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Liste der Veröffentlichungen des Think Tank des EP

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank>

Suchkriterien für die Erstellung der Liste :

Sortierung Nach Datum ordnen
Verfasser "DE MICCO Pasquale"

22 Ergebnisse

Erstellungsdatum : 19-04-2024

Auf der Suche nach Gasfernleitungen - Energiepolitik der EU und der östlichen Partnerländer: Die Sicherheit im Vergleich zu den Vorteilen der Transitleistungen

Art der Veröffentlichung Studie

Kalenderdatum 14-07-2016

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale | KOCAK Konur Alp

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energieversorgung | Erdgas | Erdölindustrie | EU-Umweltpolitik | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Norwegen | Politische Geografie | Sicherung der Versorgung | UMWELT | Umweltpolitik | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftsverkehr | Östliche Partnerschaft

Zusammenfassung Die Europäische Union hat ihre Anstrengungen zur Gewährleistung einer sicheren Gasversorgung erhöht, insbesondere in Bezug auf den Hauptlieferanten Russland. In diesem Zusammenhang kommt den Ländern der Östlichen Partnerschaft, die als Gaslieferanten (Aserbaidschan) oder Transitländer (alle anderen, ausgenommen Armenien) dienen, eine für die EU unbestreitbar wichtige Rolle zu. Die sichere Gasversorgung hängt für die EU von einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern der Östlichen Partnerschaft und deren Energieverbünden ab. Es sind einige begrüßenswerte Entwicklungen zu beobachten, wie der südliche Gaskorridor, über den kaspisches Gas in die EU befördert wird. Diese tragen dem Stellenwert der Länder der Östlichen Partnerschaft Rechnung und leisten zudem einen Beitrag zur sicheren Energieversorgung der EU und zum ehrgeizigen Projekt der Energieunion. Zu einiger Kritik hat andererseits ein Projekt geführt, mit dem die Kapazitäten der Nordstream-Gasfernleitung, die Deutschland und Russland direkt über die Ostsee verbindet, verdoppelt werden sollen.

Studie [DE](#), [EN](#), [FR](#)

Between the East and the West: Mobility and Migration from the EU's Eastern Partners

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 22-04-2016

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Internationaler Handel | Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts

Schlagwortliste Arbeitsmarkt | Assoziationsabkommen (EU) | Belarus | BESCHÄFTIGUNG UND ARBEITSBEDINGUNGEN | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | EU-Migrationspolitik | EU-Visumpolitik | Europa | Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | GEOGRAFIE | illegale Zuwanderung | Internationales Recht | Kaukasusländer | Moldau | Politische Geografie | RECHT | räumliche Mobilität | SOZIALE FRAGEN | Statistik | Wanderarbeitnehmer | Wanderung aus beruflichen Gründen | Wanderungsbewegungen | WIRTSCHAFT | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie

Zusammenfassung The Eastern Partners were among the first countries to launch mobility dialogues with the EU. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have also engaged in a process of visa liberalisation, which has been completed in the Republic of Moldova and is in its final stages in Georgia and Ukraine. In addition, the Association Agreements with these countries include provisions, which will be applicable from 2017 for the temporary presence – up to two years – of natural persons in EU Member States. Notwithstanding the influence of these mobility-fostering legal provisions, legal migration from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is concentrated in certain Member States as a result of economic opportunities or linguistic ties. However, with the exception of Moldova, the number of migrants from the countries in question is generally smaller in Member States than in the Russian Federation, where specific legal provisions favour internal migration from members of the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus and Armenia), and to a lesser extent from members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Moldova and Ukraine) and Georgia. The countries of origin of those large numbers of migrant workers receive a substantial boost to their economies through personal remittances. This precious source of capital has declined recently, however, owing to falling oil prices and, to a lesser extent, to economic sanctions affecting Russia. Personal remittances from the EU are showing a similar trend, with the exception, again, of Moldova.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

Could US Oil and Gas Exports Be a Game Changer for EU Energy Security?

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 08-02-2016

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie | Internationaler Handel

Schlagwortliste Amerika | Ausfuhrpolitik | die Vereinigte Staaten | Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung | Einfuhr (EU) | ENERGIE | Energieangebot | Energiepolitik | Energiepreis | Energieversorgung | Erdgas | Erdölindustrie | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Freihandelsabkommen | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelsabkommen (EU) | Handelspolitik | Internationaler Handel | Politische Geografie | Rohöl | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftsverkehr

Zusammenfassung The quest for oil markets abroad can be seen as an attempt by US companies to find higher prices and profits and avoid bankruptcy, since the current low price of oil, resulting from OPEC's strategy of oversupplying the market, is making shale-oil production in the US less and less profitable. The impact of potential US oil exports on the European Union's energy security is expected to be limited in the short term. The oil market is oversupplied, prices are depressed and are only expected to increase slightly if OPEC and other producers agree to stabilise production, and Europe can find alternative suppliers easily. These now include Iran, which has the world's fourth-largest reserves of oil, since sanctions were lifted in January following the nuclear deal. The US ban on natural gas exports is still in force. Should it be removed, as part of a TTIP deal or under changes to domestic law, the US has the potential to become a net gas exporter. However, as the US can get higher prices on Asian markets and as both the US and the EU have limited LNG infrastructures, the EU is an unlikely destination for large LNG imports from the US in the short run. Europe can obtain gas from a plethora of suppliers, now including Iran, which has the world's second-largest reserves of gas. The long-term outlook is more promising, as US LNG export capacities are expected to rise significantly in the coming decade and EU Member States may decide to diversify supplier countries and routes, under the European Energy Security Strategy, rather than allowing short-term commercial interests to prevail.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

The International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and International Trade

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 28-01-2016

Verfasser ALBERS MAGDALENA | DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe | Globale Ordnungspolitik | Internationaler Handel

Schlagwortliste Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Finanzhilfe | FINANZWESSEN | Geldwirtschaft | GEOGRAFIE | Griechenland | HANDEL | institutionelle Reform | institutionelle Zusammenarbeit | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN | internationale Rolle der Union | internationaler Handel | Internationaler Handel | Internationaler Währungsfonds | Koordinierung der WWU-Politiken | Politik der Zusammenarbeit | Politische Geografie | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Politisches Leben und öffentliche Sicherheit | Vereinte Nationen | Welthandelsorganisation | Weltorganisationen | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Währungsbeziehungen | Währungskrisen

Zusammenfassung The EU's trade policy does not exist in a vacuum. On the one hand, it is affected by international standard and rule-setting. On the other hand, the EU is itself an influential actor shaping the international trade agenda by participating in the work of international organisations and fora. This short note focuses on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Briefing [EN](#)

Ukraine's will to liberalise: Tested on many fronts

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 04-11-2015

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Internationaler Handel | Wirtschaft und Währung

Schlagwortliste Assoziationsabkommen (EU) | Autonomiebewegung | Außenpolitik | Beilegung der Streitigkeiten | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Finanzen der Europäischen Union | Finanzhilfe | Finanzierung der EU | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelsbeziehungen | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | internationale Sicherheit | Internationaler Handel | Politik der Zusammenarbeit | Politische Geografie | politische Lage | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Politisches Leben und öffentliche Sicherheit | WIRTSCHAFT | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftslage | Wirtschaftsreform | Wirtschaftssanktion | Wirtschaftssituation | Wirtschaftsstruktur

Zusammenfassung Faced with a deteriorating economy, unstable internal security and the financial repercussions of military efforts in the east, Ukraine is striving to create a business-friendly climate. To this end, the country is preparing for the enforcement by 1 January 2016 of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) created under the Association Agreement with the EU. The war and a decline in industrial output have led Ukraine's foreign trade to contract. Imports have been hit by the country's shrinking GDP, and exports are also declining. In the case of exports to Russia, several embargos and the unpredictability of the Russian market have compounded the toll. On the other hand, exports to the EU have demonstrated a surprising resilience, thanks largely to the positive performance of agriculture. While the EU has granted the country autonomous trade measures, these may not be responsible for the recent strength of Ukraine's agricultural exports; instead, traders' new market orientation may be the cause. Russia's opposition to the implementation of the DCFTA has been muted since trilateral trade negotiations with the EU and Ukraine were launched. A mutually acceptable solution may be found – or not – by the end of 2015. Ultimately, any real improvement in Ukraine's economy will depend on the termination of military activities in the east, on not totally losing trade with traditional Eurasian partners, on the effective entry into force of the DCFTA, on debt restructuring and on a commitment to ambitious reforms. Ukraine's current trade barriers must be removed. For now, at least, Ukraine seems dedicated to doing just that.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

Changing Pipelines, Shifting Strategies: Gas in South-Eastern Europe, and the Implications for Ukraine

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 01-07-2015

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie | Industrie

Schlagwortliste Asien-Ozeanien | die Russische Föderation | die Türkei | die Ukraine | Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energieversorgung | Energiezusammenarbeit | Erdgas | Erdölindustrie | Europa | Gasfernleitung | GEOGRAFIE | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | Kartellgesetzgebung | marktbeherrschende Stellung | Mitgliedstaat der EU | Organisation des Verkehrs | Politik der Zusammenarbeit | Politische Geografie | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | UNTERNEHMEN UND WETTBEWERB | VERKEHR | Westlicher Balkan | Wettbewerb | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftssanktion

Zusammenfassung Plans for gas pipelines in south-eastern Europe have experienced great upheaval in recent years, the result of business competition as well as the ongoing stand-off between Europe and Russia. The projects' advances and reversals reflect shifting strategies: those of new suppliers to find clients, those of traditional suppliers to conserve their markets and avoid regulatory impediments, and those of both suppliers and clients to ensure greater reliability. For many, this means planning to bypass Ukraine. Yet Europe as a whole does not have a single, coherent strategy. Different European countries have divergent relations with Moscow, and their multiple approaches to energy security impede coherence, particularly when it comes to Ukraine. Even within the EU institutions, the messages sometimes appear contradictory, with political declarations deviating from the technical statements of the European Commission. Ukraine's fate – whether or not it remains a transit country for gas to the EU – depends on multiple factors: its own internal reforms, its integration with the EU market, and the EU's continued support.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

When Choosing Means Losing: The Eastern Partners, the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union

Art der Veröffentlichung Studie

Kalenderdatum 10-03-2015

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie | Internationaler Handel | Wirtschaft und Währung

Schlagwortliste Angleichung der Normen | Asien-Ozeanien | Assoziationsabkommen (EU) | Belarus | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Europa | Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Freihandelszone | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelsbeschränkung | Handelsbeziehungen | INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN | Internationaler Handel | Kasachstan | Kaukasusländer | Liberalisierung des Handels | Moldau | Politische Geografie | PRODUKTION, TECHNOLOGIE UND FORSCHUNG | Technologie und technische Regelungen | Welthandelsorganisation | Weltorganisationen | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Integration | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftslage | Wirtschaftspolitik | Wirtschaftssituation | Zolltarifpolitik

Zusammenfassung The six countries in the EU's Eastern Partnership are sandwiched between two large, potent trading blocs: the EU to the west, and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to the east. Most of the six have chosen to pursue a deeper alliance with one or the other bloc – a tough choice, reflecting both political and economic factors. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed Association Agreements with the EU on 27 June 2014. Armenia and Belarus chose to accede to the Eurasian Economic Union (belatedly, in the case of Armenia). For all these countries, a choice for East or West has meant a loss: a loss of trade policy sovereignty – and likely the growth that comes with open trade policies – for some; a loss of the vital and once-fluid exchanges with the EAEU for the others. The trade and economic separation between the EU and EAEU has not aided the Eastern partners. In fact, the division is not simply a commercial one: it has been drawn – and deepened – by political and geopolitical considerations. But from a purely trade perspective, all the partners – the countries choosing one or another alliance, as well as the dozens composing the EU and EAEU – would benefit from a new and more constructive approach.

Studie [EN](#)

Commitments Made at the Hearings of the Commissioners-Designate, Juncker Commission (November 2014 - October 2019)

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 14-11-2014

Verfasser ANGERER Jost | BARNA Judit | CHATEAU Céline | DAVOLI Alessandro | DE MICCO Pasquale | FORGACS Annamaria | GARCÉS DE LOS FAYOS TOURNAN Fernando | GOUARDERES Frederic | GYORFFI Miklos Laszlo | HAUPTMAN Manica | HRADISKY Martin | KOLASSA Doris | KOŁODZIEJSKI Marek | MACIEJEWSKI Mariusz | MAGNUS Marcel | MANRIQUE GIL Manuel | MARZOCCHI Ottavio | MATHIS Alexandre | NEVILLE Darren | NOVAK Petr | OJAMAA Priit | PIAGUET Carine | RAGONNAUD Guillaume | SMAJDA Laurence | SOAVE Piero | STOERRING Dagmara | SY Sarah Salome | TEJEDOR DEL REAL Purificacion | TROSZCZYNSKA VAN GENDEREN Wanda | VERBEKEN Dirk

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Beschäftigung | Bildung | Binnenmarkt und Zollunion | Demokratie | Demokratie in der EU, institutionelle und parlamentarische Rechte | Energie | Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe | EU-Recht: Rechtsordnung und Rechtsakte | Finanz- und Bankenangelegenheiten | Fischerei | Forschungspolitik | Gleichstellungsfragen, Gleichheit und Vielfalt | Globale Ordnungspolitik | Haushalt | Haushaltskontrolle | Industrie | Internationaler Handel | Internationales Privatrecht und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Zivilsachen | Kultur | Landwirtschaft und Entwicklung des ländlichen Raums | Lebensmittelsicherheit | Menschenrechte | Petitionen an das Europäische Parlament | Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts | Rechte des geistigen Eigentums | Regionale Entwicklung | Sicherheit und Verteidigung | Sozialpolitik | Tourismus | Umwelt | Verbraucherschutz | Verkehr | Vertrags-, Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht | Völkerrecht | Wirtschaft und Währung | Öffentliche Gesundheit

Schlagwortliste Ausschuss EP | Ernennung der Mitglieder | EU-Politik | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | Europäischer Kommissar | europäisches Einigungswerk | Hoher Vertreter der Union für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik | Institutionen der Europäischen Union und Europäischer Öffentlicher Dienst | Interinstitutionelle Zusammenarbeit (EU) | parlamentarische Arbeit | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Präsident der EG-Kommission | Vizepräsident einer Institution | öffentliche Anhörung

Zusammenfassung This compilation of briefings presents the most salient points and essential commitments made by the commissioners-designate during the hearings held in September/October 2014 before the parliamentary committees. These commitments concern the main on-going legislative procedures, the preparation of future legislative proposals as well as the scrutiny of the implementation of existing legislation. They also touch upon the crucial issue of inter-institutional cooperation.

Briefing [EN](#)

Commitments Made at the Hearing of Cecilia Malmström - Commissioner-Designate

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 14-11-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Binnenmarkt und Zollunion | Verbraucherschutz

Schlagwortliste Amerika | Asien-Ozeanien | Aushandlung von Abkommen (EU) | China | die Vereinigten Staaten | Ernennung der Mitglieder | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | Europäischer Kommissar | europäisches Einigungswerk | FINANZWESEN | gemeinsame Handelspolitik | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelspolitik | Institutionen der Europäischen Union und Europäischer Öffentlicher Dienst | Interinstitutionelle Zusammenarbeit (EU) | INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN | internationales Handelsrecht | Internationales Recht | Investition und Finanzierung | Investitionspolitik | Kanada | parlamentarische Arbeit | Politische Geografie | POLITISCHES LEBEN | RECHT | Schweden | Transparenz des Entscheidungsprozesses | Welthandelsorganisation | Weltorganisationen | Wirtschaftsgeografie | öffentliche Anhörung

Zusammenfassung Cecilia Malmström, the recently-confirmed European Commissioner for Trade, appeared before the European Parliament on 29 September 2014 to answer MEPs' questions. In that hearing and in her answers to the questionnaire prepared for the meeting in advance, Commissioner Malmström made a number of statements of interest to the European Parliament. This document provides a summary of her most salient points.

Briefing [EN](#)

The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Deal: Taking the Bite out of Winter?

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 11-11-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste Bürgerkrieg | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | energetischer Wirkungsgrad | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energiepreis | Energieversorgung | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | Finanzen der Europäischen Union | Finanzhilfe | Finanzierung der EU | FINANZWESEN | Gasfernleitung | Geisteswissenschaften | Geld- und Kreditwesen | GEOGRAFIE | Geopolitik | HANDEL | Handelspolitik | Handelsvertrag | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Korruption | Kreditgarantie | Organisation des Verkehrs | Politik der Zusammenarbeit | Politische Geografie | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Politisches Leben und öffentliche Sicherheit | RECHT | Sicherung der Versorgung | Strafrecht | VERKEHR | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftsverkehr | WISSENSCHAFTEN

Zusammenfassung A recent agreement between Moscow and Kyiv, triumphantly heralded by the European Commission, is unlikely to prove everything promised by an outgoing Commission President José Manuel Barroso. Brokered by the EU, the deal should preclude a repeat of the winter gas crisis that hit Ukraine and the EU in 2006 and 2009. Already, Russia – which cut supplies to Ukraine in June 2014, when pro-Russian separatists were waging war in eastern Ukraine – has agreed to restore the supply in the cold months ahead. Prices and conditions have also been settled. But the plan's short-term solutions leave a number of problems unresolved. Ukraine's national reserves and the IMF will pay for some of Ukraine's gas, although a contribution from EU taxpayers cannot be ruled out. Not all of the agreement has been made public, and its sustainability is questionable: even if the deal has taken the bite out of winter, the ramifications for the following seasons are uncertain. The EU's energy security is likely to remain hostage to tensions between Kyiv and Moscow until Ukraine's structural weaknesses are repaired and the country's role as guardian of the pipelines reduced.

Briefing [EN](#)

[A Cold Winter to Come? The EU Seeks Alternatives to Russian Gas](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Studie

Kalenderdatum 24-10-2014

Verfasser BLAZAITIS Dovydas Vytautas | DE MICCO Pasquale | HANNAOUI-SAULAISS Lea

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste Afrika | Algerien | Amerika | Aserbaidschan | Asien-Ozeanien | Australien | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | die Vereinigten Staaten | Einfuhr (EU) | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energieversorgung | Europa | Gas | Gasfernleitung | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | Irak | Iran | Katar | Libyen | Mangel | Mosambik | Nigeria | Norwegen | Organisation des Verkehrs | Politische Geografie | Sicherung der Versorgung | Turkmenistan | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | VERKEHR | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftssanktion | Wirtschaftsverkehr

Zusammenfassung The crisis in Ukraine has led to seven rounds of sanctions between Russia and the EU – and may well lead to more. Energy is the most alarming casualty in this clash, with the EU and Russia largely interdependent in the domain. The level of dependency among EU Member States varies greatly, as does their ability to respond to Russian warnings and actions. Ukraine's gas situation is also at stake. The Russian gas exporter Gazprom ceased exporting to Ukraine in June. In late September, gas cuts were registered in Slovakia, Austria, Poland and Romania – in some cases to prevent Russian gas from being diverted to Ukraine. A provisional solution for Ukraine's winter supplies was reached in Berlin on 26 September, but has yet to be completely endorsed by Moscow and Kiev. However, the risk of gas shortages for the rest of Europe has not been averted. Military and political tensions have obliged the EU to boost its energy security mechanisms and seek alternatives to Russian gas. The European Commission has just concluded a stress test on the EU gas system to assess the impact of a potential gas crisis. Several studies have suggested that, in the short term, the EU could substitute Algerian, Norwegian and Qatari supplies for Russian gas, although this would cost more and require new gas terminals. The Union's reserves – at present 90 % full – will also help, but for how long depends on the coming winter. In the longer term, gas supplies from Azerbaijan, the United States, Iran, Mozambique, Australia, Israel and Turkmenistan could also supply the thirsty European market. EU energy policies (on renewable sources, greater efficiency, shale gas and interconnection of energy grids) could also play a role in reducing – if not completely eliminating – Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

Studie [EN](#)

[The Expected Impact of the TTIP on EU Member States and Selected Third Countries](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 19-09-2014

Verfasser BENDINI Roberto | DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Binnenmarkt und Zollunion | Industrie | Internationaler Handel | Verbraucherschutz

Schlagwortliste allgemeine Präferenzen | Amerika | Ausfuhr (EU) | Aussetzung der Zollsätze | die Vereinigten Staaten | Einfuhr (EU) | Entwicklungsland | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Freihandelsabkommen | GATT | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelsabkommen (EU) | Handelspolitik | Internationaler Handel | Liberalisierung des Handels | Marktzugang | Mitgliedstaat der EU | Politische Geografie | Wirkungsstudie | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftssituation | Wirtschaftsverkehr | Zolltarifpolitik

Zusammenfassung The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is one of the largest trade deals ever negotiated by the European Union. The European Commission, based on studies commissioned externally, has stressed on the extremely positive effects the deal could produce on the EU economy as a whole and tried to dismiss allegations that TTIP could have negatively impacted on a certain number of economic sectors and third countries, especially those benefitting from preferential access to the EU and the US markets. Several independent studies, both general and regional, have meanwhile been published. These studies, while generally confirming the expected benefits to the EU economy as a whole, often diverge as far as given economic sectors or Member States are concerned. It is worth to note that at present time, only two studies dealing with third countries have been carried out. Impact on third countries has been analysed revealing that preferential partners of both the EU and the US may face severe losses should the deal be finally concluded following the most optimistic scenario (full liberalisation).

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

[The Prospect of Eastern Mediterranean Gas Production: An Alternative Energy Supplier for the EU?](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 15-04-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste Afrika | Amerika | Asien-Ozeanien | ausschließliche Wirtschaftszone | die Russische Föderation | die Türkei | die Vereinigten Staaten | Einfuhr (EU) | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energieversorgung | Erdgas-Lagerstätte | Europa | Gasfernleitung | Gebietsanspruch | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelspolitik | Importsubstitution | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | internationale Sicherheit | Internationales Recht | Israel | Libanon | Organisation des Verkehrs | Palästina | Palästina-Frage | Politische Geografie | RECHT | Sicherung der Versorgung | VERKEHR | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftsverkehr | Zypern | Ägypten

Zusammenfassung Israeli gas discoveries in 2009 and 2010 have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a natural gas producing region and a potential energy exporter for European and Asian markets. However, the turbulent political situation in Egypt, the Syrian civil war, the tensions between Israel and Gaza, the long-lasting dispute between Turkey and Cyprus, and the maritime border disputes cast a shadow on this economic opportunity. Moreover, the gas industry in the Eastern Mediterranean is at an infant stage, and the countries concerned seem unable to coordinate their plans for future exports. Global actors are ready to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean's strategic implications. Russia aims to safeguard its gas monopoly, the United States to support its business interest, and Europe to increase its energy security and reduce dependence on Russia in the light of the Crimean crisis. In this context, the European Union should back the strategic triangle of Israel, Cyprus and Turkey as a first step towards the construction of an Eastern Mediterranean energy corridor.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

The EU's Energy Security Made Urgent by the Crimean Crisis

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 10-04-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | Einfuhr (EU) | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energietransport | Energieversorgung | Erdgas | Erdölindustrie | Europa | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handelspolitik | Importsubstitution | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | internationale Sicherheit | militärische Besetzung | Politische Geografie | Sicherung der Versorgung | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftssanktion | Wirtschaftsverkehr

Zusammenfassung The crisis in Crimea has led to a first round of sanctions between Russia and the EU – and may well lead to more. For both the EU and Russia, energy constitutes the main risk in this clash, as the two actors are largely interdependent: Russia exports 65 % of its gas to Europe, while the EU imports roughly one third of its natural gas from Russia. Among EU Member States, the level of dependency varies greatly, as does their ability to respond to Russian threats. Military and political tensions are obliging the EU to boost its energy security mechanisms and to seek out short- and long-term alternatives to Russian gas. The Union's reserves are at present half-full, thanks to a mild winter, although no-one knows what the next winter will bring. Several studies have suggested that in the short term the EU could substitute Algerian, Iranian, Norwegian and Qatari gas for Russian gas, although the price would naturally be higher. Yet the risk of recession is estimated to be lower than was the case in the 1970 oil crisis. Most of the new supply would come via cargo ships, bypassing traditional pipelines, although this will require the rapid creation of new gas terminals. In the longer term, Azeri, US and Turkmenistan gas supplies may also quench the thirsty European market, depending on commercial and technical conditions. Other energy policies (focusing on renewable sources, greater efficiency, nuclear power, shale gas and the interconnection of the energy grids) can also play a role in reducing – if not completely eliminating – Europe's dependence on Russian gas.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

Iceland: On the Verge of Withdrawing its EU Accession Application?

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 07-03-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale | GARCES DE LOS FAYOS TOURNAN Fernando

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Wirtschaft und Währung

Schlagwortliste Außenpolitik | Banksystem | Beitritt zur Europäischen Union | Beziehungen der Union | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | FINANZWESEN | Fischerei | Fischereipolitik | Geld- und Kreditwesen | GEOGRAFIE | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | internationale Sicherheit | Island | LAND- UND FORSTWIRTSCHAFT, FISCHEREI | Politische Geografie | politische Lage | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Politisches Leben und öffentliche Sicherheit | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftslage | Wirtschaftssituation | Währungsbeziehungen | Währungskrise | Öffentliche Finanzen und Haushaltspolitik | öffentliche Schulden

Zusammenfassung Iceland's application for EU membership, launched in the aftermath of the financial crisis, is today at a turning point. A new government, elected in April 2013, has presented the country's parliament with a proposal to withdraw the accession application. While the move has triggered protests and petitions against the proposal, the government has also rejected a widely requested referendum on whether to pursue accession. The government's position reflects two thorny issues in the bilateral relationship: the 'mackerel war' – in which the EU has argued that Iceland has overfished the mackerel in Icelandic waters – and Iceland's refusal to reimburse the British and Dutch depositors holding accounts with Icelandic banks before the banks collapsed. Iceland's position, which favoured domestic over foreign depositors, was backed in January 2013 by a decision issued by the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) court. The new government in Reykjavik may also be sensitive to more general concerns about EU membership and the adoption of the euro. The small Nordic country has largely recovered from its deep economic crisis, thanks to a devalued currency and a strong trade surplus – a turnaround made possible in part by the country's distance from the euro area.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

The US and EU Free Trade Agreements with Peru and Colombia: A Comparison

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 28-02-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Internationaler Handel

Schlagwortliste Amerika | die Vereinigten Staaten | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Forschung und geistiges Eigentum | Freihandelsabkommen | geistiges Eigentum | GEOGRAFIE | HANDEL | Handel mit Agrarerzeugnissen | Handelsabkommen (EU) | Handelspolitik | Handelsstatistik | Internationaler Handel | Kolumbien | Marktzugang | Menschenrechte | nichttarifäres Handelshemmnis | Peru | Politische Geografie | PRODUKTION, TECHNOLOGIE UND FORSCHUNG | RECHT | Rechte und Freiheiten | Sozialklausel | Ursprungserzeugnis | Vermarktung | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftsverkehr

Zusammenfassung On 1 March and 1 August 2013 respectively, the EU's trade agreements (TAs) with Peru and Colombia entered into force, one year after the US trade promotion agreement (TPA) with Colombia and four years after the US TPA with Peru. They are all second-generation free trade agreements, focused not only on removing tariffs on goods but also on liberalising services, public procurement and investment. While it is too early to verify the effects of these agreements, three years of statistics on bilateral Peru/US trade demonstrate a growing trend of trade in goods, even if it is impossible at this stage to establish a causality link with the US trade pact. With the exception of the US-Peru TPA, the future impact of the agreements can only be assessed by means of impact analysis reports which are between five and eight years old, and according to which the EU's gains will be more significant than those of the USA. While these results are questionable because of the different methodologies used, a sector-by-sector analysis of the differences between the trade agreements concluded by the EU and by the USA will help in understanding how second-generation agreements are shaped by different trade policy options and negotiating techniques.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

[Switzerland Votes 'Against Mass Immigration': How Can the EU Respond?](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 13-02-2014

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des Rechts

Schlagwortliste Arbeitsmarkt | Aufenthaltsrecht | Aushandlung von Abkommen (EU) | BESCHÄFTIGUNG UND ARBEITSBEDINGUNGEN | die Schweiz | EU-Bürger | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | freier Personenverkehr | GEOGRAFIE | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | Internationales Recht | Kündigung eines Abkommens | Migrationspolitik | Politische Geografie | POLITISCHES LEBEN | RECHT | Referendum | Schutzklausel | SOZIALE FRAGEN | Wahlverfahren | Wanderarbeitnehmer | Wanderungsbewegungen | Wirtschaftsgeografie

Zusammenfassung The EU-Switzerland Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, signed in 1999, is linked to six other agreements. As the EU incorporated new Member States, the bilateral agreements with Switzerland were extended to new EU countries. The Swiss government has already applied a 'safeguard clause' to limit the longterm residence permits for EU citizens. The Swiss authorities must implement the referendum within three years. The EU may choose among different courses of action, which would involve the European Parliament to different degrees. The seven linked agreements could be terminated... or suspended. Negotiations on the wider institutional framework for bilateral relations may also be frozen. The referendum confirms the need for a new framework.

Briefing [EN](#)

[EU and Russian Policies on Energy and Climate Change](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 18-12-2013

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale | GARCES DE LOS FAYOS TOURNAN Fernando | KEREBEL Cécile | OHLIGER Tina

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie | Umwelt

Schlagwortliste Arktis | Auswirkung auf die Umwelt | Beziehungen der Union | die Russische Föderation | Diversifizierung der Energieversorgung | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Energiepreis | Energieversorgung | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Gasfernleitung | Geisteswissenschaften | GEOGRAFIE | Geopolitik | Klimaschutzpolitik | Mitgliedstaat der EU | Natürliche Umgebung | Nutzung der Ressourcen | Organisation des Verkehrs | Politische Geografie | UMWELT | Umweltpolitik | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | VERKEHR | Wirtschaftsgeografie | WISSENSCHAFTEN

Zusammenfassung EU-Russian energy relations are characterised by mutual interdependence. Within the EU, however, the level of Member States' dependence on Russia varies largely according to Member States' abilities to diversify their energy mix and their imports. This has created a fragmented internal energy market, as demonstrated by the wide range in gas prices among Member States. Energy supply diversification has become a key concern for the entire EU, although energy policies are still largely overseen by Member States. While Russia is likely to remain Europe's principal energy supplier in the medium term, the importance of other crude oil and natural gas exporters, including Azerbaijan and Algeria, is likely to grow. The European Commission supports widening the possible range of sources, particularly given its antitrust investigations against Russian companies, which have exacerbated tensions. The EU and Russia are also divided by their environmental policies, stemming from a different environmental sensibility but also from the different availability of fossil fuels. Fighting against climate change, the EU has committed to reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions by 20 % by 2020. To fulfil this promise, the EU has relied on the EU Emission Trading System, currently the largest international carbon market. Unlike Europe and its ecological considerations, Moscow has long been driven by more economic and geostrategic factors. Despite Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's recent willingness to consider limiting carbon emissions and fostering investments in renewable sources, the country's refusal to adhere to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and its environmentally unfriendly Arctic efforts confirm Moscow's resistance to integrating climate issues in its policies.

Eingehende Analyse [EN](#)

[Delays to South Stream Benefit Ukraine](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Briefing

Kalenderdatum 16-12-2013

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Energie

Schlagwortliste Assoziationsabkommen (EU) | die Russische Föderation | die Ukraine | ENERGIE | Energiepolitik | Europa | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Finanzen der Europäischen Union | Finanzierung der EU | FINANZWESEN | Gasfernleitung | Geisteswissenschaften | Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik | GEOGRAFIE | Geopolitik | Organisation des Verkehrs | Politische Geografie | Recht der Europäischen Union | Unabhängigkeit in der Energieversorgung | VERKEHR | Verstoß gegen EU-Recht | WIRTSCHAFT | wirtschaftliche Auswirkung | Wirtschaftsanalyse | Wirtschaftsgeografie | WISSENSCHAFTEN | Öffentliche Finanzen und Haushaltspolitik | öffentliche Schulden

Zusammenfassung Ukraine needs Russian gas for its domestic consumption and for the revenues it provides. The Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines would circumvent Ukraine, cutting down on the country's much-needed income and making it more vulnerable to Russia's cuts. The Commission has long sought alternatives for South Stream, although Nord Stream has received funding and approval. South Stream's alternatives will not deliver nearly as much gas. Ukraine needs cash, and is unlikely to receive more from the International Monetary Fund. Moscow is likely to make a tempting offer. While the EU reportedly offered less than Ukraine requested, some analysts consider the delay to South Stream a way to entice Kyiv.

Briefing [EN](#)

[The Plurilateral Agreement on Services : At the Starting Gate](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 11-02-2013

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Binnenmarkt und Zollunion | Internationaler Handel

Schlagwortliste Aushandlung von Abkommen (EU) | Erbringung von Dienstleistungen | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Freihandelsabkommen | GATS | HANDEL | Handel mit Agrarerzeugnissen | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONEN | Internationale Politik | Internationaler Handel | Liberalisierung des Handels | multilaterales Abkommen | Vermarktung | Welthandelsorganisation | Weltorganisationen | Wirtschaftsverkehr

Zusammenfassung Faced with an impasse in World Trade Organisation's global multilateral trade talks, some 20 countries — accounting for two-thirds of the world's cross-border trade in services — began negotiating a plurilateral agreement on services in 2012 with the aim of opening domestic markets to foreign services and guaranteeing foreign and domestic companies equal treatment. Negotiations were confidential until recently, but on 15 January the US Trade Representative's office notified the US Congress of its intention to negotiate such an agreement. The European Commission is also expected to make its position public in the coming months by requesting an official mandate from the Council. The agreement has been calculated as offering the EU a potential EUR 15.6 billion and the USA EUR 10.4 billion. For the moment, China, India and Brazil remain outside the proposed trade agreement, and their entrance would increase the potential gain by 30 %. With this in mind, the agreement is likely to be crafted in such a way as to allow them a relatively easy accession in the near future.

[Eingehende Analyse EN](#)

[Does ACTA Still Matter ? Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in International Trade](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 14-01-2013

Verfasser DE MICCO Pasquale

Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Internationaler Handel | Rechte des geistigen Eigentums

Schlagwortliste EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | Forschung und geistiges Eigentum | geistiges Eigentum | gemischtes Abkommen | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | Internationale Politik | Kündigung eines Abkommens | PRODUKTION, TECHNOLOGIE UND FORSCHUNG | Ratifizierung eines Abkommens

Zusammenfassung The European Parliament's rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in July 2012 (by 478 votes to 39, with 165 abstentions) drew attention to the EU's distinctive approach to issues of intellectual property. In the years to come, the Union will implement its strategy through bilateral trade agreements, as it has in previous years, with a pragmatic and constantly changing approach. The terms of future agreements will evolve in step with the changing pattern of the world economy and with Europe's singular contributions to that economy. Yet ACTA is likely to live on regardless of the EU's rejection. The treaty's provisions may still impact — and, indeed, benefit — EU companies when they export to ACTA Members' markets. This may be the case in the US, for example. The US approach to intellectual property determined many of ACTA's internet provisions, and these proved to be the undoing of the treaty in Europe. The gap between the US — largely concerned with copyright and, until recently, less perturbed by issues of freedom of expression — and the EU — focused on trademark and deeply attentive to personal liberties — are difficult to reconcile. Despite this, there may well be ways to advance ex post ACTA.ÿÿÿ

[Eingehende Analyse EN](#)

[Egypt - A Strategic Partner for the EU](#)

Art der Veröffentlichung Eingehende Analyse

Kalenderdatum 22-11-2012

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Politikbereich Auswärtige Angelegenheiten | Demokratie | Gleichstellungsfragen, Gleichheit und Vielfalt | Menschenrechte

Schlagwortliste Afrika | Außenpolitik | Beziehungen der Union | Demokratie | Demokratisierung | EUROPÄISCHE UNION | europäisches Einigungswerk | exekutive Gewalt und öffentliche Verwaltung | GEOGRAFIE | INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN | internationale Sicherheit | Menschenrechte | Politische Geografie | Politischer Rahmen | POLITISCHES LEBEN | Pressefreiheit | RECHT | Rechte der Frau | Rechte und Freiheiten | Vereinigungsfreiheit | WIRTSCHAFT | Wirtschaftsgeografie | Wirtschaftslage | Wirtschaftssituation | Ägypten

Zusammenfassung In the most populous Arab nation, Egypt's newly elected officials are working to recapture their country's old role of regional leader, tarnished under the previous regime. The country's political and economic potential is still constrained by the complexity of its transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. After decades of government largely influenced by the military, a new era of political leaders are seeking their political direction. These politicians— for the most part Islamists — enjoy a clear mandate, garnered in a series of free and fair elections. It is essential that the political transition process continue, and that new democratic institutions be established. Egypt's fledgling democracy must be consolidated in a new constitution, also approved by the Egyptian people. Fundamental human rights and the equality of all citizens must be guaranteed, and economic growth jump-started. The EU is Egypt's first trading partner, and the EU would benefit from a greater political alliance with Egypt. Egypt's success in mediating a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel has underscored its role as a principal power in a region profoundly altered by the Arab Awakening. Egypt is a strategic partner for the European Union, and the Union should assume a more palpable presence in the country, deepen its political dialogue and support Egypt's democratic transition and socio-economic development.

[Eingehende Analyse EN](#)