Accountability at the Fed and the ECB
Eingehende Analyse
30-09-2020
This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).
Eingehende Analyse
Externe Autor
Karl WHELAN
Über dieses Dokument
Art der Veröffentlichung
Schlagwortliste
- Amerika
- BILDUNG UND KOMMUNIKATION
- die Vereinigte Staaten
- Dokumentation
- Ernennung der Mitglieder
- EUROPÄISCHE UNION
- Europäische Zentralbank
- Europäischer Rat
- Europäisches Parlament
- Forschungsbericht
- GEOGRAFIE
- Institutionen der Europäischen Union und Europäischer Öffentlicher Dienst
- Interinstitutionelle Beziehungen (EU)
- Kontrollbefugnis
- Politische Geografie
- Politischer Rahmen
- POLITISCHES LEBEN
- Transparenz des Entscheidungsprozesses
- Wirtschaftsgeografie