75

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Single Supervisory Mechanism: Accountability arrangements (9th parliamentary term)

14-04-2021

This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the European Central Bank (ECB) Supervisory Board in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all external papers requested by the ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains an overview of the respective legal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). For an overview of public ...

This document provides an overview of public hearings and exchange of views with the Chair of the European Central Bank (ECB) Supervisory Board in the ECON Committee since July 2019. It also provides an overview of all external papers requested by the ECON Committee by a standing panel of banking experts. Lastly, the annex contains an overview of the respective legal bases for these hearings as part of the accountability framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). For an overview of public hearings during the 8th parliamentary term, please see here.

EU/EA measures to mitigate the economic, financial and social effects of coronavirus State of play 8 March 2021

09-03-2021

This document compiles information, obtained from public sources, on the measures proposed and taken at the EU or Euro Area level to mitigate the economic and social effects of Covid19 since its outbreak to early March 2021.

This document compiles information, obtained from public sources, on the measures proposed and taken at the EU or Euro Area level to mitigate the economic and social effects of Covid19 since its outbreak to early March 2021.

When and How to Deactivate the SGP General Escape Clause?

11-12-2020

Based on a brief assessment of the current EU fiscal framework, the paper discusses when and how fiscal surveillance should be enacted again, and investigates possible options for reform. The general escape clause should be lifted as soon as epidemiological conditions allow for economic activity to normalise, probably by 2022. We propose a transitory arrangement if the discussion on a broader reform of the fiscal framework remains inconclusive while the general escape clause is in force.

Based on a brief assessment of the current EU fiscal framework, the paper discusses when and how fiscal surveillance should be enacted again, and investigates possible options for reform. The general escape clause should be lifted as soon as epidemiological conditions allow for economic activity to normalise, probably by 2022. We propose a transitory arrangement if the discussion on a broader reform of the fiscal framework remains inconclusive while the general escape clause is in force.

Ekstern forfatter

Klaus-Jürgen GERN Stefan KOOTHS Ulrich STOLZENBURG

Banking Union: ESMA report on Wirecard

01-12-2020

This briefing provides a summary of ESMA’s Fast-Track Peer-Review (FTPR), published on 3 November 2020. ESMA carried out an assessment of the effectiveness of the supervisory response in the financial reporting area by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard AG fraud case.

This briefing provides a summary of ESMA’s Fast-Track Peer-Review (FTPR), published on 3 November 2020. ESMA carried out an assessment of the effectiveness of the supervisory response in the financial reporting area by BaFin and FREP in the context of Wirecard AG fraud case.

When and how to deactivate the SGP general escape clause?

25-11-2020

This paper provides a framework for considering when and how to deactivate the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). That framework takes into account the goals of the SGP, the desire to avoid pro-cyclical policy influences that might stifle Europe’s economic recovery, and the necessity not to endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The framework also considers the variation in performance across countries and the indicators that might be used to map transitional ...

This paper provides a framework for considering when and how to deactivate the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). That framework takes into account the goals of the SGP, the desire to avoid pro-cyclical policy influences that might stifle Europe’s economic recovery, and the necessity not to endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The framework also considers the variation in performance across countries and the indicators that might be used to map transitional arrangements.

Ekstern forfatter

Erik JONES

The Financial Stability Board (FSB). An overview of the work for 2020

20-11-2020

The briefing provides an overview of the latest work by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). It first addresses the FSB as an institution, its mandate, members and governance arrangements, and second, outlines its current work. This paper builds and updates an earlier version.

The briefing provides an overview of the latest work by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). It first addresses the FSB as an institution, its mandate, members and governance arrangements, and second, outlines its current work. This paper builds and updates an earlier version.

Guidance by the FSB, BCBS and IAIS on COVID related measures

20-11-2020

This briefing gives an overview of measures proposed by the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors to address the COVID-19 pandemic related financial consequences.

This briefing gives an overview of measures proposed by the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors to address the COVID-19 pandemic related financial consequences.

Thematic Digest on the Wirecard case

06-11-2020

This document presents the summaries of three external papers commissioned by EGOV upon request of the Economic and Monetary Committee (ECON). ECON has requested external experts to provide expertise on the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case. The summaries were drafted by EGOV in own responsibility.

This document presents the summaries of three external papers commissioned by EGOV upon request of the Economic and Monetary Committee (ECON). ECON has requested external experts to provide expertise on the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case. The summaries were drafted by EGOV in own responsibility.

What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?

05-11-2020

The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in ...

The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.

Ekstern forfatter

Katja LANGENBUCHER, Christian LEUZ, Jan Pieter KRAHNEN, Loriana PELIZZON

What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?

29-10-2020

While multiple causes underpin accounting scandals such as Wirecard, they often point at deficiencies in the audit profession and its oversight. Currently, the system of national public audit oversight boards (POBSAs) is fragmented and overly complex, characterized by limited responsiveness to red flags, and apparent lack of communication among the POBSAs, and with other supervisors. This suggests supervisory coordination and clear action triggers are imperative. Importantly, pervasively low transparency ...

While multiple causes underpin accounting scandals such as Wirecard, they often point at deficiencies in the audit profession and its oversight. Currently, the system of national public audit oversight boards (POBSAs) is fragmented and overly complex, characterized by limited responsiveness to red flags, and apparent lack of communication among the POBSAs, and with other supervisors. This suggests supervisory coordination and clear action triggers are imperative. Importantly, pervasively low transparency limits the usefulness of this briefing and hinders evidence-based policy making.

Ekstern forfatter

Beatriz GARCÍA OSMA, Ana GISBERT, Begoña NAVALLAS

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