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62 Risultati(i)

Data di creazione : 19-04-2024

[EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 12-04-2024

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Riassunto Sanctions have become an increasingly central element of the EU's common and foreign security policy. At present, the EU has over 50 sanctions programmes in place, concerning nearly 40 countries. Unlike the comprehensive trade embargoes used in the past, the EU has moved towards asset freezes and visa bans targeting individual persons and companies, aiming to influence foreign governments while avoiding humanitarian costs for the general population. Other measures in the sanctions 'toolkit' include arms embargoes, sectoral trade and investment restrictions, and suspensions of development aid and trade preferences. The declared purpose of EU sanctions is to uphold the international security order, while also defending human rights and democracy standards by encouraging targeted countries to change their behaviour. Measuring sanctions' effectiveness is difficult, as sanctions alone rarely achieve all their aims, and usually there are other causes to which changes can also be attributed. However, even when this primary purpose is not achieved, sanctions may have useful secondary effects, for example by deterring other actors from similar behaviour. The broader the international support for EU sanctions and the closer the relationship between the EU and the targeted country are, the stronger the prospects for success will be. On the other hand, effectiveness can be undermined by inconsistent application of sanctions standards and by the difficulty of coordinating implementation between multiple stakeholders. The unprecedented scale and scope of sanctions imposed against Russia has put the spotlight on new implementation challenges, including inside the EU's borders. In response, the Council adopted a decision to add the violation of restrictive measures to the list of particularly serious crimes ('EU crimes') under Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This is an update of an earlier briefing.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Vincitori del premio Sacharov 2023: Jina Mahsa Amini e il movimento "Donna, Vita, Libertà" in Iran](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 30-11-2023

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Diritti dell'uomo

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | costruzione europea | democrazia | diritti e libertà | diritti fondamentali | diritti umani | DIRITTO | distinzione onorifica | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Iran | movimento per i diritti dell'uomo | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | quadro politico | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica | vita sociale

Riassunto Il rispetto delle libertà fondamentali e dei diritti umani è un valore fondamentale dell'UE, che quest'ultima promuove attraverso le sue politiche. Il premio Sacharov del Parlamento europeo rende omaggio all'operato di quanti difendono tali libertà e diritti. In un momento in cui la pace e i diritti umani sono sempre più sotto attacco, il premio è oggi più attuale che mai. Quest'anno il premio è stato assegnato alla defunta Jina Mahsa Amini e al movimento "Donna, Vita, Libertà" in Iran. La cerimonia di premiazione si terrà durante la sessione plenaria di dicembre del Parlamento europeo.

In sintesi [BG](#), [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#), [XL](#)

[Peace and Security in 2023: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Studio

Data 18-07-2023

Autore BILQUIN Bruno | CAPRILE ANNA | CLAPP SEBASTIAN | DAMEN Mario | DELIVORIAS Angelos | IMMENKAMP Beatrix | LAZAROU Eleni | PICHON Eric | SHREEVES Rosamund | STANICEK BRANISLAV | SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Democrazia UE | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave accordo multilaterale | coesistenza pacifica | composizione delle controversie | costruzione europea | cultura e religione | DIRITTO | diritto internazionale | geopolitica | identità europea | instaurazione della pace | libertà aerea | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | politica internazionale | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCIENZE | scienze umane | sicurezza internazionale | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Russia's war on Ukraine has caused the European Union (EU) to intensify its work for peace and security. The Peace and Security Outlook, produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), seeks to analyse and explain the European Union's contribution to the promotion and restoration of peace and security internationally, through its various external policies. This study provides an overview of the issues and current state of play. It looks first at the concept of peace and the changing nature of the geopolitical environment, as European security faces the most tangible military threat since the end of the Cold War. Linking the study to the Normandy Index, which measures threats to peace and democracy worldwide based on the EU Global Strategy, each chapter of the study analyses a specific threat to peace, and presents an overview of EU action to counter the related risks. The areas discussed include proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, democracy support, conflict prevention and mitigation in fragile contexts, the security impacts of climate change, cyber-attacks, disinformation, and terrorism, among other issues'. A parallel paper, published separately, focuses specifically on the state of play of the EU's relations with Iraq. EPRS has drafted this study as a contribution to the Normandy World Peace Forum, taking place in September 2023.

Studio [EN](#), [FR](#)

Multimedia [Peace and security in the world](#)

[Relazioni dell'UE con l'Autorità palestinese](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 05-07-2023

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | autoregolamentazione | costruzione europea | cultura e religione | DIRITTO | fonti e branche del diritto | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | Palestina | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | questione palestinese | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | religione | sicurezza internazionale | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto L'Autorità nazionale palestinese (o Autorità palestinese) è l'organo di governo delle regioni autonome palestinesi della Cisgiordania e della Striscia di Gaza, istituito nel 1994 nel quadro degli accordi di pace di Oslo tra Israele e l'Organizzazione per la liberazione della Palestina (OLP). Le relazioni tra l'Autorità palestinese e Israele sono particolarmente tese, soprattutto da quando si è insediato il nuovo governo israeliano nel dicembre 2022. L'Autorità palestinese si trova ad affrontare una crisi di legittimità dovuta al crescente malcontento della popolazione palestinese. Durante la tornata di luglio il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe votare i progetti di raccomandazione sulle relazioni dell'UE con l'Autorità palestinese.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

[EU relations with Iran](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 31-01-2023

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Agenzia internazionale per l'energia atomica | analisi economica | Asia-Oceania | conseguenza economica | costruzione europea | diritto dell'Unione europea | ECONOMIA | ENERGIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | gestione amministrativa | IMPRESA E CONCORRENZA | industria nucleare ed elettrica | Iran | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | politica nucleare | programma d'azione | questione russo-ucraina | relazioni dell'Unione europea | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sanzione (UE) | sicurezza internazionale | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Even though the EU and Iran have worked together over the past 4 years to save the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), relations between the two sides have reached a new low. The EU is concerned about the acceleration of Iran's nuclear programme in violation of the JCPOA and the country's reluctance to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the Iranian authorities' violent crackdown on and execution of peaceful protesters has outraged Europeans – and their allies – and drawn new attention to human rights violations in the country. Iran's military support for Russia in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine has put the spotlight on Iran's conventional weapons capabilities. Moreover, Iran continues to stoke tensions in the Middle East, providing military, financial and political support to non-state actors in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, as well as the Gaza Strip. In response to these concerns, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on an increasing number of high-ranking Iranian individuals and entities under four EU sanctions regimes. Sanctions include an asset freeze and a prohibition on making funds and economic resources available to the listed individuals and entities; individuals are also banned from travelling to the EU. Nevertheless, in December 2022, EU Member States reaffirmed their commitment to, and continued support for, the full and effective implementation of a restored JCPOA. The European Parliament has adopted several resolutions critical of human rights violations in Iran, most recently in January 2023, and has called for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be added to the EU terrorist list, while also expressing its continued support for the JCPOA. After Iran began to sanction certain of its Members in October 2022, Parliament decided in November 2022 that delegations and committees would no longer engage with the Iranian authorities.

Briefing [EN](#)

[A strategic partnership with the Gulf: Old ties, new impetus](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 01-12-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Autore esterno External authors: Bendini, Roberto; Srouf, Perla

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave accordo internazionale | AGRICOLTURA, SILVICOLTURA E PESCA | Asia-Oceania | commercio internazionale | costruzione europea | GEOGRAFIA | paesi del Golfo | partnership strategica, partenariato strategico (UE) | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | politica internazionale | produzione e strutture agricole | rapporto agricoltura-commercio | relazione commerciale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Enhanced and more focused cooperation between the European Union (EU) and member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has become a priority for the EU, with a view to jointly addressing a series of global and regional challenges. Building on strong ties established over decades of a close trading and investment relationship, the EU is now seeking to put relations on a more secure footing, with new impetus and a much broader scope. A joint communication on a strategic partnership with the Gulf, released on 18 May 2022, sets out a path for the EU to develop a closer partnership with the six GCC member states in several priority areas. These include: trade and investment; climate change; energy security and the green transition; global health; global development and humanitarian needs; and peace and stability. On 20 June 2022, the Council approved conclusions on a strategic partnership with the Gulf. Along with the joint communication, these provide an operational roadmap in the abovementioned priority areas. Some experts have expressed concern that the substance of EU-GCC relations may not be sufficient to realise the ambitious plans set out in the joint communication. Others point to the unfulfilled potential of EU-GCC relations and welcome this new impetus. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have maintained regular contacts with Gulf partners, especially through the activities of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the dedicated delegation for relations with the Arab Peninsula, and through frequent visits to the region. However, MEPs have on several occasions condemned human rights violations in GCC member states, notably Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Guerra della Russia contro l'Ucraina: designare uno Stato come sponsor del terrorismo](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 16-11-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave America | costruzione europea | Europa | finanziamento del terrorismo | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | misura restrittiva dell'UE | politica internazionale | questione russo-ucraina | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | Russia | sanzione economica | sanzione internazionale | sicurezza internazionale | Stati Uniti | Ucraina | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto Il presidente ucraino Volodymyr Zelenskyy ha chiesto al Congresso degli Stati Uniti e alla Casa Bianca per la prima volta nell'aprile 2022 di aggiungere la Russia all'elenco del Dipartimento di Stato degli Stati sponsor del terrorismo. Da allora ha esteso l'appello ai governi di tutto il mondo. Sia la Camera dei rappresentanti che il Senato degli Stati Uniti hanno approvato risoluzioni che invitano il Segretario di Stato Antony Blinken ad aggiungere la Russia all'elenco, cosa che finora si è rifiutato di fare. Il 18 ottobre 2022 il Parlamento europeo ha tenuto un dibattito sulla designazione della Russia come Stato sponsor del terrorismo. Il Parlamento dovrebbe votare una risoluzione per dare seguito al dibattito, chiedendo il riconoscimento della Federazione Russa come Stato sponsor del terrorismo durante la tornata di novembre II.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

[Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 30-09-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Diritti dell'uomo

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | costruzione europea | detenzione preventiva | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | diritto di manifestare | diritto penale | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | giustizia | Iran | movimento per i diritti dell'uomo | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | restrizione di libertà | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto For the past two weeks, Iran has seen massive protests over the death in police custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish woman arrested for allegedly violating Iran's compulsory veiling laws. Protests have spread to more than 150 cities across Iran, including universities. The government has reacted violently to the protests, leading to at least 75 deaths and over a thousand arrests. Iranians are protesting not just against Amini's death, but also against an increasingly repressive regime that targets women, journalists and minorities. During its current mandate, the European Parliament has adopted eight resolutions condemning human rights violations in Iran.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Question Time: The state of play on the war on Ukraine](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 12-09-2022

Autore CAPRILE ANNA | CLAPP SEBASTIAN | DELIVORIAS Angelos | IMMENKAMP Beatrix | PICHON Eric | PRZETACZNIK Jakub

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave costruzione europea | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia politica | guerra | mantenimento della pace | politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune | questione russo-ucraina | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | Ucraina | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Russia's war on Ukraine has now been going on for 6 months. Ukraine's citizens have paid the highest price to defend the country's independence. The EU and Western allies are supporting the country diplomatically, financially and militarily. In early September, the Ukrainian army liberated important areas of the country. The European Parliament will use its powers of oversight in the revived 'question time' during the September plenary session, to question the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) on the issue.

In sintesi [EN](#)

Tenth NPT review conference: Nuclear weapons threat at an all-time high

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 12-07-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave arma nucleare | conferenza internazionale | controllo degli armamenti | difesa | ENERGIA | guerra nucleare | industria degli armamenti | industria nucleare ed elettrica | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | tecnologia nucleare

Riassunto Nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity. Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its war on Ukraine has been a stark reminder that this threat is real. At present, nine states are known to have military nuclear programmes. Over recent years, tensions among nuclear-armed states have increased, leading to 'outright strategic rivalry and competition' among several of them. Moreover, experts are concerned that the 'fabric of international institutions, treaties, and norms that has historically contributed to predictable and more stable relationships among nuclear-armed States is deteriorating'. Experts also point to technological developments that heighten uncertainties and unpredictability in the strategic relationships among nuclear-armed states. In January 2021, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the doomsday clock to 100 seconds to midnight and warned that the world is 'sleepwalking its way through a newly unstable nuclear landscape'. In 1968, the five states that possessed nuclear weapons at the time signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), intended to lead to the eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons and control their proliferation. However, rather than fulfilling the pledge to disarm that they made when they signed the NPT, nuclear weapon states are investing massive sums in more modern nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Moreover, an additional four states have acquired nuclear weapons since the NPT came into force in 1970, and a fifth, Iran, is getting dangerously close to building its own nuclear bomb. The Tenth NPT Review Conference, scheduled to take place in New York from 12-26 August 2022, will review progress on the implementation of the treaty. The conference is taking place at a time of fundamental divides between NPT member states over key aspects of the treaty. Moreover, Russia's invasion of a non-nuclear weapon state and its reckless nuclear rhetoric pose particular challenges for the disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The EU remains fully committed to the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and recently called on all parties to work towards a positive and substantive outcome of the conference.

Briefing [EN](#)

Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – First meeting of States Parties

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

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Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave accordo internazionale | arma nucleare | controllo degli armamenti | difesa | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | guerra nucleare | intervento militare | NATO | non proliferazione degli armamenti | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica degli armamenti | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | Russia | sicurezza internazionale | Ucraina

Riassunto From 21 to 23 June 2022, the 61 States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) will meet for the first time. Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons in the context of its war on Ukraine has given new relevance – and some will argue urgency – to the initiative launched a decade ago to prohibit nuclear weapons. The TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021. On that day, nuclear weapons development, testing, production, possession, stockpiling, use and threat of use, as well as the stationing or deployment of another country's nuclear weapons on a state party's national territory became prohibited under international law. The TPNW has been hailed as historic by supporters of the initiative, which has gained ground in recent years, to rid the world of the most destructive weapon known to humankind. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which spearheaded these efforts, was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. Supporters hope that the TPNW will strengthen the international legal framework and gradually advance the political norm against possession and use of nuclear weapons. However, opponents of the Treaty argue that the conditions for disarmament do not currently exist and that promoters of the TPNW fail to recognise this. Arguably, their position has been strengthened by recent developments. The nine states known to have military nuclear programmes have not signed the TPNW. Nor have Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which re-confirmed its commitment to nuclear deterrence in 2016. This raises doubts about the impact of this new instrument and its ability to create normative values. Most EU Member States, 21 of which are members of NATO, oppose the TPNW, and only three have ratified it. The European Parliament has noted that the TPNW provided evidence of the desire to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is an updated version of an earlier briefing, from January 2021.

Briefing [EN](#)

Situation in Lebanon: Severe and prolonged economic depression

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 13-04-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix | JONGBERG Kirsten

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | condizione socioeconomica | costruzione europea | ECONOMIA | FINANZE | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | impatto sociale | Libano | libera circolazione dei capitali | quadro sociale | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | recessione economica | relazioni dell'Unione europea | situazione economica | situazione economica | situazione finanziaria | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto The Lebanese government's decision to impose new taxes in October 2019 sparked nation-wide protests by a population exhausted by poor public services, worried about increasing national debt and frustrated by widespread corruption. Since then, Lebanese politics have been marked by political deadlock that has prevented successive governments from implementing urgent reforms. The devastating explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August 2020 only exacerbated the situation. By the time Prime Minister Najib Mikati presented his new government on 10 September 2021, the country had sunk deeply into a financial and economic crisis. Lebanon's severe and prolonged economic depression is, according to the World Bank, 'likely to rank in the top 10, possibly top 3, most severe crisis episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century'. Poverty in Lebanon has spread dramatically over the past year and now affects about 74 % of the population. Lebanon is host to approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 90 % of whom live in extreme poverty. There are also over 210 000 other refugees. The Lebanese pound has lost 90 % of its value in the past two years, most people have only two hours of electricity per day, and the healthcare sector is at breaking point. The middle class has been decimated, with many leaving the country or planning to do so. There is concern that parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2022 may be postponed, further prolonging the political deadlock that is preventing the implementation of critical reforms. The war in Ukraine is meanwhile expected to have a serious impact on Lebanon, which imports around 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia. The EU has supported Lebanon with €2.77 billion over the past decade, to help the country. However, in July 2021, the Council adopted a framework for targeted restrictive measures, offering the possibility to impose sanctions on persons and entities responsible for undermining democracy or the rule of law in Lebanon. The European Parliament has called Lebanon's present situation a 'man-made disaster caused by a handful of men across the political class'.

Briefing [EN](#), [FR](#)

Russia's war on Ukraine: EU sanctions in 2022

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 13-04-2022

Autore CLAPP SEBASTIAN | IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave commercio internazionale | costruzione europea | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | intervento militare | misura restrittiva dell'UE | politica internazionale | questione russo-ucraina | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | restrizione agli scambi | Russia | sanzione economica | sanzione internazionale | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | sicurezza internazionale | Ucraina | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Outraged by Moscow's illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, the EU Member States have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions against Russia, in cooperation with the US, Canada, the UK and other G7 countries, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members, and others. Below is a timeline of the sanctions adopted in response to Russia's decision, announced on 21 February 2022, to recognise the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine as independent entities, and Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The timeline does not include EU sanctions adopted in 2014 in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea.

In sintesi [EN](#)

Russia's war on Ukraine: New EU sanctions

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 05-04-2022

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave analisi economica | commercio internazionale | conseguenza economica | costruzione europea | ECONOMIA | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | intervento militare | misura restrittiva dell'UE | politica internazionale | recessione economica | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | restrizione agli scambi | Russia | sanzione economica | sanzione internazionale | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | sicurezza internazionale | situazione economica | Ucraina | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Outraged by Moscow's aggressive invasion of Ukraine, EU countries have adopted unprecedentedly tough sanctions in cooperation with close partners such as the US, Canada and the UK. Although Russia will partially adapt, these measures are expected to cause major disruption and isolate the country from the global economy. This paper updates a previous 'at a glance' note of 3 March 2022, by Martin Russell.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Russia's war on Ukraine: The EU's financing of military assistance to Ukraine](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 30-03-2022

Autore BILQUIN Bruno | IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave aiuto ai rifugiati | aiuto dell'UE | aiuto finanziario | armamento | cooperazione militare | difesa | ECONOMIA | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | intervento militare | NATO | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | Russia | sicurezza dell'aviazione | sicurezza internazionale | trasporti aerei e spaziali | TRASPORTO | Ucraina

Riassunto In an unprecedented and unanimous reaction to the Russian war on Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, the EU swiftly decided to provide €500 million, and then rapidly a further €500 million, from the European Peace Facility to fund and coordinate EU military assistance and to deliver military (including lethal) equipment to Ukraine. The Council had already agreed €31 million for non-lethal assistance to Ukraine on 2 December 2021. For the first time in its history, the EU is now using a dedicated, although off-budget, tool to finance – but not to deliver, with that responsibility falling on Member States alone – lethal military equipment for a third country. This is an update of an 'At a glance' note published on 11 March 2022.

In sintesi [EN](#), [XL](#)

[The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar: Turning the spotlight on workers' rights](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 16-12-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Diritti dell'uomo

Parole chiave amministrazione e remunerazione del personale | Asia-Oceania | commercializzazione | condizioni di lavoro | condizioni e organizzazione del lavoro | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | diritto del lavoro | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | lavoratore migrante | manifestazione sportiva | mercato del lavoro | Nazioni Unite | OCCUPAZIONE E LAVORO | Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro | organizzazione sportiva | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | patrocinio | Qatar | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | rapporti di lavoro e diritto del lavoro | salario minimo | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | schiavitù | vita sociale

Riassunto Enormous natural gas resources have turned Qatar into one of the world's richest countries. The 11 610 km² nation currently has the fourth highest GDP per capita in the world. The absolute monarchy's estimated 340 000-350 000 citizens benefit from free education, free healthcare, virtually guaranteed – and well paid – employment, and pay almost no taxes. However, the great majority of the emirate's nearly 3 million inhabitants live in very different conditions. Qatar has the highest ratio of migrants in the world: 85 % of its population are migrants and 94 % of its workforce comes from abroad, mostly from south Asia and Africa. In contrast to the small percentage of expatriates from the West and other Gulf States, Asian and African migrants live and work in harsh conditions. Around 1 million are employed in construction, and 100 000 are domestic workers. In December 2010, FIFA, world football's governing body, granted Qatar the right to host the 2022 World Cup, which is scheduled to take place from 21 November to 18 December. Expanding on an existing development programme enshrined in the Qatar National Vision 2030, the country embarked on an extensive building programme to prepare for the World Cup, involving an estimated 1 million migrant workers. However, these preparations placed the spotlight on Qatar's poor treatment of migrant workers. In response to international pressure, Qatar has introduced important legal changes to improve the situation of these workers, which the EU has welcomed. However, according to human rights organisations, the country needs to take further steps to stop abuses. Of particular concern is the kafala sponsorship system, which is widely used throughout the six Gulf Cooperation Council States and gives disproportionate power to employers, leading to widespread abuse of migrant workers' rights. Even though Qatar has started to dismantle the kafala system, important elements remain in place. Moreover, ensuring compliance with more favourable labour laws remains a challenge. Since 2008, the European Parliament has adopted four resolutions addressing the situation of migrant workers in Qatar; it has called on Qatar to end the 'deplorable situation' of migrant workers and prevent preparations for the 2022 World Cup from being 'overshadowed by allegations of forced labour'.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Security situation in Afghanistan: Implications for Europe](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 29-10-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix | LATICI Tania

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave Afghanistan | aiuti umanitari | Asia-Oceania | conflitto religioso | costruzione europea | difesa | diritti e libertà | DIRITTO | GEOGRAFIA | lotta contro la criminalità | politica di cooperazione | politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune | politica europea di difesa | quadro politico | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza regionale | Stato islamico | terrorismo | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica | vita sociale

Riassunto Just over two months after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, the movement remains politically isolated. So far, no country has recognised the caretaker government that the new leaders announced on 7 September 2021. The humanitarian situation in a country that largely depended on foreign aid to survive is deteriorating rapidly, so much so that international aid organisations describe the situation as a 'humanitarian meltdown'. Aware that the collapse of the economic and financial system in Afghanistan would impact heavily on the stability of the country, the region and beyond, the international community has mobilised large amounts of funds, including €1 billion in humanitarian aid from the EU budget. While no major population movements out of Afghanistan have been detected so far, the EU is determined to avoid a crisis reminiscent of the 2015 refugee crisis prompted by the Syrian civil war. EU assistance is partly destined for countries in the region hosting Afghan refugees. In the longer term, the EU is concerned that Afghanistan could revert to being a safe haven for international terrorists who might target EU countries. The EU's preparedness to deal with the threat from terrorism has evolved significantly over the past decade. In response to events in Afghanistan, the Council published a counter-terrorism action plan on Afghanistan in September, setting out four clear objectives, and making 22 recommendations for action. The United States government's determination to leave Afghanistan according to a set timetable, irrespective of allies' reservations, has reignited the debate over the need for greater EU strategic autonomy. The EU's 'strategic compass' process provides a framework for these discussions, including negotiations over a potential future rapid reaction or 'initial entry' force, able to provide a European capability to react to events such as those that unfolded in Afghanistan. Members of the European Parliament have called on the EU to reinforce significantly its capacity to act autonomously and for the strategic compass to address the terrorist threat from Afghanistan.

[Briefing](#) [EN](#)

[The situation in Afghanistan: Essential benchmarks for EU engagement](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 17-09-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave Afghanistan | aiuti umanitari | aiuto allo sviluppo | America | Asia-Oceania | cultura e religione | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | instaurazione della pace | integralismo religioso | mantenimento della pace | migrazione | migrazione | NATO | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica di cooperazione | profugo | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza regionale | Stati Uniti

Riassunto The departure of United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban's ability to provide sanctuary for international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military aeroplane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban had taken back control of most of Afghanistan. On 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced an all-male caretaker government drawn entirely from the Taliban movement, contrary to earlier promises that the new government would be 'inclusive'. So far, no country has recognised the interim government. There have been reports of reprisals against security personnel, individuals with links to the previous administration and foreign forces, journalists and minorities, in particular. The rights to education and employment that women have enjoyed for the past 20 years are meanwhile being curtailed. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen. Many Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 3-4 million Afghan refugees already living there, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. The EU has expressed concerns over the composition of the interim government, noting that an inclusive and representative government – which the interim government is not – is an essential benchmark for EU engagement. The EU has made available large amounts of humanitarian and development aid and is hoping to establish a diplomatic presence on the ground in Kabul. The EU is also planning to set up a regional platform for cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbours on issues including population flows from Afghanistan, terrorism, organised crime and drugs. This Briefing expands and updates an 'At a glance' note published on 2 September 2021.

[Briefing](#) [EN](#)

[Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 02-09-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Afghanistan | aiuti umanitari | America | Asia-Oceania | ECONOMIA | fame | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | instaurazione della pace | NATO | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica di cooperazione | profugo | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | recessione economica | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | salute | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza internazionale | situazione economica | Stati Uniti | terrorismo | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The departure of United States (US) and NATO troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban's ability to provide sanctuary to international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military plane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban were back in control over most of Afghanistan. The Taliban have yet to announce the nature and the full composition of their new government. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Review of dual-use export controls](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 20-07-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Adozione della legislazione da parte del PE e del Consiglio | Commercio internazionale | Diritti dell'uomo | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave analisi economica | arma di distruzione di massa | bene a doppio uso | commercio | commercio internazionale | commissione PE | competitività | controllo delle esportazioni | difesa | diritto dell'Unione europea | ECONOMIA | esportazione (UE) | IMPRESA E CONCORRENZA | istituzioni dell'Unione europea e funzione pubblica europea | licenza d'esportazione | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | organizzazione aziendale | organizzazione dei trasporti | politica commerciale | politica tariffaria | PRODUZIONE, TECNOLOGIA E RICERCA | regolamento CE | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | restrizione agli scambi | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | scambi intra UE | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza pubblica | statistica | tecnologia e regolamentazione tecnica | traffico illecito | transito | TRASPORTO | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto Certain goods and technologies have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used for military purposes; so-called 'dual-use' goods are subject to the European Union's export control regime. The regime has just been revised, mainly to take account of significant technological developments, increase transparency and create a more level playing field among EU Member States. The proposed regulation will recast the regulation in force since 2009. Among other elements, the proposal explicitly defines cyber-surveillance technology as dual-use technology and introduces human rights violations as an explicit justification for export control. It also includes provisions to control emerging technologies. The proposed regulation introduces greater transparency into dual-use export control by increasing the level of detail Member States will have to provide on exports, licences, licence denials and prohibitions. On 17 January 2018, based on the INTA committee's report on the legislative proposal, the European Parliament adopted its position for trilogue negotiations. For its part, the Council adopted its negotiating mandate on 5 June 2019, and on the basis of this mandate, the Council Presidency began negotiations with the European Parliament's delegation on 21 October 2019. Trilogue negotiations ended on 9 November 2020, with agreement on a final compromise text. Endorsed by the INTA committee on 30 November, the Parliament formally voted on the text in plenary on 25 March 2021. The Regulation was published in the Official Journal on 11 June 2021 and enters into force on 8 September 2021. Seventh edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing [EN](#)

[A new neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument – Global Europe](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 20-07-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave analisi economica | assistenza preadesione | costruzione europea | diritto dell'Unione europea | ECONOMIA | ENERGIA | finanze dell'Unione europea | industria nucleare ed elettrica | integrazione europea | paesi e territori d'oltremare | paesi terzi | politica di cooperazione | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | politica europea di vicinato | potere esecutivo e amministrazione pubblica | proposta (UE) | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza nucleare | strumento finanziario dell'UE | studio d'impatto | sviluppo sostenibile | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA

Riassunto In the context of the Commission's proposal for a multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, on 14 June 2018 the Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. Council and Parliament agreed in trilogue negotiations, which ended in March 2021, that Parliament would have an enhanced role in defining the main strategic choices of the instrument, through a delegated act and twice-yearly geopolitical dialogue. The Commission also committed to inform Parliament prior to any use of the 'emerging challenges and priorities cushion', and take its remarks into consideration. Parliament insisted that any activities related to migration had to be in line with the objectives of the instrument, and also secured safeguards on the amounts for capacity-building, election observation missions, local authorities, Erasmus, the Pacific and the Caribbean. Negotiators also agreed to include a reference, in a recital, to existing EU financial rules that allow for the suspension of assistance if a country fails to observe the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As a final step, negotiators agreed to change the name of the instrument to the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe. After formal adoption by Council and Parliament the regulation was signed on 9 June 2021, and it entered into force on 14 June 2021. The regulation applies retroactively from 1 January 2021. Sixth edition. The 'Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing [EN](#)

[US and NATO leave Afghanistan: What next?](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 14-07-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Riassunto Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, United States (US) counterterrorism efforts began to focus on Afghanistan. The Taliban, which controlled most of Afghanistan in 2001, hosted al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. During a 20-year military campaign, the US and its allies sought to eliminate the Taliban's ability to provide sanctuary to international terrorists and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. The peace agreement the US signed with the Taliban in 2020 paved the way for the withdrawal of US and NATO troops. Shortly after taking office, US President Joe Biden announced in April 2021 that all US troops would leave Afghanistan by 11 September 2021. All allied troops will also leave the country by that deadline. In recent months, the Taliban have re-established control over half of the districts in the country, raising concerns about the future of Afghanistan once foreign troops leave.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Nuclear Safety outside the EU: Proposal for a new Council regulation](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 02-07-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave cooperazione internazionale | costruzione europea | diffusione di informazioni sull'UE | diritto dell'Unione europea | documentazione | ECONOMIA | ENERGIA | finanze dell'Unione europea | industria nucleare ed elettrica | istituzioni dell'Unione europea e funzione pubblica europea | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | paesi terzi | politica di cooperazione | politica di sviluppo | politica economica | politica europea di vicinato | proposta (UE) | quadro finanziario pluriennale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza nucleare | sintesi di testi | trattato CEEA | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto In the context of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2021-2027 period, the Council has adopted Council Regulation (Euratom) 2021/948 of 27 May 2021 establishing a European instrument for international nuclear safety cooperation complementing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe on the basis of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Regulation 2021/948 complements, but is separate from, the new Global Europe Instrument. Regulation 2021/948 replaces Council Regulation (Euratom) No 237/2014 of 13 December 2013 establishing an instrument for nuclear safety cooperation (INSC). It continues to fund the important activities carried out under the previous regulation, namely to support the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety and radiation protection and the application of effective and efficient safeguards of nuclear materials in third countries, building on the activities under the Euratom Treaty. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing [EN](#)

[European Peace Facility - Investing in international stability and security](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 02-06-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave aiuto dell'UE | commercio di armi | contributo degli Stati membri | cooperazione militare | costruzione europea | difesa | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | documentazione | ECONOMIA | finanze dell'Unione europea | fondo (UE) | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | missione militare dell'UE | organizzazione non governativa | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni non governative | pace | paesi terzi | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | relazione | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | ruolo internazionale dell'UE | sicurezza internazionale | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto A key objective of the EU's external action is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In the context of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the Union offers assistance to third states, international organisations and regional organisations engaged in peace support operations. Moreover, the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP) – part of the CFSP – provides the Union with its own operational capacity, allowing it to deploy civilian and military assets (provided by the EU Member States) in third countries. While many of the operations and missions the EU supports have military and defence implications, the EU cannot finance activities with military or defence implications from the EU budget. EU Member States therefore have mechanisms to fund expenditure with military and defence implications directly from national budgets. The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new off-budget fund with a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion financed by Member State contributions. The EPF, which will be operational by 1 July 2021, will make it easier for Member States to share the costs of EU military operations. It will also help the EU to support military peace-support operations conducted by third countries and regional organisations, anywhere in the world. Controversially, for the first time, the EU will be able to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have warned that the new facility risks fuelling conflict and human rights abuses around the world. They warn that this could exacerbate violence and arms proliferation, and fuel the very dynamics the EPF seeks to address. By contrast, practitioners believe the facility will ensure that the EU is taken seriously as a security provider and is able to maintain its influence in conflict areas. The Council has called for swift operationalisation of the EPF and has invited Member States and the High Representative to present proposals for assistance measures.

Briefing [EN](#)

Multimedia [European Peace Facility: Investing in international stability and security](#)

Strumento di vicinato, cooperazione allo sviluppo e cooperazione internazionale

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 02-06-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave bilancio generale (UE) | costruzione europea | diritto dell'Unione europea | documentazione | ECONOMIA | FES | finanze dell'Unione europea | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | politica europea di vicinato | proposta (UE) | quadro finanziario pluriennale | relazione | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | ripartizione del finanziamento dell'UE | ruolo internazionale dell'UE | Strumento europeo di vicinato e partenariato | sviluppo sostenibile | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto La proposta di regolamento che istituisce lo strumento di vicinato, cooperazione allo sviluppo e cooperazione internazionale rientra nella rubrica 6 "Vicinato e resto del mondo" del nuovo quadro finanziario pluriennale (QFP), che stabilisce le principali priorità dell'azione esterna dell'Unione europea per il periodo 2021-2027. Lo strumento proposto, che dispone di una dotazione pari a 70,8 miliardi di EUR a prezzi del 2018, riunisce dieci strumenti e fondi diversi esistenti nel quadro del QFP 2014-2020, così come il Fondo europeo di sviluppo, finora al di fuori del bilancio generale dell'UE. Durante la tornata di giugno I, il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe procedere a una votazione in seconda lettura sul testo concordato a seguito dei negoziati interistituzionali.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

Controllo delle esportazioni, del trasferimento, dell'intermediazione, dell'assistenza tecnica e del transito di prodotti a duplice uso

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 22-03-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Commercio internazionale

Parole chiave bene a doppio uso | commercio | commercio internazionale | controllo delle esportazioni | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | diritto dell'Unione europea | esportazione (UE) | licenza d'esportazione | nuova tecnologia | organizzazione dei trasporti | politica commerciale | politica tariffaria | PRODUZIONE, TECNOLOGIA E RICERCA | proposta (UE) | restrizione agli scambi | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | scambi intra UE | tecnologia e regolamentazione tecnica | transito | TRASPORTO | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Alcuni beni e tecnologie hanno applicazioni civili legittime, ma possono essere utilizzati anche per scopi militari; noti come prodotti "a duplice uso", sono soggetti al regime di controllo delle esportazioni dell'Unione europea. Il regime è attualmente in fase di revisione, principalmente per tener conto dei significativi sviluppi tecnologici, aumentare la trasparenza e creare condizioni di maggiore parità tra gli Stati membri dell'UE. La proposta introdurrà nuovi limiti all'esportazione di prodotti di sorveglianza informatica e rafforzerà le considerazioni in materia di diritti umani. Il Parlamento europeo dovrebbe votare il testo concordato a seguito dei negoziati interistituzionali durante la tornata di marzo II.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – The 'Ban Treaty'

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 20-01-2021

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave accordo internazionale | accordo multilaterale | arma di distruzione di massa | arma proibita | difesa | disarmo | ENERGIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | industria nucleare ed elettrica | non proliferazione degli armamenti | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | paesi terzi | politica di cooperazione | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza nucleare | Stato membro UE

Riassunto On 22 January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the TPNW) enters into force. On that day, nuclear weapons development, testing, production, possession, stockpiling, use and threat of use, as well as the stationing or deployment of another country's nuclear weapons on a state party's national territory will become prohibited under international law. The TPNW has been hailed as historic by supporters of an initiative, which has gained ground in recent years, to rid the world of the most destructive weapon known to humankind. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which spearheaded these efforts, was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. Supporters hope that the TPNW will strengthen the international legal framework and gradually advance the political norm against nuclear weapons possession and use. Opponents of the Treaty argue that the conditions for disarmament do not currently exist and that promoters of the TPNW fail to recognise this. They also point to the danger of undermining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), recognised as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, including by proponents of the TPNW. The nine states known to have military nuclear programmes have not signed the TPNW. Nor have Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which in 2016 re-confirmed its commitment to nuclear deterrence. This raises doubts about the impact of this new instrument and its ability to create normative values. Most EU Member States, 21 of which are members of NATO, oppose the TPNW, and only three have ratified it. The European Parliament has noted that the TPNW provided evidence of the desire to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is an updated version of an earlier briefing, from January 2018.

Briefing [EN](#)

Multimedia [Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons – the 'Ban Treaty'](#)

The Abraham Accords

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 05-11-2020

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave accordo internazionale | Asia-Oceania | Bahrein | cooperazione internazionale | Emirati arabi uniti | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | instaurazione della pace | Israele | mantenimento della pace | occupazione militare | politica di cooperazione | politica estera | politica internazionale | questione palestinese | relazioni internazionali | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale

Riassunto On 15 September 2020, in a White House ceremony, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain signed the 'Abraham Accords' with Israel, normalising pre-existing relations between them that have grown stronger mainly over fears of an expansionist Iran and loss of faith in the US's role as security provider. The accords, brokered by the US, mark a diplomatic breakthrough in the Middle East, which has seen a growing number of Arab League states strengthen ties with Israel. However, the Palestinian Authority and all Palestinian factions denounced the agreements, on which they were not consulted and which make no reference to ending Israel's occupation of Palestinian land. The accords are expected to generate important economic benefits for the participating states.

In sintesi [EN](#)

On the path to 'strategic autonomy': The EU in an evolving geopolitical environment

Tipo di pubblicazione Studio

Data 28-09-2020

Autore ANGHEL Suzana Elena | IMMENKAMP Beatrix | LAZAROU Eleni | SAULNIER JEROME LEON | WILSON Alex Benjamin

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Coronavirus | Democrazia UE, diritto istituzionale e parlamentare | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | Cina | costruzione europea | diritto dell'Unione europea | documentazione | epidemia | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geopolitica | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | malattia da coronavirus | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | rapporto di ricerca | ruolo internazionale dell'UE | salute | SCIENZE | scienze umane | Stato membro UE | trattato di Lisbona | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto In confronting the EU with an unprecedented crisis, the coronavirus outbreak is testing the bloc's unity, but may also accelerate the construction of EU strategic autonomy, as the roadmap for recovery is implemented. Political will, still in the making, and the capacity to act are key prerequisites for achieving effective European strategic autonomy. The EU is increasingly at risk of becoming a 'playground' for global powers in a world dominated by geopolitics. Building European strategic autonomy on a horizontal – cross-policy – basis would strengthen the EU's multilateral action and reduce dependence on external actors, to make the EU less vulnerable to external threats; while promoting a level playing field that benefits everyone. The EU could thus reap the full dividend of its integration and possibly benefit from greater economic gains. To build European strategic autonomy, the EU may choose to use the still 'under-used' or 'unused' potential of the Lisbon Treaty, with the European Council having a key role to play in triggering some of the Treaty provisions, particularly in foreign and security policy. European strategic autonomy may also result from a deepening of the EU integration process. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the Member States will wish to grasp the opportunity offered by the Conference on the Future of Europe to deepen the European project.

Studio [DE](#), [EN](#), [FR](#)

Multimedia [What is Strategic Autonomy?](#)

EU-Iran: The way forward - Can the JCPOA survive the Trump presidency?

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 07-07-2020

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Coronavirus

Parole chiave accordo (UE) | America | Asia-Oceania | costruzione europea | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Iran | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sanzione internazionale | sicurezza internazionale | Stati Uniti | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto Two issues have dominated relations between the EU and Iran in recent years: the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – including efforts to conclude it, followed by efforts to save it – and human rights concerns. Even though the European Union (EU) and Iran have worked together over the past two years to save the JCPOA, relations between the two have deteriorated. Iran accuses EU Member States of not standing up to pressure from the United States of America (USA) to isolate Iran and of not doing enough to save the JCPOA. The EU, for its part, is concerned about Iran's enrichment activities; growing tensions in the region and Iran's role in this context, including the provision of military, financial and political support to non-state actors in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen; and its ballistic missile programme. In 2011, the EU put restrictive measures in place to react to serious human rights violations in Iran. These remain in force. Nevertheless, the EU has continued to engage with Iran, in marked contrast to the USA. Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, the Trump administration re-imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Iran and has since then pursued a policy of 'maximum pressure'. The declared goal of the maximum pressure campaign is to push Iran to negotiate a new agreement that would also address Iran's ballistic missile programme, end its support of militant groups in the region, and curb its foreign policy ambitions in western Asia. Instead, the US policy of maximum pressure on Tehran has led to an escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf region, with potentially direct consequences for Europe. With Iran continuing uranium enrichment to levels far exceeding the levels permitted under the JCPOA, and with the USA threatening to trigger the re-imposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iran, further escalation is likely. Security in the EU is linked to the security situation in western Asia. For that reason, Europe should maintain efforts to preserve the JCPOA and seek to reduce tension between Iran and the USA.

Briefing [EN](#)

Religion and the EU's external policies: Increasing engagement

Tipo di pubblicazione Analisi approfondita

Data 12-02-2020

Autore BENTZEN Naja | D'AMBROGIO Enrico | GRIEGER Gisela | IMMENKAMP Beatrix | PERCHOC Philippe | RUSSELL Martin | STANICEK BRANISLAV | ZAMFIR Ionel

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave costruzione europea | cultura e religione | diritti e libertà | DIRITTO | laicità | libertà di religione | organizzazione non governativa | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni non governative | politica internazionale | potere esecutivo e amministrazione pubblica | quadro politico | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | rapporti Stato-Chiesa | relazioni dell'Unione europea | relazioni diplomatiche | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | religione | Stato confessionale | Stato laico | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA

Riassunto Religion has been emerging as a new dimension in the EU's external policies. This paper provides an overview of the principles, institutional set-up and policies underpinning the EU's approach to religious issues in third countries. Nine case studies meanwhile serve to illustrate the important role played by religion in the foreign policies of a number of different countries worldwide.

Analisi approfondita [DE](#), [EN](#), [FR](#)

US 'Peace Plan' for the Middle East

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 07-02-2020

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave America | Asia-Oceania | coesistenza pacifica | composizione delle controversie | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Israele | Palestina | questione palestinese | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | Stati Uniti

Riassunto On 28 January 2020, United States President Donald Trump released his administration's 'vision for Israeli-Palestinian peace'. The White House Plan, coupled with earlier Trump administration moves, marks a distinct departure from past US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. Key elements are illegal under international law, as they advocate the annexation of occupied territory. Israeli leaders have welcomed the plan, seen as meeting Israel's key demands. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas have been united in rejecting the proposal, and the PA has since cut ties with Israel and the USA. The plan is meant to serve as the basis for future direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, to stretch over four years. However, the Israeli government has announced plans to implement parts of it unilaterally in the near future.

In sintesi [EN](#)

Escalating US-Iran conflict: The EU's priorities

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 16-01-2020

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave America | Asia-Oceania | composizione delle controversie | controversia internazionale | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | intervento militare | Iran | Iraq | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sanzione internazionale | sicurezza internazionale | Stati Uniti | terrorismo | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto On 3 January 2020, a United States (US) strike outside Baghdad killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the al-Qods force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IGRC), and arguably the second most important man in Iran after Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assassination was a reaction to an escalation in the growing conflict between the USA and Iran. Iran retaliated on 8 January 2020, by attacking two US bases in Iraq with missiles; luckily – or intentionally – without casualties. Although both the USA and Iran have refrained from any further action, few expect this to mark the end of tensions between the USA and Iran in the region. The EU reaction to the assassination has been to try to de-escalate the situation to prevent all-out war, to focus on stabilising Iraq, and to limit damage to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

In sintesi [EN](#)

[The European Parliament's evolving soft power - From back-door diplomacy to agenda-setting:](#)

[Democracy support and mediation](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 27-09-2019

Autore BENTZEN Naja | IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Democrazia UE | Valutazione del diritto e delle politiche nella pratica

Parole chiave competenza del PE | costruzione europea | istituzioni dell'Unione europea e funzione pubblica europea | Parlamento europeo | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | politica internazionale | relazioni diplomatiche | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto For the past 40 years, Members of the European Parliament have been working at boosting Parliament's role in EU foreign policy. These efforts have continued to be stepped up since the launch of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 1993. Over recent decades, the European Parliament has significantly raised its profile as a credible moral force with strong focus on strengthening human rights, supporting democracy and enhancing the rule of law worldwide. Perhaps less visible than the European Parliament's Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought, the European Parliament's democracy support activities are part of its 'soft-power' approach to international relations. Moreover, Parliament can convey messages through channels that are different from, and complementary to, those employed by the EU's traditional diplomatic players; for example, through its parliamentary networks. Parliament also enjoys Treaty-based information and consultation rights, which allow its Members to shape the EU's external policies. In addition, the European Parliament has become a public forum for debating with representatives of partner countries and international organisations, as well as influential non-state actors. MEPs pro-actively engage in inter-parliamentary delegations and missions to third countries as well as joint parliamentary assemblies. Moreover, parties in different countries often share strong links via their political families.

Briefing [EN](#)

[EU policies – Delivering for citizens: The fight against terrorism](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 28-06-2019

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix | SGUEO Gianluca | VORONOVA Sofija

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa | Spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia

Parole chiave Agenzia europea per la gestione operativa dei sistemi IT su larga scala nello spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia | aiuto alle vittime | armi da fuoco e munizioni | competenza degli Stati membri | cooperazione transfrontaliera | costruzione europea | difesa | diffusione delle informazioni | diritti e libertà | diritti fondamentali | DIRITTO | diritto dell'Unione europea | diritto penale | documentazione | informatica e trattamento dei dati | istituzioni dell'Unione europea e funzione pubblica europea | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | lotta contro la criminalità | politica di cooperazione | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | radicalizzazione | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza delle informazioni | terrorismo | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica | vita sociale

Riassunto Faced with a growing international terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an ever more ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Even though primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond its own borders. EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years and is set to grow in the future, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security, such as Europol and eu-LISA. Financing for cooperation with third countries has also increased, including through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted since 2014 range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms. To evaluate the efficiency of the existing tools and identify gaps and possible ways forward, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR), which delivered its report in November 2018. TERR made extensive recommendations for immediate or longer term actions aiming to prevent terrorism, combat its root causes, protect EU citizens and assist victims in the best possible way. In line with these recommendations, future EU counterterrorism action will most probably focus on addressing existing and new threats, countering radicalisation – including by preventing the spread of terrorist propaganda online – and enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure. Foreseeable developments also include increased information sharing, with planned interoperability between EU security- and border-related databases, as well as investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes at EU level, through the proposed extension of the mandate of the recently established European Public Prosecutor's Office. This is an update of an earlier briefing issued in advance of the 2019 European elections.

Briefing [DE](#), [EN](#), [FR](#)

Multimedia [The fight against terrorism](#)

[Accordo di cooperazione UE-Afghanistan](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 06-03-2019

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Riassunto L'accordo di cooperazione UE-Afghanistan sul partenariato e sullo sviluppo è stato firmato dall'UE e dall'Afghanistan nel febbraio 2017. Tale accordo costituisce la prima relazione contrattuale tra l'Unione europea e l'Afghanistan e definisce il quadro giuridico per la cooperazione tra l'UE e l'Afghanistan. La piena entrata in vigore di questo accordo misto è subordinata all'approvazione del Parlamento europeo e alla ratifica da parte dei parlamenti nazionali e di taluni parlamenti regionali degli Stati membri dell'UE. Nel corso della tornata di marzo l'è attesa la votazione del Parlamento europeo in merito all'approvazione del progetto di decisione del Consiglio ai fini della conclusione dell'accordo.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

The first EU-Arab League summit: A new step in EU-Arab relations

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 22-02-2019

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave cooperazione internazionale | costruzione europea | gestione amministrativa | gestione delle crisi | IMPRESA E CONCORRENZA | incontro al vertice | Lega araba | mantenimento della pace | migrazione | migrazione | organizzazioni extraeuropee | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | politica di cooperazione | politica internazionale | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | relazione multilaterale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | terrorismo | Unione europea | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto On 24 and 25 February 2019, heads of state or government from the European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States (LAS) will meet in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, for the first-ever EU-LAS summit. The summit comes at a time of heightened EU interest in developing closer cooperation with its main regional counterpart in the Arab world. The meeting will be co-chaired by Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and European Council President, Donald Tusk, who will represent the EU alongside European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker. A large number of EU and LAS heads of state or government have confirmed their attendance. A wide range of issues and common challenges will be on the agenda, including multilateralism, trade, investment and economic cooperation, technology, migration, climate change, security and the situation in the region. Since 2011, EU-LAS meetings have been taking place regularly at different levels in the context of a political and strategic dialogue. The most recent ministerial meeting, which brought together 10 EU and 15 Arab League foreign ministers, took place in Brussels on 4 February 2019. Moreover, working groups have been gathering in between meetings of senior officials to discuss political and security matters of shared concern. The EU and the LAS share positions on a range of issues, including support for a political transition in Syria, the two-state solution under the Middle East peace process, and the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of both Israel and a future Palestinian state. The two partners also cooperate to find solutions to the war in Yemen and the conflict in Libya. The summit is taking place at a time of intensified talks with Egypt and other North African countries to address the issue of migration. It is also seen as part of a broader effort to build closer ties with Africa. In September 2018, Commission President Juncker urged the EU to strike a new alliance with Africa to boost investment and create millions of jobs. The EU holds regular summits with other regional players, including the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the African Union (AU).

Briefing [EN](#)

The end of the INF Treaty? A pillar of European security architecture at risk

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 04-02-2019

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave America | controllo degli armamenti | denuncia d'accordo | euromissile | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | Russia | sicurezza internazionale | Stati Uniti

Riassunto The US administration announced on 1 February 2019 that it was suspending its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with effect from 2 February 2019, and that it was giving Russia six months' notice of complete withdrawal. Russia reacted by announcing that it was also suspending its obligations under the Treaty. Both parties said they would begin developing new nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty. The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark nuclear-arms-control treaty between the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that eliminated and prohibited ground-launched intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km. The US announcement follows years of allegations that the Russian Federation has acted in breach of the agreement. Russia, for its part, has also accused the US of violating the treaty. Both deny the allegations. Moreover, both parties consider that the agreement puts their countries at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis other nuclear powers, especially China. The parties' announcements undermine a cornerstone of the European security order. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 led to the removal and destruction of nearly 3 000 US and Soviet short-, medium- and intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles stationed in or aimed at Europe. The EU has called on the US to consider the consequences of its possible withdrawal from the INF for its own security, the security of its allies and that of the whole world. The EU has also called on both the US and Russia to remain engaged in constructive dialogue to preserve the INF Treaty, and on Russia to address the serious concerns regarding its compliance with the treaty. NATO considers Russia to be in violation of the INF Treaty, and the alliance has called on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance with the agreement. Any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles will put Europe once more in the line of fire of strategic nuclear weapons. If the INF Treaty is abrogated, Europeans will be faced with stark choices all carrying inherent security risks, including engaging in a deployment race with Russia, or refusing re-deployment of US missiles on European soil, potentially leaving European countries exposed to Russian intimidation. Efforts over the next six months will focus on preserving the INF Treaty against all odds.

Briefing [EN](#)

Norme dell'UE in materia di controllo delle esportazioni di armi

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 07-11-2018

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Commercio internazionale

Parole chiave armamento | commercio di armi | controllo delle esportazioni | difesa | politica commerciale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | traffico illecito

Riassunto La posizione comune dell'UE sulle esportazioni di armi è l'unico accordo regionale in materia di esportazioni di armi convenzionali giuridicamente vincolante. Se da un lato la posizione comune ha aumentato la condivisione e delle informazioni e la trasparenza sulle esportazioni di armi degli Stati membri, dall'altro è ancora possibile rafforzare la convergenza delle politiche nazionali e applicare in modo più rigoroso i criteri definiti nel testo dell'UE. In seguito alla pubblicazione, nel febbraio 2018, della 19a relazione annuale dell'UE sulle esportazioni di armi, il Parlamento europeo si accinge a discutere una relazione sull'attuazione della posizione comune nel corso della tornata di novembre l.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

Updating the Blocking Regulation: The EU's answer to US extraterritorial sanctions

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 07-06-2018

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave America | applicazione della legge | Asia-Oceania | commercio internazionale | commercio internazionale | competenza territoriale | DIRITTO | diritto dell'Unione europea | diritto internazionale | diritto internazionale | extraterritorialità | FINANZE | fonti e branche del diritto | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | IMPRESA E CONCORRENZA | impresa multinazionale | informazione ed elaborazione dell'informazione | Iran | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | libera circolazione dei capitali | libera circolazione dei capitali | organizzazione della giustizia | politica internazionale | regolamento CE | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | relazioni transatlantiche | sanzione internazionale | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | scambio d'informazioni | Stati Uniti | tipo d'impresa | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto On 8 May 2018, President Trump announced the unilateral US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the landmark nuclear agreement signed by Iran and the E3/EU+3 – France, Germany, the UK and the EU plus China, Russia and the USA – in 2015. He also announced that the US would re-impose sanctions on Iran that had been lifted as part of the implementation of the JCPOA. These sanctions have extraterritorial effect, essentially making it illegal for EU companies and financial institutions to engage in a wide range of economic and commercial activities with Iran. Companies that disregard the US secondary sanctions face major fines and/or criminal charges in the US, or even exclusion from the US market. US sanctions will be reinstated after a 90- or 180-day wind-down period, to allow companies to make the necessary arrangements. Following the signing of the JCPOA in 2015, European companies have entered into important commercial and investment agreements with Iranian counterparts, worth billions of euros. Many of these companies also have important commercial ties with the US. Faced with the prospect of penalties in the US, several EU companies have already announced that they are ending their dealings with Iran, unless a way can be found to exempt or shield them from US secondary sanctions. In response, the Commission adopted a delegated act on 6 June 2018 to update the annex to the 'Blocking Regulation', which was adopted in 1996 to protect EU businesses against the effects of the extraterritorial application of legislation adopted by a third country. The Blocking Regulation forbids EU persons from complying with extraterritorial sanctions, allows companies to recover damages arising from such sanctions, and nullifies the effect in the EU of any foreign court judgment based on them. The effectiveness of the regulation as a mechanism to offset US sanctions has been questioned, however its adoption sends an important political message. Parliament now has two months to object to the delegated act, but may signal earlier that it will not do so, thus allowing the measure to come into force earlier than the end of the two-month period.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Future of the Iran nuclear deal: How much can US pressure isolate Iran?](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 25-05-2018

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave accordo internazionale | accordo multilaterale | America | arma nucleare | Asia-Oceania | commercio internazionale | commercio internazionale | costruzione europea | difesa | disarmo | ENERGIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | industria nucleare ed elettrica | Iran | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | politica internazionale | relazioni internazionali | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | ruolo internazionale dell'UE | sanzione internazionale | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza nucleare | Stati Uniti | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto In July 2015, Iran and the E3/EU+3 – France, Germany, the UK and the EU plus China, Russia and the USA – signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark agreement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for the termination of restrictive measures against Iran. Following certification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had complied with its nuclear dismantlement commitments, implementation of the JCPOA commenced on 16 January 2016. On that day, known as Implementation Day, all nuclear-related UN, US and EU sanctions on Iran were lifted. President Trump, who took office in January 2017, has consistently called the JCPOA 'a terrible deal'. In January 2018, he announced that the US would cease implementing the JCPOA in May 2018 unless Congress and US allies successfully addressed what he called the agreement's 'disastrous flaws'. During the short period given by President Trump, the US worked with EU allies on a 'supplemental agreement', to address the perceived weaknesses of the JCPOA. However, sufficient common ground could not be reached and on 8 May, President Trump announced that the US was leaving the nuclear deal with Iran and would (re-)impose sanctions. These block American firms from doing business in Iran, and bar foreign firms that do business with Iran from accessing the entire US banking and financial system. In addition, companies that violate the sanctions risk huge fines. The E3/EU have repeatedly stressed their support for the continued full and effective implementation of the JCPOA by all sides, pointing to the fact that it imposes very tough nuclear inspections and that the IAEA has confirmed 10 times that Iran is abiding by its commitments under the agreement. Russia and China have likewise expressed their unwavering support for the agreement. Iran has given the EU 60 days to ensure the continued implementation of the JCPOA, in particular its trade and economic aspects. The US has threatened to impose sanctions on European companies that continue to do business in Iran, but also signalled willingness to continue working on a 'supplemental agreement'.

[Briefing](#) [EN](#)

[Renewed chemical attack in Syria](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 12-04-2018

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave America | arma chimica | Asia-Oceania | difesa | diritti e libertà | diritti umani | DIRITTO | Europa | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | guerra civile | intervento militare | Nazioni Unite | ONU | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | politica internazionale | relazione multilaterale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | Siria | Stati Uniti | Turchia | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica | vittima civile

Riassunto As the conflict in Syria enters its eighth year, Parliament is due to debate the situation, following a recent escalation. The Assad regime is suspected of having carried out a toxic gas attack on the besieged town of Douma near Damascus on 7 April 2018, killing around 80 people and injuring hundreds. The United Nations Security Council debated the attack during an emergency meeting on 9 April 2018, during which Russia denied Syrian regime responsibility for the attack. The EU has strongly condemned the latest use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict, and the United States, France and the United Kingdom have signalled their willingness to respond with air-strikes in order to uphold the global ban on the use of chemical weapons.

[In sintesi](#) [EN](#)

EU efforts on counter-terrorism - Capacity-building in third countries

Tipo di pubblicazione [Briefing](#)

Data [19-12-2017](#)

Autore [IMMENKAMP Beatrix](#)

Settore di intervento [Affari esteri](#) | [Sicurezza e difesa](#) | [Sviluppo e aiuti umanitari](#)

Parole chiave [Africa](#) | [Africa del Nord](#) | [Asia-Oceania](#) | [assistenza preadesione](#) | [Balceni occidentali](#) | [costruzione europea](#) | [cultura e religione](#) | [difesa](#) | [esercito](#) | [finanze dell'Unione europea](#) | [GEOGRAFIA](#) | [geografia economica](#) | [integralismo religioso](#) | [paesi terzi](#) | [politica commerciale](#) | [politica di cooperazione](#) | [propaganda politica](#) | [QUESTIONI SOCIALI](#) | [RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI](#) | [ripartizione del finanziamento dell'UE](#) | [SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI](#) | [sicurezza europea](#) | [sicurezza internazionale](#) | [terrorismo](#) | [traffico illecito](#) | [UNIONE EUROPEA](#) | [Vicino e Medio Oriente](#) | [VITA POLITICA](#) | [vita politica e sicurezza pubblica](#)

Riassunto In the European Union (EU), responsibility for counter-terrorism lies primarily with Member States. However, the role of the EU itself in counter-terrorism has grown significantly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks that have hit Europe in the post-'9/11' era. The cross-border aspects of the terrorist threat call for a coordinated EU approach. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as internal and external security, has come to shape the EU's actions beyond its own borders. In the context of terrorism, the EU has an extensive toolkit of human and financial resources that support third countries in managing or mitigating terrorist threats. A key element of EU action is capacity-building in partner countries, to ensure local ownership, a sustainable assistance model and the full use of local expertise for challenges that are geographically distinct. The EU's external capacity-building efforts in counter-terrorism include security sector reform (SSR)-associated measures, such as strengthening the rule of law, improving the governance of security providers, improving border management, reforming the armed forces, and training law enforcement actors. As part of the EU's multifaceted assistance, efforts to curb terrorist funding and improve strategic communications to counter radicalisation and violent extremism complement SSR-related activities. Soft-power projects funded through the Commission's different funding instruments, coupled with both military and civilian common security and defence policy missions provide the framework through which the EU tries to address both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism and radicalisation.

[Briefing](#) [EN](#)

Multimedia [EU efforts on counter-terrorism - Capacity-building in third countries](#)

US recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel

Tipo di pubblicazione [In sintesi](#)

Data [11-12-2017](#)

Autore [IMMENKAMP Beatrix](#)

Settore di intervento [Affari esteri](#)

Parole chiave [ambasciata](#) | [America](#) | [Asia-Oceania](#) | [coesistenza pacifica](#) | [conflitto religioso](#) | [Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU](#) | [costruzione europea](#) | [diritti e libertà](#) | [DIRITTO](#) | [GEOGRAFIA](#) | [geografia economica](#) | [geografia politica](#) | [instaurazione della pace](#) | [Israele](#) | [Nazioni Unite](#) | [ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI](#) | [Palestina](#) | [politica estera e di sicurezza comune](#) | [politica internazionale](#) | [quadro politico](#) | [questione palestinese](#) | [regime presidenziale](#) | [RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI](#) | [sicurezza internazionale](#) | [Stati Uniti](#) | [status di Gerusalemme](#) | [UNIONE EUROPEA](#) | [Vicino e Medio Oriente](#) | [VITA POLITICA](#)

Riassunto On 6 December 2017, US President Donald Trump recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, mirroring the official Israeli position on the status of the city. In doing so, the US has become the first country to officially endorse the Israeli position on a hotly disputed issue that lies at the very heart of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), potentially weakening the role of the US in that process as an impartial mediator and tilting the odds further in Israel's favour. The move has been widely condemned as a violation of international law and a political provocation. However, it leaves open the possibility to address the status of the city as part of a comprehensive peace deal between Israelis and Palestinians.

[In sintesi](#) [EN](#)

Lo strumento inteso a contribuire alla stabilità e alla pace: adeguamento per gli operatori militari

Tipo di pubblicazione [In sintesi](#)

Data [24-11-2017](#)

Autore [IMMENKAMP Beatrix](#)

Settore di intervento [Affari esteri](#) | [Bilanci](#) | [Sicurezza e difesa](#) | [Sviluppo e aiuti umanitari](#)

Parole chiave [armamento](#) | [cooperazione militare](#) | [costruzione europea](#) | [difesa](#) | [diritto dell'Unione europea](#) | [elaborazione del diritto dell'UE](#) | [finanze dell'Unione europea](#) | [mantenimento della pace](#) | [meccanismo di finanziamento dell'UE](#) | [ordine pubblico](#) | [politica di cooperazione](#) | [politica estera e di sicurezza comune](#) | [RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI](#) | [ruolo internazionale dell'UE](#) | [sicurezza internazionale](#) | [UNIONE EUROPEA](#) | [VITA POLITICA](#) | [vita politica e sicurezza pubblica](#)

Riassunto La Commissione europea propone di modificare il regolamento (UE) n. 230/2014 che istituisce uno strumento inteso a contribuire alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), onde creare le condizioni per consentire all'UE di sostenere, per mezzo del suo bilancio, un controllo sistematico e a più lungo termine, da parte dell'Unione, del settore della sicurezza nei paesi terzi, compreso nel settore militare, attraverso programmi di sviluppo delle capacità, la fornitura di dispositivi non letali e il miglioramento delle infrastrutture. Il voto del Parlamento sulla proposta è previsto per la tornata di novembre II.

[In sintesi](#) [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

The EU's new approach to funding peace and security

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 22-11-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Adozione della legislazione da parte del PE e del Consiglio | Sicurezza e difesa | Sviluppo e aiuti umanitari

Parole chiave aiuto allo sviluppo | composizione delle controversie | cooperazione internazionale | cooperazione militare | diritto dell'Unione europea | instaurazione della pace | lavori parlamentari | mantenimento della pace | politica di cooperazione | politica estera | prevenzione dei conflitti | procedura legislativa ordinaria | proposta (UE) | regolamento (UE) | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | revisione della legge | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza internazionale | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA

Riassunto The link between security, peace and development is recognised by both security and development communities. However, the practical implications of this nexus still pose challenges – especially in the light of a rapidly evolving security environment. While the EU's assistance for peace and security comes in different forms – for instance through budgetary support or under common security and defence policy – the existing rules of financing under the EU budget exclude activities aimed at enhancing cooperation with the defence sector and the military in third countries. The proposed amendment to Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) aims to remedy this situation by creating the conditions to allow EU budgetary support for capacitybuilding programmes in third countries aimed at training and mentoring, the provision of non-lethal equipment and assistance with infrastructure improvements, and help with strengthening the capacity of military actors in order to contribute to the achievement of peaceful and inclusive societies and sustainable development. Fifth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Please note this document has been designed for on-line viewing.

Briefing [EN](#)

Norme dell'UE in materia di controllo delle esportazioni di armi

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 05-09-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave commercio di armi | controllo delle esportazioni | difesa | diritto dell'Unione europea | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | informazione ed elaborazione dell'informazione | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | licenza d'esportazione | politica commerciale | politica tariffaria | posizione comune | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | scambio d'informazioni | Stato membro UE | UNIONE EUROPEA

Riassunto La posizione comune dell'Unione europea sulle esportazioni di armi è l'unico accordo regionale in materia di esportazioni di armi convenzionali giuridicamente vincolante. Se da un lato la posizione comune ha aumentato la condivisione e la trasparenza delle informazioni sulle esportazioni di armi degli Stati membri, dall'altro è ancora possibile rafforzare la convergenza delle politiche nazionali e applicare in modo più rigoroso i criteri definiti nel testo dell'UE. Durante la tornata di settembre il Parlamento europeo discuterà una relazione sull'attuazione della posizione comune.

In sintesi [DE](#), [EN](#), [ES](#), [FR](#), [IT](#), [PL](#)

Multimedia [EU rules on control of arms exports](#)

Qatar: Rising tension in the Gulf

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 09-06-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Arabia Saudita | Asia-Oceania | Consiglio di cooperazione del Golfo | cultura e religione | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | geopolitica | integralismo religioso | islam | organizzazioni extraeuropee | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | politica estera | politica internazionale | Qatar | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | relazioni diplomatiche | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sanzione internazionale | SCIENZE | scienze umane | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza regionale | situazione politica | terrorismo | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto On 5 June 2017, several Arab nations, including Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), simultaneously announced that they were severing ties with Qatar, a fellow member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Accusing Qatar of supporting and financing 'terrorism and extremism' in the region, the above countries announced that they would halt all land, air and sea traffic with Qatar, expel its diplomats and ask Qatari citizens to leave their territory within 14 days. Oil prices rose initially as markets responded nervously to the worst crisis to involve the GCC since its creation in 1981, but then dropped again. Any escalation in the crisis would likely lead to more sustained increases in oil and gas prices.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Syrian crisis: Impact on Iraq](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 03-04-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave aiuti umanitari | aiuto dell'UE | Asia-Oceania | conflitto internazionale | cultura e religione | ECONOMIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | guerra civile | instaurazione della pace | integralismo religioso | Iraq | islam | migrante | migrazione | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | profugo | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | Siria | terrorismo | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The Syrian crisis, which began with anti-government protests before escalating into full-scale civil war, has had a huge impact on neighbouring Iraq. From its stronghold in the Syrian town of Raqqa, the 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL/Da'esh), which originated in Iraq, was able to over-run a third of Iraq's territory in 2014, sowing death and destruction in its path and leading to the internal displacement of over 3 million Iraqis today. It is estimated that as many as 11 million Iraqis — almost a third of the population — may need humanitarian assistance this year to deal with the effects of continuous conflict and economic stagnation. Moreover, a quarter of a million Syrians have sought refuge in Iraq from the war raging in their country. Most have settled in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), increasing the population of this autonomous region by nearly 30 % over the past few years. The — mostly Kurdish — Syrian refugees were well received by the government of the Kurdistan Region, which gave Syrians the right to work in the region and to enrol in public schools and universities. Nevertheless, the large influx of refugees has placed strains on the local economy and host communities, and on public services. Prices and unemployment have increased while wages have tumbled. Economic growth in the KRI has slowed, while the poverty rate has more than doubled. The international community has stepped in to assist Iraq in its fight against ISIL/Da'esh and to help the country deal with the humanitarian crisis caused by the unprecedented displacement of Iraqis, and Syrian refugees. As a result of concerted military efforts, ISIL/Da'esh now occupies less than 10 % of Iraqi territory. At the same time, funds and substantial amounts of humanitarian aid have been poured into the country, to support the displaced and facilitate their return to areas over which the Iraqi State has re-established control. The EU is a leading partner in the effort to mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on its Iraqi neighbours.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Syrian crisis: Impact on Lebanon](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 30-03-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave accesso all'istruzione | aiuto ai rifugiati | aiuto finanziario | analisi economica | Asia-Oceania | conseguenza economica | costruzione europea | ECONOMIA | finanze dell'Unione europea | finanziamento dell'UE | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | gestione amministrativa | gestione delle crisi | IMPRESA E CONCORRENZA | istruzione | ISTRUZIONE E COMUNICAZIONE | Libano | migrazione | migrazione forzata | politica di cooperazione | politica estera | politica europea di vicinato | profugo | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | Siria | situazione economica | situazione economica | situazione politica | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The crisis in Syria has had a significant impact on neighbouring countries over the past six years. Five million Syrians have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, putting host countries and communities under great pressure. Moreover, violence has spilled over into some neighbouring countries, including Lebanon. The impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon has been immense. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2011, up to 1.5 million displaced persons are believed to have crossed the border into Lebanon, formerly home to around 4.5 million people. The population has grown by an unprecedented 30 % in under four years, making Lebanon the country with the highest per capita concentration of refugees worldwide. The situation in neighbouring Syria has exacerbated Lebanon's political instability, and led to political deadlock for the past three years. This, in turn, has made it impossible to tackle some urgent challenges arising from the refugee presence, and from underlying structural problems with the delivery of basic services to the Lebanese population. Moreover, there are concerns, particularly among Christians, Shias and Druze, that a large number of Syrian Sunni Muslims could upset the delicate sectarian balance in Lebanon's multi-confessional political system. In light of Lebanon's experience with up to 280 000 Palestine refugees, its population is united in its opposition to a lasting refugee presence in the country. The Lebanese government insists that the presence of refugees from Syria is 'temporary', despite the absence of reasonable prospects for their safe return to their homeland in the foreseeable future. The international community has stepped in to help countries in the region cope with the influx of large numbers of vulnerable people. Emphasis has shifted from traditional humanitarian aid to 'resilience building'. This implies creating the long-term conditions that will allow Syrians to build a future for themselves and their children in the region, including acquiring the skills and tools to re-build their own country once they are able to return. The EU is co-hosting an international conference on 'Supporting the future of Syria and the region' on 5 April 2017, which will assess where the international community stands collectively in helping the region cope with the crisis.

Briefing [EN](#)

Syrian crisis: Impact on Jordan

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 07-02-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | conservazione del posto di lavoro | contabilità nazionale | creazione di posti di lavoro | ECONOMIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | geopolitica | Giordania | occupazione | OCCUPAZIONE E LAVORO | politica internazionale | povertà | profugo | relazioni internazionali | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCIENZE | scienze umane | sicurezza internazionale | Siria

Riassunto The impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan is immense. Jordan hosts an estimated 1.3 million Syrians, of which roughly half are refugees registered by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). An estimated two out of three refugees live below the poverty line. The strain of the ongoing refugee crisis on host-communities has led to public discontent, directed at the Jordanian government. Syrians live mainly among Jordan's most disadvantaged communities. The sudden influx of large numbers of people exacerbates challenges Jordan has faced for many years – increased competition for jobs, overburdened infrastructure and strained social services, such as healthcare and education. Marginalised Jordanians have begun to mobilise around their grievances as public frustration grows. To confront these issues, Jordan will continue to depend on external assistance. The country has accepted that the bulk of the refugees will remain until the situation in Syria allows for their return, which may be many years from now. In this context, creating job opportunities for Syrian refugees without discriminating against Jordanians will be a key policy challenge. Jordan's stability is a high priority for the EU. The country is an important partner in the European Neighbourhood Policy, as well as in the fight against ISIL/Da'esh. It is one of only two Arab countries to have signed a peace treaty with Israel and is key to any future agreement between Israel and Palestine. Jordan remains a haven of stability in a turbulent region; any change to this situation, particularly if it were to threaten the monarchy, would further destabilise a region in the midst of an existential crisis, potentially also causing new refugee movements to Europe.

Briefing [EN](#)

A Nuclear Ban Treaty: Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 13-01-2017

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave arma nucleare | cooperazione internazionale | difesa | disarmo | NATO | ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | organizzazioni mondiali | politica di cooperazione | politica internazionale | relazione multilaterale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza internazionale

Riassunto On 23 December 2016, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a resolution on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, thus paving the way for a conference in 2017 to 'negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination'. The adoption of the resolution has been hailed as historic by supporters of an initiative that has gained ground in the last few years to rid the world of the most destructive weapon known to humankind. Opponents of a 'ban treaty' argue that the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons is essential to maintain the existing global order, and the official nuclear-weapon states have mostly indicated that they will not participate in the conference. The majority of United Nations member states voted in favour of the resolution, but five nuclear-armed states and all but four NATO members voted against it. EU Member States, most of which are members of NATO, have taken different positions on the prospect of a nuclear weapons ban, with some supporting it, but most against. The European Parliament welcomed the convening of a conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, noting that this would reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and obligations contained in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and help to create the conditions for global security and a world without nuclear weapons. In a resolution adopted on 27 October 2016, the European Parliament invited the EU Member States to support the convening of such a conference in 2017 and 'to participate constructively in its proceedings'.

Briefing [EN](#)

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 28-10-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave arma biologica | attentato contro la sicurezza dello Stato | conferenza internazionale | convenzione internazionale | difesa | DIRITTO | diritto penale | distruzione delle armi | non proliferazione degli armamenti | politica internazionale | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | sicurezza internazionale | terrorismo | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The Eighth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, better known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), takes place in Geneva from 7 to 25 November 2016. Together with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC provides the foundation of the disarmament and non-proliferation framework in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Convention opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and has been ratified by 115 states parties, including all EU Member States. Lack of a verification mechanism weakens the Convention, but at present, terrorist use of biological weapons may actually pose the greater threat to public security.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Parliamentary elections in Jordan](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 15-09-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Asia-Oceania | diritti e libertà | DIRITTO | discriminazione etnica | discriminazione sessuale | elezioni politiche | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Giordania | procedura elettorale e voto | rappresentanza politica | verifica dello scrutinio | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto Jordanians will go to the polls on 20 September 2016 to elect a new parliament, at a time of unprecedented regional upheaval, an increasingly challenging domestic economic situation and high levels of public discontent. A new electoral law introduces multi-member districts and elections using a list system, replacing the 'one-person, one-vote' rule. This has prompted the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the main opposition party, which had boycotted the 2010 and 2013 elections, to participate in the election. Reducing the number of seats in the parliament from 150 to 130, the new legislation also provides for better representation of Jordan's largest cities while retaining quotas for women and minorities, including Christians, Circassians and Chechens. The IAF's participation in the elections increases their legitimacy. However, in view of the strength of the monarchy, few expect the composition of the new parliament to significantly alter the country's domestic or foreign policies.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Egypt: A failed revolution?](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 13-06-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Democrazia UE

Parole chiave accordo di associazione (UE) | Africa | aiuto dell'UE | costruzione europea | diritti e libertà | diritti politici | diritti umani | DIRITTO | ECONOMIA | Egitto | finanze dell'Unione europea | finanziamento dell'UE | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | politica economica | politica europea di vicinato | situazione economica | situazione economica | situazione politica | UNIONE EUROPEA | violenza di Stato | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The most populous of the Arab countries, situated at the crossroads between Africa and the Middle East, Egypt is an important partner for Europe. Since 2004, bilateral EU-Egypt trade has almost tripled, from €11.8 billion to €27.7 billion in 2015. At the same time, the EU and Egypt share many foreign policy concerns, including the Middle East peace process, migration and the fight against terrorism. Under the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, the challenge will be to reconcile growing EU concerns over the deteriorating human-rights situation in post-revolutionary Egypt with the importance of enhancing cooperation with Egypt as a partner for stability in the region.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Jordan: A protest movement eclipsed](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 13-06-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Democrazia UE

Parole chiave accordo di associazione (UE) | agitazione politica | aiuto ai rifugiati | aiuto dell'UE | Asia-Oceania | contabilità nazionale | corruzione | costruzione europea | DIRITTO | diritto penale | ECONOMIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Giordania | politica di cooperazione | politica economica | politica europea di vicinato | povertà | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | rifugiato politico | sicurezza internazionale | sicurezza regionale | situazione economica | situazione economica | situazione politica | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto Low-level protests in Jordan throughout 2011 were met by offers of reform from the King, and subsided as neighbouring countries descended into chaos and civil war. The Syrian refugee crisis has diverted attention away from the causes of the unrest in 2011, but has given rise to new grievances that have the potential to undermine the stability of the country once more.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[Iraq-Iran relations following the nuclear deal](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 09-05-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave America | Asia-Oceania | commercio | composizione delle controversie | cultura e religione | ECONOMIA | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Iran | Iraq | islam | non proliferazione di armi nucleari | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | setta religiosa | sicurezza internazionale | situazione economica | situazione economica | situazione politica | Stati Uniti | terrorismo | Vicino e Medio Oriente | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica | volume degli scambi

Riassunto Critics of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran have warned that Iran would use any financial benefits to further strengthen its influence in the region, by supporting its allies, which include important Shia militias in Iraq. While the nuclear deal has yet to translate into major economic and financial benefits for Iran, any requests for extra resources to support foreign allies will also have to compete with the Iranian government's many other – domestic – priorities. Moreover, the potential long-term effects of the nuclear deal on the funding of Iran's allies in Iraq will depend on many other factors, including the domestic situation in Iraq and Iran and developments in Syria. It is certain, however, that Iran will continue to pursue its strategic economic interests in Iraq.

In sintesi [EN](#)

[ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 02-05-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa | Spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia

Parole chiave AMBIENTE | arma di distruzione di massa | bene a doppio uso | chimica | commercio di armi | controllo delle esportazioni | costruzione europea | degrado ambientale | difesa | esplosivo | finanze dell'Unione europea | finanziamento dell'UE | INDUSTRIA | politica commerciale | politica estera e di sicurezza comune | PRODUZIONE, TECNOLOGIA E RICERCA | progetto di ricerca | propaganda politica | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | ricerca e proprietà intellettuale | SCAMBI ECONOMICI E COMMERCIALI | sicurezza europea | sicurezza internazionale | sostanza pericolosa | tecnologia e regolamentazione tecnica | terrorismo | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The European Union and its Member States must prepare for the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled 'Islamic State' in Iraq and the Levant (known variously as IS, ISIS or ISIL, and by the Arabic acronym 'Da'esh'). Since October 2015, terrorist attacks in Ankara, the Sinai Peninsula, Beirut, Paris, Tunis and Brussels, for which ISIL/Da'esh has claimed responsibility, have cost the lives of over 530 people. Immediately following the attacks in Paris and Brussels, the jihadist terrorist group threatened further attacks in European cities. ISIL/Da'esh has vowed that future strikes will be more lethal and even more shocking, prompting experts to warn that the group may be planning to try to use internationally banned weapons of mass destruction in future attacks. On 19 November 2015, the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, raised the spectre of ISIL/Da'esh planning a chemical or biological attack. At present, Europeans are generally not contemplating the possibility that extremist groups might use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials during attacks in Europe. Under these circumstances, the impact of such an attack, should it occur, would be even more destabilising. European governments and EU institutions need to be on alert, and should consider publicly addressing the possibility of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear materials. The EU institutions have devoted considerable efforts to preventing a CBRN attack on European soil and preparing worst-case scenarios. However, some gaps remain, in particular with regard to information-sharing among Member States. This briefing updates the previous edition published on 3 December 2015.

Briefing [EN](#)

[Understanding the branches of Islam: Sunni Islam](#)

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 15-02-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave conflitto religioso | cultura e religione | diritti e libertà | DIRITTO | diritto musulmano | fonti e branche del diritto | islam | istituzione religiosa | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | SCIENZE | scienze umane | storia | teologia

Riassunto All Muslims share certain fundamental beliefs and practices. Nonetheless, over time, leadership disputes within the Muslim community have resulted in the formation of different branches, leading to the development of distinct religious identities within Islam. Sunni Islam is by far the largest branch of Islam: its followers make up 87 to 90% of the global Muslim population.

The name 'Sunni Islam' derives from the term ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama'a ('people of the prophetic tradition and the community'). Sunni Islam claims to represent the Muslim consensus concerning the teachings and habits of the Prophet. It originated among those Muslims who, contrary to Shiites and Khawarij, denied that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, had been chosen as Muhammad's only legitimate successor. In contrast to Shiite Islam, where disagreement over the legitimate leader led to further splits into several sub-branches, Sunni Islam avoided fundamental divisions, allowing, instead, for 'pluralism within a unitary system'.

This briefing offers a short overview over the distinctive features of Sunni Islam, its main institutions and holy places and the main trends in Sunni Islam today.

This paper may be read together with other EPRS publications entitled Understanding the branches of Islam (September 2015) and Understanding the branches of Islam: Shia Islam (January 2016), as well as Understanding Sharia (May 2015) and Relations between Islam and the State (June 2015).

Briefing [EN](#), [HU](#)

The new Egyptian parliament

Tipo di pubblicazione In sintesi

Data 05-02-2016

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri

Parole chiave Africa | coalizione politica | competenza del parlamento | DIRITTO | Egitto | elezioni politiche | fonti e branche del diritto | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | Parlamento | partiti politici | partito politico | procedura elettorale e voto | revisione della costituzione | ripartizione dei seggi | sistema elettorale | situazione politica | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The new Egyptian legislative assembly, sworn in on 10 January 2016, is likely to be loyal to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Two thirds of members have joined the pro-Sisi 'State Support' (Da'am Masr) coalition, led by former intelligence officer Sameh Seif Alyazal. A supporter of the President, Alyazal has openly voiced his intention to limit the powers of the assembly, to weaken its ability to impeach the President. A member of the 'State Support' coalition, Ali Abdelaal, a French-educated lawyer who helped draft the constitution and the election law, was elected as speaker of the parliament. In the absence of a dominant party, it is feared that parliamentarians, the majority of whom ran as independents, will be particularly receptive to the diverse interests of big business, national security and individual constituencies. Parties that flourished after the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011 either boycotted the elections or lost to coalitions made up of former military and police officials, business leaders and their families. The party with the strongest showing in the previous elections, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, has been banned and did not participate in the polls.

In sintesi [EN](#)

ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 03-12-2015

Autore IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Affari esteri | Sicurezza e difesa

Parole chiave AMBIENTE | approvvigionamento di armi | arma di distruzione di massa | bene a doppio uso | chimica | competenza degli Stati membri | cultura e religione | degrado ambientale | difesa | diritto dell'Unione europea | esplosivo | INDUSTRIA | integralismo religioso | politica dell'ambiente | prevenzione dei rischi ambientali | PRODUZIONE, TECNOLOGIA E RICERCA | progetto di ricerca | programma quadro di ricerca e sviluppo | protezione civile | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | ricerca e proprietà intellettuale | sicurezza europea | sicurezza internazionale | sostanza pericolosa | tecnologia e regolamentazione tecnica | terrorismo | UNIONE EUROPEA | VITA POLITICA | vita politica e sicurezza pubblica

Riassunto The European Union and its Member States must prepare for the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled 'Islamic State' in Iraq and the Levant (known variously as IS, ISIS or ISIL, and by the Arabic acronym 'Da'esh'). Since the beginning of October 2015, terrorist attacks in Ankara, the Sinai Peninsula, Beirut, Paris and Tunis, for which ISIL/Da'esh has claimed responsibility, have cost the lives of 500 people. Immediately following the latest attack in Paris, the jihadist terrorist group threatened further attacks in European cities. ISIL/Da'esh has vowed that future strikes will be more lethal and even more shocking. This has prompted experts to warn that the group may be planning to try to use internationally banned weapons of mass destruction in future attacks. On 19 November 2015, the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, raised the spectre of ISIL/Da'esh planning a chemical or biological attack. At present, European citizens are not seriously contemplating the possibility that extremist groups might use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials during attacks in Europe. Under these circumstances, the impact of such an attack, should it occur, would be even more destabilising. European governments and EU institutions need to be on alert, and should consider publicly addressing the possibility of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear materials. The EU institutions have devoted considerable efforts to preventing a CBRN attack on European soil and preparing worst-case scenarios. However, some gaps remain, in particular with regard to information-sharing among Member States.

Briefing [EN](#)

EU Trust Funds for external action: First uses of a new tool

Tipo di pubblicazione Briefing

Data 27-11-2015

Autore D'ALFONSO Alessandro | IMMENKAMP Beatrix

Settore di intervento Bilanci | Sviluppo e aiuti umanitari

Parole chiave Africa | Africa | aiuto ai rifugiati | aiuto allo sviluppo | aiuto multilaterale | Asia-Oceania | finanze dell'Unione europea | finanziamento dell'aiuto | fondo (UE) | GEOGRAFIA | geografia economica | geografia politica | migrazione | migrazione illegale | politica di cooperazione | politica migratoria dell'UE | QUESTIONI SOCIALI | RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI | Repubblica centrafricana | Siria | UNIONE EUROPEA | utilizzazione degli aiuti

Riassunto Since January 2013, the new Financial Regulation applicable to the EU budget allows the European Commission to create and administer Union Trust Funds in the field of external action: these are multi-donor trust funds for emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions. The European Parliament welcomed this development in an April 2013 resolution, considering that it would allow the EU to raise the visibility of its external action and to have greater control over the delivery chain of relevant funds. The first two EU Trust Funds were created in 2014: the Békou EU Trust Fund (€108 million), focusing on the stabilisation and reconstruction of the Central African Republic and the Madad Fund (€542 million), dealing with the response to the Syrian crisis. As part of intensifying efforts to tackle the refugee crisis, the European Commission and Spain have also set up an Emergency Trust Fund for stability, to address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. The new fund has an initial budget of €1.8 billion and targets 23 countries in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, the Horn of Africa and North Africa. The bulk of funding has so far come from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF). By comparison, Member State contributions to the Trust Funds have to date been relatively low. The European Commission and the European Parliament are therefore urging Member States to match the EU budget and EDF contributions to the Trust Funds. The Commission's aim is to increase the amounts in the Madad Fund and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to €1 billion and €3.6 billion, respectively.

Briefing [EN](#)