12

resultat(er)

Ord
Type af publikation
Politikområde
Forfatter
Nøgleord
Dato

Balanced Withdrawal of Policy Support to Avoid Cliff Effects

01-03-2021

The COVID-19 crisis has triggered unprecedented concerted economic policy response. The paper investigates potential cliff effects that may arise from the temporary nature of the measures adopted and their different phase-out schedules. It finds that the concern that premature policy tightening could jeopardise the recovery are overblown. The major challenges for economic policy lie in the medium term. This paper was provided by the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies ...

The COVID-19 crisis has triggered unprecedented concerted economic policy response. The paper investigates potential cliff effects that may arise from the temporary nature of the measures adopted and their different phase-out schedules. It finds that the concern that premature policy tightening could jeopardise the recovery are overblown. The major challenges for economic policy lie in the medium term. This paper was provided by the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the request of the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 18 March 2021.

Ekstern forfatter

Klaus-Jürgen GERN

Enabling sovereign bond-backed securities

05-12-2018

This briefing analyses the IA accompanying the legislative proposal of the Commission to enable market-led sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS). The problem definition and the objectives of the IA do not follow entirely the better regulation guidelines. Nevertheless, the policy options, including the baseline scenario, seem logical and pertinent, lacking, however, necessary specification and precision. The assessment focusses on direct effects on the euro-area sovereign bonds market, expecting ...

This briefing analyses the IA accompanying the legislative proposal of the Commission to enable market-led sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS). The problem definition and the objectives of the IA do not follow entirely the better regulation guidelines. Nevertheless, the policy options, including the baseline scenario, seem logical and pertinent, lacking, however, necessary specification and precision. The assessment focusses on direct effects on the euro-area sovereign bonds market, expecting no direct social or environmental impacts. The IA does not include the mandatory 12-week public consultation nor a comprehensive cost and benefit assessment of the initiative. It also omits, without explanation, a number of relevant issues, so that it seems like a missed opportunity to provide comprehensive and transparent support to evidence-based policy making.

Sovereign bond-backed securities: Risk diversification and reduction

13-09-2018

As a part of the European regulatory responses to the financial and sovereign debt crises, the European Commission has proposed a regulation on sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), a new class of low-risk securities backed by a diversified pool of national government bonds. The proposal seeks to provide an enabling framework for a market-led development of SBBS, thus encouraging banks and investors to diversify their holdings of euro area bonds. The proposal is meant to address a weakness that ...

As a part of the European regulatory responses to the financial and sovereign debt crises, the European Commission has proposed a regulation on sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), a new class of low-risk securities backed by a diversified pool of national government bonds. The proposal seeks to provide an enabling framework for a market-led development of SBBS, thus encouraging banks and investors to diversify their holdings of euro area bonds. The proposal is meant to address a weakness that appeared during the aforementioned crises, when banks' high exposure to their sovereigns' own debt, coupled with deteriorating creditworthiness of those sovereigns, led to balance sheet strains for banks. This in turn put pressure on government budgets, thus creating mutual contagion and financial instability. The procedure is currently at the initial stage in the European Parliament and the Council. First edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Are Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (‘SBBS’) a ‘self-standing’ proposal to address the sovereign bank nexus?

13-09-2018

Further to the adoption by the Commission of a proposal for a Regulation on sovereign bond-backed securities (‘SBBS’) on 24 May 2018, this briefing outlines the main purposes of this “enabling regulatory framework” for the development of SBBS. SBBS have been presented by the Commission as a market-driven initiative. By removing regulatory obstacles that have hindered its development, this enabling framework would put SSBS to a market test. In that context, SBBS has been portrayed by Commission Vice ...

Further to the adoption by the Commission of a proposal for a Regulation on sovereign bond-backed securities (‘SBBS’) on 24 May 2018, this briefing outlines the main purposes of this “enabling regulatory framework” for the development of SBBS. SBBS have been presented by the Commission as a market-driven initiative. By removing regulatory obstacles that have hindered its development, this enabling framework would put SSBS to a market test. In that context, SBBS has been portrayed by Commission Vice President Dombrovskis at the May 2018 structural dialogue as “a proposal on its own”. This briefing focusses also on significant differences between the original ESRB proposal and the concept of SBBS, which no longer suggests institutional changes nor amendments to the existing regulatory treatment for sovereign debts. Absent such ‘flanking’ measures to SBBS, the question is raised as to whether SBBS as proposed by Commission would be met by sufficient demand.

Resources for the funding of the research fund for coal and steel

15-09-2017

The ECSC Treaty, which was concluded for a period of 50 years from its entry into force, expired on 23 July 2002. Accordingly, in the run-up to its expiry, and in view of the benefits which the coal and steel sectors derived from the ECSC research and technological development programmes, the European Council, in the resolution on growth and employment which it adopted in Amsterdam on 16 and 17 June 1997, determined that revenues from reserves outstanding at the expiry of the Treaty should be used ...

The ECSC Treaty, which was concluded for a period of 50 years from its entry into force, expired on 23 July 2002. Accordingly, in the run-up to its expiry, and in view of the benefits which the coal and steel sectors derived from the ECSC research and technological development programmes, the European Council, in the resolution on growth and employment which it adopted in Amsterdam on 16 and 17 June 1997, determined that revenues from reserves outstanding at the expiry of the Treaty should be used for a research fund for sectors related to the coal and steel industry.

The ECB's Outright Monetary Transaction Programme compatibility with the EU Law (Judgment in case Gauweiller C-62/14)

15-06-2015

The note provides a summary of the main points of the ECJ Judgment in the case Gauweiller C-62/14. It concerns the referral by the German Constitutional Court for the preliminary ruling about the compatibility of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transaction Programe announced in 2012 with the EU law.

The note provides a summary of the main points of the ECJ Judgment in the case Gauweiller C-62/14. It concerns the referral by the German Constitutional Court for the preliminary ruling about the compatibility of the ECB's Outright Monetary Transaction Programe announced in 2012 with the EU law.

Banks' Net Exposure to Home Sovereign

23-03-2015

This note prepared by Economic Governance Support Unit gives an overview of the Banks’ average Net Exposure to Home Sovereign.

This note prepared by Economic Governance Support Unit gives an overview of the Banks’ average Net Exposure to Home Sovereign.

Covered bonds – ripe for expansion?

09-01-2015

The covered bond is a debt instrument with a long history in Europe. There has never been a default of a covered bond, and they performed relatively well during the latest financial crisis. They are characterised by the double protection offered to their holders, the separation of collateralised assets in a cover pool that is dynamically managed, and strict regulatory and supervisory frameworks. The main issuers of covered bonds are banks and the debt they use is mainly mortgage or public-sector ...

The covered bond is a debt instrument with a long history in Europe. There has never been a default of a covered bond, and they performed relatively well during the latest financial crisis. They are characterised by the double protection offered to their holders, the separation of collateralised assets in a cover pool that is dynamically managed, and strict regulatory and supervisory frameworks. The main issuers of covered bonds are banks and the debt they use is mainly mortgage or public-sector debt, although in the context of the current economic environment, many suggest extending them to include SME debt too. Covered bonds bring numerous benefits to all parties involved, although some researchers have pointed out certain drawbacks which can increase systemic risk and therefore need to be investigated more closely by regulators and supervisors. There is no single, harmonised, legal framework for covered bonds, and the legislation relating to them at EU level is interwoven in the provisions of different regulations and directives. However, some convergence has taken place following the development of the eligibility criteria for preferential capital requirements under the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). The European Commission, after consulting the European Banking Authority, intends to review the treatment of such bonds in this context. Taking into account the findings of this review, it is then expected to launch a study on the merits of introducing an EU framework for covered bonds in 2015.

Building a Comprehensive Crisis Management Framework for the EU and Extinguishing the Raging Fire

14-01-2011

The on-going discussion on Crisis Management in the EU is incomplete and on particular issues misguided and ill-informed. This is true both of the longer term discussion on designing a Crisis Management Framework for the EU as well as the immediate and on-going efforts to put the fire out. This Policy Paper has three parts: Part I maps out the structure of a complete Crisis Management framework for the EU. Part II offers detailed suggestions on improving the current Crisis Mitigation framework in ...

The on-going discussion on Crisis Management in the EU is incomplete and on particular issues misguided and ill-informed. This is true both of the longer term discussion on designing a Crisis Management Framework for the EU as well as the immediate and on-going efforts to put the fire out. This Policy Paper has three parts: Part I maps out the structure of a complete Crisis Management framework for the EU. Part II offers detailed suggestions on improving the current Crisis Mitigation framework in the form of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism. Part III sketches an optimal detailed design of what the permanent European Stabilization Mechanism should look like.

Ekstern forfatter

Sony KAPOOR (Managing Director Re-Define) ; additional research by Linda OKSNES (Research Associate Re-Define)

EU Public Debt Management and Eurobonds

09-09-2010

A common Eurobond making each participating issuer liable only for its own share could be agreed upon by the Member States with the lowest credit risk premia: Finland, France and Germany. However, the efficiency gains from this weak form of cooperation in terms of market integration and liquidity would be limited if not offset by the higher costs of an inflexible debt management. To reap the liquidity benefits of a unified market, the Eurobonds should be issued by all euro-area Member States or by ...

A common Eurobond making each participating issuer liable only for its own share could be agreed upon by the Member States with the lowest credit risk premia: Finland, France and Germany. However, the efficiency gains from this weak form of cooperation in terms of market integration and liquidity would be limited if not offset by the higher costs of an inflexible debt management. To reap the liquidity benefits of a unified market, the Eurobonds should be issued by all euro-area Member States or by an EU Institution. But only a common bond jointly guaranteed by all euro-area Member States could reach the “safehaven” status and the size needed to compete with the US Treasury market. The mutualisation of credit risks faces however strong political opposition, because of fears of relaxed fiscal discipline and inequitable sharing of its benefits and costs. Although solutions to these problems can be found, more evidence is needed on the benefits and costs of a common Eurobond to convince potential issuers. This paper makes a first step in this direction.

Ekstern forfatter

Carlo A. FAVERO and Alessandro MISSALE (Bocconi University and Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy)

Kommende begivenheder

26-10-2021
Investment Policy and Investment Protection Reform
Høring -
INTA
26-10-2021
ANIT Hearing on Recommendations for the Future
Høring -
ANIT
26-10-2021
Inclusion measures within the Erasmus+ Programme 2014-2020
Høring -
CULT

Partnere