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Accountability at the Fed and the ECB

30-09-2020

This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective ...

This paper reviews the independence and accountability of the ECB and the Federal Reserve. While the ECB makes significant efforts to be accountable for its actions, there are several improvements that could be made to European institutions to improve its independence and accountability. These include reforming the process of appointing ECB Executive Board members, improving the transparency of ECB decision-making and reforming aspects of the Monetary Dialogue to make the questioning more effective. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Údar seachtarach

Karl WHELAN

How Can the European Parliament Better Oversee the European Central Bank?

30-09-2020

This paper assesses how the European Parliament (EP) holds the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable. The same exercise is done for the Bank of Japan, in order to identify possible lessons for the ECB and the EP. Possible improvements to the ECB accountability framework include procedural changes to the Monetary Dialogue to increase its effectiveness, the release of detailed minutes and votes from ECB governing council meetings, and the establishment of a ranking by the EU legislators of the ECB ...

This paper assesses how the European Parliament (EP) holds the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable. The same exercise is done for the Bank of Japan, in order to identify possible lessons for the ECB and the EP. Possible improvements to the ECB accountability framework include procedural changes to the Monetary Dialogue to increase its effectiveness, the release of detailed minutes and votes from ECB governing council meetings, and the establishment of a ranking by the EU legislators of the ECB’s secondary objectives. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Údar seachtarach

Grégory CLAEYS, Marta DOMÍNGUEZ-JIMÉNEZ

Independence with Weak Accountability: The Swiss Case

29-09-2020

The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue ...

The Swiss National Bank is highly independent but weakly accountable. Weak accountability is rooted in the formal legislation on central banking but also in the reputation of the Bank, which is unanimously considered as highly successful. The ECB too is highly independent and weakly accountable but it faces diverse public opinions whose views differ across countries. Buttressing ECB accountability is important, therefore, and the European Parliament should consider strengthening the Monetary Dialogue. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Údar seachtarach

Charles WYPLOSZ

SSM and the SRB accountability at European level: room for improvements?

12-05-2020

The paper distinguishes two contrasting models of accountability, one based on principal-agent relations, which is backward-looking, the other a dynamic and forward-looking model. The paper argues that this second model of accountability is more appropriate for independent bodies like the ECB/SSM and the SRB, operating in technically complex, rapidly evolving environments under conditions of high uncertainty, where parliaments and other political authorities have very limited sanctioning powers. ...

The paper distinguishes two contrasting models of accountability, one based on principal-agent relations, which is backward-looking, the other a dynamic and forward-looking model. The paper argues that this second model of accountability is more appropriate for independent bodies like the ECB/SSM and the SRB, operating in technically complex, rapidly evolving environments under conditions of high uncertainty, where parliaments and other political authorities have very limited sanctioning powers. It then goes on to review the nature and effectiveness of three main forms of accountability as applied to these institutions – administrative, judicial, and political – together with the contribution of external review bodies, such as the European Court of Auditors and the European Ombudsman, to their accountability at European level. Following the dynamic, forward-looking approach advocated above, the paper argues that the best way to improve the accountability of the SSM and the SRB is to request the ECB/SSM and SRB to make the findings of their internal quality assurance and review bodies publicly available (subject to constraints on professional secrecy) and for the EP to use these findings to scrutinize and stimulate public debate about the operations and effectiveness of the two institutions.

Údar seachtarach

Jonathan ZEITLIN, Filipe BRITO BASTOS

Single Supervisroy Mechanism (SSM) – Accountability arrangements and legal base for hearings in the European Parliament - State of Play - August 2019

29-08-2019

This note prepared by the Economic Governance Support Unit provides an overview of the EP’s accountability hearings in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

This note prepared by the Economic Governance Support Unit provides an overview of the EP’s accountability hearings in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

Single Supervisory Mechanism – Main Features, Oversight and Accountability

16-07-2019

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism, one of the pillars or the Banking Union (the third pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme, still pending completion). It comprises the European Central Bank, in its supervisory capacity, and the national supervisory authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism, one of the pillars or the Banking Union (the third pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme, still pending completion). It comprises the European Central Bank, in its supervisory capacity, and the national supervisory authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.

Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Commission: Implementation of Treaty provisions

09-07-2019

The European Parliament's application of scrutiny prerogatives of political oversight of the European Commission increases the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the transparency and accountability of the European executive. The update of the 2018 study examines the European Parliament's powers of scrutiny of the European Commission in the last two legislative terms. The cases examined pertain mainly to electoral and institutional issues, motions of censure, parliamentary questions, ...

The European Parliament's application of scrutiny prerogatives of political oversight of the European Commission increases the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the transparency and accountability of the European executive. The update of the 2018 study examines the European Parliament's powers of scrutiny of the European Commission in the last two legislative terms. The cases examined pertain mainly to electoral and institutional issues, motions of censure, parliamentary questions, inquiry committees and special parliamentary committees and reporting, consultation and provision of information. It also touches upon scrutiny in budgetary issues, scrutiny of delegated acts, scrutiny in the legislative procedure, legal proceedings and the EU's external relations.

Banking Union Essential Terms: Technical Abbreviations & Glossary (EN/DE/FR)

06-07-2018

This abbreviation list and tri-lingual glossary (English, German and French, see disclaimer) lists and explains relevant terms frequently used in the area of documents related to the Banking Union, more specifically in relation to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the application of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). The glossary and list of abbreviations may be updated and extended in order to ...

This abbreviation list and tri-lingual glossary (English, German and French, see disclaimer) lists and explains relevant terms frequently used in the area of documents related to the Banking Union, more specifically in relation to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the application of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). The glossary and list of abbreviations may be updated and extended in order to take account of new developments and needs. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the ECON Committee.

Údar seachtarach

Bernd HEIMBÜCHEL, Ute HEIMBÜCHEL, Urs LENDERMANN

The role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)

20-10-2017

This briefing gives an overview of the role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in setting international standards in banking regulation and supervision. It also raises the questions on how the preparatory work is organised in the European Union in order to enhance transparency and co-operation.

This briefing gives an overview of the role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in setting international standards in banking regulation and supervision. It also raises the questions on how the preparatory work is organised in the European Union in order to enhance transparency and co-operation.