be intended for internal repression and/or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;

COMP Paragraph 47

Covered:
Fall: AM 573 (ECR), AM 574 (ID), AM 575 (EPP),

47. Stresses that, in a future amendment of the Dual-use Regulation, designated national authorities responsible for the approval and denial of export licences for dual-use items should provide detailed reports including information on the dual-use item in question; the number of licences applied for, the name of the exporting country, a description of the export company and whether this company is a subsidiary; a description of the end user and destination; the value of the export licence; why the export licence was approved or denied; emphasises that these reports should be made public on a quarterly basis; calls for the set up of a dedicated standing parliamentary committee with access to classified information by the Commission, for the purpose of parliamentary oversight;

COMP Paragraph 48

Covered:
Fall: AM 576 (ID), AM 577 (EPP), AM 578 (ECR)

48. Stresses that, in a future amendment of the Dual-use Regulation, the exception to the requirement to provide information to the Commission on grounds of commercial sensitivity, defence and foreign policy or national security reasons must be abolished; considers instead that in order to prevent sensitive information becoming available to third countries, the Commission can decide to classify certain information in its annual report;

COMP Paragraph 49

Covered:
Fall: AM 579 (ECR)

49. Stresses that the definition of cyber-surveillance items in the recast Dual-use Regulation cannot be given a restrictive interpretation but should include all technologies in this area, such as mobile telecommunications interception or jamming equipment; intrusion software; IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment; software specially designed or modified for monitoring or analysis by law enforcement; laser acoustic detection equipment; forensic tools which extract raw data from a computing or communications device and circumvent ‘authentication’ or authorisation controls of the device; electronic systems or equipment, designed either for surveillance and monitoring of the electro-magnetic spectrum for military intelligence or security purpose; and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles capable of conducting surveillance;
COMP Paragraph 50

Covered:
Fall: AM 580 (ID), AM 581 (EPP)

50. Calls for additional European legislation that requires corporate actors producing and/or exporting surveillance technologies to include human rights and due diligence frameworks in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs);
Compromises on International cooperation

COMP Paragraph 51

Covered: AM 583 (Renew),
Fall: AM 582 (ID), AM 584 (EPP), AM 585 (Left)

International cooperation to protect citizens

51. Calls for a joint EU-US spyware strategy, including a joint white list and/or black list of spyware vendors whose tools have been abused or are at risk of being abused to maliciously target government officials, journalists, civil society, and who operate against the security and foreign policy of the Union, (AM 583) by foreign governments with poor human rights, (not) authorised to sell to public authorities, common criteria for vendors to be included in either list, arrangement for common EU-US reporting on the industry, common scrutiny, common due diligence obligations for vendors and the criminalisation of the sale of spyware to non-state actors;

COMP Paragraph 52

Covered: AM 589 (Left)
Fall: AM 586 (ID), AM 587 (ID), AM 588 (EPP),

52. Calls for the EU-US Trade and Technology Council to hold wide and open consultation with civil society for the development of the joint EU-US strategy and standards, including the joint white list and/or black list;

COMP Paragraph 53

Covered: AM 590 (Greens)
Fall: AM 591 (ECR), AM 592 (Left)

53. Calls for talks to be launched with other countries, in particular Israel, to establish a framework for spyware marketing and export licences, including rules on transparency, a list of eligible countries regarding human rights standards and due diligence arrangements;

COMP Paragraph 54

Covered: 171 (S&D)
Fall: AM 593 (ID), AM 594 (EPP), AM 595 (ECR),

54. Emphasises Notes that compared to the US, where NSO was quickly black-listed and the US President signed an Executive Order, stating that it shall not make operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person, prohibits operational use by the US Government of commercial spyware that poses risks to national security or has been misused by foreign actors to enable human rights
abuses around the world; there are bipartisan initiatives for legislation on commercial spyware, no sufficient action has been taken in the Union at the EU level as regards the imports of spyware and the enforcement of the exports rules is wholly inadequate;

COMP Paragraph 55

Covered: AM 361 (Renew), AM 366 (Greens), AM 369 (Left), AM 597 (EPP), AM 598 (S&D) Fall: AM 367 (Left), AM 596 (ID), AM 599 (Left), 600 (Greens), 601 (Greens),

55. Concludes that the Union export rules and their enforcement must be strengthened (AM 598) given sharp teeth for the protection of human rights in third countries and must be given the necessary tools to implement its clauses-provisions effectively; recalls (AM 597) that the EU should seek to join forces with the US and other allies in regulating the trade in spyware and using their combined market power to force change and set robust standards of transparency, traceability and accountability on the use of surveillance technology (AM 361), which should culminate in an initiative on global—at a United Nations level (AM 369);
Compromise on Zero-day vulnerabilities

COMP Paragraph 56 to Paragraph 61

Zero-day vulnerabilities

Paragraph 56

Covered: AM 603 (Greens),
Fall: AM 602 (Greens), AM 604 (Left), AM 605 (ID),

56. Calls for a regulation of the discovery, sharing, patching and exploitation of vulnerabilities, as well as disclosure procedures completing the basis set out by the Cyber Resilience Act, the NIS2 Directive and the proposal for the Cyber Resilience Act;

Paragraph 57

Covered: 607 (S&D)
Fall: AM 606 (Left),

57. Considers that researchers must be able to research vulnerabilities, and share their results without civil and criminal liability under inter alia the Cybercrime Directive and the Copyright Directive;

Paragraph 58 to Paragraph 58 a (new)

Covered: AM 608 (Greens), AM 609 (Rapporteur), 613 (Left)
Fall: 626 (RE)

58. Calls upon the major industry players to create incentives for researchers to participate in vulnerability research, by investing in vulnerability treatment plans, disclosure practices within the industry and with civil society and run bug bounty programmes;

58 a (new). Calls on the Commission to increase their support and funding for bug bounties and other projects aiming to search for and patch security vulnerabilities, and set up a coordinated approach to mandatory vulnerability disclosure (CVD) among Member States (AM 608);

Paragraph 59

Covered: AM 611 (Renew),
Fall: AM 610 (EPP), AM 612 (Left),

59. Calls for a ban on the sale of vulnerabilities in a system for any other purpose than strengthening the security of that system commercial trade in vulnerabilities, and an obligation to disclose the findings of all vulnerability research so they can be patched in a coordinated
and responsible manner that promotes public safety and minimises the risk of exploitation of that vulnerability (AM 611);

Paragraph 60 to Paragraph 60 a (new)

Covered: AM 371 (Left), AM 616 (Renew), AM 617 (Greens), AM 618 (Greens)  
Fall: AM 614 (ID), 615 (Left),

60. Calls upon organisations public and private entities to create a publicly available contact point where vulnerabilities can be disclosed in a standardised way reported in a coordinated and responsible manner, and for organisations that receive information about vulnerabilities in their system to act immediately to fix; considers that, calls for a maximum period to patch disclosed vulnerabilities, when a patch is available, after organisations should be mandated to have the appropriate measure in place to ensure rapid and guaranteed deployment (AM 617), as part of a coordinated and responsible disclosure process (AM 616);

60 a (new). Considers that Member States should allocate sufficient financial, technical and human resources to security research and patching vulnerabilities (AM 618);

Paragraph 61

Covered: 624 (Renew)  
Fall: AM 619 (ID), AM 620 (ECR), AM 621 (EPP), AM 622 (Greens), AM 623 (Left), AM, AM 625 (Renew), 627 (Greens), 628 (Left)

61. Calls on Member States to develop for a ban for public authorities to purchase, keep open or stockpile vulnerabilities, except only in limited, specified cases with clear vulnerability equity processes, set in prescribed by law, which determines that by default vulnerabilities must be disclosed and not exploited, and that any decision to deviate from this must be an exception and assessed under the requirements for necessity and proportionality including the consideration whether the infrastructure affected by the vulnerability is used by a large share of the population, and be subject to strict oversight by an independent supervising body with necessity/proportionality test for the decision to disclose or exceptionally withhold a vulnerability, as well as transparent procedures and decisions; and strict rules on delaying notification, subject to strict oversight by an independent supervising body;
Compromises on Telecom networks

COMP Paragraph 62

Covered: AM 631 (Rapporteur),
Fall: AM 629 (ID), AM 630 (ID)

Telecom networks

62. Stresses that, if any state actor has an access point to the SS7 network, the licence of the main operator through which the state actor has access, the license should be revoked of any service provider that is found to be facilitating unlawful access into national and/or international mobile signalling infrastructure across all generations (currently 2G to 5G) (AM 631);

COMP Paragraph 63 to Paragraph 63 b (new)

Covered: AM 634 (EPP)
Fall: AM 632 (ID), AM 633 (Greens),

63. Stresses that the current unlimited possibility for processes through which new phone numbers from all over the world can be created by (AM 634) unknown individuals to buy any number for any country in the world available malicious actors should be better regulated to make malicious illicit activity more difficult to hide;

63 a (new). Stresses the need for telecom providers to ensure that they have the capacity to detect potential misuse of access, control, or effective end-use of signalling infrastructure gained by third parties through commercial or other agreements in the Member State that they operate in;

63 b (new). Calls on Member States to ensure that competent national authorities, in accordance with NIS 2 provisions, evaluate telecom providers’ level of resilience to unauthorised intrusions;

COMP Paragraph 64 to Paragraph 64 c (new)

Covered: AM 635 (Rapporteur), AM 636 (EPP), AM 637 (Left), AM 638 (EPP), AM 639 (EPP),
Fall:

64. Calls (AM 637) on Telecom providers to take firm and demonstrable action to mitigate against the various forms of spoofing emulating without authorisation the origination of telecoms traffic by a network element in order to access the data or service that was meant for the legitimate user (AM 636), and other activity involving the manipulation of normal operations of mobile network elements and infrastructure for surveillance purposes by malicious actors including state-level actors as well as criminal groups (AM 635);
64 a (new). Calls on the Member States to take action to ensure that non-EU state actors that do not respect fundamental rights do not have control or effective end-use of strategic infrastructure, or influence over decisions related to strategic infrastructure within the Union, including telecommunication infrastructure (AM 638);

64 b (new). Calls on all Member States to prioritise greater investment in the protection of critical infrastructure, such as national telecommunications systems, to address gaps in protection against privacy breaches, data leaks, and unauthorised intrusions, in order to defend the fundamental rights of citizens (AM 639);

64 c (new). Calls on competent national authorities to actively promote the strengthening of capabilities of providers as well as response capabilities to better support identification of persons illegally targeted, notification and incident reporting, in order to provide ongoing, measurable assurance and mitigation of the exploitation of security gaps by third country and domestic malicious actors;
Compromise on e-Privacy

COMP Paragraph 65 to Paragraph 65 b (new)

Covered: AM 643 (Left), AM 645 (Greens), AM 646 (S&D), AM 647 (Left), Fall: AM 640 (ID), AM 641 (ID), AM 642 (ECR), AM 644 (EPP), AM 648 (Left),

e-Privacy

65. Calls for the rapid adoption of the e-Privacy Regulation in a way that fully reflects the case-law on the restrictions for national security and the need to prevent abuse of surveillance technologies, strengthens the fundamental right to privacy, provides for strong safeguards and effective enforcement (AM 643); points out that the scope for lawful interception should not go beyond the e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC (AM 645);

65 a (new). Calls for the protection of all electronic communications, content and metadata against the abuse of personal data and private communications by private companies and government authorities; points out that digital safety-by-design tools such as end-to-end encryption should not be weakened (AM 646);

65 b (new). Calls on the Commission to assess the Member States’ implementation of the e-Privacy Directive across the EU, and to start infringement procedures where violations occur (AM 647);
Compromises on Europol

COMP Paragraph 66 -a (new) to Paragraph 66

Covered: AM 650 (Rapporteur), AM 653 (S&D), AM 654 (Rapporteur), AM 655 (Renew), AM 657 (EPP), AM 658 (Renew),

Fall: AM 649 (ECR), AM 651 (ECR), AM 652 (Left), AM 656 (ID), AM 659 (Left),

The role of Europol

66 - a (new). Notes that a letter by Europol to the Chair of the PEGA Committee of December 2022 April 2023 informs the Committee that Europol contacted Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Poland to ascertain whether there is an ongoing or envisaged criminal investigation or another inquiry under the applicable provisions of national law, which could be supported by Europol; stresses that offering assistance to Member States does not constitute the initiation, conduct or coordination of a criminal investigation as laid down in Article 6 (AM 650);

66. Expresses its dismay at the refusal of Calls on Europol to make full use of its newly acquired powers under Art 6 (1a) of the (AM 655) Regulation (EU) 2022/991, enabling it to propose to competent authorities of the Member States concerned to initiate, conduct or coordinate a criminal investigation, especially when the national authorities are unable or unwilling to investigate, and in particular when there is a justified concern that evidence may be destroyed where relevant (AM 653, AM 657); points out that under Article 6 it is for the Member States to reject such a proposal (AM 654, AM 658);

COMP Paragraph 67

Covered: AM 660 (Renew), AM 663 (S&D), AM 664 (EPP),

Fall: AM 661 (ECR), AM 662 (Left),

67. Calls on all Member States to commit to granting the proposals of Europol under the aforementioned article the European Parliament and Council to involve Europol in investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware at national level (663, 664), especially when a proposal under Article 6 (1a) of Regulation (EU) 2022/991 has been made.

COMP Paragraph 68

Covered: AM 669 (S&D), AM 670 (EPP)

Fall: AM 665 (ECR), AM 666 (EPP), AM 667 (Left), AM 668 (Greens)

68. Calls on Europol Member States to set up a register within Europol of national law enforcement operations involving the use of spyware within Europol, wherein each operation should be identified with a code, and for the use of spyware by governments to be included in the annual Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment report by Europol;
COMP Paragraph 69

Covered: AM 677 (RE), AM 678 (EPP),

Fall: AM 671 (ID), AM 672 (ECR), AM 673 (Left), AM 674 (S&D), AM 675 (EPP), AM 676 (Greens),

69. Calls for the revision of the Europol Regulation, so that in exceptional cases Europol can also start a criminal investigation, without Member State consent, in cases where the national authorities fail or refuse to investigate and there are clear threats to the interests and security of the EU; Takes the view that a reflection must be launched about the role of Europol in case where national authorities fail or refuse to investigate and there are clear threats to the interests and security of the EU;
Compromise on Union Development Policies

COMP Paragraph 70 to Paragraph 70 b (new)

Covered: AM 350 (EPP), AM 351 (Renew), AM 352 (Greens), AM 354 (Left), AM 355 (S&D), AM 357 (EPP), AM 358 (EPP), AM 359 (Left), AM 360 (EPP), AM 362 (Renew), AM 363 (Greens), AM 365 (Left), AM 370 (Greens), AM 680 (Left), AM 681 (Greens), Fall: AM 348 (Greens), AM 349 (EPP), AM 353 (ECR), AM 356 (Left), AM 364 (ECR), AM 679 (ECR),

Union development aid policies

70. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to implement more rigorous control mechanisms to ensure that Union development aid, including the donation of surveillance technology (AM 681) and training in the deployment of surveillance software (AM 352, AM 354, AM 365), does not fund or facilitate tools and activities (AM 680) that could impinge on the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights; or that or that poses a threat to international security or the essential security of the Union and its Members (AM 351, AM 362); notes that the Commission’s assessments of compliance with Union law, in particular the Financial Regulation, should contain specific control criteria and enforcement mechanisms to prevent such abuses, including the possible temporary suspension of specific projects if there is an infringement of these principles (AM 350, AM 363, AM 680);

70 a (new). Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to include in every human and fundamental rights impact assessment a monitoring procedure on potential abuse of surveillance that fully takes into account Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the timeframe within one year [after the publication of the PEGA recommendations] (AM 355); stresses that this procedure must be presented to Parliament and the Council and that this impact assessment must be done prior to any support to third countries (AM 359);

70 b (new). Calls on the EEAS to report on the abuse of spyware against human rights defenders in the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy (AM 370);
Compromises on Union financial regulations

COMP Paragraph 71 to Paragraph 71 a (new)

Covered: AM 685 (EPP), AM 686 (Rapporteur),
Fall: AM 682 (ID), AM 683 (ID), AM 684 (ECR),

Union financial regulations

71. Highlights that respect for human rights by the financial sector must be enhanced; stresses that the UNGPs 10+ recommendations must be transposed into Union law and that the Due Diligence Directive should (AM 685) apply to the financial sector, to ensure respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the financial sector;

71 a (new). Is concerned about the implications of the CJEU decision with regards to the Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing whereby the information of the beneficial ownership of corporate and legal entities established in a national and publicly accessible Register of Beneficial Ownership (UBO) is ruled invalid1a; stresses that, taking into consideration the CJEU decision, the future Directive should allow for as much public accessibility as possible so that it becomes more difficult to hide purchases or sales of spyware through proxies and broker companies (AM 686);

Footnote:
Compromises on Follow-up of Parliament resolutions

COMP Paragraph 72

Covered:
Fall: AM 687 (ECR), AM 688 (ID), AM 689 (ECR), AM 690 (EPP),

Follow-up of Parliament resolutions

72. Calls for the urgent follow-up of Parliaments resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs; stresses that the following recommendations need to be carried out as a matter of urgency;

COMP Paragraph 73

Covered:
Fall: AM 691 (ID), AM 692 (ECR), AM 693 (EPP),

73. Stresses that, despite the fact that oversight of intelligence services’ activities should be based on both democratic legitimacy (strong legal framework, \textit{ex ante} authorisation and \textit{ex post} verification) and adequate technical capability and expertise, the majority of current EU and US oversight bodies dramatically lack both, in particular the technical capabilities;

COMP Paragraph 74

Covered:
Fall: AM 694 (ECR), AM 695 (Renew)

74. Calls, as it did in the case of Echelon, on all national parliaments which have not yet done so to install meaningful oversight of intelligence activities by parliamentarians or expert bodies with legal powers to investigate; calls on the national parliaments to ensure that such oversight committees/bodies have sufficient resources, technical expertise and legal means, including the right to conduct on-site visits, to be able to effectively control intelligence services;

COMP Paragraph 75

Covered:
Fall: AM 696 (ECR), AM 697 (EPP), AM 698 (Greens)

75. Calls for the setting up of a High-Level Group to propose, in a transparent manner and in collaboration with parliaments, recommendations and further steps to be taken for enhanced democratic oversight, including parliamentary oversight, of intelligence services and increased oversight collaboration in the EU, in particular as regards its cross-border dimension;
COMP Paragraph 76

Covered:
Fall: AM 699 (ID), AM 700 (EPP), AM 701 (ECR), AM 702 (EPP), AM 703 (Left), AM 704 (EPP)

76. Considers this High-Level group should:
(a) define minimum European standards or guidelines on the ex ante and ex post oversight of the intelligence services on the basis of existing best practices and recommendations by international bodies, such as the UN and the Council of Europe, including the issue of oversight bodies being considered as a third party under the ‘third party rule’, or the principle of ‘originator control’, on the oversight and accountability of intelligence from foreign countries;

(b) set strict limits on the duration and scope of any surveillance ordered unless its continuation is duly justified by the authorising/oversight authority; recalls that the duration of any surveillance ordered should be proportionate and limited to its specific purpose;

(c) develop criteria on enhanced transparency, built on the general principle of access to information and the so-called Tshwane Principles\(^{18}\);

Footnotes:
\(^{18}\) The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, June 2013.

COMP Paragraph 77

Covered:
Fall: AM 705 (ECR), AM 706 (ID)

77. Intends to organise a conference with national oversight bodies, whether parliamentary or independent;

COMP Paragraph 78

Covered:
Fall: AM 707 (ID), AM 708 (ECR), AM 709 (Renew)

78. Calls on the Member States to draw on best practices so as to improve access by their oversight bodies to information on intelligence activities (including classified information and information from other services) and establish the power to conduct onsite visits, a robust set of powers of interrogation, adequate resources and technical expertise, strict independence vis-à-vis their respective governments, and a reporting obligation to their respective parliaments;

COMP Paragraph 79 to Paragraph 81

Covered: AM 712 (Rapporteur),
Fall: AM 710 (ECR), AM 711 (EPP)
79. Calls on the Member States to develop cooperation among oversight bodies (AM 712);

Covered:
Fall: AM 713 (ID), AM 714 (ECR), AM 715 (EPP),

80. Calls on the Commission to present, a proposal for a Union security clearance procedure for all office holders in the Union, as the current system, which relies on the security clearance undertaken by the Member State of citizenship, provides for different requirements and lengths of procedures within national systems, thus leading to differing treatment of Members of Parliament and their staff depending on their nationality;

Covered:
Fall: AM 716 (ID), AM 717 (ECR), AM 718 (EPP), AM 719 (S&D)

81. Recalls the provisions of the inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by Parliament of classified information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy, which should be used to improve oversight at EU level;

COMP Paragraph 82 to Paragraph 82 a (new)

Covered: AM 724 (Rapporteur), AM 725 (Renew), AM 726 (Left), AM 727 (Greens),
Fall: AM 720 (ID), AM 721 (ECR), AM 722 (ID), AM 723 (ECR),

Union research programmes

82. Calls for the implementation of more rigorous and effective (AM 726) control mechanisms to ensure that Union research funds do not fund or facilitate tools, including spyware and surveillance tools (AM 725), that infringe on EU values; notes that assessments of compliance with Union law should contain specific control criteria to prevent such abuses; calls for the termination of Union research funds to entities that are or have been involved in the direct or indirect facilitation of human rights violations with surveillance tools (AM 724);

82 a (new). Stresses that EU funding for research, such as the Horizon Europe agreements with third countries, must not be used to contribute to the development of spyware and equivalent technologies (AM 727);

COMP Paragraph 83 to Paragraph 83 f (new)

Covered: AM 368 (Greens), AM 416 (Renew), AM 480 (S&D), AM 728 (ID), AM 729 (ECR), AM 732 (Renew), AM 733 (S&D), AM 734 (Greens), AM 736 (Greens), AM 737 (Greens), AM 739 (Greens), AM 740 (Left) AM 741 (Greens), AM 746 (Greens), AM 748 (Greens)
Fall: AM 730 (ID), AM 731 (ECR), AM 735 (EPP), AM 738 (Greens),
A Union EU Tech Lab

83. Calls on the Commission to initiate without delay the creation of an independent European interdisciplinary research institute, with a focus on research and development at the nexus of information and communication technology, fundamental rights and security, which will also be tasked with discovering and exposing the unlawful use of software for illicit surveillance purposes; stresses that this institute should work with experts, academia and civil society representatives, as well as be open to participation by Member States experts and institutions (AM 416);

83 a (new). Stresses that this institute would contribute to better awareness, attribution and accountability in and beyond Europe, as well as increase the European talent base and our understanding of how spyware vendors develop, maintain, sell and deliver their services to third parties (AM 732);

83 b (new). Considers that this institute should be tasked with discovering and exposing the unlawful use of software for illicit surveillance purposes, providing accessible and free legal and technological support, including smartphone-screenings for individuals who suspect to have been targeted by spyware and the tools necessary for detecting spyware (AM 480, AM 736, AM 740), performing forensic analytical research for judicial investigations (AM 739), and reporting regularly on the use and misuse of spyware in the EU (AM 733), taking into account technological updates; considers that this report should be made available annually and transmitted to the Commission, Parliament, and Council (AM 737);

83 c (new). Recommends that the Commission sets up the EU Tech Lab in close cooperation with CERT EU and ENISA and consults with relevant experts when establishing the EU Tech Lab to learn from best practices in the academic field (AM 746);

83 d (new). Underlines the importance of ensuring adequate funding for the EU Tech Lab (AM 748);

83 e (new). Recommends that the Commission puts forward a certification scheme for analysis and authentication of forensic material (AM 741);

83 f (new). Calls on the Commission to support civil society capacity globally to strengthen resilience against spyware attacks and the provision of assistance and services to citizens (AM 368);

COMP Paragraph 84

Covered: AM 755 (S&D), AM 756 (Greens), AM 757 (Left),

Fall: AM 751 (ECR), AM 752 (ID), AM 753 (ID), AM 754 (ECR), AM 758 (NI),

Rule of law
84. Stresses that the impact of the illegitimate use of spyware is much more pronounced in Member States where authorities that would usually be tasked with investigating, and providing redress to victims persons targeted (AM 755) and ensuring accountability (757), are captured by the state and that where a rule of law crisis exists and the independence of the judiciary is endangered (AM 756), the national authorities cannot be relied upon;

COMP Paragraph 85

Covered: AM 761 (Left), AM 764 (Greens), AM 765 (Left), AM 768 (Greens)

Fall: AM 759 (ID), AM 760 (ECR), AM 762 (EPP), AM 763 (EPP), AM 766 (EPP), AM 767 (Left), AM 769 (EPP), AM 770 (Greens)

85. Calls therefore on the Commission to ensure an active and effective (AM 761) implementation of its Rule of Law toolbox, particularly by:

(a) putting in place a more comprehensive monitoring of the Rule of Law, including country-specific recommendations related to Member States’ unlawful use of spyware in the Commission’s annual Rule of Law report (AM 764, AM 765) assessing the responsiveness of State institutions to provide redress to persons targeted victims of spyware, in particular to journalists, and by broadening the scope of its annual Rule of Law report and include all challenges to Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights as included in Article 2 TEU, as repeatedly asked for by Parliament;

(b) proactively pursuing launching (AM 768) and bundling infringement procedures against Member States for Rule of Law deficiencies such as threats to the independence of the judiciary and the effective functioning of the police and prosecutorial service in the context of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and

(c) broadening the Commission assessment for the purpose of the Rule of Law budget conditionality regime, in particular by looking at the impacts of the use of spyware on the accountability of public spending;

COMP Paragraph 86

Covered: AM 777 (Renew),
Fall: AM 772 (ID), AM 773 (ECR), AM 774 (ID), AM 775 (ECR), AM 776 (EPP),

Union litigation fund

86. Calls for the establishment, without undue delay, of a Union Litigation Fund to cover the actual litigation costs and enable the persons targeted victims of spyware to seek adequate redress, including damages for illegal use of spyware against them (AM 777), in line with the Preparatory Action adopted by Parliament in 2017, to create an ‘EU fund for financial support for litigating cases relating to violations of democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights’;
Compromises on EU institutions

COMP Paragraph 87 to Paragraph 88 a (new)

Covered: 749 (EPP), 750 (EPP)
Fall: AM 778 (ID), AM 779 (ECR), AM 780 (ID), AM 781 (EPP), AM 782 (ID), AM 783 (Left)

European Council, Council of ministers and Commission EU Institutions

87. Expresses concern over the lack of action by the Commission so far, and urges it to make full use of all its powers as guardian of the Treaties, and to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth investigation into the abuse of and trade in spyware in the Union;

88. Urges the Commission to conduct a full-blown inquiry into all allegations and suspicions of the use of spyware against its officials, and report to Parliament, and to the responsible law enforcement authorities where necessary;

88 a (new). Calls on the Commission to set up a special taskforce, involving the national electoral commissions, dedicated to protection of the 2024 European elections across the Union; recalls that not only foreign but also internal interference poses a threat to the European electoral processes; stresses that in case of misuse of pervasive surveillance tools, such as Pegasus, elections may be affected;

COMP Paragraph 89 to Paragraph 89 a (new)

Covered: AM 771 (Greens)
Fall: AM 784 (EPP), AM 785 (ECR), AM 786 (ID), AM 787 (Left), AM 788 (Greens),

89. Notes that the PEGA Committee received a collective reply from the Council to the queries of the European Parliament to all individuals Member States only on the eve of the publication of the draft report, approximately 4 months after the letters of the EP; expresses dismay at the lack of action of the European Council and Council of ministers, and calls for a dedicated European Council Summit, given the magnitude of the threat to democracy in Europe;

89 a (new). Calls on the Council of the EU to address developments related to the use of spyware and its impact on the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU during hearings organised under Article 7(I) TEU (771);

COMP Paragraph 90

Covered: AM 793 (S&D), AM 794 (Left),
Fall: AM 790 (ID), AM 791 (EPP), AM 792 (ECR),
90. Takes the position that Parliament should have full powers of inquiry, including **better access to classified and non-classified information (AM 794)**, the power to summon witnesses, to formally require witnesses to testify under oath and to provide requested information within specific deadlines; **Reiterates the Parliament's position in the Proposal of the European Parliament of 23 May 2012 for a Regulation on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry and repealing Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (2009/2212(INI)); calls on the Council to immediately advance on this Proposal for a Regulation to allow for a proper right of inquiry for the European Parliament (AM 793);**

COMP Paragraph 91 -a (new) to Paragraph 91

Covered: AM 789 (Greens), AM 796 (Greens)
Fall: AM 795 (ECR), AM 797 (ID),

91 -a (new). Acknowledges Parliament’s efforts in detecting spyware infections; considers however that the protection of and staff should be strengthened, having regard to privileges and immunities of those who have been spied on; recalls that any attack to Member’s political rights is an attack to the independence and sovereignty of the institution (AM 789), as well as an attack on voters rights;

91. **Calls on the Bureau of the Parliament** Resolves to adopt a protocol for cases where members or staff of the House have become the direct or indirect target of spyware and underlines that all cases must be reported by Parliament to the responsible law enforcement authorities; **stresses that Parliament should provide legal and technical assistance in such cases (AM 796);**

COMP Paragraph 92 to Paragraph 92 b (new)

Covered: AM 747 (EPP), AM 800 (Left), AM 801 (S&D),
Fall: AM 798 (ID), AM 799 (ECR),

92. **Resolves (AM 800)** to take the initiative to launch an inter-institutional conference wherein Parliament, the Council and the Commission must aim for governance reforms that strengthen the Union institutional capacity to respond adequately to attacks on democracy and rule of law from the inside and to ensure that the Union has effective supranational methods for enforcing the Treaties and secondary law in the case of non-compliance by Member States;

92 a (new). **Calls for the swift adoption of the Commission proposal for a regulation laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (2022/0085 COD) and prompt implementation and strict enforcement thereafter, in order to reduce the risk of spyware infections of devices and systems used by EU institutions staff and politicians (AM 801);**

92 b (new). **Calls on the EU to sign up to Convention 108+.**
92 c (new). Calls on the European Ombudsman to initiate discussions within the European Network of Ombudsmen on the impact of the misuse of pervasive surveillance on democratic processes and citizen’s rights; call on the Network to develop recommendations on effective and meaningful redress across the EU;

COMP Paragraph 93 to Paragraph 94

Covered: AM 804 (Left),
Fall: AM 802 (ID), AM 803 (ECR), AM 805 (ECR)

Legislative action

93. Calls on the Commission to promptly come forward with legislative proposals on the basis of this Recommendation;

94. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Member States, the Council, the Commission and to Europol.
Compromises on Citations

Covered: 1 (Left), 2 (S&D), 3 (Greens), 4 (Rapporteur), 5 (Left), 6 (Rapporteur), 7 (Left), 8 (Left), 9 (Left), 10 (EPP), 11 (Left), 14 (EPP), 15 (EPP), 16 (Greens), 17 (Greens), 18 (Greens), 19 (Greens), 20 (Greens)

Fall: 12 (Left), 13 (ECR)

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and in particular Articles 2, 4, 6 and 21 thereof,

– having regard to Articles 16, 223, 225 and 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), and in particular Articles 7, 8, 11, 17, 21, 41, 42 and 47 thereof,(1)


– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)3,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA4,


– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items5,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States6, as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/796 of 17 May 20217,

– having regard to the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage8,
– having regard to Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry;


— having regard to the Proposal of a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 September 2022 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (2022/0277(COD));

— having regard to Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

— having regard to CJEU judgement C-37/20 on the anti-money-laundering directive on the provision whereby the information on the beneficial ownership of companies incorporated within the territory of the Member States is accessible in all cases to any member of the general public is ruled invalid;

— having regard to Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;


— having regard to the statement of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet on 19 July 2022 on "Use of spyware to surveil journalists and human rights defenders";

— having regard to the statement of Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatovic on 27 January 2023 "highly intrusive spyware threatens the essence of human rights";

— having regard to the European Data Protection Supervisor’s Preliminary Remarks on Modern Spyware,

– having regard to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and in particular Articles 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and 17 thereof, and the Protocols to that Convention,

– having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs and to its recommendations regarding the strengthening of IT security in the EU’s institutions, bodies and agencies,
– having regard to the Venice Commission report concerning the democratic oversight of the security services\textsuperscript{12} and the Opinion on the Act of 15 January 2016 Amending the Police Act and Certain Other Acts\textsuperscript{13},

– having regard to the 2021 Europol report on Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA);\textsuperscript{(14)}

– having regard to the 2017 FRA report titled “Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and remedies in the EU”, as well as the updates presented on February 28th, 2023;\textsuperscript{(15)}

– having regard to Rule 208 of its Rules of Procedure,

— having regard to the European Data Protection Supervisor’s (EDPS) opinion on the European Media Freedom Act,\textsuperscript{(17)}

— having regard to the glossary on malware and spyware by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA),\textsuperscript{(18)}

— having regard to the European Ombudsman’s Decision on how the European Commission assessed the human rights impact before providing support to African countries to develop surveillance capabilities (case 1904/2021/MHZ),\textsuperscript{(19)}

— having regard to the statement 2 February 2023 by Ms. Irene Kahn, UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression and Mr. Fernand de Varennes, UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, demanding an investigation into the alleged spying programme targeting Catalan leaders; \textsuperscript{13a(20)}

Footnotes:

4 OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89.
8 OJ L 278, 8.10.1976, p. 5.
9a OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 43–74

51
Compromises on Recitals

RECITAL A

Covered: 24 (S&D), 25 (EPP), 26 (S&D), 29 (S&D), 31 (Greens),
Fall: 21 (EPP), 23 (ECR), 27 (Greens) 28 (EPP), 30 (The Left), 32 (Greens),

A. whereas, thanks to the efforts of CitizenLab and Amnesty Tech and numerous investigative journalists, it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries, both EU Member States and third countries, have used Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware against journalists, politicians, law enforcement officials, diplomats, lawyers, business people, civil society actors and other actors, for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore demonstrate the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine fundamental human rights, and democracy and electoral processes (24);

A a (new). whereas whenever the term "spyware" is mentioned in the report, it means "Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware" as defined in the European Parliament’s decision of 10 March 2022 on setting up a committee of inquiry to investigate the use of the Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware, and defining the subject of the inquiry, as well as the responsibilities, numerical strength and term of office of the committee (2022/2586(RSO));(29)

A b (new). whereas it has been observed that state actors have deliberately used spyware in a misleading manner by using spyware that can disguise itself as legitimate program, file or content (“trojan horse”), such as fake messages from public institutions; whereas in some cases phone operators have been used by public authorities to transmit malicious content to the targeted person’s device; whereas spyware can be deployed by exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities without the interaction of the target with infected content and can remove all traces of its presence upon uninstallation as well as anonymising the link between remote operators and server (31)

RECITAL B

Covered:

Falls:

B. whereas in the early days of mobile communication, eavesdropping was conducted through the interception of calls and, later, of text messages in their plain format;

RECITAL C

Covered: 33 (Left), 35 (EPP), 36 (Left), 37 (EPP), 38 (Left), 41 (EPP),
Fall: 34 (EPP), 39 (EPP), 40 (Left), 42 (EPP), 43 (EPP), 44 (EPP),
C. whereas the arrival of encrypted mobile communication applications led to the emergence of the spyware industry exploring existing vulnerabilities in smartphones’ operative systems to install software used to import spyware into the phone, including through ‘zero-click’ without a user’s knowledge or without requiring any action by the user (37, 41), enabling the extraction of data before encryption; whereas such ‘zero-click’ spyware, by its very design, makes effective and meaningful scrutiny of its use very difficult; (36)

C a (new). whereas the knowledge of vulnerabilities in software systems is traded directly between parties, or is facilitated by brokers; whereas this trade includes non-state actors and criminal organisations; (35)

C b (new). whereas the acquisition, trading and hoarding of zero-day vulnerabilities fundamentally undermines the integrity and security of our communications and cyber security of EU citizens; information and communication technology; (38)

RECITAL D

Covered: 22 (EPP), 46 (EPP),
Fall: 45 (ID), 47 (ECR), 48 (Left)

D. whereas the use of spyware surveillance should remain the exception and always subject to an effective, binding (46) and meaningful ex ante judicial authorisation by an impartial and independent judicial authority, which must ensure that the measure is necessary and proportionate and strictly limited to cases affecting national security, terrorism and serious crime; whereas surveillance techniques are liable to be abused in environments without effective checks and balances (22);

RECITAL E

Covered: 49 (S&D), 50 (EPP), 51 (Left),
Fall: 52 (ECR)

E. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority, which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Venice Commission (50) and must be able to terminate; whereas such ex post oversight authority should order the termination of (49) the surveillance immediately (51) when it is not found to be incompatible with the above-mentioned rights and conditions (49);

RECITAL F

Covered: 54 (S&D), 68 (S&D)
Fall: 53 (ECR), 55 (Left)
F. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in Union law and the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR would entail a violation of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and, in particular, Articles 7, 8, 11, 17, 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights, freedoms and principles set out in it, such as respect for private and family life, the protection of personal data, freedom of expression and information, right to property, right to non-discrimination, as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial and the presumption of innocence (54);

RECITAL G

Covered: 56 (EPP), 60 (Greens)
Fall: 57 (Left), 58 (S&D), 59 (Greens),

G. whereas the rights of targeted persons are laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and international conventions, notably the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, and in Union rules on the rights of suspects and accused, and are confirmed by case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR (56);

Ga (new). whereas the impact of targeted surveillance on women can be particularly grievous, as authorities may use the increased social scrutiny women are under to weaponise private and intimate data extracted through spyware for defamation campaigns (60)

RECITAL H

Covered: 63 (EPP), 64 (S&D), 65 (Left), 67 (Greens),
Fall: 61(NI), 62 (ECR), 66 (ID),

H. whereas it results from the testimonies of persons targeted (64) victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper, they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies, the absence of or non-implementation of the right of persons targeted to be informed for victims, and the administrative burden obstacle (63) to prove the status as victim; whereas even in systems that offer quick and open procedures, the nature of spyware makes it very hard to prove the nature and extent of victimhood and authorship;(63)

Ha (new). whereas Courts have not accepted the forensic evidence of independent experts but only evidence based on examinations of the authorities, security or law enforcement that are allegedly behind the attack; whereas this leaves victims targets facing a paradoxical situation and no viable option of proving a spyware infection;

RECITAL I

Covered: 70 (S&D), 71 (Left), 72 (EPP),
Fall: 69 (ECR), 73 (ID),
I. whereas the Polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures, effectively leaving persons targeted (70) victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the Pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists, opposition (71) politicians, lawyers (72), prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;

RECITAL J

Covered: 75 (S&D), 76 (Left)
Fall: 74 (ECR), 77 (ID),

J. whereas the Hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures, effectively leaving persons targeted (75) victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the Pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists, opposition politicians, (76), lawyers, prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;

RECITAL K

Covered: 80 (Rapporteur), 82 (S&D),
Fall: 78 (ID), 79 (EPP), 81 (ECR), 90 (Left),

K. Whereas it has been officially confirmed that a Greek member of European Parliament and a Greek journalist have been both wiretapped by the EYP and targeted with Predator spyware; whereas a former US-Greek Meta employee has been simultaneously wiretapped by the EYP and targeted with Predator spyware, the use of which is illegal under Greek law; whereas according to media reports Greek Members of Parliament, opposition as well as government party New Democracy (ND) MPs, party activists (82) loyalists and journalists have allegedly also been targeted with Predator spyware or conventional wiretapping by the EYP or both, the use of which is illegal under Greek law; whereas many of the persons targeted were also under official surveillance by the EYP Greek secret service, whereas the Greek government denies having purchased or used Predator, but it is highly probable that Predator has been used by or on behalf of persons very close to the Prime Minister’s office; whereas the Greek government admitted it has granted export licences to Intellexa for the sale of the Predator spyware to repressive governments, such as Madagascar and Sudan; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of the target to be informed after surveillance has taken place and further hampers the work of independent authorities (80);

RECITAL L

Covered: 83 (EPP), 84 (Greens), 85 (S&D), 89 (Left),
Fall: 86 (NI), 87 (ECR), 88 (ECR),

L. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in Spain; whereas the first includes the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior and other
**high officials** (83) that are believed to be spied upon by Morocco; whereas the second referred to as ‘CatalanGate’ by the organization Citizen Lab (83) includes 65 targeted persons among which political figures of the regional Government of Catalonia, concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘CatalanGate’ including Catalan parliamentarians members of the pro-Catalan independence movement (85). Members of the European (84) Parliament, lawyers, academics (89) and civil society actors; whereas the Spanish authorities admitted in May 2022 to targeting 18 of those 65 victims persons with court authorisation, however, they have refrained from providing so far not provided disclosed the judicial authorisations warrants, as well as nor any (84) further information, invoking national security when giving account of the use of spyware surveillance in Spain (85); whereas 47 other persons have been allegedly targeted, but not received any information apart from Citizen Lab.

**RECITAL M**

Covered: 91 (EPP)
Fall: 92 (ID)

M. whereas there are allegations of the Cyprus government party spying on critics, but so far no allegations of spyware infections have been confirmed in Cyprus; whereas Cyprus is an important European export hub for the surveillance industry and an attractive location for companies selling surveillance technologies;

**RECITAL N**

Covered: 93 (EPP), 94 (Left),
Fall:

N. whereas there are strong indications of among others the governments of Morocco and Rwanda having targeted with spyware high profile Union citizens, including the President of France, the Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior (93) of Spain, the then Prime Minister of Belgium, the former President of the Commission and former Prime Minister of Italy, and Carine Kanimba, (94) the daughter of Paul Rusesabagina;

**RECITAL O**

Covered: 97 (Left), 99 (EPP),
Fall: 95 (S&D), 96 (EPP), 98 (ECR),

O. whereas it can be safely assumed that all Member States have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments in the European Union (99) will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware, but in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight, and in light of technical challenges to detect and trace infections (97) the risk of abuse is very high plausible (99);
RECITAL P

Covered: 104 (Left), 105 (S&D), 106 (S&D)
Fall: 100 (ECR), 101 (S&D), 102 (EPP), 103 (ID)

P. whereas most (105) the Member State governments and Member State parliaments have not provided the European (104) Parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their Member States beyond what was already publicly known, despite an obligation to do so pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Decision of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 6 March 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of Union legislation and the safeguards, oversight, and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights;

RECITAL Q

Covered: 107 (EPP)
Fall: 108 (Greens)

Q. whereas several key figures from the spyware industry have acquired Maltese citizenship, which facilitates their operations (107) in order to be able to operate freely within and from the Union;

RECITAL R

Covered: 109 (EPP)
Fall:

R. whereas different multiple spyware developers and (109) vendors are or have been registered in one or more Member States; whereas examples include NSO Group with corporate presence in Luxembourg, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Bulgaria, the parent company of Intelluxa, Thalestris Limited, in Ireland, Greece, Switzerland and Cyprus, DSIRF in Austria, Amesys and Nexa Technologies in France, Tykelab and RCS Lab in Italy, and FinFisher (now defunct) in Germany;

RECITAL S (linked to para 41)

Covered: 110 (EPP), 111 (Left)
Fall:
S. whereas the European Union does not participate (110) all Member States but Cyprus are participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement for controlling conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies; whereas all Member States but Cyprus are participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement although Cyprus has long submitted a request to join the Wassenaar Arrangement (111); whereas Cyprus is bound by EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (Dual-Use Regulation); (110)

RECITAL T

T. whereas Israel’s export regime applies in principle to all Israeli citizens, even when operating from the EU; whereas Israel is not a participating country in the Wassenaar Arrangement but claims to apply its standards nevertheless;

RECITAL U

U. whereas the export of spyware from the Union to third countries is regulated in the Dual-use Regulation, which was revised in 2021; whereas the Commission issued a first implementation report in September 2022;

RECITAL V

Covered: 113 (S&D)
Fall: 112 (EPP)

V. whereas some spyware producers exporting to third countries establish themselves within the Union to gain respectability while trading in spyware to totalitarian repressive (113) regimes; whereas exports from the Union to totalitarian repressive regimes or non-state actors are taking place, in violation of the EU export rules on surveillance technologies;

RECITAL W

Covered: 115 (Greens)
Fall: 114 (EPP),

W. whereas Amesys and Nexa Technologies are currently being prosecuted in France for exporting surveillance technology to Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; whereas Intellexa companies based in Greece reportedly exported their products to Bangladesh, Sudan, Madagascar and at least one Arab country, FinFisher’s software is being used by dozens of countries all over the world, including Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Morocco’s intelligence services have been accused of using Pegasus spyware against journalists, human rights defenders, civil society (115) and politicians by Amnesty and Forbidden Stories; whereas it is unknown if export licences were granted for the export of spyware to all these countries;

RECITAL X
X. whereas the number of attendees at arms fairs and ISSWorld marketing spyware capabilities demonstrates the prevalence of third country providers of spyware and related products and services, a significant number of which are headquartered in Israel (e.g. NSO Group, Wintego, Quadream and Cellebrite), and reveals prominent producers in India (ClearTrail), the United Kingdom (BAe Systems and Black Cube) and the United Arab Emirates (DarkMatter), while the United States Entity List blacklisting spyware producers located in Israel (NSO Group and Candiru), Russia (Positive Technologies) and Singapore (Computer Security Initiative Consultancy PTE LTD.) further highlights the diversity of origin among spyware producers; whereas the fair is also attended by a wide range of European public authorities, including local police forces;

RECITAL Y

Y. whereas Article 4 (2) TEU provides Member States claim that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State that matters relating to national security fall outside of the Treaties as Article 4 (2) TEU provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of the Member States; (118, 119, 120, 121)

RECITAL Z

Z. whereas however the CJEU has ruled (C-623/17) that ‘although it is for the Member States to define their essential security interests and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal and external security, the mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law’;

RECITAL AA

European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides for general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication’;

RECITAL AB

Covered: 128 (Left)
Fall:

AB. whereas the CJEU has ruled (C-203/15) that ‘Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic and location data and, in particular, access of the competent national authorities to the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of fighting crime, is not restricted solely to fighting serious crime, where access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the European Union’;

AB a (new). whereas the case-law of the ECtHR establishes that all surveillance must occur in accordance with the law, serve a legitimate aim and be necessary and proportionate. Moreover, the legal framework must provide precise, effective, and comprehensive safeguards on the ordering, execution and potential redress opportunities against surveillance measures, which must be subject to adequate judicial review and effective oversight;¹

Footnote:
¹a https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/fs_mass_surveillance_eng.pdf

AC. whereas the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108), recently modernised as Convention 108+, applies to processing of personal data for State (national) security purposes, including defence and all Member States are parties to this convention;

RECITAL AD

Covered: 131 (EPP)
Fall: 129 (ECR), 130 (EPP)

AD. whereas important aspects of the use of surveillance spyware for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security, fall within the scope of EU law;

RECITAL AE
AE. whereas the Charter lays down the conditions for the limitation of the exercise of fundamental rights: it must be provided for by law, respect the essence of the rights and freedoms concerned, be subject to the principle of proportionality, and only be imposed if it is necessary and genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others; whereas in the case of the use of spyware the level of interference with the right to privacy is can be so severe that the individual is in fact deprived of it and the use cannot always be considered proportionate, irrespective of whether the measure can be deemed necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives of a democratic state;

RECITAL AF (paragraph 65 a-b (new))

AF. whereas the e-Privacy Directive provides that Member States must ensure the confidentiality of communications; whereas the deployment of surveillance tools constitutes a restriction of the right to protection of terminal equipment afforded by the e-Privacy Directive; whereas this would place national laws on spyware within the scope of the e-Privacy Directive similar to national data retention laws; whereas regular deployment of intrusive spyware technology would not be compatible with the Union legal order;

RECITAL AG

AG. whereas a state under international law only has the right to investigate potential crimes within its jurisdiction, and has to resort to the assistance of other states where the investigation has to take place in other states, unless there is a basis for conducting investigations in the other jurisdiction due to an international agreement, or in the case of Member States, in Union law;

RECITAL AH

AH. whereas the infection of a device with spyware and the subsequent collection of data takes place through the servers of the mobile service provider, and as the free roaming within the
Union has resulted in persons more often sometimes (142) having mobile contracts from other Member States than the one in which they live, a legal base for the collection of data in the other Member State through the use of spyware is currently absent in Union law;

AH a (new). whereas the former UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression David Kaye\(^{1a}\), and current UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression Irene Khan\(^{1b}\) call for an immediate moratorium on the use, transfer and sale of surveillance tools until rigorous human rights safeguards are put in place to regulate practices and guarantee that Governments and non-State actors use the tools in legitimate ways;(143)

Footnotes:
\(^{1b}\) OHCHR. Spyware scandal: UN experts call for moratorium on sale of ‘life threatening’ surveillance tech.

RECITAL AH b (new)

AH b (new). Whereas there are cases where spyware companies, notably Intellexa, have not only sold the interception and extraction technology itself, but also the entire service, also referred to as "hacking as a service" or "active cyberintelligence", offering a package of surveillance and interception technology methods, as well as training for staff and technical, operational and methodological support; whereas this service could allow the company to be in control of the entire surveillance operation and aggregates the surveillance data; whereas this practice is almost impossible to oversee and control for the relevant authority; whereas this makes it difficult to adhere to principles of proportionality, necessity, legitimacy, legality and adequacy; whereas this service is not permitted by Israel's defense export agency (DECA); whereas Cyprus has been used to surpass the existing limitations under Israeli law to provide "hacking as a service”;

RECITAL AI

Covered: 144 (Left)

Fall:

AI. whereas Member States must comply with Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2009/81/EC on public and defence procurement, respectively, adequately justify derogation under Article 346(1)(b) of the TFEU, as the 2009 Directive explicitly takes into account the sensitive characteristics of defence procurement and observe the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, as amended 30 March 201216 (GPA) if party to it;

AI a (new). whereas EDPS has underlined that Member States have to respect the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human rights, which sets limits to surveillance activities for national security. Furthermore, when used for law enforcement purposes, surveillance has to comply with EU law and notably the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and by EU directives such as the ePrivacy directive and the law enforcement directive;(144)
AJ. whereas it has been reported that large financial institutions have tried to incite spyware producers to refrain from applying appropriate human rights standards and due diligence and continue selling spyware to totalitarian repressive (146) regimes;

RECITAL AK

AK. whereas in Horizon 2020, amongst the Associated Countries, Israel ranked third in terms of overall participation in the programme; whereas Horizon Europe agreement with the state of Israel has an overall budget for 2021-27 of €95.5b1a; whereas Israel participates in Union research programmes since 2000; whereas parts of these funds have been made available to Israeli military and security companies through these European Programmes; whereas some funds have been made available to Israeli military and security companies through these European Programmes1b,


RECITAL AL

AL. whereas the main legislative instrument within the Union development policies is Regulation (EU) 2021/947 - the ‘Global Europe Regulation’17, and Union funding may be provided through the types of financing envisaged by the Financial Regulation, even to the extent that assistance could be suspended in the event of degradation in democracy, human rights or the rule of law in third countries;