European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership (2012/2287(INI))

P7_TA(2013)0280 A7-0173/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 1 June 2006 on improving EU-US relations in the framework of a Transatlantic Partnership Agreement(1), its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections(2) and its resolution of 17 November 2011 on the EU-US Summit of 28 November 2011(3),

–  having regard to the outcomes of the EU-US Summit held on 28 November 2011 in Washington, D.C.,

–  having regard to the joint declarations of the 71st Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) held in December 2011 in Jacksonville, the 72nd TLD held in June 2012 in Copenhagen and Strasbourg, and the 73rd TLD held in November 2012 in Washington, D.C.,

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2012 on trade and economic relations with the United States(4), which supported the idea of launching negotiations for a comprehensive economic agreement, and its resolution of 23 May 2013(5) on the negotiating mandate,

–  having regard to the statement of 13 February 2013 by US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso announcing that both the United States and the European Union will initiate the internal procedures necessary to launch the negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,

–  having regard to the Summit Declaration of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Chicago on 20 May 2012,

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2012 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy(6), its resolution of 22 November 2012 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy(7), and its resolution of 22 November 2012 on Cyber Security and Defence(8),

–  having regard to the joint statement of 12 July 2012 by the European Union and the United States on the Asia-Pacific Region,

–  having regard to the US Department of Defense document of January 2012 entitled ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st century Defense’, outlining the changes in US military strategy,

–  having regard to US President Barack Obama’s second Inaugural Address of 21 January 2013 and his State of the Union Address of 12 February 2013, and the remarks made by US Vice-President Joseph Biden at the Munich Security Conference of 2 February 2013,

–  having regard to the EU’s strategic partnerships with Brazil (2007) and Mexico (2008), to the EU Association Agreements with Mexico, Chile and Central America, the Trade Agreements with Colombia and Peru, the ongoing negotiations with Canada on a Strategic Partnership Agreement and a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, and the current negotiations with Mercosur,

–  having regard to its resolution of 12 June 2012 on defining a new development cooperation with Latin America(9), which underlines the EU’s support for the Latin American regional integration process, as represented by CELAC, UNASUR, Mercosur, the Andean Community, SICA, CARICOM and the Pacific Alliance,

–  having regard to the regular summits that the EU and the US hold with Latin American countries, the biannual EU-CELAC Summit and the Summit of the Americas, both of which are expected to be held in 2015,

–  having regard to the EU’s relationship with the African regional and subregional organisations of the Atlantic rim, in particular the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC),

–  having regard to the G20 Leaders Declarations, the outcome document of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (‘Realising the Future We Want for All’), and the outcome document of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (’The future we want’),

–  having regard to its resolutions on, inter alia, the Arab Spring, Mali, the Middle East, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, the Eastern Partnership, Russia and China,

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0173/2013),

A.  whereas in the whole Atlantic Basin the most important political and economic relationship is that linking the EU and the US; whereas the beginning of a new term of the Obama presidency should serve to strengthen that relationship through an ambitious new agenda;

B.  whereas the transatlantic partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historical links, on shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and on common goals, such as prosperity, open and integrated economies, social progress and inclusiveness, sustainable development, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

C.  whereas the global economic downturn has led to significant cutbacks in defence spending in both the EU and the US;

D.  whereas in a global, complex and increasingly multipolar world, the EU and the US should, in spite of the economic crisis, continue to play key constructive roles in the world’s politics and economy and in the shaping of the international environment, and jointly face regional conflicts and global challenges on a multilateral basis, notably in the framework of international organisations; whereas, to that end, they should also secure the involvement of new key powers - including the EU’s two Latin American Strategic Partners, Brazil and Mexico - and of Canada;

E.  whereas, in parallel to the shift in the global landscape triggered by the rise of Asian emerging powers, think-tanks, international organisations and some governments have recently been highlighting the growing importance of the Atlantic Basin as a whole, including its southern dimension, and the need for cooperation between the countries of which it is composed, so as to enable all of them to deal with problems that are common to the wider region;

F.  whereas Latin America is a region which shares with the EU and the US many values, interests, history and increasing economic ties; whereas Latin American countries have established a large number of regional or subregional organisations; whereas it is useful to study possible fields in which various modalities of triangular cooperation could be developed; whereas that cooperation could be extended to include the African countries of the Atlantic Basin; whereas it is important to base cooperation in the transatlantic space on compromises between the various interests, and whereas all parties should preserve their right to follow their own national priorities and developmental approaches;

G.  whereas some countries, notably China and also others such as India, are becoming increasingly active in the Atlantic basin area, particularly in the Southern Atlantic, where their actions are influenced by their need to acquire raw materials and food;

H.  whereas the broader transatlantic partnership needs to tackle issues such as development, security, energy and immigration, as well as favouring gradual economic and political convergence;

I.  whereas, beyond the broader Atlantic perspective, there are other current issues and conflicts in respect of which coordinated action on the part of the EU and the US is essential;

J.  whereas an increase in the number and sophistication of high profile cyber-attacks has led to the review of related legislation, with the US adopting voluntary reporting mechanisms while the EU plans to adopt tighter compulsory measures;

Bilateral relations

1.  Congratulates Barack Obama on his re-election as President of the United States of America; invites him to address the European Parliament at its plenary session in Strasbourg during his next visit to Europe;

2.  Calls for an EU-US summit to be held as soon as possible to decide on a common agenda of short-term and long-term goals with regard to both bilateral matters and global and regional issues;

3.  Recognises the long-term implications for the transatlantic partnership of the geopolitical rebalancing on the part of the US towards Asia; emphasises the need for a constructive, coherent and strategic response by the EU; believes that this also presents an opportunity for the EU to engage more actively in the Asia-Pacific region, as an autonomous global actor but in close cooperation with the US, thereby deepening the strategic dimension of the transatlantic partnership;

4.  Welcomes the official announcement of negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); stresses that this agreement will represent a significant boost to the EU and US economies and will reinvigorate the EU-US relationship; notes that its global impact would go beyond its bilateral implications, by providing common approaches to rules and standards in global trade, investment and trade-related areas; stresses the need to exercise strong political will and a constructive attitude in order to pursue the negotiations in an efficient manner; expects the TTIP process to engender a renewed political momentum in transatlantic relations, which could and should be used to stimulate closer cooperation in other areas, including foreign policy;

5.  Calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), the Council, the Commission and the EU Member States to enhance their coordination of EU policy vis-à-vis the US administration, so as to send out a convincing message that the EU is a coherent and efficient international player; highlights the importance of also strengthening the common security and defence policy, given the different crises that may arise in the EU’s neighbouring regions and the US’s ‘leading from behind’ doctrine;

6.  Recalls its suggestion that a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) be created to serve as a body for systematic consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy, led by the HR/VP and the US Secretary of State;

7.  Highlights the contribution of the TLD, as a content -based, constructive body, to the strengthening of EU-US relations by providing a forum for parliamentary dialogue, identifying objectives and coordinating on issues of common concern; welcomes the opening of the European Parliament Liaison Office in Washington, and invites the US Congress to follow suit in Brussels; calls for the continuation of staff exchanges between the two institutions;

8.  Strongly condemns the Boston terrorist attacks of 15 April 2013; encourages both partners to continue the fight against terrorism and organised crime and, at the same time, to respect and uphold human rights and fundamental liberties; is deeply concerned by recent revelations on the US surveillance and data gathering operations under the PRISM programme, and their implications for the protection of EU citizens' civil liberties; calls on the Commission and the Council to raise the issue at the forthcoming JHA EU-USA Ministerial meeting on June 14th; notes the fact that the Passenger Name Records Agreement and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme Agreement (SWIFT Agreement), approved by the European Parliament, are already in force; calls on the partners to increase their cooperation on the Data Privacy and Protection Agreement, in order to finalise the negotiations in such a manner as to ensure the proper transparency of data processing and sufficient protection of personal data;

9.  Notes the increasing importance of the use of drones; underlines the need for a vigorous debate on armed drones and their limits, transparency and control,; welcomes the current debate in the US, and expects that a comprehensive regulatory framework could be established soon; welcomes, in this context, the decisions announced by President Obama in his speech of 23 May 2013 to formalise new limitations on the use of drones as lethal arms and to engage Congress to explore options for increased oversight of this use; invites both partners to engage in close discussions on armed drones, and stresses the need to take steps towards a future international regulation, given the global implications;

10.  Reiterates its view that the EU must continue to raise with the US, at both political and technical level, the longstanding issue of the visa requirement imposed on the citizens of four EU Member States;

11.  Reiterates the growing importance of cyber-defence and welcomes the creation, at the 2010 summit, of the Working Group on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Crime; believes that the EU and the US should give special priority to their cooperation on cyber-security, with special regard to countering cyber-attacks and to jointly advancing efforts at international level for the development of a comprehensive and transparent international framework that will set minimum standards for cyber-security policies, while also upholding fundamental liberties;

12.  Regrets that the EU and US plan to implement differing levels of cyber-security vigilance at a time when NATO is pushing for intensified cooperation; stresses that such inconsistencies not only pose a threat for cyber-defence but may also create trade-related problems for companies whose operations span both jurisdictions;

13.  Welcomes the renewed pledge of President Obama to close Guantánamo, expressed in his speech of 23 May 2013; reiterates its call to allow detainees who have not been charged to return home or to another safe country as quickly as possible, to try Guantánamo detainees against whom sufficient admissible evidence exists without delay in a fair and public hearing by an independent, impartial tribunal, and to ensure that, if convicted, they are imprisoned in the United States in accordance with the applicable international standards and principles;

14.  Underlines the continuous importance of NATO as the cornerstone of transatlantic security; calls again for the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO;

Atlantic and global agenda

15.  Calls on both partners to study areas and frameworks through which broader transatlantic cooperation could be carried out in a pragmatic way, and to explore with other Atlantic countries the usefulness of this extended cooperation; underlines that possible areas from the EU’s point of view include economic and social issues, global governance, the process of democratisation, human rights, development cooperation, climate change, security and energy; calls on the partners to analyse the possibility of making use, for the purpose of these triangular dialogues, of the regional and subregional structures created in Latin America which the EU has traditionally encouraged;

16.  Suggests that the partners engage in regular exchanges of views regarding their respective summits with Latin American countries in a regional framework, namely the biannual EU-CELAC summit and the Summit of the Americas held by the Organisation of American States;

17.  Highlights the fact that there already exist various multilateral frameworks devoted to specific matters which have a strong triangular component, such as the Central America Regional Security Initiative;

18.  Recalls the positive role that Canada - with which both partners have a solid relationship - can play in a broader transatlantic cooperation;

19.  Calls on both partners also to study the possibility of a broader cooperation including the African rim of the Atlantic Basin, and, in addition, to identify pertinent fields and frameworks, taking the relevant African organisations into account;

20.  Calls on the EU and the US to work in a coordinated manner with a view to contributing to a stable international order of peace and cooperation, based on effective multilateralism with emerging players, including those of the South Atlantic rim; urges the partners to continue working on the UN reform programme while engaging the other Atlantic countries and taking their interests into account; stresses the need for an enhanced cooperation between the EU and the countries of the Americas within the UN;

21.  Recalls that the International Criminal Court is an increasingly indispensable instrument of international law and a fundamental element of EU foreign policy in relation to the goal of ending impunity; pays tribute to the work of the ICC on its tenth anniversary; welcomes the move of the Obama administration to re-establish a working relationship with the Court, and expects that the US will take further steps towards re-signing and ratifying the Rome Statute;

22.  Calls on the EU and the US to work jointly towards the strengthening of regional and subregional organisations in the Atlantic Basin, given the important role played by them in promoting economic and political integration;

23.  Calls on the partners to give a new impetus to the G20, inter alia by simultaneously, engaging, on an equal footing, the other Atlantic powers participating in that forum; highlights the fact that, given Obama’s re-election and the large number of new leaders in key G20 countries, the moment is timely to make the next meeting of the G20 more ambitious and operational, and expects that this issue will be addressed at the next bilateral summit;

24.  Stresses that the eventual conclusion of the TTIP will create the prospect of a wide economic space that would include North America, the EU, and the many Latin American countries with which the partners have negotiated economic agreements;

25.  Stresses that the integration of two of the biggest market economies can create a geopolitical template for promoting democratic values;

26.  Stresses that democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights must be central for the Atlantic Basin countries; encourages further cooperation between EU and US programmes promoting democracy, free and fair elections and the upholding of human rights;

27.  Stresses the importance of coordination to combat the risks to global security, such as terrorism, failed states, trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs, organised crime, piracy and cyber-security, all of which constitute current threats in the Atlantic Basin; underlines the need to deepen comprehensive cooperation between all the countries of the Atlantic Basin in the fight against drug trafficking, a phenomenon which is on the rise throughout West Africa and the Sahel; welcomes the partners’ support for the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on Drugs;

28.  Draws attention to the particularly important role that maritime security must play in the Atlantic space; welcomes the efforts of the partners, in close coordination with ECOWAS and ECCAS, to fight piracy and promote maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea;

29.  Highlights the importance of diversifying energy suppliers, sources and transportation routes; stresses the growing relevance of the countries of the Atlantic Basin with regard to energy production and reserves as well as raw materials, all of which offer considerable diversification opportunities; suggests that the EU-US Energy Council, together with the other countries of the Atlantic Basin, should study the possibility of working together on energy security and sustainability matters, including renewable energy technologies; likewise suggests studying the possibility of closer cooperation on raw materials efficiency and recycling;

30.  Welcomes the emphasis placed by President Obama in his inauguration speech on the renewal of the United States’ capacity to manage crises abroad, and hopes that the cooperation already engaged in by the EU and the US in crisis management, and increasingly in crisis prevention, in East Africa will be extended to the Atlantic rim; in this context, invites both partners to make full and constructive use of the 2011 Framework Agreement on US participation in the CSDP; calls on the EU Member States to engage seriously in joint pooling and sharing projects in order to be able to autonomously fulfil the tasks described in Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty;

31.  Calls on the EU and the US to continue strengthening their dialogue and cooperation in the field of development, in order to improve the quality and effectiveness of their development assistance; urges both partners to continue promoting the objective of achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; welcomes the fact that the partners have set up a reflection group to work on a post-2015 agenda concerning the Millennium Development Goals; urges the partners to engage in close coordination with the countries of the Atlantic rim in relation to those goals, given their special importance for that group; calls on the EU and the US, in this reflection process, to address the issue of how the post-2015 MDGs and the Sustainable Development Goals can be linked;

32.  Welcomes President Obama’s renewed commitment to the fight against climate change; urges the partners to agree, as early as possible and by 2015 at the latest, on binding commitments on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in line with maintaining climate change below 2°C; expects this issue to be addressed at the next bilateral summit; highlights the need to involve the Atlantic countries in this effort, especially given the harmful impact of climate change, in those countries and across the globe, on food production, biodiversity, desertification and extreme weather events; regards it as essential that the EU and the US lead the way towards a global agreement on the regulation of airline emissions in the context of the ICAO General Assembly; reaffirms the need for close transatlantic cooperation in the field of shale gas exploitation;

33.  Calls on the EU and the US to adopt a common strategy in international forums, especially the UN, for reducing stocks of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, and to involve the Atlantic countries in those endeavours; expects the US and Russia to make further progress on nuclear disarmament; warmly welcomes the recent approval of the Arms Trade Treaty by the UN General Assembly, and urges the EU Member States and the US to swiftly sign it;

34.  Encourages think-tanks and researchers to continue their study of broader transatlantic cooperation, which also helps to foster the idea of a wider Atlantic community;

35.  Stresses that cultural exchanges through educational programmes are fundamental to developing common values and, therefore, to building bridges between the Atlantic basin partners;

Current issues and conflicts

36.  Calls on the partners to prioritise close coordination in supporting the democratic transition in North Africa and the Middle East on the basis of a comprehensive and conditional strategy of assistance and incentives linked to democratic reforms; urges the partners to coordinate as closely as possible regarding support for the opposition in Syria, and to maintain pressure on Russia and China with a view to an urgent political solution for the tragic crisis in that country; supports the call for a peace conference on Syria in Geneva; underscores the need for a common response to the political instability and looming economic crisis in Egypt; encourages cooperation in order to support democratisation programmes in the region;

37.  Underlines the need for coordination between the EU, its Member States, the US, the AU, ECOWAS, the UN and other actors in support of implementation of the roadmap to transition in Mali, as well as the need for financial and logistical support for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which is poised to transfer its authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 2100 as adopted on 25 April 2013;

38.  Regrets the stalling of the Middle East peace process; welcomes the fact that President Obama visited Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan during his first visit abroad after his re-election, and welcomes the fact that the Middle East peace process has again become a main priority, as shown by the current efforts made by the Secretary of State, John Kerry; welcomes President Obama’s commitment to a two-state solution; calls on the US side to push for a freeze on settlement construction and to work together with the EU on the resumption of direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; shares President Obama’s view on Israel’s ongoing settlement building and on the importance of ensuring Israel’s security;

39.  Urges the two partners to continue to work towards a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue with a view to expeditiously achieving a comprehensive negotiated long-term settlement which would foster international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT; calls on the EU and the US to consider, in the context of the EU 3+3 (P5 +1) negotiations with Iran, the coordinated and conditional lifting of sanctions in exchange for mutually agreed and verifiable action by the Iranian government to resolve all outstanding issues concerning its nuclear programme, in full compliance with the provisions of the NPT, the IAEA Board of Governors and the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the demands made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); calls on both partners to adopt a more comprehensive approach towards relations with Iran that addresses the human rights situation as well as the broader regional security picture, and to involve Iranian civil society and NGOs wherever applicable;

40.  Urges the partners to jointly develop a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan for the post-2014 period, in coordination with the Afghan government; stresses that properly trained and equipped Afghan military and police forces, together with human and socio-economic development, good governance and pro-rule of law policies, will be vital for peace, stability and security in the country, while a much stronger commitment from Afghanistan’s neighbours to these goals will also be required; also stresses the need for a democratic and inclusive political process in the country; recognises the fundamental role that has been played by NATO in coordinating the security response to the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, including reconstruction and rehabilitation, and recognises the potential role of NATO in the post-2014 period;

41.  Highlights the importance of the Eastern Partnership to the EU; stresses the need to bring the countries of this neighbouring region closer, politically and economically, to the EU and to the common values of the transatlantic partners; calls on the EU and the US to coordinate actively in this regard, and stresses the need for concerted efforts in order to promote democratic reforms, consolidate democratic institutions and enhance peaceful conflict resolution; appreciates the continued support of the US support for the Western Balkans enlargement process, and encourages both partners to maintain a coordinated approach toward the countries of this region;

42.  Urges both partners to better coordinate their policies regarding critical engagement with Russia; emphasises the importance of cooperation with Russia on global challenges, including disarmament and non-proliferation; calls on the EU and the US to contribute to Russia’s modernisation process, with particular emphasis on consolidating democracy, human rights and the rule of law and on promoting diversified and socially equitable economic growth; highlights the importance of promoting people-to-people contacts; in this regard, regrets the new restrictive laws on NGOs and the increasing pressure being applied by the Russian authorities on the offices of NGOs based in Russia; stresses that implementation of the commitments made by Russia when it joined the WTO is an important part of the modernisation agenda of the country; calls on both partners to engage in a constructive discussions with Russia on frozen conflicts; welcomes the approval of the Magnitsky list by the US Congress, and recalls its own resolution of October 2012;

43.  Notes the shift of international attention towards East Asia owing to the political and economic rise of the Asia-Pacific region; welcomes the recent establishment of closer consultation between the EU and the US regarding that region, and believes this might lead to closer EU-US cooperation concerning Asia; notes, in particular, the need for a coordinated response to issues that could potentially disturb peace in the region, especially in the case of the South-East China Sea conflict, which is fuelling aggressive nationalism in some Asian countries and poses a threat to maritime security;

44.  Strongly condemns the escalating war rhetoric on the part of North Korea and its direct threats made against the US in response to the recent UN Security Council resolution 2087 adopting tougher sanctions; calls on Pyongyang to abide by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes; urges both sides to maintain calm and to pursue peace through diplomatic channels; urges the EU, the US and South Korea to maintain close dialogue with China in order to restrain the Pyongyang regime;

45.  Calls on the EU and the US to make a coordinated effort to commit the new Chinese leadership to dealing more actively with global agenda issues and conflicts; welcomes the fact that the EU and China have agreed to hold a regular dialogue on defence and security policy, as well as to maintain regular contacts between special representatives and special envoys; recalls the importance of sustaining an open dialogue with China on good governance and respect for human rights;

o
o   o

46.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the US Government and the US Congress.

(1) OJ C 298 E, 8.12.2006, p. 226. (2) OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p. 198. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0510. (4) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0388. (5) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0227. (6) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0334. (7) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0455. (8) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0457. (9) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0235.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali (2013/2587(RSP))

P7_TA(2013)0281 B7-0254/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its resolutions of 20 April 2012 on the situation in Mali(1) and of 14 June 2012 on human rights and the security situation in the Sahel region(2),

–  having regard to the European Union’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, adopted in March 2011,

–  having regard to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012) on the situation in Mali,

–  having regard to UNSC resolution 2085 (2012) authorising the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma),

–  having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 22 March, 26 March, 7 April, 21 December and 23 December 2012, as well as of 11 January, 7 March and 7 June 2013, regarding the situation in Mali,

–  having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on the Sahel of 23 March 2012 approving the Crisis Management Concept for a civilian CSDP Advisory, Assistance and Training Mission in the Sahel,

–  having regard to the EU Council Conclusions on Mali of 31 January, of 18 February, of 23 April and of 27 May 2013,

–   having regard to the letter of 25 March 2013 from the transitional authorities in Mali to the UN Secretary-General requesting the deployment of a United Nations operation to stabilise and restore the authority and the sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its national territory,

–   having regard to the letter of 26 March 2013 from the President of the Ecowas Commission to the UN Secretary-General requesting the transformation of Afisma into a United Nations stabilisation mission,

–  having regard to UN Resolution 2100 (2013) adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting on 25 April 2013 creating a peace-keeping force

–  having regard to the Malian roadmap for transition which was unanimously approved by the country’s National Assembly on 29 January 2013,

–  having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

–  having regard to all African and international human rights conventions signed by Mali,

–  having regard to Written Questions O-000040 – B7-0205/2013 and O-000041 – B7-0206/2013 to the Council and the Commission, respectively, on the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali,

–  having regard to the ‘Together for a New Mali’ conference of donors for development held in Brussels on 15 May 2013,

–  having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the effects of the military coup d’état in Mali in March 2012, the occupation of the northern part of the country by armed rebel jihadist groups, and the following armed conflict in the northern part, are felt far beyond Mali and the Sahel region, with repercussions elsewhere in Africa and in Europe;

B.  whereas Mali is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and ranks 182nd among the 187 countries on the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 2013; whereas even before the current crisis Mali suffered from socio-economic disparities between North and South, as well as from weak democratic institutions, poor governance, corruption and organised crime;

C.  whereas Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, appointed head of the Military Committee for Reform of the Armed Forces and Security, remains a dangerous figure who retains his capacity to cause damage, not least in light of his new functions which provide him with a direct contact with the military;

D.  whereas a roadmap for transition has been approved by the Malian authorities and a Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation has been set up; whereas the EU, together with Mali’s transitional authorities and other regional and international organisations, has started working on the implementation of the roadmap in order to bring lasting peace;

E.  whereas political dialogue and reconciliation between ethnic groups – to keep the peace and create a willingness among the country’s different ethnic groups to live together – represent a challenge to the reconstruction of Mali; whereas the situation in Kidal, still controlled by Tuaregs from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), could well jeopardise this reconciliation process; whereas only those groups that respect Mali’s Constitution and the integrity of the country’s territory will be allowed to participate in the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation;

F.  whereas at a donors’ conference in Addis Ababa organised by the African Union (AU) on 29 January 2013, a total of EUR 337,2 million were pledged by donors toward resolving the Mali crisis, of which sum the EU awarded EUR 50 million to Afisma and, under the Instrument for Stability, EUR 20 million to provide immediate support to Mali’s law enforcement and justice services, local authorities, dialogue and reconciliation efforts and the first phases of the preparatory process for the coming elections;

G.  whereas the Commission has announced a gradual resumption of development aid, to the sum of EUR 250 million, in support of areas such as: reconciliation and conflict prevention; the electoral process; the provision of basic services, including health and access to water and sanitation; the strengthening of food security; and the re-launching of the economy;

H.  whereas many international organisations and non-governmental organisations work in Mali to help provide basic services to local communities, including food aid, access to water and healthcare;

I.  whereas the international community and Mali agree on the fact that the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED) constitutes a sound basis for mutual commitments; that the implementation of the PRED requires monitoring and evaluation of the planned programmes and expenditure; that the donors’ support for the PRED depends on Mali honouring its commitments, and in particular implementing the necessary reforms with regard to democratic governance;

J.  Whereas the French military operation ‘Serval’, launched in support of the Malian army on 11 January 2013 in response to an offensive by radical Islamist groups, has been successful in retaking northern towns and areas captured by rebels, and whereas, according to the French government, the French troops began their phased withdrawal from Mali in April 2013;

K.  whereas the UN-sanctioned African-led International Support Mission in Mali (Afisma) already has 6 500 troops in the country; whereas UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has pleaded that a UN peacekeeping force be deployed to Mali to stabilise the country;

L.  whereas on 25 April 2013 the UN Security Council adopted, under Chapter VII of the Charter, Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in line with recommendations of the UN Secretary-General; whereas the 12 600-strong MINUSMA force will take over from Afisma on 1 July 2013, while the French troops are authorised, upon request of the UN Secretary-General, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat;

M.  whereas while the security situation in northern Mali has improved since the French intervention, the struggle against radical Islamist groups continues; whereas there is a need to maintain the momentum against isolated terrorist threats in some northern areas, such as the recent threats to Timbuktu and Gao, requiring a stabilising force and quick response capacities; whereas armed extremists are increasingly resorting to asymmetric tactics, such as guerrilla ambushes, suicide attacks, car bombings and the use of anti-personnel land-mines; whereas, therefore, maintaining peace and security in the medium and long term presents exceptional challenges;

N.  whereas the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and requires a response that goes beyond addressing security threats, including a long-term commitment on the part of the international community and decisive action to tackle deep-rooted political, governance, development and humanitarian challenges;

O.  whereas for the past two decades elections have been held on a regular basis in Mali, and whereas prior to the coup d’état the country was seen as a success story for democracy in Africa, even though the country’s economy never did progress sufficiently to provide a better future for its young people (many of whom were instead forced to migrate) or to improve the livelihood of the population in general;

P.  whereas relaunching the economic development of Mali requires targeted aid focusing on the real needs of the country;

Q.  whereas the Malian crisis is manifold and complex, and cannot be reduced to an ethnic conflict; whereas the solutions must therefore be comprehensive and coherent, encompassing economic, social and environmental policies that aim to improve the living standards of the population, and to achieve this it is important to understand past mistakes by analysing the internal and external factors of Mali’s economic development failure;

R.  whereas unconstitutional change of government is a major obstacle to peace, security and development; whereas Article 25 of the African Charter – on democracy, elections and governance – stipulates that individual perpetrators shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or to hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State;

S.  whereas the human rights situation in Mali deteriorated sharply after the start of the rebellion in the north of the country and the military coup on 22 March 2012;

T.  whereas there are massive humanitarian needs in Mali, where up to 1 million people have been dependent on food assistance, including 174 129 refugees in neighbouring countries and 300 783 internally displaced people; whereas an integrated return strategy is needed for when conditions in the north are conducive to safe, voluntary and dignified returns;

U.  whereas 750 000 people are in need of immediate food assistance and 660 000 children are at risk of malnutrition, including 210 000 at risk of severe malnutrition; whereas access to basic social services remains limited, particularly in the north;

V.  whereas an Action Plan for the Rehabilitation of Cultural Heritage and the Safeguarding of Ancient Manuscripts in Mali was adopted at an international experts meeting organised by Unesco in February 2013;

W.  whereas the European Union attaches great importance to the respect of human rights; whereas the population in northern Mali lives in an atmosphere of fear, and their human rights are systematically violated by radical Islamist groups;

X.  whereas on 15 May 2013 a high-level donor conference, ‘Together for a New Mali’, was held in Brussels convening delegations from 108 countries, including 13 heads of state and government, a large number of foreign affairs ministers and senior representatives of regional and international institutions, together with representatives of local authorities and civil society; whereas donors have undertaken to donate EUR 3.25 billion to Mali in the next two years, with the EU taking the lead by pledging EUR 520 million;

Y.  whereas the EU will collectively allocate EUR 1.35 billion in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED), of which the Commission will contribute EUR 523.9 million, including EUR 12 million in humanitarian aid to meet the most urgent needs;

Z.  whereas the situation in Kidal remains uncertain and is threatening to disrupt the upcoming presidential elections, despite mediation efforts by Burkina Faso;

1.  Stresses its commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali; welcomes the French intervention in support of these principles as a first step towards the reconstruction and democratisation of Mali; calls for strong EU involvement in this process;

2.  Supports a Malian-led political process enabling the country to achieve long-term political stability and economic prosperity; underlines the importance of inclusive national dialogue, and of the reconciliation process, in the effort to reach a genuine and democratic political solution to the country’s recurrent crisis; welcomes, in this context, the establishment of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013, and expresses hope that it is rapidly made operational; welcomes the nomination of a woman and a Tuareg as vice-presidents of this Commission as a sign of a commitment to inclusiveness and plurality in the political process;

3.  Is deeply concerned about the situation in Kidal, where Tuaregs from the MNLA are still refusing to hand over control to the Malian army and are therefore seriously hampering the reconstruction process; invites the government and the MNLA to hold a preliminary discussion about the participation of MNLA in the Commission for National Dialogue and Reconciliation;

4.  Urges swift implementation of the roadmap, in order to sustain the transition until the constitutional order and the rule of law has been re-established throughout the country through the organisation of democratic, free, fair and transparent elections in 2013; welcomes the commitment on the part of the Malian authorities to organise the elections on 28 July and 11 August 2013, as well as the declarations by leaders of the transitional government not to stand for election; acknowledges the challenges that the organisation of the elections pose, including tasks such as ensuring security in the northern areas, issuing biometric voter cards and registering refugees on the electoral rolls, and calls on the EU and its international partners to step up their support for the upcoming electoral process; welcomes, in this respect, the intention of sending an EU electoral observation mission, as requested by the Malian government;

5.  Reaffirms that the presidential and legislative elections are seen as a first step towards a return to democracy, and that holding the elections is an essential element in ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of future governments;

6.  Welcomes the mediation efforts by the President of Burkina Faso in the ongoing negotiations in Ouagadougou between the Malian government and Tuareg rebels; calls for the rapid conclusion of the negotiations, and reiterates its determination to support the re-establishment of the State administration throughout the territory of Mali and the forthcoming holding of elections, including in Kidal Region and in refugee camps;

7.  Insists that any political solution to rebuild Mali needs to be accompanied by a clear and sustainable economic development strategy that addresses the problem of unemployment in order to improve the livelihood of the population, and stresses that the provision of basic services such as health, education, water and sanitation must be resumed as they are essential to the stability of the country; believes that institutional reforms are necessary to ensure political stability and to allow the Malian community as a whole to be involved in building the country’s future; stresses as well the need to strengthen democratic processes and accountability throughout the country if better development results are to attained;

8.  Welcomes the sustainable recovery plan for 2013-2014 that forms part of the Roadmap for Transition of 29 January 2013 and the Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction 2012-2017 of December 2011 (CSCRP 2012-2017);

9.  Is convinced that the success of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali requires that account be taken of the regional and sub-regional dimension, in particular through consolidation of good governance and greater economic integration, development of economic infrastructure, development of human resources in healthcare and education, and establishment of a partnership to mobilise resources and monitor evaluation;

10.  Invites the Malian government to work together with relevant international organisations and NGOs in order to provide the people of Mali with adequate and coordinated support;

11.  Takes the view that responding to Mali’s development challenges requires both adequate funding and improved coordination, both at EU level and with other international donors; strongly supports a tailor-made approach that focuses on the needs of the country and that reflects the progress made towards implementing the roadmap and restoring the rule of law;

12.  Calls on the EU and its international partners to help West African governments fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; calls on the countries in the region to put a balanced and sustainable development strategy at the heart of their development policy, provide basic public services to the population in general and create employment opportunities, in particular for the young;

13.  Calls on the EU, the UN and the individual states to provide logistic and technical support to help Malians fight against drug trafficking and the proliferation of arms; invites all countries in the Sahel region to coordinate their respective security policies with a view to formulating a strong response to trafficking;

14.  Stresses that security and development in the Sahel are mutually reinforcing; welcomes the initial intervention by France, reinforced by the Afisma (and, with effect from 1 July 2013, the MINUSMA), to halt further destabilisation and to counter extremist forces; underlines the important complementary role of the EU Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in providing decisive assistance in building the longer-term capacity of the Malian army; recalls that longer-term stability, security and territorial integrity of the country requires not only that violent and radical extremists – and traffickers in arms, drugs and people – are defeated but that alternatives to the illegal activities of impoverished people and unemployed youth are promoted;

15.  Underlines the need to find a regional solution, rooted in a regional agreement supported by a conference of the countries of the sub-region, in particular Algeria and Mauritania;

16.  Calls for the reform of the Malian armed forces, and the broader security services, to be stepped up under democratic and civilian control in order to ensure stability and build confidence in the role of the security sector in contributing to lasting peace and democracy in the country;

17.  Calls on the Malian government to pay particular attention to promoting human rights throughout the territory of Mali, and to prosecute all those who have committed serious violations of human rights, regardless of whether they belong to radical Islamist groups or to the Malian army;

18.  Commends the efforts of the African countries that contributed to Afisma and welcomes its deployment to Mali; welcomes, equally, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), an operation with a robust mandate to stabilise the country, support the implementation of the roadmap for transition, protect civilians, promote and protect human rights, as well as support humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and national and international justice; expresses its hope that MINUSMA will soon be fully operational and that the security situation will be such that it can be deployed on 1 July 2013;

19.  Welcomes the launch of EUTM Mali on 18 February 2013 and its mandate to support the reform of the Malian armed forces under democratic civilian control; recalls the urgent need to support the Malian government in ensuring that it can maintain its territorial integrity over the longer term, which includes having the means to address key asymmetric threats represented by the radical Islamist groups and by those trafficking in people, goods and arms; takes the view that the EU should consider including in the training programmes of the Malian armed forces modules on good practices, human rights and fighting corruption;

20.  Notes the complementary work of EUCAP Sahel Niger in providing training to strengthen the security sector in neighbouring countries and in coordinating with EUTM Mali through a liaison officer in Bamako; calls on the VP/HR to set out options for providing similar support for the reform of the broader security sector in Mali (including police, national guard, gendarmerie and the justice sector), inter alia by assessing whether this could be done through an extension of the mandate of EUTM Mali or EUCAP Sahel Niger, or through the creation of a new CSDP Mission dedicated to the broader reform of the civilian security sector;

21.  Condemns the human rights violations and calls for the perpetrators to be held responsible; welcomes the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open an inquiry, and calls on the Malian authorities to cooperate with the ICC; welcomes the deployment of the first human rights observers in Mali, in accordance with the decisions of the African Union Peace and Security Council and Ecowas; underlines that political reconstruction and its credibility also depend on the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms;

22.  Calls for the provision to continue of humanitarian aid to populations in need, and for measures to be taken to ensure the free and voluntary return of the refugees; stresses the need to maintain a clear distinction between humanitarian and political/security agendas in order to ensure the impartiality of humanitarian action, the safety of humanitarian workers and the access to relief of those in need;

23.  Invites all security forces in Mali to secure the country in order to allow humanitarian aid to reach the whole population;

24.  Reiterates its condemnation of the looting and destruction of cultural heritage sites; welcomes the recent measures taken by Unesco to rehabilitate Mali’s cultural heritage;

25.  Takes the view that the EU should, in light of the Malian crisis, make necessary adjustments to the European Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel; underlines the need for better integration between the development and security pillars of the strategy, and for better coordination of its policy instruments; stresses the need to improve the EU’s early warning systems in order that it may realise the strategy’s preventive dimension;

26.  Welcomes the positive outcome and the conclusions of ‘Together for a New Mali’, the high-level donor conference organised by the EU and France together with Mali and held in Brussels on 15 May 2013 in support of the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali; calls on the EU and its international partners to implement their mutual commitments as part of an effective and coordinated follow-up to the conference; stresses, in this context, the importance of initiating a global reform of governance in Mali, of establishing a new decentralisation policy and of creating the conditions for sustainable economic and social development in Mali;

27.  Stresses the need for closer regional cooperation, and takes the view that the EU should use its political influence and financial leverage to encourage its partners in the region to harmonise their often fragmented political, diplomatic and military initiatives in order to address more effectively the multi-faceted challenges that the Sahel faces;

28.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and National Assembly of Mali, the African Union, Ecowas, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0141. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0263.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the negotiations on an EU-Afghanistan cooperation agreement on partnership and development (2013/2665(RSP))

P7_TA(2013)0282 RC-B7-0274/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions of 16 December 2010 on a new strategy for Afghanistan(1), of 15 December 2011 on budgetary control of EU financial assistance to Afghanistan(2) and of 15 December 2011 on the situation of women in Afghanistan and Pakistan(3),

–  having regard to the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan, including Resolution 2096 of March 2013,

–  having regard to the conclusions of the International Afghanistan Conferences of 2011 and 2012, including those held in Bonn in December 2011, in Chicago in May 2012, in Kabul in June 2012 and in Tokyo in July 2012,

–  having regard to the statement issued by the EU Delegation to Afghanistan in agreement with the EU Heads of Mission in Afghanistan on 19 November 2012, concerning the execution of people sentenced to death,

–  having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers’ decision of 27 May 2013 to extend the EU’s police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) until 31 December 2014,

–  having regard to Rule 110(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the EU has been supporting the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan since 2002 and continues to be committed to peaceful transition in Afghanistan, its inclusive and sustainable development and the stability and security of the whole region;

B.  whereas the provision of EU assistance from 2011 to 2013 has focused on key sectors of governance (including the police), agriculture, rural development, health and social protection;

C.  whereas the EU and Afghanistan are about to conclude negotiations on a cooperation agreement on partnership and development (CAPD) which will place EU-Afghanistan cooperation on a new, comprehensive level, with a new legal framework;

D.  whereas Parliament has asked for a five-year action plan for the elimination of opium cultivation through alternative development in Afghanistan;

E.  whereas the EU is supporting the training of police forces and capacity-building in Afghanistan, and whereas since 2007 the EUPOL mission has been supporting a sustainable and effective civil police force which will help in establishing a criminal justice system under Afghan ownership;

F.  whereas, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the number of Afghan citizens addicted to drugs is still increasing, with a major social impact on the population;

G.  whereas despite the active role being played by the EU in supporting counter-narcotics measures, significant results are very limited;

H.  whereas the lack of coordination between donors to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government is undermining the effectiveness of EU contributions to Afghanistan;

I.  whereas, since the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament has played a key role in giving the consent required for new cooperation agreements;

1.  Reaffirms its continued support for the construction of an Afghan state with stronger democratic institutions capable of securing national sovereignty, state unity, territorial integrity and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan; reaffirms that the peaceful future of Afghanistan depends on the building of a stable, secure and economically sustainable state which is free of terrorism and narcotics and is based on the rule of law, strengthened democratic institutions, respect for the separation of powers and a strong parliament, and the guarantee of fundamental rights; appreciates, in this connection, the important contributions made by EU development cooperation and by the EUPOL Afghanistan mission, the extension of which is welcomed;

2.  Welcomes the efforts and progress made in the last decade; reiterates, however, its concern about the security situation and the ongoing violence in Afghanistan, which are resulting in threats to the local population, including women, children, national security forces and international military and civilian personnel;

3.  Urges the Afghan Government to prepare to take over full responsibility for its security following the withdrawal of international forces; calls on the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to support the military and civilian capacity-building of the Afghan Government and its national security forces in order to establish stability and security as an essential basis for socio-economic development and avoid creating a vacuum once the country assumes full responsibility for its own security after 2014; underlines the risk that the withdrawal of international forces in 2014 may create an economic vacuum;

4.  Supports the negotiations on a cooperation agreement on partnership and development and stresses that it should lead to a more strategic approach and to support for the Afghan authorities during and after the withdrawal of international forces;

5.  Stresses the importance of this new agreement comprising a comprehensive and sustainable approach to addressing the security, economic, governance and development challenges in Afghanistan, which are interconnected;

6.  Calls on the Afghan authorities to commute all death sentences and to reintroduce a moratorium on executions with a view to the permanent abolition of the death penalty;

7.  Considers regrettable the lack of political momentum for the conclusion of the CAPD negotiations; calls, therefore, on the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Afghan Government to conclude them swiftly;

8.  Calls for the EU, within the framework of the new agreement, to continue its efforts to support democratic values, the rule of law, a reliable governance system (including the fight against corruption), an independent judiciary, human rights and the creation of a genuine civil society;

9.  Regrets the fact that despite the EEAS’s obligation to inform Parliament concerning all stages of the negotiations, Parliament has not been properly informed; recalls its new prerogatives in foreign affairs as stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty, and demands full cooperation from the EEAS and the Council on an issue of such major importance;

10.  Points to the need for further socio-economic development and economic diversification; stresses, in this connection, the potential to boost growth by exploiting energy resources and placing a stronger focus on the extractive industry; underlines, however, the need for the extractive industry to operate transparently and the need to apply the standards laid down by the International Extractive Transparency Initiative;

11.  Notes that despite some progress in the field of gender equality and fundamental rights over the last decade, women in Afghanistan are still the most vulnerable segment of society and continue to be subjected to threats, intimidation and violence and to suffer from discriminatory laws; highlights the need – from both a legal and a practical perspective – to integrate women fully into society and ensure their full participation, and to achieve real empowerment of women; strongly condemns the fact that many women are victims of ongoing threats and violence and that in the last few years prominent women in Afghan public life have been murdered or had attempts made on their lives, while the perpetrators have not been brought to justice;

12.  Stresses the need for continuing support for the development of infrastructure in many sectors, including schools, hospitals, transport, energy grids, agriculture and the empowerment of women in Afghanistan, in line with EU development aid even before the 2001 intervention;

13.  Regrets the fact that the EU anti-narcotics initiative has not achieved satisfactory results so far; points out that drug production and trafficking sustain ‘insurgent’ groups and fuel corruption at various levels; stresses that the main focus of action against narcotics should be on supporting income alternatives for farmers; highlights, in this connection, the need for a broader strategy in relation to sustainable rural development and water management;

14.  Recalls that more than 90 % of heroin in Europe originates in Afghanistan and that the costs to public health in European countries run into billions of dollars; notes, however, that opium production is a key social, economic and security issue; regrets the fact that in 2011 opium production rose by 61 % by comparison with 2010, accounting for 9 % of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2011;

15.  Notes that between 2009 and 2011 the US and the international community spent USD 1,1 billion on counter-narcotics measures without achieving any significant impact on production and trafficking; recalls that Parliament has repeatedly called for the establishment of a five-year opium elimination plan with specific deadlines and benchmarks, to be implemented through a dedicated office with its own budget and staff and on the basis of cooperation between the EU, the US and the Russian Federation, the latter being the main victim of Afghan heroin and the world’s largest opium market;

16.  Recalls that between 2002 and the end of 2011 the EU committed a total of approximately EUR 2,5 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, including EUR 493 million in humanitarian assistance; regrets the fact that despite the huge injections of foreign aid the impact has been limited; invites the Court of Auditors to draw up a special report on the effectiveness of EU assistance to Afghanistan over the last decade, similar to the one on the EULEX mission in Kosovo;

17.  Expresses the strongest possible concern about the inefficiency of international financial support and of Afghan government structures, and about the lack of transparency and the limited mechanisms for donor accountability;

18.  Deplores the fact that a significant proportion of European and other international aid money is lost in the course of the distribution chain, and draws attention to the four main ways this happens: waste, excessive intermediary and security costs, overbilling and corruption;

19.  Reiterates that it is crucial to coordinate EU assistance on the basis of a joint approach involving Member States and international actors in a common strategy; welcomes the strategic consensus between the Government of Afghanistan and the international community on a renewed and enduring partnership for the next decade, as stated in the conclusions of the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan and the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework;

20.  Stresses the importance of a comprehensive and inclusive Afghan-led and -owned approach to reconciliation in Afghanistan for all those who renounce violence, respect the constitution – including its human rights provisions, in particular those relating to the rights of women – and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan; stresses that the peace process should involve the political opposition, civil society in general and women in particular, and be as inclusive as possible; calls for the role of the High Peace Council in this area to be strengthened and focused more closely on the actual peace process;

21.  Recalls the commitments made by the Government of Afghanistan at the International Afghanistan Conferences in Kabul and Tokyo to strengthen and improve Afghanistan’s electoral process, including through long-term electoral reform, in order to ensure that future elections meet international standards; welcomes the announcement of the date for the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections, along with Afghanistan’s preparations for those elections; stresses the need to mobilise participation, which may depend on the security situation, especially in the southern and eastern provinces; reminds the Afghan authorities of the need for oversight by national and international observers of the national electoral roll and the organisation and monitoring of the voting process in the forthcoming elections; calls for the EU to provide support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, for the organisation of the forthcoming elections;

22.  Stresses the need for regional cooperation which has the objective of promoting stability and security in the wider region; emphasises the need for enhanced cooperation with Russia, Pakistan, Central Asia, India and Iran as part of a regional framework, in order to address the challenges presented by security issues, cross-border trafficking in people and goods, and the fight against the illegal production and trafficking of drugs;

23.  Calls on the EEAS to improve its cooperation with Parliament in relation to EU assistance to Afghanistan, including the progress of negotiations; expects full information on the terms of negotiations and regular reporting once the agreement has been adopted;

24.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of Afghanistan, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

(1) OJ C 169 E, 15.6.2012, p. 108. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0578. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0591.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the Millennium Development Goals – defining the post-2015 framework (2012/2289(INI))

P7_TA(2013)0283 A7-0165/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000,

–  having regard to the Resolution entitled ‘Keeping the promise: United to achieve the Millennium Development Goals’ adopted by the General Assembly at the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly on the Millennium Development Goals, at its sixty-fifth session in 2010,

–  having regard to the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995, the Declaration and Platform for Action adopted in Beijing and the subsequent outcome documents adopted at the UN Beijing +5, Beijing +10 and Beijing +15 Special Sessions on further actions and initiatives to implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted on 9 June 2000, 11 March 2005 and 2 March 2010 respectively, in which member states undertook to take action to promote gender equality between women and men in 12 areas,

–  having regard to the Istanbul Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020,

–  having regard to the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) decided upon in Cairo in 1994, recognising that sexual and reproductive health and rights are fundamental to realise sustainable development,

–  having regard to the report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) entitled ‘Beyond the Midpoint: Achieving the Millennium Development Goals’, published in January 2010,

–  having regard to the UNDP Human Development Report 2010 entitled ‘The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development’,

–  having regard to the UN ‘Gender Chart 2012’, which measures improvements regarding the gender equality aspects of the eight MDGs,

–  having regard to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2011 Human Development Report,

–  having regard to the final declaration adopted at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012,

–  having regard to the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW) adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, defining what constitutes discrimination against women and setting up an agenda for national action to put an end to such discrimination,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the human rights legal framework,

–  having regard to the work of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, led jointly by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and the UNDP, with support from all UN agencies and in consultation with relevant stakeholders,

–  having regard to the June 2012 UN Report to the UN Secretary General entitled ‘Realizing the future we want for all’,

–  having regard to the work of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the outcome of the Rio+20 conference,

–  having regard to the Monterrey Consensus adopted at the international conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, from 18 to 22 March 2002,

–  having regard to the declaration and action plan adopted at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in December 2011,

–  having regard to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action,

–  having regard to the European Consensus on Development(1) and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy(2),

–  having regard to Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which reaffirms that the EU shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account,

–  having regard to Article 208 TFEU, which stipulates that ‘the Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 April 2005 entitled ‘Policy Coherence for Development’ (COM(2005)0134), and the Council conclusions entitled ’Policy Coherence for Development’, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 14 May 2012,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2010 entitled ‘An EU policy framework to assist developing countries in addressing food security challenges’ (COM(2010)0127),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 31 March 2010 entitled ‘Humanitarian Food Assistance’ (COM(2010)0126),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 October 2012 entitled ‘The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises’ (COM(2012)0586),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2013 entitled ‘Enhancing Maternal and Child Nutrition in External Assistance: an EU Policy Framework’ (COM(2013)0141),

–  having regard to the European Report on Development of 19 September 2008 entitled ‘Millennium Development Goals at Midpoint: Where do we stand and where do we need to go?’,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 27 February 2013 entitled ‘A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’ (COM(2013)0092),

–  having regard to the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries (COM(2011)0843, SEC(2011)1475, SEC(2011)1476),

–  having regard to the Commission proposal of 7 December 2011 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (COM(2011)0840),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 June 2011 entitled ‘A Budget for Europe 2020’ (COM(2011)0500) and the Commission working paper of the same date entitled ’A Budget for Europe 2020: the current system of funding, the challenges ahead, the results of stakeholders consultation and different options on the main horizontal and sectoral issues’ (SEC(2011)0868),

–  having regard to the Commission’s joint communication of 7 December 2011 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Global Europe: A New Approach to financing EU external action’ (COM(2011)0865),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 December 2011 entitled ‘Preparation of the multiannual financial framework regarding the financing of EU cooperation for African, Caribbean and Pacific States and Overseas Countries and Territories for the 2014-2020 period’ (COM(2011)0837),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, 3218th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 31 January 2013,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions entitled ‘Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of 14 May 2012,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

–  having regard to the Commission’s public consultations on the preparation of an EU position ‘Towards a Post-2015 Development Framework’(3), which ran from 15 June 2012 to 15 September 2012 and was open to all interested stakeholders, individuals, organisations (governmental/non-governmental, parliamentary, academic, private-sector, etc.) and countries,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 April 2010 entitled ‘A twelve-point EU action plan in support of the Millennium Development Goals’ (COM(2010)0159),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2010 on ‘progress towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals: mid-term review in preparation of the UN high-level meeting in September 2010(4),

–  having regard to the January 2013 study entitled ‘Millennium Development Goals and beyond 2015 – a strong EU engagement’,

–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (A7-0165/2013),

A.  whereas the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have raised awareness that ending global poverty is an urgent challenge and a priority for global action thanks to their limited set of concrete and time-bound targets; whereas, two years from the 2015 target date for the MDGs, there has been significant progress: the target of reducing extreme poverty by half has been reached, as has the target of halving the proportion of people who lack dependable access to improved sources of drinking water, conditions for over 200 million people living in slums have been improved, primary school enrolment of girls now equals that of boys and accelerating progress in reducing child and maternal mortality can be seen; whereas, however, the current MDGs do not sufficiently address the root causes of poverty such as inequalities within and among countries, social exclusion, biodiversity and governance;

B.  whereas the European Consensus for Development, signed by the Commission, the Council and Parliament is an acquis communautaire; recalling the importance and scope of this document, which enshrines the European Roadmap for development, as well as the acquis and the guidelines arising from it;

C.  whereas the MDGs have helped to define poverty as a multidimensional deprivation in people’s lives, covering education, health, the environment, food, employment, housing and gender equality;

D.  whereas global challenges remain and are expected to increase – poverty, hunger and malnutrition, lack of access to quality health care for all, restricted access to medication, lack of proper, safe sanitation and hygiene, insufficient levels of quality, primary and secondary education, high unemployment – particularly youth unemployment, lack of social protection and respect for human rights, inequalities, including gender, as well as environmental degradation and climate change - prompting the need to find new development pathways that could lead to inclusive and sustainable development for all;

E.  whereas nearly one billion people in the world are undernourished and more than 200 million are unemployed; whereas only 28 % of the global population is covered by comprehensive social protection systems, reflecting high degrees of informal employment and whereas an estimated 1.4 billion people lack access to sufficient energy services, hampering their ability to overcome poverty;

F.  whereas the problem of malnutrition in developing countries kills an estimated 2,6 million children every year and owing to the effects of climate change the number of undernourished is expected to increase;

G.  whereas an estimated 140 million girls will become child brides by 2020 if current rates of early marriage continue;

H.  whereas three-quarters of the world’s poor people live in middle income countries and, according to the World Development Indicators 2008 of the World Bank, income and wealth inequalities within countries have increased since the early 1980s, including in high-income countries; whereas insecurity about incomes and jobs has also increased owing to patterns of globalisation based on outsourcing and weaker labour protection;

I.  whereas it is projected that in 2015 more than 600 million people will still be using unimproved water sources which pose a risk to health and that one billion people, of which 70 % are women, will be living on less than USD 1,25 per day, especially in a number of African countries, but also in emerging countries, and, if present trends continue, the MDG target to halve the proportion of people living without basic sanitation services will not be met until 2049; whereas currently almost 200 million people are unemployed, about 74 million of those are between the ages of 15 and 24, and only 20 % of the world’s population has adequate social security coverage, while more than half lack any coverage at all; whereas declaring 2015 the European Year for Development will thus help raise public awareness in Europe of the importance of the new MDGs;

J.  whereas the global food, energy and financial crisis of 2007-2010, coupled with the global economic decline and climate change, highlighted the fragility of global food supply systems and exposed failures of financial and commodity markets and of global governance mechanisms;

K.  whereas sustainability concerns, including the urgent need to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and to achieve more equitable and sustainable management and governance of natural resources, represent the key challenge for a transformative agenda;

L.  whereas the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development affirms development as a fundamental human right; whereas the Declaration commits to a ‘human rights based’ approach, characterized by the realisation of all human rights (economic, social, cultural, civil and political) and whereas the Declaration also commits to strengthening international cooperation;

M.  whereas the achievement of the MDGs before the deadline will depend largely on the fulfilment of the Global Partnership for Development, and whereas the EU and its Member States should stick to their commitments and not allow the current economic and financial crisis to halt the progress that has been made;

N.  whereas Article 208 TFEU establishes that the reduction and, in the long term, eradication of poverty is the primary objective of EU development policy;

O.  whereas 50 years of donor-driven development policy have created excessive addiction and dependency(5);

P.  whereas the UN is working closely with all stakeholders, in an inclusive manner, to build on the momentum generated by the MDGs and to carry on with an ambitious post-2015 development agenda, which should be based on better quality aid, improved coordination, and respect for the principles of policy coherence;

Q.  whereas the EU’s commitment to ensure policy coherence for development (PCD), in accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in 2005, was reaffirmed in its conclusions of 14 May 2012(6);

R.  whereas the EU, as the world’s largest donor, is determined to achieve the MDGs on time and is deeply engaged in the negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda;

S.  whereas the European Parliament attaches particular relevance to this process and considers that the EU should work as a driving force for the post-2015 framework;

T.  whereas a significant number of fragile or conflict-affected states have not met a single MDG target(7);

U.  whereas the lack of peace, security, democracy, respect for human rights and political stability, together with corruption and human rights violations, prevents poor countries from fulfilling their development potential;

V.  whereas 75 % of the world’s poor people live in middle-income countries (MICs), despite their economic growth and whereas the specific situation in MICs, should not therefore be overlooked when reviewing the MDGs while taking into account the principle of differentiation as agreed in the new development agenda;

I.Millennium Development Goals and new challenges

1.  Affirms that the Millennium Development Goals defined in 2000 figure among many successes in middle-income countries and developing countries and that these results must be correctly analysed for the future framework in order to achieve more global and sustainable results;

2.  Stresses that the global landscape has dramatically changed over the last decade, as has the nature of poverty, with an increased gap and inequality between and within countries becoming a major issue in the context of poverty eradication;

3.  Points out that although some developing countries have become donors, they still face high and increasing levels of inequality comparable to that of other developing countries; points out that, among other things, climate change, food insecurity, migration, unemployment, demographic change, corruption, resource constraints, unsustainable growth, financial and economic crises and human rights violations pose complex and interrelated challenges;

4.  Recalls that environmental degradation jeopardises the achievement of MDGs, including the objective of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; in particular, recalls that persistent inequalities and struggles over scarce resources are among the key drivers of conflict, hunger, insecurity and violence, which in turn are key factors that hold back human development and efforts to achieve sustainable development; calls for the adoption of a more holistic approach that reflects the outcome and follow-up of the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development;

5.  Stresses the need for coherence between the EU’s trade policies and its policies on development, in particular as regards the outermost regions;

6.  Urges the EU to lead with one strong voice during the discussions on the post-2015 framework and up until the UN Summit and to adopt a common, effective and ambitious position on the principles and goals that should be part of the new post-2015 development framework; points out, at the same time, that there must be a single, comprehensive and integrated framework,with clear benchmarks incorporating the key development and sustainability issues, and that this framework must be universal and global in nature, promoting prosperity, human rights and well-being for all and signifying the direct and active involvement of all countries in its construction and implementation, and paying attention to the role and responsibilities of richer countries - beyond financing - in its success;

7.  Points out that the global partnership for development should be reoriented to take into account the changed context and should be closely linked to the new dimensions of the post-2015 agenda; underlines that a reshaped and reinvigorated global partnership for development will be essential for implementing the post-2015 agenda and for ensuring effective accountability mechanisms at all levels;

8.  Considers that this unified approach requires due coordination between the EU and its Member States before it is presented at the New York Autumn Summit as well as high visibility during the negotiation process under the leadership of the European Commissioner for Development; calls on the EU, which is the major donor worldwide, to fully assume its role as the key player on the post-2015 agenda;

9.  Calls for the goals of the post-2015 development framework to include the MDGs as well as the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and promote prosperity and well-being for all, including disadvantaged groups, such as women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities; stresses that there must be genuine flexibility according to capacities to set national targets with direct and active involvement of developing countries and development partners, especially civil society; points out that rich countries must make strong commitments, both related to their own development and to their policies that affect other countries;

10.  Stresses that the lack of progress on those MDGs that relate to the position of women is caused not only by financial or technical obstacles, but particularly by a lack of political will;

II.Poverty eradication

11.  Urges that poverty eradication, which is the primary objective of EU development cooperation, and the achievement of sustainable social and environmental development within the planetary boundaries must be the imperative global priorities for the post-2015 development agenda;

12.  Stresses that inequality hampers economic development and poverty reduction efforts; in particular, recalls that high levels of inequality make it difficult to construct broad-based, redistributive and fiscally sustainable social welfare systems that are grounded on principles of social solidarity, while high levels of inequality may raise crime levels or cause violent conflict, especially in multi-ethnic societies; believes that the structural causes of poverty need to be addressed in order to bring real change to society;

13.  Acknowledges the ways in which development and poverty eradication are intertwined with the challenges of peace and security, the environment, human rights, gender equality, democracy and good governance; hence, calls for a renewed approach to poverty eradication which takes into consideration the importance of inclusive economic development and growth, redistribution of wealth through budgetary means, decent work, efficient professional training, environmental sustainability, human rights and good governance;

14.  Calls for the ‘post-MDG agenda’ to be anchored to the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, which not only affirms development as a fundamental human right but also addresses development as a process;

15.  Calls for the integration of gender mainstreaming into a growth-oriented approach to end poverty and for the inclusion of gender equality in all EU programmes, policies and strategies and across the post-2015 framework;

16.  Stresses that inclusiveness is a dynamic concept that goes beyond a ‘pro-poor’ strategy, and implies broadening the focus to include vulnerable populations in precarious livelihoods, which calls for development strategy to be anchored in the macroeconomic framework; considers that defining qualitative indicators will be critical to monitor both the degree to which development progress is inclusive and sustainable, and the extent to which the needs of the most deprived and vulnerable groups are being addressed;

17.  Calls, in this connection, for a broader definition of poverty than one based on gross domestic product (GDP) alone; stresses that global and national averages exclude large numbers of the world’s poor;

Health, nutrition, education and social protection

18.  Recognises that addressing child and maternal malnutrition requires long-term development strategies, focusing on sectors which influence malnutrition, such as health, education, water and sanitation, and agriculture;

19.  Recalls that the multidimensionality of human well-being needs to be fully acknowledged; recalls, in this respect, that health, nutrition, social protection, gender equality and education are key drivers of poverty eradication and inclusive economic development;

20.  Stresses the importance of reducing gender gaps firstly in education, when it comes to raising the average quality of human capital, and secondly in health, in order to make better progress in improving maternal health and reducing child mortality rates;

21.  Asks for the EU to strongly defend the right to the highest attainable standard of health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights and the integration of HIV/AIDS, inter alia in the provision of voluntary family planning, safe abortion and contraceptives;

22.  Stresses that the post-2015 MDG framework includes a specific goal on the elimination of all forms of violence against women;

23.  Stresses that access to universal health coverage (UHC) - combining both treatment and a preventive approach -, universal access to adequate nutritious food, and high quality education for all and at all levels which enable employment should be considered to be major goals of the post-2015 agenda;

24.  Insists that the post-2015 framework must include, firstly, targets on the accessibility and affordability of quality health care with a focus on health promotion, prevention and curative interventions including sexual and reproductive health and rights and HIV/AIDS as key elements, and secondly, practical steps towards the establishment of basic health care systems that ensure prevention, treatment, care and support for all people, including the most marginalised and disadvantaged groups such as minorities, prisoners, migrants, undocumented people, sex workers and drug users;

25.  Calls for accelerated global action to reduce maternal, newborn and child mortality and reaffirms the central importance of universal access to reproductive health care;

26.  Calls for continued support for research into more effective and sustainable prevention and treatment programmes, including research and development in relation to effective forms of medical intervention, including vaccines, drugs and diagnostics;

27.  Notes that women play a crucial role in nutrition and food security, being responsible for 80 % of farming in Africa, even though they are still hardly ever able to own the land they cultivate; stresses that the eradication of hunger consequently depends on aid to enable small-scale farmers to produce sufficient food for themselves and their families; points out that most small-scale farmers are women; calls for a gender-sensitive approach that is integrated into all elements of food security programming; underlines the need to prevent and treat malnutrition by means of evidence-based intervention, giving priority to pregnant women and young children;

28.  Underlines the need to design and implement health programmes in order to strengthen health systems, taking into account the fact that the global economic crisis has undermined progress on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases;

29.  Stresses the importance of the goal of improved maternal health with regard to reducing the maternal mortality rate and achieving universal access to sexual and reproductive health services and family planning; stresses the importance of education and awareness-raising in the area of sexual and reproductive health as an integral part of the women’s health agenda;

30.  States that special attention needs to be paid to educating both sexes about gender issues from the outset of their schooling, so that attitudes and social stereotypes gradually change and gender equality becomes a basic principle of society in all countries of the world;

31.  Urges that the provision of EU humanitarian aid that contributes to the attainment of the MDGs and should effectively be excluded from the restrictions on humanitarian aid imposed by the USA or other donors, in particular by ensuring access to abortion for women and girls who are victims of rape in armed conflicts;

32.  Recognises that decent work opportunities enable poor households to lift themselves out of poverty and are key vehicles for individuals and families to gain self-esteem, a sense of belonging to a community and a way to make a productive contribution; calls for full and productive employment and decent work to be a central goal of the post-2015 development agenda and calls for this goal to be supported through the implementation of well-designed national social protection floors for poverty reduction and resilience;

33.  Maintains that health information and education are key elements in better public health;

34.  Urges that special attention should also be paid to tackling non-communicable diseases, such as cancer;

35.  Calls for the post-2015 MDG framework to advance women’s empowerment and gender equality by closing gender gaps at all levels of education, with specific targets including universal access to and completion of quality education (at primary, secondary, and higher level) and vocational training within a youth-friendly job creation policy environment, the elimination of female illiteracy, and access to comprehensive sexuality education inside and outside school;

III.Good governance

36.  Stresses that the post-2015 sustainable development framework requires respect for the principle of democratic governance and human rights, effective, transparent and accountable institutions and partners at all levels and an empowered civil society that is systematically involved in the democratic process; insists that the framework must be driven by the key notions of participatory democracy and effective citizenship through the full and increased exercise of civic and political rights;

37.  Calls on the EU to share its experience and expertise with developing countries, providing access to knowledge in relevant areas of sustainable development, especially capitalizing on the transition experience of the EU Member States;

38.  Considers that the ongoing negotiations and debate must be structured so as to ensure that a clear commitment to democratic governance is reflected and pursued in the new development framework;

39.  Underlines that climate change, the recent food price crisis and the global financial crisis can all be linked to the lack of adequate global governance; hence, stresses that global governance should be a key ingredient of the post-2015 development agenda;

40.  Deplores the lack of coherence between institutions of global governance, in particular regarding the multilateral trade, finance and environmental architectures; considers that, while global governance deficits have led countries to seek regional solutions as a way to respond to region-specific development needs, such arrangements require coordination to avoid policy fragmentation and incoherence with multilateral regimes and international standards; more broadly, deems that action at the global level is required to supplement national efforts;

41.  Notes that, although the format of the MDG framework enabled the setting of concrete and time-bound goals and targets that could be monitored by statistically robust indicators, there is a lack of ownership of these goals; in this context, warns against imposing a one-size-fits-all approach and believes that global goals and targets must be tailored and adapted to national and regional contexts and initial conditions;

42.  Points out that authorities at all levels play a crucial role in a sustainable development agenda by taking part in policy debates, translating commitments into legislation, holding governments accountable for their social, environmental and judicial policies, and building on the ownership principle;

43.  Urges the international community to pay special attention to creating an enabling and participatory environment within which civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector, philanthropic foundations and other independent development partners, as well as national parliaments and local authorities at a local, national and regional level are able to assume their responsibilities for framing policies and monitoring their implementation and thus play a proper role in the post-2015 framework;

44.  Urges, furthermore, that young people, especially girls and young women, should be enabled to play a key role in the post-2015 framework, recalling that youth participation in governance can have broad benefits, including fostering democratic decision-making structures and processes and improving the well-being of young people and their communities;

Human rights-based approach

45.  Calls for human rights principles to underpin the post-2015 framework, which must address, in particular, issues of inequality, harmful traditional practices, discrimination, gender-based violence, participation and the empowerment of marginalised and disadvantaged people in society, with special attention being paid to the rights of young people, women, migrants, people living with HIV, people suffering caste-based discrimination, LGBT-persons and persons with disabilities;

46.  Calls, in this connection, for a stand-alone goal to address the persistent inequalities facing women and girls, fostering the necessary political will, resources and ownership to create sustainable and effective action;

47.  Stresses that the post-2015 UN development agenda must respond to a human-rights based approach, which encompasses social and economic rights, while also including civil and political rights related to peace and security, as well as the right to development;

48.  Recommends the creation of an overarching equality goal;

49.  Encourages the EU to support developing countries in building up their political will and in increasing efforts to improve the level of ratification and implementation of legal human rights instruments to prohibit discrimination or any legal, policy, or regulatory barriers and punitive provision based on age, gender, race, ethnicity, caste, culture, religion, belief, marital status, disability, HIV status, national origin, migration status, language skills, sexual orientation, gender identity or other factors or status; also encourages the EU to support developing countries in introducing appropriate social protection floors;

50.  Urges the ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women by all countries in order to promote gender equality;

Peace, security and development

51.  Stresses that armed conflict and post-conflict situations are some of the main obstacles to development and poverty reduction and threaten democracy; stresses equally that peace and security, development and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing; therefore encourages the Union to use all relevant instruments such as the International Declaration of Human Rights or those provided in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement in order to strengthen conflict prevention;

52.  Calls, in this connection, for the prioritisation of capacity building in conflict-affected and fragile states; takes the view that effective international partnerships, knowledge-sharing and capacity development methods based on the transition experience of EU Member States, building on the model of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States launched during the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, are necessary for the stabilisation and development of these states;

53.  Calls on the EU to continue to be deeply engaged in fragile states, providing integrated responses linked to development policies, providing humanitarian relief and contributing to disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention and state building;

54.  Considers that the post-2015 framework must reflect the peace building and state building (PBSB) goals agreed on in Busan;

55.  Stresses that the prevention of violence and discrimination, especially sexual violence against girls and women, should be addressed in the post-2015 framework and that comprehensive protection systems accessible to all must be established or strengthened;

IV.Sustainability

56.  Calls on the EU to contribute, in an inclusive and transparent manner, to strengthening coherence between SDGs in the social and environmental spheres and post-2015 development goals;

57.  Emphasises that the final result should be ‘one development agenda’, avoiding duplication of efforts and resources; underlines that, given the fact that environmental and development questions tend to be dealt with separately at global level, the EU should seek new ways to overcome this split and build bridges between these closely interlinked areas, including from an institutional point of view;

58.  Emphasises that sustainability is an overriding challenge, where failure is likely to threaten all dimensions of human development; in particular, recognises the inseparable links between food, sustainable and secure access to energy, water, sustainable land use, efficient use of natural resources, the protection of marine and other ecosystems and biodiversity, deforestation and climate change mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction, sustainable production and consumption, social inclusion and decent work in the anti-poverty framework;

59.  Points out that universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation, as a horizontal basic social service to achieve all goals, and modern, reliable, affordable, climate-friendly and sustainable energy services for all is a key driver of poverty eradication and inclusive sustainable growth;

60.  Underlines that energy security requires an implementation of strategies based on the diversification of sources, including solar energy, protection of ecosystems and natural resources, reduction of disaster risks, integrated water resource management, and improvement of markets, infrastructure and regulatory measures;

61.  Also calls for concrete action in the promotion and development of healthy marine ecosystems, sustainable fisheries and sustainable aquaculture, which might have an important role in food security and nutrition and sustainable agriculture;

62.  Stresses how important it is that the differentiation principle enshrined in the new development agenda is implemented properly; urges the emerging countries to assume their responsibility in redistributing revenue between their citizens through the state budget in order to close the poverty gap;

V.Towards an EU position on the post-2015 development framework
Financing the post-2015 MDGs

63.  Recalls the commitment made to allocate 0,7 % of gross national income to official development assistance (ODA) by 2015; stresses that this level has to be maintained in a future framework and calls on all Member States to introduce this through binding legislation and to adopt multiannual budget timetables in order to reach the target;

64.  Emphasises the importance of having an EU budget that is capable of meeting the challenges facing it, especially in times of crisis and particularly in terms of financing for development; in this regard and in order for the EU budget to no longer be hostage to the single question of the level of payment appropriations, calls for the creation of own resources, such as a financial transaction tax, a share of which should go to Heading IV of the EU budget;

65.  Insists that funding to fight and adapt to the effects of climate change be genuinely additional to existing commitments; calls on the EU, therefore, to propose that financing sources other than ODA be made available for climate finance, allowing post-2015 discussions to clarify the roles of ODA and adaptation finance in sustainable poverty eradication;

66.  Calls on the Commission to boost discussions with all stakeholders on financing mechanisms in order to fulfil financial needs in a post-2015 development landscape;

67.  Recalls that, during the 2012 UN Development Cooperation Forum, the need for greater coordination rather than competition between different aid mechanisms and donors, was clearly highlighted; calls on the EU to promote an aid effectiveness agenda as the EU and its Member States have a joint responsibility to reduce aid fragmentation;

Innovative financing mechanisms

68.  Calls on the Commission to continue to work together with other donors at global level on developing further innovative financial mechanisms for development as those, together with new partnerships, will play a crucial role in a new development landscape, complementing other sources and compromises on financing for sustainable development; reminds EU Member States that have agreed to establish the financial transaction tax to devote part of those funds to sustainable development and the fight against climate change;

69.  Points out that the EU should promote an integrated and complementary approach to financing, including through public-private partnerships;

70.  Calls on the EU to encourage social, ethical and environmentally-friendly public procurement at the international level as a tool for implementation of the post-2015 framework;

71.  Calls on the EU to properly evaluate the mechanism of blending loans and grants – particularly in terms of development and financial additionality, transparency and accountability, local ownership and debt risk - before continuing to develop blending loans and grants to boost financial resources for development and to promote microcredit; calls on the Commission to publish guidelines and precise criteria that are based on harmonised poverty reduction strategies and that have a clear sustainable development impact when these new arrangements are implemented;

Strengthening domestic revenue through effective taxation and the fight against corruption

72.  Reiterates its call to make combating corruption, money laundering, tax havens, illicit flows of capital and harmful tax structures an overriding priority of the EU’s agenda in international finance and development institutions so as to enable developing countries to raise domestic revenues;

73.  Stresses the urgent need for increased domestic resource mobilisation and therefore calls on the EU and the international community to increase their support to developing countries when it comes to establishing effective fiscal policy and a sustainable tax base, as well as strengthening the capacity, skills and qualifications of their administrations with a view to tackling illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, tax evasion and fraud and improving the collection of taxes;

74.  Recalls that the quality of financial reporting is crucial to combat tax evasion effectively; hence, underlines the importance of full transparency in corporate reporting of profits and taxes paid, especially by - but not limited to - companies involved in the exploitation of natural resources; therefore asks the Commission to promote the inclusion of a requirement within the International Financial Reporting Standard of the International Accounting Standards Board that multinational corporations report their income and tax paid on a country-by-country basis; recalls that this request is consistent with the need to improve the corporate social responsibility of multinational enterprises;

Monitoring mechanisms and indicators

75.  Stresses the urgent need to move to an appropriate mix of quantitative and qualitative measurements for development;

76.  Points out that a new set of indicators other than GDP is necessary in order to achieve prosperity and development and overcome new social and environmental challenges, and should therefore include indicators such as the human development index, the poverty headcount ratio, the poverty gap index, and the Income Gini coefficient;

77.  Points out that clear and measurable indicators, including outputs and outcomes, are crucial for monitoring and reporting on progress achieved in respect of areas such as poverty eradication and economic and social development, and should include gender equality, employment, social protection (e.g. access to health care and pensions, protection against the risks of unemployment, and protection against the special livelihood deprivation of women, children and the elderly), disability, migration and minority status;

78.  Calls on the EU to develop relevant baselines, indicators and targets for measuring the impact of PCD;

Private sector

79.  Stresses the need to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; against this background, calls on all countries to establish a genuine business regulatory framework, promotion of full and productive employment and decent work, respect for human rights, including ILO standards, transparency and social and environmental standards;

80.  Considers that the principal aim of support to the private sector should be to lift people in developing countries out of poverty and help strengthen the private sector in developing countries, given that failure to do so would result in unbalanced development and growth;

81.  Urges EU-based companies with production facilities in developing countries to comply with their obligations to respect human rights and freedoms, social and environmental standards, gender equality, core labour standards, international agreements and payment of taxes in a transparent manner;

82.  Points out the importance of protecting private property in order to enhance an investment environment and the rule of law;

83.  Stresses that, although the private sector plays a crucial role in the economy, it is the main responsibility of the state to provide basic quality services to its citizens, and therefore contribute to fighting poverty;

84.  Stresses that those in the public and private sectors must find new ways to combine their interests, capacities and efforts in order to contribute to the attainment of the post-2015 agenda;

85.  Underlines that economic growth and development should be sustainable, inclusive and contribute to strengthening production capacities, decent job creation and social inclusion for all in order to enable developing countries to transform their economies; calls for the establishment of nationally-defined social protection floors in developing countries and for an end to all forms of child labour;

86.  Points out that Fair Trade is a trading partnership based on dialogue, transparency and respect that seeks greater equity in international trade(8); takes the view that Fair Trade is an example of a successful partnership, involving many stakeholders around the world and at different stages along a supply chain, that ensures market access for disadvantaged producers, guarantees sustainable livelihoods, respects labour standards, phases out child labour and encourages environmentally sustainable farming and production practices;

Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and coordination among donors

87.  Calls on the EU, whilst ensuring that PCD is firmly incorporated into the post-2015 framework, to continue to pay particular attention to the following priority areas: trade and finance, health and education, climate change, natural resources, agriculture, fisheries, health care, nutrition and food security, migration, energy, peace and security policies, and human rights;

88.  Points out that trade can be a fundamental driver of poverty reduction, leading to greater equity and transparency and promoting sustainable human development and economic growth; urges the EU, in this respect, to ensure that its trade policy is coherent with the EU’s development goals;

89.  Takes the view that, while the MDGs have certainly been a success in shining a brighter spotlight on development aid, a mere focus on aid is too narrow; considers that a new approach is needed that embraces global governance, with a strong focus on policy coherence for development and the provision of global public goods;

90.  Believes that a post-2015 agenda for development needs to identify essential global public goods, set how they are financed and specify which global institutions can be held accountable for their provision;

91.  Takes the view that PCD should move beyond a ‘do no harm’ perspective, both in Europe and beyond, towards a more integrated approach where international trade, the environment and international financial architecture are understood as global public policies that help to enhance global development objectives; supports, in this context, the idea of establishing a Global Economic Council in the context of the United Nations System;

92.  Points out that PCD can only achieve real and effective results by means of a collective effort and the active involvement of developed and developing countries, emerging economies and international organisations;

93.  Stresses that the future development framework should contain a reference to aid and the concept of ‘development effectiveness’; in particular, takes the view that turning ’aid effectiveness‘ into a ’development effectiveness‘ agenda implies a combination of development aid, assistance for the provision of global public goods and adaptation of existing global governance structures in order to increase their capacity to respond to global challenges;

94.  Urges the EU to act as a driving force, ensuring complementarity and division of labour within the development process in an inclusive and transparent manner, including through an increased use of joint programming;

Comprehensive guidance towards a post-2015 development framework

95.  Welcomes the ambitious and engaging Commission communication of 27 February 2013 entitled ‘A decent life for all’;

96.  Stresses that the following principles should be taken into consideration in defining a coherent EU position with a view to the negotiation of a new development framework:

97.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(1) OJ C 46, 24.2.2006, p. 1. (2) Council Conclusions 9558/07, 15.5.2007. (3) http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/millenium-development-goals/index_en.htm (4) OJ C 236 E, 12.8.2011, p. 48. (5) http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/african-consultations-post2015-development-agenda. (6) Doc. 9317/12. (7) OECD et al, 2011, ‘Conflict, fragility and armed violence are major factors preventing the achievement of the MDGs’. (8) As defined in the Charter of Fair Trade Principles by the World Fair Trade Organisation.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the rule of law in Russia (2013/2667(RSP))

P7_TA(2013)0284 RC-B7-0269/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, in particular those of 17 February 2011 on the rule of law in Russia(1), of 13 September 2012 on the political use of justice in Russia(2) and of 13 December 2012 containing Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia Agreement(3),

–  having regard to the existing Agreement on partnership and cooperation establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part (PCA) and to the ongoing negotiations for a new EU-Russia agreement,

–  having regard to the ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ initiated in 2010 in Rostov-on-Don and to the commitment made by the Russian leadership to the rule of law as a fundamental basis for the modernisation of Russia,

–  having regard to the Constitution of Russia, in particular Article 118 thereof, which states that justice in the Russian Federation shall be administered by courts alone, and Article 120 thereof, which provides that judges are independent and are subordinate only to the Russian Constitution and the federal law,

–  having regard to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

–  having regard to the results of the EU-Russia Summit of 3-4 June 2013 and the human rights consultations of 19 May 2013,

–  having regard to the statements made by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the GOLOS association, on the situation of NGOs in the Russian Federation and on the Magnitsky case,

–  having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

–  having regard to its award of the 2009 Sakharov Prize for the Freedom of Thought to Memorial, a Russian non-governmental organisation campaigning, inter alia, for the rights of political prisoners in Russia, and having regard to the growing support in the European Parliament for ‘Memorial’ as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize,

–  having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on Russian Federal Law No 65 of 8 June 2012 on assemblies, meetings, demonstrations, marches and picketing and the code of administrative offences, on the Russian Federal Law on combating extremist activities and on the Russian Federal Law on the Federal Security Service (FSB),

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedures,

A.  whereas the European Union remains committed to further deepening and developing relations between the EU and Russia in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Partnership for Modernisation, based on a deep mutual commitment to democratic principles, respect for fundamental and human rights, the rule of law, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, respect for human dignity and equality;

B.  whereas, as a member of the Council of Europe and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a signatory to the UN declarations, Russia has committed itself to the protection and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law;

C.  whereas there remains serious concern about developments in the Russian Federation with regard to respect for and the protection of human rights and respect for commonly agreed democratic principles, rules and procedures;

D.  whereas freedom of the press and media, both online and offline, is a crucial aspect of a democratic and open society, as well as being fundamental in countering corruption and safeguarding human rights and the rule of law; whereas the independent press, as a collective manifestation of free expression, is one of the key actors in the media landscape, acting as a watchdog of democracy;

E.  whereas several trials and judicial proceedings over the last few years, such as the Magnitsky, Khodorkovsky and Politkovskaya cases, have cast doubt on the independence and impartiality of the judicial institutions of the Russian Federation; whereas the high profile cases cited above are merely just the most well-known cases outside Russia of what amounts to a systematic failure of the Russian state to uphold the rule of law and to deliver justice to its citizens;

F.  whereas a prominent lawyer, anti-corruption campaigner and social activist, Alexei Navalny, is currently on trial in Russia on charges which, he claims, represent a politically motivated attempt to punish him as one of the most prominent opponents of the government; whereas Navalny has consistently exposed massive corruption within the highest levels of the Russian state apparatus;

G.  whereas prosecutors continue to pursue opposition activists who participated in the ‘March of Millions’ on 6 May 2012, the day before President Putin’s inauguration; whereas, according to reliable independent reports, the demonstration was forcibly disrupted at Bolotnaya Square by riot police, who subjected participants to disproportionate force and arbitrary violence; whereas reports by the Presidential Human Rights Council, the Human Rights Ombudsman and an independent investigative commission comprising senior public figures blamed both the Russian authorities and police for the violence;

H.  whereas the adoption of laws over the last few months on the registration of political parties, NGO financing, the right of assembly, extremism, defamation and internet filtering restrictions has significantly contributed to a deterioration in the climate as regards the development of a genuine civil society in Russia;

I.  whereas the Russian Parliament adopted a bill in July 2012 granting the ‘foreign agent’ status to Russian non-commercial organisations engaged in political activities and financed from abroad; whereas in the last year the laws on NGOs and on the right to freedom of assembly have been used to suppress civil society, stifle opposing political views and harass NGOs, the democratic opposition and the media;

J.  whereas the federal authorities have done nothing to stop discriminatory legislation banning ‘homosexual propaganda’ from coming into effect in nine regions of Russia; whereas the Duma recently adopted a similar law at national level;

K.  whereas members of the Presidential Human Rights Council have complained of harassment, intimidation, interrogations, searches of their offices and property and other measures carried out by Russian law enforcement agents;

L.  whereas the further development of EU-Russia relations continues to be held back by Russia’s failure Russia to fully embrace democratic values and strengthen the rule of law;

1.  Reminds Russia of the importance of full compliance with its international legal obligations, as a member of the Council of Europe, and with the fundamental human rights and the rule of law enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);

2.  Expresses its serious concerns about the recent repressive laws and their arbitrary enforcement by the Russian authorities, often leading to harassment of NGOs, civil society activists, human rights defenders and minorities;

3.  Is deeply worried by Russia’s failure to observe its international legal obligations to protect freedom of association, expression and assembly, which is posing a threat to both the viability of Russia’s vibrant civil society and its cooperation with the EU;

4.  Reaffirms its disappointment with the bill granting ‘foreign agent’ status to Russian non-commercial organisations engaged in political activities and financed from abroad; urges the Russian authorities to stop registering NGOs as ’foreign agents’ on the basis of a law which extended state control over NGOs, using the vague definition of political activities included in this law, stigmatising NGOs and creating an atmosphere that is hostile to civil society;

5.  Considers that the widespread, targeted and intrusive inspections, confiscation of property and administrative fines imposed on Russian NGOs and their activists allegedly receiving foreign funding are inadmissible and interfere with the right to freedom of association; criticises furthermore the raid and pressure applied upon international political foundations; considers it deeply regrettable that a few NGOs are already facing trial, like Memorial, in St Petersburg, or have already been sentenced, like GOLOS and the Levada Centre; is concerned by the investigations launched against international non-governmental organisations seeking to build democracy in Russia, including international institutes;

6.  Urges the Russian authorities to address these concerns by bringing the above-mentioned laws into line with international standards and Russia’s international and constitutional human rights commitments, including its own Constitution, in particular by removing undue legal, administrative and other restrictions on the operation of NGOs;

7.  Urges the Vice-President / High Representative, the EEAS and the Commission to take into account, during the current negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework and during the programming phase, the deteriorating situation for civil society, the forced withdrawal of other international donors and the increasing requests for EU support, and to provide for a significant increase in the Union’s financial support to NGOs and civil society accordingly;

8.  Is deeply concerned at the negative consequences of the adoption of a federal law on ‘homosexual propaganda’, which could increase discrimination and violence against LGBTI individuals;

9.  Calls on the Russian authorities to guarantee political pluralism, media freedom, the rule of law, the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, freedom of speech and assembly, including on the internet, effective and independent trade unions, and non-discrimination, as a necessary precondition for Russia’s further development and modernisation in such a way as to recognises and protect the individual and collective rights of all its citizens; recalls that, under international law, states have an obligation to support, directly or indirectly, the funding of civil society activities, in particular by creating a favourable environment, without interfering in their independence;

10.  Expresses deep concern at reports of politically motivated trials, unfair procedures and failures to investigate serious crimes such as killings, harassment and other acts of violence, as evidenced in the Magnitsky, Khodorkovsky, Politkovskaya and other cases; urges the Russian judicial and law enforcement authorities to carry out their duties in an effective, impartial and independent manner in order to bring perpetrators to justice;

11.  Recalls its recommendation on common visa restrictions for Russian officials involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case and asks the Council and the Commission to implement an EU-wide visa ban and to freeze the financial assets in the EU of all officials involved in the death of Magnitsky, which is being prosecuted posthumously, and of other serious human rights violators in Russia; stresses that those individuals must not benefit from any EU-Russia visa facilitation agreement;

12.  Urges the Member States to facilitate and positively assess visa requests from persecuted Russian political activists;

13.  Welcomes the recent re-opening of proceedings in the case of the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, more than six years after she was shot, but shares the concern that the question of who ordered the murder is unlikely to emerge from the case;

14.  Expresses its deepest concern at the case of Alexei Navalny and deplores the allegedly politically motivated nature of his prosecution; urges the Russian authorities to ensure that he is accorded his full rights and that his trial meets internationally accepted standards of due process; calls, in this connection, on the EU Delegation and Member States’ Missions in Russia to monitor the trials of all human rights defenders, including that of Navalny and others, in particular at regional level;

15.  Urges Russia, with regard to the ‘March of Millions’, to commission an independent inquiry into the Bolotnaya Square violence and, in particular, to investigate allegations of excessive use of force against demonstrators; expresses concern at the allegedly politically motivated nature of the prosecutions linked to the Bolotnaya Square violence;

16.  Urges the Russian authorities to ensure freedom of the press and media, both online and offline, to foster a pluralist media landscape, to allow media platforms, journalists and bloggers to fulfil their key role in Russian society independently, to safeguard the free flow of information and to ensure freedom of expression; stresses the importance of freedom of information laws, which are essential for journalists and civil society to do their work as watchdogs;

17.  Calls on Russia to cooperate fully with the special procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council, including by issuing a standing invitation for country visits and responding positively to pending requests for access by the UN Special Rapporteurs on the protection of human rights defenders, on freedom of association and assembly, and on freedom of expression to Russia; calls on Russia also to accept recommendations, made in the context of the Universal Periodic Review of Russia at the Human Rights Council, to repeal or revise legislation affecting the work of NGOs and to stop obstructing human rights work;

18.  Calls on the Council to adopt the EU Foreign Affairs Council’s conclusions on human rights in Russia, which would serve to provide critical support to all those in Russia working to protect human rights and also to bind the 27 EU Member States and EU institutions to a common message and approach with regards to human rights in Russia;

19.  Urges Russia to take all possible measures to ensure that all members of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and more generally all those working to defend human rights in Russia, are afforded protection from harassment and intimidation;

20.  Encourages the Presidents of the Council and Commission, as well as the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to continue to closely follow these cases, to raise these issues in different formats and meetings with Russia and to report back to Parliament on their exchanges with the Russian authorities;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

(1) OJ C 188 E, 28.6.2012, p. 37. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0352. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0505.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on Azerbaijan: the case of Ilgar Mammadov (2013/2668(RSP))

P7_TA(2013)0285 RC-B7-0289/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Azerbaijan, in particular those concerning human rights and the rule of law,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 9 February 2013 by Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle on the arrests of Tofiq Yaqublu, newspaper columnist and deputy chair of the Musavat opposition party, and Ilgar Mammadov, leader and presidential candidate of the Republican Alternative (REAL) party,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 7 June 2013 by the respective spokespersons of Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Füle on curbs on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan,

–  having regard to the statement of 3 May 2013 by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, concerning new charges brought against Mr Mammadov,

–  having regard to the statement of 18 March 2013 by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe,

–  having regard to the joint statement issued by 52 Azerbaijani civil society organisations requesting the release of Mr Mammadov and Mr Yaqublu,

–  having regard to the established relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan, which took effect in 1999, as represented by the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan, the creation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the negotiations on an EU-Azerbaijan association agreement and Azerbaijan’s participation in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,

–  having regard to the ongoing negotiations between the EU and Azerbaijan on an association agreement,

–  having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2012 on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy(1),

–  having regard to the 2012 ENP country progress report on Azerbaijan, dated 20 March 2013,

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Mr Mammadov, leader of the opposition REAL movement and director of the Council of Europe’s Baku School of Political Studies, and Mr Yaqublu, deputy chair of the Musavat opposition party, were arrested by Azerbaijani authorities on 4 February 2013 and have been unlawfully detained since then; whereas Mr Mammadov is accused of inciting riots in the town of Ismaili after he visited the town;

B.  whereas his initial pre-trial detention has been extended twice in an apparent attempt to keep him behind bars pending the forthcoming elections; whereas according to recent reports Ilgar Mammadov has been placed in a punishment cell, raising concerns that he is being singled out;

C.  whereas the overall human rights situation in Azerbaijan has deteriorated continuously over the last few years despite the adoption of the ENP Action Plan, with growing pressure on, and intimidation of, NGOs and independent media, engendering a widespread sense of fear among opposition forces, human rights defenders and youth and social network activists and leading to self-censorship among journalists;

D.  whereas before his arrest Mr Mammadov had been confirmed as the REAL opposition party’s candidate for the Azerbaijani presidential elections scheduled for October 2013;

E.  whereas human rights defenders and civil society representatives consider Mr Mammadov’s arrest to be illegal and politically motivated, and an attempt to intimidate the opposition;

F.  whereas the Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Member State governments have expressed grave concern about this case;

G.  whereas the EU has expressed its grave concerns about the use of selective justice for political purposes;

H.  whereas the Council of Europe representative in Baku was not admitted to the initial court hearing in February 2013 and whereas, in addition, a group of Council of Europe ambassadors who recently visited Azerbaijan were not allowed to see Mr Mammadov;

I.  whereas freedom of the press and media, both online and offline, is a crucial aspect of a democratic and open society, as well as being fundamental in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law;

J.   whereas journalists, bloggers, activists and other independent thinkers continue to experience serious limitations on their freedom of expression in Azerbaijan, facing prosecution on bogus charges, harassment, intimidation and physical attacks;

K.  whereas demonstrations have effectively been banned in central Baku since 2006, and whereas harsh new fines and longer periods of administrative detention for those who organise or participate in unauthorised public gatherings were recently introduced;

L.  whereas Azerbaijani authorities recently requested the downgrading of the mission of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Baku to the status of a ‘project coordination office’, which is seen as an attempt to limit the OSCE’s anticipated criticism of the presidential elections scheduled for October 2013;

M.  whereas, contrary to the commitments made, Azerbaijan’s parliament, the Milli Mejlis, has adopted amendments to the Criminal Code that provide for up to three years’ imprisonment for defamation posted online, an act that constitutes a further hindrance to the necessary conditions for independent and non-biased media in Azerbaijan;

N.  whereas Azerbaijan is currently engaged in consultations with the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the reform of the country’s defamation legislation, which must be carried out in order to execute two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights against Azerbaijan; whereas, however, the Azerbaijani parliament has adopted new amendments aimed at facilitating the application of defamation provisions to online expression;

O.  whereas Azerbaijan is a member of the Council of Europe and will take over its rotating chairmanship in 2014, as well as being a party to the European Convention on Human Rights;

P.  whereas Azerbaijan is actively participating in the ENP and the EaP, is engaged in the negotiations on an association agreement and the furthering of cooperation initiatives grounded in the EaP framework, is a founding member of Euronest and is committed to respecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which are core values of these initiatives;

Q.  whereas Azerbaijan has adopted new laws widening the definition of criminal libel, tightening regulations governing the funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and introducing much severer penalties for offences relating to public assemblies;

R.  whereas Azerbaijan has taken up a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the 2012-2013 period, and has committed itself to upholding the values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

S.  whereas 2013 is an important election year for Azerbaijan, which has committed itself to improving the general environment for democratic elections;

1.  Stresses that full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law is at the heart of the framework for cooperation within the EaP, and of the commitments made by Azerbaijan within the Council of Europe and the OSCE;

2.  Strongly condemns the detention of Mr Mammadov, calls for his immediate and unconditional release and an end to his prosecution, and urges the Azerbaijani authorities to investigate the charges against him in a speedy, fair, transparent and independent manner;

3.  Calls for the EU to assist and further support the Republic of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate democracy and the rule of law and to reform the judiciary and law enforcement systems, with a special focus on protecting human rights;

4.  Expresses serious concern over reports by human rights defenders and domestic and international NGOs about the alleged use of fabricated charges against politicians, activists and journalists;

5.  Condemns any intimidation, arrest, detention or prosecution of opposition party leaders or members, activists, journalists or bloggers solely because they have expressed their views and exercised their fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with international standards;

6.  Calls on the Azerbaijani authorities unequivocally to respect freedom of the press and media, both online and offline, and to secure freedom of expression;

7.  Calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to reform the country’s defamation legislation so that defamation is dealt with by means of proportionate fines rather than imprisonment;

8.  Calls on the Azerbaijani authorities fully to respect the freedom of assembly of the Azerbaijani population;

9.  Supports the ongoing negotiations on an EU-Azerbaijan association agreement and reaffirms its position that such an agreement must include clauses and benchmarks relating to the protection and promotion of human rights, especially with regard to freedom of the media, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly, which reflect the principles and rights enshrined in the Azerbaijani constitution and the commitments made by Azerbaijan within the Council of Europe and the OSCE;

10.  Calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to bring the legislation on elections, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and media freedom into line with international standards and to ensure its full implementation;

11.  Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) strictly to apply the ‘more for more’ principle, with a specific focus on inclusive, free and fair elections, the independence of the judiciary, democratic reforms and fundamental rights and freedoms, and clearly to lay down the consequences of lagging behind in relation to reforms;

12.  Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to step up their efforts to reform all aspects of the judicial system: prosecution, trial, sentencing, detention and appeals;

13.  Calls on Commission President José Manuel Barroso to speak out on the EU’s human rights concerns vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, as outlined in the last ENP progress report, during President Ilham Aliyev’s planned visit to Brussels;

14.  Supports the work of the EEAS and calls on the EU Delegation in Baku to continue to pay close attention to human rights concerns during the forthcoming election cycle, showing support for human rights defenders by attending events organised by civil society and speaking out on their behalf, closely monitoring court trials and supporting media freedom, inter alia by demanding the viable transmission of independent radio and television channels during the election campaign;

15.  Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to grant the Azerbaijan Human Rights House unconditional authorisation to reopen, and to register the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre and the Human Rights Club without further delays or administrative burdens;

16.  Calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to comply with all rulings of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Azerbaijan;

17.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European External Action Service, the European Council, the Commission, the Governments and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN Human Rights Council.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0470.

European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2013 on the situation of Rohingya Muslims (2013/2669(RSP))

P7_TA(2013)0286 RC-B7-0295/2013

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Burma/Myanmar, in particular those of 20 April 2012(1), 13 September 2012(2) and 22 November 2012(3),

–  having regard to its resolution of 23 May 2013 on reinstatement of Myanmar/Burma’s access to generalised tariff preferences(4),

–  having regard to the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 22 April 2013 on Myanmar/Burma,

–  having regard to the statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton of 27 November 2012 on the 2012 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton of 1 June 2013 on the agreement concluded between the Government of Myanmar/Burma and the Kachin Independence Organisation,

–  having regard to the statement of EU Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Kristalina Georgieva, of 9 August 2012 on the situation of Rohingya Muslims,

–  having regard to the final report of the Delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Burma/Myanmar from 3 to 5 April 2013,

–  having regard to the European Union’s set of restrictive measures, as set out in Council Decision 2010/232/CFSP of 26 April 2010 and as most recently amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1083/2011 of 27 October 2011,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton of 23 March 2013 on the violent clashes in the town of Meiktila in Burma/Myanmar,

–  having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the High Representative Catherine Ashton of 2 April 2013 on the reported death of 13 children caused by a fire in a Muslim school in Burma,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966,

–  having regard to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

–  having regard to UNGA Resolution 67/233 of 24 December 2012 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,

–  having regard to the UNHCR call of 13 November 2012 upon governments in Southeast Asia to keep their borders open to people fleeing Burma by sea,

–  having regard to the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur of 6 March 2013 on the situation of human rights in Burma/Myanmar, as well as his statement of 11 June 2013 that ‘the human rights violations being committed against Rohingya in Rakhine State are widespread and systematic’,

–  having regard to the statement by Aun San Suu Kyi of 27 May 2013 about the ‘two-child policy’ for Rohingya Muslims,

–   having regard to the decision taken at the ASEAN summit in November 2011 to confer the ASEAN presidency on Burma/Myanmar in 2014,

–   having regard to the Human Rights Watch report ‘’All You Can Do is Pray‘: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Rakhine State’ of 22 April 2013,

–  having regard to Rules 122(5) and 110(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the persecution of, and violence against, the Rohingya minority continue to intensify, most notably through the destruction of property and places of worship, mass arrests, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, rape, and restrictions on freedom of movement, marriage rights and access to education;

B.  whereas the religious violence that started in Rakhine State has continued to spread throughout the country; whereas in the period between March and May 2013 several anti-Muslim attacks were reported in Rangoon Division, Mandalay and Pegu, as well as in Kachin and Shan states, resulting in 46 deaths and the displacement of over 14 000 people;

C.  whereas sectarian violence has now spread to a new area in Burma, as shops in the Shan State town of Lashio were burned by a mob on 28 May 2013 and three Rohingya women were killed by police in the village of Parein during a clash over housing for the displaced minority on 4 June 2013;

D.  whereas over 130 000 displaced Rohingyas remain in camps and other areas, and the Government of Burma/Myanmar has allowed only limited and inadequate humanitarian access to Rohingya populations at risk; whereas many Rohingyas are confined to flood-prone areas where they are exposed to monsoon rains and cyclones; whereas they are unable to return to their homes because of continued violence or because their homes have been destroyed or they are prevented by security forces from leaving the camps where they are being held;

E.  whereas tens of thousands of Rohingyas have fled by sea to escape persecution, and whereas hundreds have lost their lives in sinking boats or by being pushed back into the sea; whereas close to 1 700 Rohingyas fleeing Burma are reported to be held in horrendous conditions in Thai immigration detention centres;

F.  whereas on 23 April 2013 the Independent Commission of Inquiry, set up in August 2012 in order to investigate sectarian violence in Rakhine state, issued a report with recommendations intended to ease tensions, but has nevertheless refused to acknowledge Rohingya identity, failed to hold anyone accountable for human rights abuses committed during the unrest, favoured a ‘temporary separation’ of the Muslim and Buddhist communities, and recommended the implementation of unacceptable birth-control programmes for Muslims;

G.  whereas although Burmese President U Thein Sein pledged in a speech on 6 May 2013 that his government would ensure the basic rights of Muslims in Rakhine state, and although he has taken some steps to expand civil liberties in the country, the dramatic situation of the Rohingyas, and of inter-ethnic relations overall, has the potential to undermine the entire reform process in Burma/Myanmar; whereas credible independent reports point to the complicity of the Burmese authorities in crimes against humanity targeting the Rohingya population that have resulted in Rakhine state largely being segregated along religious lines;

H.  whereas the Government of Burma/Myanmar has recently announced that it will reinstate a two-child policy; whereas this has been condemned by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma/Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, as a discriminatory and coercive measure against Rohingyas in Rakhine state that violates the basic human rights of the Rohingya, as well as Burma’s international human rights obligations and commitments;

I.  whereas the international community has urged the Burmese Government to review its 1982 Citizenship Law to ensure that the Rohingya are no longer stateless and that the roots of longstanding discrimination against the Rohingya population are dealt with;

J.  whereas Dr Tun Aung, a 65-year-old medical doctor and respected community leader from Rakhine state, was arrested in June 2012 and sentenced to 17 years in prison on what have widely been denounced by human rights groups, including Amnesty International, as politically motivated charges;

K.  whereas according to the Human Rights Watch report ‘’All You Can Do is Pray‘: Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Rakhine State’, released on 22 April 2013, the abuses perpetrated against the Rohingyas last year, which allegedly involved state agencies, amounted to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; whereas this report also presents evidence of four mass-grave sites dating from 2012 in Rakhine state;

L.  whereas freedom of the press and media, both online and offline, plays a crucial role in uncovering and documenting human rights abuses and holding governments accountable;

M.  whereas under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to seek asylum from persecution;

1.  Condemns the grave violations of human rights and the violence perpetrated against Rohingya Muslims in Burma/Myanmar and calls on all sides to refrain from the use of violence;

2.  Expresses its condolences to the victims of violence and unlawful persecution in Burma/Myanmar;

3.  Recognises the steps taken by President U Thein Sein and other reformers in Burma/Myanmar to introduce democratic reforms over the past year; deplores, however, the failure of the government to protect the Rohingya from organised violence, and calls on the government and all of Burmese/Myanmar society to act immediately to end the human rights abuses and bring the perpetrators of the violent attacks and other related abuses to justice;

4.  Urges the Government of Burma/Myanmar to ensure that its security forces do everything in their power to protect Rohingya Muslims from violent actions; expresses its deep concerns over allegations that members of Burmese security forces have participated in the violence, and repeats its urgent calls for a full and independent investigation, with the help of the United Nations, into these allegations;

5.  Stresses the need for urgent action to deal with the humanitarian risks facing all displaced persons, and in particular the Rohingya people, in Burma/Myanmar; reiterates its call on the Government of Burma/Myanmar to provide UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs, as well as journalists and diplomats, with unhindered access to all areas of the country, including Rakhine state, and to give unrestricted and full access to humanitarian aid for all communities affected by conflict and sectarian violence; calls on the Burmese authorities to improve conditions in the Rohingya displacement camps as a matter of urgency;

6.  Urges all countries in the region to uphold their international obligations as regards the rights of refugees, to open borders to Rohingya asylum seekers and to provide them at least with temporary protection, whilst supporting the Burmese Government in finding long-term, equitable solutions to the underlying causes;

7.  Calls on the Government of Thailand to end immediately the inhumane detention of at least 1 700 Rohingya asylum seekers and to provide them with access to UN refugee agencies; regrets the fact that the Government of Thailand has so far failed to permit the UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination screenings of Rohingya asylum seekers;

8.  Urges the Burmese Government to authorise the establishment of an OHCHR office in the country, with branch offices in the provinces, in order to allow for adequate monitoring of the human rights situation in the country;

9.  Welcomes the promise of President U Thein Sein that all perpetrators of violence will be prosecuted, as well as his commitment to a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-faith society; calls on the President to take further action to enforce the rule of law and to address the root causes of violence;

10.  Welcomes the announcement by President U Thein Sein on 4 June 2013 that all political prisoners in Burma/Myanmar will be released; reiterates its position that the release of all political prisoners, including Dr Tun Aung, should take place without delay or conditions and with the full restoration of their rights and freedoms;

11.  Urges the government to continue to pursue and implement durable solutions to the underlying causes of the tensions, including measures addressing the status of the Rohingya; reiterates its earlier calls for an amendment or repeal of the 1982 Citizenship Law in order that Rohingyas have equal access to Burmese citizenship, implying both rights and duties, and to bring the amended or replaced law into line with international human rights standards and with the country’s obligations under Article 7 of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child;

12.  Criticises the statement of the Burmese Immigration Minister Khin Yi of 11 June 2013 in which he expressed his support for the reinstatement of the two-child policy;

13.  Welcomes the recent declaration by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi in protest of the reintroduction of the two-child policy for Rohingyas, and urges the Burmese Government to revoke immediately this regulation along with other coercive or discriminatory policies, rules, regulations or laws;

14.  Underline the importance of making the legislative and administrative changes necessary to ensure the fullest participation of the Burmese population, including minorities, in the 2014 elections;

15.  Calls on the Vice-President / High Representative to address this issue at the highest possible political level in her contacts with Burma/Myanmar and with other ASEAN member countries;

16.  Recalls that the European Union has recently reinstalled its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) vis-à-vis Burma/Myanmar; reiterates the conditionality of these preferences as regards respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; urges the Commission to monitor closely the progress made by the Burmese authorities in respecting these conditions;

17.  Asks the Commission, when submitting to Parliament and the Council a delegated act for the continued application of the GSP system to Burma/Myanmar after 31 December 2013, to include an accompanying report demonstrating the absence of serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in the conventions listed in the GSP regulation, with particular focus on the Rohingya;

18.  Calls on the Commission to assess in an effective and comprehensive manner the human rights impact of the envisaged bilateral investment agreement before formulating its proposal for negotiating directives, and in this process closely to consult Parliament and civil society;

19.  Expects the EEAS to consult and inform Parliament regularly on the process of establishing a human rights dialogue with Burma/Myanmar; asks the EEAS and the Member States to set a list of precise human rights benchmarks against which to assess reform progress by the Burmese authorities; underlines the fact that further development of EU relations with the Burmese leadership should be conditional on tangible progress, notably with regard to the Rohingya situation;

20.  Calls for a strong and visible civil society component, in which the Rohingya are represented, to participate in the EU-Burma Task Force to be established later this year, and for this effort to build on the experience of the EU-Egypt Task Force;

21.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of Burma/Myanmar, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Myanmar, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Human Rights Council and the governments and parliaments of other states in the region.

(1) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0142. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0355. (3) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0464. (4) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0218.