Should the Marketing of Subordinated Debt Be Restricted/Different in One Way or the Other? What to Do in the Case of Mis-Selling?
Indgående analyse
17-03-2016
An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks’ subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks’ bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of bail-in instruments.
Indgående analyse
Ekstern forfatter
Martin R. Götz and Tobias H. Tröger
Om dette dokument
Type af publikation
Nøgleord
- administrativ ledelse
- bank
- bankret
- banksystem
- banktilsyn
- civilret
- emission af værdipapirer
- FINANSER
- finansiel stabilitet
- finansielt behov
- fri kapitalbevægelighed
- investering og finansiering
- investeringsgaranti
- kapitalforhøjelse
- kredit- og finansinstitutter
- LOVBESTEMMELSER
- risikostyring
- solvens
- valutaforhold
- VIRKSOMHEDER OG KONKURRENCE
- virksomhedsorganisation
- økonomisk governance (EU)