27

résultat(s)

Mot(s)
Type de publication
Domaine politique
Auteur
Mot-clé
Date

Russia's armed forces: Defence capabilities and policy

10-03-2021

Reforms launched under Vladimir Putin have restored some of the Russian armed forces' former glory. Russia now has a streamlined, mobile and mostly professional military, equipped with modern weapons. The impact of these changes was visible in Syria, Russia's first military intervention outside the post-Soviet region. Despite this increased capability, there are demographic and financial constraints on Russian military power. The armed forces are not attracting enough recruits to go fully professional ...

Reforms launched under Vladimir Putin have restored some of the Russian armed forces' former glory. Russia now has a streamlined, mobile and mostly professional military, equipped with modern weapons. The impact of these changes was visible in Syria, Russia's first military intervention outside the post-Soviet region. Despite this increased capability, there are demographic and financial constraints on Russian military power. The armed forces are not attracting enough recruits to go fully professional, and therefore still need conscripts – who are less well-trained than career soldiers – to make up the numbers. Moscow has spent billions of dollars on new weapons, such as the innovative nuclear missiles unveiled by President Putin in 2018, but not all branches of the armed forces are equally well equipped. Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy raises the question of how much of a threat its military represents. Officially, the role of the armed forces is to defend Russian territory, but in practice Moscow uses military force to assert control over its post-Soviet sphere of influence, for example in Ukraine. Russia also uses hybrid methods such as cyber-attacks, including against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. NATO's overall numerical superiority means that Russia is likely to avoid all-out war with the alliance. However, the risk that it might use nuclear weapons and other niche strengths to escape retaliation for a limited attack (for example in the Baltic region) cannot be entirely discounted.

EU Defence Package: Defence Procurement and Intra-Community Transfers Directives

19-10-2020

This study examines the implementation of the European Union (EU) defence package, which consists of the Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC and the Intra-Community Transfers Directive 2009/43/EC, during the period from 2016 to 2020. It is organised in two parts. The first part of the study, prepared internally, examines the evaluations carried out on the implementation of the two directives to identify persisting challenges. It surveys institutional and policy novelties in the field of EU defence ...

This study examines the implementation of the European Union (EU) defence package, which consists of the Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC and the Intra-Community Transfers Directive 2009/43/EC, during the period from 2016 to 2020. It is organised in two parts. The first part of the study, prepared internally, examines the evaluations carried out on the implementation of the two directives to identify persisting challenges. It surveys institutional and policy novelties in the field of EU defence cooperation so as to place the implementation of the two directives in context, and then examines Parliament's oversight work. It goes on to lay out the main elements that are likely to affect the future of EU defence industrial cooperation, and provides options for moving forward. The second part of the study, which was outsourced, is based on primary research (a survey and interviews) and aims to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and added value of the Defence Procurement Directive and the Intra-Community Transfers Directive. It also seeks to identify limitations and challenges, and explore – where possible – the links between the implementation of the two directives.

Recommendations for a transparent and detailed reporting system on arms exports within the EU and to third countries

08-05-2020

The EU’s annual report on arms export control presently lags behind the national reports of many countries. The introduction of a searchable online database will be a substantial step in increasing the user-friendliness of the report. This paper makes recommendations with regard to readability, comprehensiveness and comparability. Perhaps the principal recommendation is that steps be taken to harmonise the data provided under the categories ‘licensed value’ and ‘actual exports’, which are presently ...

The EU’s annual report on arms export control presently lags behind the national reports of many countries. The introduction of a searchable online database will be a substantial step in increasing the user-friendliness of the report. This paper makes recommendations with regard to readability, comprehensiveness and comparability. Perhaps the principal recommendation is that steps be taken to harmonise the data provided under the categories ‘licensed value’ and ‘actual exports’, which are presently not consistently interpreted across the EU. The main argument of this paper is that the EU should move towards using data visualisation to complement the lengthy statistical tables in the annual report and thus make it more readable. The EU and its Member States should also explore opportunities to enhance the data contained in the report to include additional identified data fields, narrative sections to complement the statistical data, and disaggregated data on licence denials. In identifying additional data fields that could be included, the paper also examines the challenges associated with the provision of the data in each case.

Auteur externe

Dr Ian J. STEWART, Dr Benedict WILKINSON, Prof. Christoph O. MEYER, King's College, London, UK

The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base

10-01-2020

The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been a key focus of EU policy efforts in recent years, not just for security reasons, but also for economic ones. There have been a host of funds to strengthen and reinforce the EDTIB, and to ensure deeper cooperation, avoid duplication and underscore the interoperability of equipment. These funding streams have not been fully evaluated, but they are important symbols of the energy and commitment with which the EU has attempted to create ...

The EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) has been a key focus of EU policy efforts in recent years, not just for security reasons, but also for economic ones. There have been a host of funds to strengthen and reinforce the EDTIB, and to ensure deeper cooperation, avoid duplication and underscore the interoperability of equipment. These funding streams have not been fully evaluated, but they are important symbols of the energy and commitment with which the EU has attempted to create an integrated pan-EU defence industry. There have, however, been challenges. The EU Member States remain predisposed to procuring weapons nationally or internationally, rather than regionally. There is a question as to whether these funds are great enough to be genuinely transformative, or whether in practice they are insufficient in relation to investment in the domestic defence industries. Finally, efforts to integrate the EDTIB also risk the EU being seen as protectionist, which may lead other major weapons suppliers such as the US to respond in kind.

Auteur externe

Dr Benedict Wilkinson, Associate Director of the Policy Institute, King’s College London, UK

Military mobility

12-03-2019

Military logistics was defined by Baron Henri de Jomini as 'the practical art of moving armies'. In the event of an unpredictable crisis at any border of the European Union (EU), military personnel and equipment must be able to move rapidly across the territory. Currently, training and the movement of military assets across the continent is severely hampered by the lack of appropriate infrastructure and cumbersome customs procedures. This strategic weakness in European defence cooperation is being ...

Military logistics was defined by Baron Henri de Jomini as 'the practical art of moving armies'. In the event of an unpredictable crisis at any border of the European Union (EU), military personnel and equipment must be able to move rapidly across the territory. Currently, training and the movement of military assets across the continent is severely hampered by the lack of appropriate infrastructure and cumbersome customs procedures. This strategic weakness in European defence cooperation is being addressed by means of action on military mobility: an action plan by the European Commission, a project and commitment under permanent structured cooperation, and a key action for EU-NATO cooperation. Military mobility is meant to ensure the seamless movement of military equipment across the EU by reducing physical, legal and regulatory obstacles.

Défense de l’Union européenne : Le processus de mise en oeuvre du Livre blanc

12-12-2018

Depuis longtemps, la question se pose d’un Livre blanc de défense au niveau européen. De nombreuses voix, notamment au sein du Parlement européen, poussent en faveur d’une telle initiative, alors que d’autres estiment qu’une telle démarche non seulement n’est pas nécessaire, mais qu’elle serait même dangereuse car elle diviserait les Européens. En réalité cette question ne peut être dissociée de celle de la planification de défense et des processus permettant de développer des capacités militaires ...

Depuis longtemps, la question se pose d’un Livre blanc de défense au niveau européen. De nombreuses voix, notamment au sein du Parlement européen, poussent en faveur d’une telle initiative, alors que d’autres estiment qu’une telle démarche non seulement n’est pas nécessaire, mais qu’elle serait même dangereuse car elle diviserait les Européens. En réalité cette question ne peut être dissociée de celle de la planification de défense et des processus permettant de développer des capacités militaires, car les Livres blancs en sont souvent le point de départ. Or, il y a au sein de l’Union européenne non pas un mais trois types de planifications de défense : les planifications nationales de chacun des Etats membres ; la planification otanienne qui porte le nom de NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process) et enfin une planification de l’Union européenne, qui s’est développée par étapes depuis le sommet d’Helsinki en 1999 et qui comporte de multiples éléments dont le plus connu, mais pas le seul, est le plan de développement capacitaire établi par l’Agence Européenne de Défense. Comment ces planifications coexistent-elles ? Quelles sont leurs forces et leurs faiblesses ? Ce n’est qu’en ayant une vision d’ensemble que l’on pourra répondre à la question initiale. C’est l’ambition de la présente étude.

Auteur externe

Mr Frédéric MAURO

Réglementation de l’Union européenne sur le contrôle des exportations d’armements

07-11-2018

La position commune de l’Union sur les exportations d’armements constitue la seule disposition juridique contraignante à l’échelle régionale sur les exportations d’armes classiques. Si la position commune a renforcé l’échange d’informations et la transparence en matière d’exportations d’armements par les États membres, il est encore néanmoins possible de faire converger davantage les politiques nationales et d’appliquer plus rigoureusement les critères définis dans la position commune. À la suite ...

La position commune de l’Union sur les exportations d’armements constitue la seule disposition juridique contraignante à l’échelle régionale sur les exportations d’armes classiques. Si la position commune a renforcé l’échange d’informations et la transparence en matière d’exportations d’armements par les États membres, il est encore néanmoins possible de faire converger davantage les politiques nationales et d’appliquer plus rigoureusement les critères définis dans la position commune. À la suite de la publication, en février 2018, du 19e rapport annuel de l’UE sur les exportations d’armes, le Parlement européen doit examiner un rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la position commune au cours de la première période de session de novembre (novembre I).

Instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix: adaptation en faveur des acteurs militaires

24-11-2017

La Commission européenne propose de modifier le règlement (UE) n° 230/2014 instituant un instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix (IcSP) afin de créer les conditions propres à permettre une aide budgétaire de l’Union destinée à un soutien systématique et à long terme en faveur du secteur de la sécurité dans les pays tiers, notamment des forces militaires, à travers des programmes de renforcement des capacités, la fourniture de matériel non létal et l’amélioration des infrastructures. Le ...

La Commission européenne propose de modifier le règlement (UE) n° 230/2014 instituant un instrument contribuant à la stabilité et à la paix (IcSP) afin de créer les conditions propres à permettre une aide budgétaire de l’Union destinée à un soutien systématique et à long terme en faveur du secteur de la sécurité dans les pays tiers, notamment des forces militaires, à travers des programmes de renforcement des capacités, la fourniture de matériel non létal et l’amélioration des infrastructures. Le Parlement mettra aux voix cette proposition au cours de la période de session de novembre II.

ISIL/Da'esh: From Mosul to Mosul

13-07-2017

In June 2014, ISIL/Da'esh took over the city of Mosul in Iraq, and from there declared the advent of an Islamic State. Three years later, in July 2017, after nine months of battle involving Iraqi security forces, popular militias and Kurdish troops, ISIL/Da'esh has been expelled from its Iraqi stronghold, adding to the past two years' severe territorial losses. This is an important victory; however, it does not yet represent the eradication of a terrorist group that still has many supporters.

In June 2014, ISIL/Da'esh took over the city of Mosul in Iraq, and from there declared the advent of an Islamic State. Three years later, in July 2017, after nine months of battle involving Iraqi security forces, popular militias and Kurdish troops, ISIL/Da'esh has been expelled from its Iraqi stronghold, adding to the past two years' severe territorial losses. This is an important victory; however, it does not yet represent the eradication of a terrorist group that still has many supporters.

Japon: réforme de la politique de défense et de sécurité

22-01-2016

Le 20 septembre 2015, après un parcours parlementaire long et semé d'embûches, la Diète japonaise a finalement approuvé une réforme très attendue de la législation nippone de défense et de sécurité. La détermination du Premier ministre Shinzō Abe l'a emporté sur les contestations tant au sein du Parlement que dans le pays. L'article 9 de la Constitution est réinterprété de façon à permettre aux Forces d'Autodéfense japonaises de venir en aide à un allié attaqué, notamment les États-Unis. En effet ...

Le 20 septembre 2015, après un parcours parlementaire long et semé d'embûches, la Diète japonaise a finalement approuvé une réforme très attendue de la législation nippone de défense et de sécurité. La détermination du Premier ministre Shinzō Abe l'a emporté sur les contestations tant au sein du Parlement que dans le pays. L'article 9 de la Constitution est réinterprété de façon à permettre aux Forces d'Autodéfense japonaises de venir en aide à un allié attaqué, notamment les États-Unis. En effet, l'armée américaine garantit la défense de l'archipel depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette réforme s'ajoute à une série d'autres réformes et initiatives, y compris la création d'un Conseil de sécurité nationale, la définition d'une Stratégie de sécurité nationale, l'adoption d'une loi sur l'information classifiée, ainsi que la révision des principes sur les exportations d'armes. Les lignes directrices pour la coopération avec les États-Unis ont été révisées. Parallèlement, Tokyo développe sa coopération militaire avec d'autres pays dans la région. Ces réformes visent à faire du Japon un "contributeur actif pour la paix" dans un environnement régional troublé par les ambitions chinoises et la menace nucléaire nord-coréenne croissante.

Evénements à venir

26-10-2021
Investment Policy and Investment Protection Reform
Audition -
INTA
26-10-2021
ANIT Hearing on Recommendations for the Future
Audition -
ANIT
26-10-2021
Inclusion measures within the Erasmus+ Programme 2014-2020
Audition -
CULT

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