28

résultat(s)

Mot(s)
Type de publication
Domaine politique
Auteur
Date

Non-performing Loans - New risks and policies? NPL resolution after COVID-19

12-03-2021

This paper reviews the main differences between the prospects for NPL build-up and resolution between the current pandemic and the financial crisis of 2008-2009. To facilitate NPL reduction following the pandemic, the ECB should actively counter the revealed tendency of banks with low profitability to implement relatively low loan loss provisions.

This paper reviews the main differences between the prospects for NPL build-up and resolution between the current pandemic and the financial crisis of 2008-2009. To facilitate NPL reduction following the pandemic, the ECB should actively counter the revealed tendency of banks with low profitability to implement relatively low loan loss provisions.

Auteur externe

A. C. Bertay, H. Huizinga

When and how to unwind COVID-support measures to the banking system?

09-03-2021

Designing exit strategy requires judgment, coordination among different institutions, and graduality. Restoring banks’ balance sheet transparency is a first-order objective. To this end, borrower relief measures should be phased out ahead of the other measures. Relaxation of loan classification and provisioning policies can be lifted in a second stage. The last one to be unwounded would be capital relief initiatives. To provide banks time and space of manoeuvre, exit strategies needs to be communicated ...

Designing exit strategy requires judgment, coordination among different institutions, and graduality. Restoring banks’ balance sheet transparency is a first-order objective. To this end, borrower relief measures should be phased out ahead of the other measures. Relaxation of loan classification and provisioning policies can be lifted in a second stage. The last one to be unwounded would be capital relief initiatives. To provide banks time and space of manoeuvre, exit strategies needs to be communicated in a clear and timely manner.

Auteur externe

T. Beck, B. Bruno, E. Carletti

Non-performing Loans – Different this Time? NPL resolution after COVID-19

05-03-2021

Model estimates of NPLs of a large sample of banks in the euro area suggest that macro-economic factors drive NPLs. This implies that the NPL-ratio may not increase in a similar fashion as after the global financial crisis. However, the low fit of the model shows that idiosyncratic factors play a major role in explaining NPLs. This is illustrated in a case study for the Netherlands which suggests that deferred tax payments may lead to increasing NPLs. This paper was prepared by the Economic Governance ...

Model estimates of NPLs of a large sample of banks in the euro area suggest that macro-economic factors drive NPLs. This implies that the NPL-ratio may not increase in a similar fashion as after the global financial crisis. However, the low fit of the model shows that idiosyncratic factors play a major role in explaining NPLs. This is illustrated in a case study for the Netherlands which suggests that deferred tax payments may lead to increasing NPLs. This paper was prepared by the Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Auteur externe

Jakob DE HAAN

When and how to unwind COVID-support measures to the banking system?

04-03-2021

This paper examines regulatory measures and supervisory practices that have supported public guarantee schemes and moratoria in euro-area countries. The focus is on flexibility shown with regard to default classifications, accounting practices and the treatment of non-performing loans. The paper identifies a number of undesirable effects and examines how soon such policies can be normalised. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.

This paper examines regulatory measures and supervisory practices that have supported public guarantee schemes and moratoria in euro-area countries. The focus is on flexibility shown with regard to default classifications, accounting practices and the treatment of non-performing loans. The paper identifies a number of undesirable effects and examines how soon such policies can be normalised. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.

Auteur externe

A. Lehmann, Bruegel

Review of the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR): Updated rules on supervision of central counterparties (CCPs)

10-01-2020

The increasing importance of central counterparties (CCPs), and challenges such as the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU, call for a more comprehensive supervision of CCPs in EU and non-EU countries to secure financial market infrastructure and build confidence. In June 2017, the Commission proposed amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority) and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR – European Market Infrastructure), to strengthen the regulatory ...

The increasing importance of central counterparties (CCPs), and challenges such as the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU, call for a more comprehensive supervision of CCPs in EU and non-EU countries to secure financial market infrastructure and build confidence. In June 2017, the Commission proposed amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA – European Securities and Markets Authority) and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (EMIR – European Market Infrastructure), to strengthen the regulatory framework. Under the proposals, EU CCPs would be supervised by national authorities in agreement with ESMA, and third-country CCPs subject to different requirements depending on whether (or not) they are systemically important. Following trilogue negotiations, Parliament voted on the resulting agreement at its plenary session of 18 April 2019. The final act was signed on 23 October 2019 and entered into force on 1 January 2020. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Guarantee Fund for External Actions

13-12-2018

The Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GFEA) backs loans and loan guarantees granted to non-EU countries, or to finance projects in non-EU countries. Its objectives are to help protect the EU budget against the risks associated with such loans. The main objective of the actions backed by the GFEA is to support the increase of growth and jobs, and to improve the business environment in developing countries by strengthening the involvement of the private sector. The GFEA also contributes to the European ...

The Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GFEA) backs loans and loan guarantees granted to non-EU countries, or to finance projects in non-EU countries. Its objectives are to help protect the EU budget against the risks associated with such loans. The main objective of the actions backed by the GFEA is to support the increase of growth and jobs, and to improve the business environment in developing countries by strengthening the involvement of the private sector. The GFEA also contributes to the European External Investment Plan, which addresses the root causes of migration, the ongoing refugee crisis and security-related issues.

Fonds de garantie relatif aux actions extérieures et mandat de prêt extérieur de la BEI

31-01-2018

En septembre 2016, la Commission européenne a proposé des modifications au règlement relatif au Fonds de garantie relatif aux actions extérieures et à la décision accordant une garantie de l'Union à la Banque européenne d’investissement (BEI) en cas de pertes résultant de prêts et de garanties de prêts en faveur de projets réalisés en dehors de l'Union (mandat de prêt extérieur). L’accord sur ces propositions, conclu au terme de huit mois de négociations en trilogue, doit être soumis à un vote de ...

En septembre 2016, la Commission européenne a proposé des modifications au règlement relatif au Fonds de garantie relatif aux actions extérieures et à la décision accordant une garantie de l'Union à la Banque européenne d’investissement (BEI) en cas de pertes résultant de prêts et de garanties de prêts en faveur de projets réalisés en dehors de l'Union (mandat de prêt extérieur). L’accord sur ces propositions, conclu au terme de huit mois de négociations en trilogue, doit être soumis à un vote de confirmation lors de la plénière de février I.

Reglement sur l?infrastructure du marche europeen (EMIR): Reglement sur les produits derives de gre a gre dans l?Union europeenne

13-06-2017

«Produits dérivés», «contreparties centrales» et «référentiels centraux». Que signifient ces notions et comment sont-elles liées? Pourquoi une réglementation s’est-elle avérée nécessaire et de quelle façon le règlement sur l’infrastructure du marché européen (EMIR) l’opère-t-il? Le présent article place ces éléments dans leur contexte, offre une introduction au sujet des produits dérivés de gré à gré et présente les évolutions qui ont conduit la Commission à présenter des propositions en faveur du ...

«Produits dérivés», «contreparties centrales» et «référentiels centraux». Que signifient ces notions et comment sont-elles liées? Pourquoi une réglementation s’est-elle avérée nécessaire et de quelle façon le règlement sur l’infrastructure du marché européen (EMIR) l’opère-t-il? Le présent article place ces éléments dans leur contexte, offre une introduction au sujet des produits dérivés de gré à gré et présente les évolutions qui ont conduit la Commission à présenter des propositions en faveur du réexamen de la législation en 2017.

The Commission Insolvency Proposal and its Impact on the Protection of Creditors

10-06-2017

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee compares the preventive insolvency restructuring regimes of various Member States and sets forth the scope of the Commission proposal for a draft Directive of 22 November 2016, the transposition of such proposal and policy recommendations in connection therewith.

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee compares the preventive insolvency restructuring regimes of various Member States and sets forth the scope of the Commission proposal for a draft Directive of 22 November 2016, the transposition of such proposal and policy recommendations in connection therewith.

Synthetic securitisation: A closer look

22-06-2016

In September 2015, the European Commission adopted two legislative proposals: one that aims to develop an EU-wide framework for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations, and another that aims to make the capital treatment of securitisations for banks and investment firms more risk-sensitive by amending the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). While the European Commission did not include synthetic securitisations in the STS scheme, it left open the possibility for some of them ...

In September 2015, the European Commission adopted two legislative proposals: one that aims to develop an EU-wide framework for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisations, and another that aims to make the capital treatment of securitisations for banks and investment firms more risk-sensitive by amending the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). While the European Commission did not include synthetic securitisations in the STS scheme, it left open the possibility for some of them to be included at a later stage. Similarly, while synthetic securitisations in general do not benefit from a different prudential treatment under the CRR, the Commission proposed that a specific category of synthetic transactions should – under specific conditions – benefit from an equivalent regime. The European Banking Authority (EBA), the Council of the EU and the European Central Bank (ECB) have all given their views on the matter and the debate has yet to conclude, as the two proposals are under discussion in the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The question of synthetic securitisations benefiting from a specific regime carries opportunities (by broadening the market for originators and freeing up capital to finance the real economy, notably SMEs) as well as risks, depending on the synthetic securitisation used and the final framing of the regime. Hence, this briefing gives a general introduction to the subject and outlines the positions of the Commission, the Council, the EBA and the ECB.

Evénements à venir

21-06-2021
Ensuring effective protection of European consumers in the digital economy
Audition -
IMCO
22-06-2021
AFCO ICM on the Reform of European Electoral Law & Parliament's Right of Inquiry
Autre événement -
AFCO
22-06-2021
The development of new tax practices:what new schemes should the EU pay attention to?
Audition -
FISC

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