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This document is a compilation of briefings that track the commitments made by the Vice-Presidents and Commissioners to the European Parliament – in their written answers to Parliament’s questions, at their hearings, and, in some cases, in subsequent appearances before Parliament’s committees. The document provides an overview of the state-of-play at the mid-term of the von der Leyen Commission. Since many of these commitments were made, major international crises have shifted some political priorities ...

Nous présentons ci-dessous un résumé de l’étude intitulée «Single Audit Approach - Root Causes of the Weaknesses in the Work of the Member States’ Managing and Audit Authorities» (Approche de l’audit unique - causes profondes des faiblesses que présentent les travaux des autorités de gestion et d’audit des États membres). L’étude a été réalisée pour le Parlement européen par le CSES (Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services LLP).

The Conference on the Future of Europe is an opportunity to reflect on the Union's democratic foundations, including the legislative role of the Council of the European Union (EU) and its relations with the European Parliament. Is it pertinent to reform the Council, either by reinforcing its parliamentary features or by transforming it into a Senate or a Second Chamber? Would such a change enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process? To answer these questions, this study looks ...

Au cours de la période de session de juin I, le Conseil et la Commission européenne devraient répondre aux questions orales posées par la commission des affaires constitutionnelles (AFCO) du Parlement européen sur la proposition du Parlement visant à abroger la décision 95/167/CE (qui régit actuellement le droit d’enquête du Parlement) et à adopter un nouveau règlement afin de renforcer ses pouvoirs d’enquête. Soulignant la réticence du Conseil à entamer des négociations politiques avec le Parlement ...

This paper assesses how the European Parliament (EP) holds the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable. The same exercise is done for the Bank of Japan, in order to identify possible lessons for the ECB and the EP. Possible improvements to the ECB accountability framework include procedural changes to the Monetary Dialogue to increase its effectiveness, the release of detailed minutes and votes from ECB governing council meetings, and the establishment of a ranking by the EU legislators of the ECB ...

Accountability at the Fed and the ECB

Analyse approfondie 30-09-2020

This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective ...

The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue ...

The paper distinguishes two contrasting models of accountability, one based on principal-agent relations, which is backward-looking, the other a dynamic and forward-looking model. The paper argues that this second model of accountability is more appropriate for independent bodies like the ECB/SSM and the SRB, operating in technically complex, rapidly evolving environments under conditions of high uncertainty, where parliaments and other political authorities have very limited sanctioning powers. ...

This note prepared by the Economic Governance Support Unit provides an overview of the EP’s accountability hearings in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism, one of the pillars or the Banking Union (the third pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme, still pending completion). It comprises the European Central Bank, in its supervisory capacity, and the national supervisory authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.