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A roadmap to completing the Banking Union

19-06-2020

Completing the Banking Union has been a long term endeavour, on the back of the less successful negotiations on its third leg - the common deposit guarantee scheme. The current crisis caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 will evidently put the current setup of Banking Union to test, but may also create a new impetus and political will for it’s completion. This briefing, based on two earlier EGOV briefings (here and here), (1) sets out the main milestones of such process so far, (2) outlines where work ...

Completing the Banking Union has been a long term endeavour, on the back of the less successful negotiations on its third leg - the common deposit guarantee scheme. The current crisis caused by the outbreak of COVID-19 will evidently put the current setup of Banking Union to test, but may also create a new impetus and political will for it’s completion. This briefing, based on two earlier EGOV briefings (here and here), (1) sets out the main milestones of such process so far, (2) outlines where work was before the coronavirus outbreak and (3) points to areas where progress is still missing and should continue once the urgency of the current crisis is mitigated. It will be regularly updated on the basis of available public information.

The ECB in the COVID-19 Crisis: Whatever it Takes, Within its Mandate

15-05-2020

To keep the euro-area economy afloat, the European Central Bank (ECB) has announced a large number of measures since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. This response has triggered fears of a future increase in inflation. We discuss the risks that the ECB is unable to fulfil its price-stability mandate, and also whether these new measures respect legal limits set by the EU Treaties. We conclude that the measures introduced by the ECB during the crisis and the resulting increase in the size of its ...

To keep the euro-area economy afloat, the European Central Bank (ECB) has announced a large number of measures since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. This response has triggered fears of a future increase in inflation. We discuss the risks that the ECB is unable to fulfil its price-stability mandate, and also whether these new measures respect legal limits set by the EU Treaties. We conclude that the measures introduced by the ECB during the crisis and the resulting increase in the size of its balance sheet, even if it were to be permanent, should not restrict its ability to achieve its price-stability mandate in the future, within its legal obligations. This document was provided by the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the request of the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Külső szerző

Grégory CLAEYS

Is the current “fit and proper” regime appropriate for the Banking Union?

24-03-2020

EU rules on fit and proper are a patchwork of high-level principles and national law. Deep cross-country differences affect both the assessment process and the criteria used. New Level 1 measures are required to impose common requirements on knowledge, experience, good repute, independence and conflicts of interest, and to unify procedural aspects across Member States. Meanwhile, the ECB should assign a public score to individual board members and disclose the motivations behind its fit and proper ...

EU rules on fit and proper are a patchwork of high-level principles and national law. Deep cross-country differences affect both the assessment process and the criteria used. New Level 1 measures are required to impose common requirements on knowledge, experience, good repute, independence and conflicts of interest, and to unify procedural aspects across Member States. Meanwhile, the ECB should assign a public score to individual board members and disclose the motivations behind its fit and proper assessments.

Külső szerző

Andrea RESTI

Central bank communication at times of non-standard monetary policies

28-09-2018

For the Monetary Dialogue session which took place on 24 September 2018, monetary experts analysed the issues related to the central bank communication at times of non-standard monetary policy. This note, provided by Policy department A, gives an overview of the in-depth analyses prepared by the experts.

For the Monetary Dialogue session which took place on 24 September 2018, monetary experts analysed the issues related to the central bank communication at times of non-standard monetary policy. This note, provided by Policy department A, gives an overview of the in-depth analyses prepared by the experts.

European Market Infrastructure Regulation

10-01-2018

This note seeks to provide an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact assessment (IA) accompanying its proposal above, submitted on 13 June 2017 and referred to Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). This proposal amends the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which is already in the process of being amended by two proposals currently under consideration in Parliament. The first proposal focused on the recovery and ...

This note seeks to provide an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact assessment (IA) accompanying its proposal above, submitted on 13 June 2017 and referred to Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). This proposal amends the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which is already in the process of being amended by two proposals currently under consideration in Parliament. The first proposal focused on the recovery and resolution of central counterparties (CCPs). The second proposal proposed targeted amendments aiming to meet EMIR objectives in a more effective and efficient way. The current initiative under consideration focuses on the authorisation of CCPs and on the recognition of third-country CCPs. The impact assessment clearly identifies the problems that require EU action, as well as their drivers and consequences. The objectives of the initiative appear to be coherent with the analysis, and are relevant and measurable. The IA analyses a limited number of alternatives to the status quo in depth: two for each of the objectives, which deal respectively with EU and third-country central counterparties. These options are phrased in rather general terms and are left open to further development. The analysis is based on relevant sources and the Commission's expert knowledge in the field. However, the IA appears to have been prepared in a rather limited time-span and could have benefited from further work.

TARGET imbalances at record levels: Should we worry?

15-11-2017

TARGET is the payments system for making settlements between euro area economies and five other EU economies. Cross-border transactions generate claims/surpluses and liabilities/deficits among national central banks which “net out” for the system as a whole. These imbalances are manageable in relative terms, but look large in absolute terms. None are larger than one third of their corresponding public debt ratios; and despite a big build up in the 2010-13 period, the imbalances now appear to be on ...

TARGET is the payments system for making settlements between euro area economies and five other EU economies. Cross-border transactions generate claims/surpluses and liabilities/deficits among national central banks which “net out” for the system as a whole. These imbalances are manageable in relative terms, but look large in absolute terms. None are larger than one third of their corresponding public debt ratios; and despite a big build up in the 2010-13 period, the imbalances now appear to be on a non-expanding cyclical path. The implications for the EU economies and their policymakers are less easy. The main drivers, beyond the need to fund persistent current account deficits or surpluses, are the use of different funding sources (some outside the euro area), internal and external portfolio re-balancing, loose monetary policy and exchange rate risks. TARGET imbalances support quantitative easing, but are not driven by it. The main threats are the divergence that interrupts further economic integration; and the increasing liabilities taken on by the ECB since 2015. That said, self-correcting mechanisms are weak which makes symmetric adjustments by both creditor and debtor countries essential (because of the adding up constraint); and the difficulty that the imbalances cannot always be eliminated simply by balancing current accounts around the system.

Külső szerző

Andrew HUGHES HALLETT

TARGET (im)balances at record level: Should we worry?

15-11-2017

LAccording to the ECB, the recent rise in TARGET 2 balances could be seen as the result of the decentralised implementation of the extended asset purchase programme (APP). The programme entails cross-border payments by the purchasing NCBs, with around 50% of involved counterparties resident outside the euro area, including the UK. These counterparties access the TARGET system via a limited number of financial centres, particularly Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. According to the ...

LAccording to the ECB, the recent rise in TARGET 2 balances could be seen as the result of the decentralised implementation of the extended asset purchase programme (APP). The programme entails cross-border payments by the purchasing NCBs, with around 50% of involved counterparties resident outside the euro area, including the UK. These counterparties access the TARGET system via a limited number of financial centres, particularly Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands. According to the ECB, the increase in TARGET balances stemming from the concentration of cross border flows due to APP transactions would reflect technical features of the euro-area financial structure rather than evidence of financial stress. However, these imbalances recently may be well indicative of a persistent fragmentation within the euro area’s financial markets as well as uneven liquidity allocation; the risks of which may be understated. Against this background, the paper discusses what the underlying factors behind the recent rise of TARGET2 (im)balances are, and the risks associated to rising Target (im)balances for the ECB’s monetary policy.

Külső szerző

Paul DE GRAUWE, Yuemei JI, Corrado MACCHIARELLI

Should we be concerned about TARGET balances?

15-11-2017

This document was provided to Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. The paper describes how the Eurosystem’s processing of cross-border banking transactions via its TARGET2 payments system produces a set of assets and liability items on the balance sheets of national central banks. The factors determining the evolution of TARGET-related balances are discussed and the risks associated with these balances are addressed.

This document was provided to Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. The paper describes how the Eurosystem’s processing of cross-border banking transactions via its TARGET2 payments system produces a set of assets and liability items on the balance sheets of national central banks. The factors determining the evolution of TARGET-related balances are discussed and the risks associated with these balances are addressed.

Külső szerző

Karl WHELAN, University College Dublin

TARGET imbalances at record levels: Should we worry?

15-11-2017

The imbalances within the Eurosystem’s Target 2 payment system are an indication that financial markets are not fully integrated. However, the increase in these imbalances in the wake of the large asset purchases (often called QE, for quantitative easing) that started in early 2015, should not be a particular cause for concern. The imbalances had declined until the start of QE, accompanied by a reduction in risk premia. QE was associated with a further reduction in financial stress. There is thus ...

The imbalances within the Eurosystem’s Target 2 payment system are an indication that financial markets are not fully integrated. However, the increase in these imbalances in the wake of the large asset purchases (often called QE, for quantitative easing) that started in early 2015, should not be a particular cause for concern. The imbalances had declined until the start of QE, accompanied by a reduction in risk premia. QE was associated with a further reduction in financial stress. There is thus little reason to believe that the increase since 2015 reflects renewed fears about a euro break-up. The ‘technical’ nature of the increasing imbalances in the wake of QE is illustrated by the fact that the European Central Bank (the central institution of the Eurosystem) has also run up a negative Target balance of over €200 billion. No one would argue that this is motivated by a fear of a break-up of the euro area. There are reasons to believe that the recent run-up in the negative balances of Italy and Spain is due to similarly technical reasons.

Külső szerző

Daniel GROS, CEPS

Simulating the macroeconomic effects of ECB tapering

15-11-2017

Although macroeconomic effects of asset purchases are intensively discussed, the literature addressing “tapering” is rather thin. Using a broad definition of tapering the study considers three tapering scenarios within a Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium Model: A reduction of net purchases in the expansionary stage, the announcements of an earlier exit, and a faster than expected exit. In all three cases the effects on long-term yields are positive and negative on output growth and inflation. Quantitatively ...

Although macroeconomic effects of asset purchases are intensively discussed, the literature addressing “tapering” is rather thin. Using a broad definition of tapering the study considers three tapering scenarios within a Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium Model: A reduction of net purchases in the expansionary stage, the announcements of an earlier exit, and a faster than expected exit. In all three cases the effects on long-term yields are positive and negative on output growth and inflation. Quantitatively, the effects are rather modest, however.

Külső szerző

Marius CLEMENS, Stefan GEBAUER, Malte RIETH (DIW Berlin)

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