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Banking Union: Completing the Single Rule Book

18-07-2019

This briefing provides an insight into where banking legislation stands in terms of providing a ‘single rule book’ for the purposes of supervising banks in the Banking Union It also identifies the key areas where further harmonisation would facilitate both supervision and resolution.

This briefing provides an insight into where banking legislation stands in terms of providing a ‘single rule book’ for the purposes of supervising banks in the Banking Union It also identifies the key areas where further harmonisation would facilitate both supervision and resolution.

Public hearing with Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board, on the SRB Annual Report 2018 - ECON on 22 July 2019

18-07-2019

This note is prepared in view of a public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke König who will inter alia present the SRB 2018 Annual Report.

This note is prepared in view of a public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Elke König who will inter alia present the SRB 2018 Annual Report.

Banking Union: What next?

18-07-2019

This briefing summarises the key areas of possible regulatory initiatives with a view to further completing the Banking Union: (1) EDIS, (2) Further harmonisation of banking law (“single rule book’), (3) Home/host issues, (4) Resolution financing, (5) Further harmonisation of insolvency law, (6) safe assets and regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures and (7) AML supervision. These issues are further explained in additional thematic briefings.

This briefing summarises the key areas of possible regulatory initiatives with a view to further completing the Banking Union: (1) EDIS, (2) Further harmonisation of banking law (“single rule book’), (3) Home/host issues, (4) Resolution financing, (5) Further harmonisation of insolvency law, (6) safe assets and regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures and (7) AML supervision. These issues are further explained in additional thematic briefings.

An Effective Regime for Non-viable Banks: US Experience and Considerations for EU Reform

17-07-2019

For 85 years, the US regime for non-viable banks has maintained a high degree of stability and public confidence by protecting deposits, while working to minimize the public cost of that protection. With awareness of the difference in context, EU reformers can draw valuable insights from the US experience. On balance, a review of the US regime supports arguments in favour of harmonization and centralization of bank insolvency proceedings and deposit insurance in Europe’s banking union. A unitary ...

For 85 years, the US regime for non-viable banks has maintained a high degree of stability and public confidence by protecting deposits, while working to minimize the public cost of that protection. With awareness of the difference in context, EU reformers can draw valuable insights from the US experience. On balance, a review of the US regime supports arguments in favour of harmonization and centralization of bank insolvency proceedings and deposit insurance in Europe’s banking union. A unitary regime would improve on the current EU status quo along multiple dimensions: deposit protection, creditor rights, controlling moral hazard, predictability and operational effectiveness, transparency and accountability, and financial stability. It would help break the bank-sovereign vicious circle in the euro area. The US experience suggests that substantial improvements are achievable in a well-designed system of institutional checks and balances that learns and adapts over time.

Vanjski autor

A.Gelpern, N.Véron

Single Resolution Mechanism - Main Features, Oversight and Accountability

16-07-2019

One of the key lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2007-2008 is that in order to reduce the direct and indirect costs of bank failures for national governments, one has to have a credible framework in place to deal with banks’ failures, including clear rules as to the allocation of losses and the conditions attached to the use of common resources, to provide strong incentives for taking measures of precaution in good times and minimise losses in times of crisis. To that end, Europe has put ...

One of the key lessons learned from the financial crisis in 2007-2008 is that in order to reduce the direct and indirect costs of bank failures for national governments, one has to have a credible framework in place to deal with banks’ failures, including clear rules as to the allocation of losses and the conditions attached to the use of common resources, to provide strong incentives for taking measures of precaution in good times and minimise losses in times of crisis. To that end, Europe has put together a framework for resolving banks in difficulties. That framework is the Single Resolution Mechanism, headed by an European agency, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), based on Regulation 806/2014 and comprising all national resolution authorities of the Member States participating in the Banking Union.

Single Supervisory Mechanism – Main Features, Oversight and Accountability

16-07-2019

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism, one of the pillars or the Banking Union (the third pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme, still pending completion). It comprises the European Central Bank, in its supervisory capacity, and the national supervisory authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is, along with the Single Resolution Mechanism, one of the pillars or the Banking Union (the third pillar, the common deposit guarantee scheme, still pending completion). It comprises the European Central Bank, in its supervisory capacity, and the national supervisory authorities (NCAs) of participating Member States.

Banking Union: Towards new arrangements for the provision of liquidity in resolution?

16-07-2019

The recent case of Banco Popular has shown the importance of liquidity funding in the context of bank resolution. The Eurogroup report endorsed by the December 2018 Euro Summit noted the “broad support for the assessment of the institutions [i.e. ECB, SRB and Commission] that there are limitations in the current framework [for liquidity provision in resolution] which may hamper its effectiveness. The June 2019 Euro summit has not yet reached any conclusions on the design of that liquidity facility ...

The recent case of Banco Popular has shown the importance of liquidity funding in the context of bank resolution. The Eurogroup report endorsed by the December 2018 Euro Summit noted the “broad support for the assessment of the institutions [i.e. ECB, SRB and Commission] that there are limitations in the current framework [for liquidity provision in resolution] which may hamper its effectiveness. The June 2019 Euro summit has not yet reached any conclusions on the design of that liquidity facility, as planned. The Eurogroup is expected to report back to the Euro-Summit in December 2019. This briefing (1) describes the existing arrangements in the Banking Union, (2) compares those arrangements with the US and the UK regimes and (3) echoes ongoing reflections on possible new arrangements with a view to completing the Banking Union. This briefing is an updated version of a briefing initially drafted in July 2018.

Banking Union: Defusing the “home/host” debate

16-07-2019

While a banking group located in the Banking Union is supervised by a single supervisor (SSM) and no longer by home and host supervisors, subsidiaries are subject to individual requirements with remaining national powers over legal entities of a group. Further integration of banking groups’ risk management has been identified by the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as one of the remaining steps to completing the Banking Union. For the Chair of the SSM, there are “still obstacles to ...

While a banking group located in the Banking Union is supervised by a single supervisor (SSM) and no longer by home and host supervisors, subsidiaries are subject to individual requirements with remaining national powers over legal entities of a group. Further integration of banking groups’ risk management has been identified by the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as one of the remaining steps to completing the Banking Union. For the Chair of the SSM, there are “still obstacles to the integrated management of bank capital and liquidity within cross-border groups operating in the banking union”. As the SSM put it “the fences should be removed; they are out of place within a banking union where the concept of home and host supervisors has disappeared”.

European Central Bank appointments: Role of the European Parliament

15-07-2019

The European Parliament plays an important role in the appointment processes of two European Central Bank bodies: the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (Chair and Vice-Chair). This paper aims to: a) provide an overview of the relevant procedural provisions, b) present a selection of past appointments; and c) describe the evolving role of the European Parliament in those procedures. This document was prepared by Policy Department A for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

The European Parliament plays an important role in the appointment processes of two European Central Bank bodies: the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (Chair and Vice-Chair). This paper aims to: a) provide an overview of the relevant procedural provisions, b) present a selection of past appointments; and c) describe the evolving role of the European Parliament in those procedures. This document was prepared by Policy Department A for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

Single-limb collective action clauses: A short introduction

05-07-2019

Sovereign bonds, the most common form of sovereign debt, have specific characteristics. They are issued by national debt management offices on the primary market and subsequently traded on secondary markets. Loan agreements signed at the issuance of sovereign bonds on the primary market may include collective action clauses (CACs) aimed at making restructuring more orderly and predictable. CACs have been included in loan agreements and bond contracts since the 1990s. These clauses enable a 'supermajority ...

Sovereign bonds, the most common form of sovereign debt, have specific characteristics. They are issued by national debt management offices on the primary market and subsequently traded on secondary markets. Loan agreements signed at the issuance of sovereign bonds on the primary market may include collective action clauses (CACs) aimed at making restructuring more orderly and predictable. CACs have been included in loan agreements and bond contracts since the 1990s. These clauses enable a 'supermajority' of creditors to modify essential payment terms of the contract, thus overcoming the problem posed by holdout creditors. Indeed, while debt restructuring involves benefits for both debtor countries and their creditors, there are also incentives for both parties to delay the process. Certain creditors, for instance, are tempted to hold out, and are therefore referred to as holdout creditors. Their incentive for holding out is the chance that they might recover their investment either in full or in a higher amount than the debtor country has offered in the restructuring agreement. While a holdout can bring creditors great gains, it has significant negative consequences for debtor countries and, in the worst case, can jeopardise the restructuring process. CACs can have one or two 'limbs'. While the EU Member States that are in the euro area decided in 2011 to include two-limb CACs in sovereign debt issued after 2013, the Greek restructuring experience and recent New York court decisions relative to sovereign debt have shown that such CACs can protect sovereign debtors only up to a certain point. Therefore, in the context of the euro-area governance reform, the Eurogroup has proposed that euro-area leaders should work for the introduction of single-limb CACs by 2022, and included this commitment in the draft revised text of the European Stability Mechanism Treaty.

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