100

Resultado(s)

Palavra(s)
Tipo de publicação
Domínio de intervenção
Autor
Palavra-chave
Data

Go Big or Go Home? The ECB’s Asset Purchase Programmes in Macroeconomic Perspective

30-09-2020

Until this year, governments in the single currency area appeared to be ‘missing in action’. There is belated recognition that monetary and fiscal policies must coordinate especially in crisis conditions. The euro area has experienced crisis or near crisis conditions for over a decade. Lessons are being learned late but there continue to be several gaps that the euro area and its members need to close. The paper highlights these and the continuing threats to the single currency area. This document ...

Until this year, governments in the single currency area appeared to be ‘missing in action’. There is belated recognition that monetary and fiscal policies must coordinate especially in crisis conditions. The euro area has experienced crisis or near crisis conditions for over a decade. Lessons are being learned late but there continue to be several gaps that the euro area and its members need to close. The paper highlights these and the continuing threats to the single currency area. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON).

Autor externo

Pierre L. SIKLOS

Communication During Unconventional Times: The ECB’s Approach

15-01-2020

During the past five years, communication of the ECB has changed drastically, not least with the introduction of forward guidance. Against this backdrop, this note assesses how successful the central bank has been in influencing financial markets and expectations and discusses the challenges for future ECB communication. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

During the past five years, communication of the ECB has changed drastically, not least with the introduction of forward guidance. Against this backdrop, this note assesses how successful the central bank has been in influencing financial markets and expectations and discusses the challenges for future ECB communication. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.

Autor externo

Eddie GERBA and Corrado MACCHIARELLI

A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data

17-10-2019

The financial crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, starting a worldwide chain reaction. The EU economy contracted for five consecutive quarters, with growth returning only in the second half of 2009. Stimulatory and fiscal actions by national governments and the EU, and the Eurosystem's loose monetary policy, helped achieve recovery. It was short-lived, however, as in 2010 a sovereign debt crisis resulted from a loss of financial market confidence, with soaring public debt. Yields on ...

The financial crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, starting a worldwide chain reaction. The EU economy contracted for five consecutive quarters, with growth returning only in the second half of 2009. Stimulatory and fiscal actions by national governments and the EU, and the Eurosystem's loose monetary policy, helped achieve recovery. It was short-lived, however, as in 2010 a sovereign debt crisis resulted from a loss of financial market confidence, with soaring public debt. Yields on government bonds, particularly in the periphery countries, rose dramatically. Ad hoc rescue devices, such as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, brought the situation under control, later supported by the pledge of European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to do 'whatever it takes' to save the euro. The acute phase of the crisis ended in 2014, followed by a period of extremely low inflation and weak growth. To boost inflation, facilitate bank lending and stimulate the economy, the Eurosystem relied increasingly on quantitative easing. While 2017 was the EU's best year since the crises, with economic performance returning to pre-crisis levels, recent data suggest that the momentum is weakening, both in and outside the EU.

A decade on from the crisis: Main responses and remaining challenges

17-10-2019

It has been a decade since the financial crisis erupted and changed the world in 2008. Few at the time guessed what would be its magnitude and long-term consequences. The interconnectedness of the economy and the financial sector facilitated the spread of the crisis from the United States to Europe. First, the EU faced the Great Recession in the 2008-2009 period and then, after a short recovery, several Member States succumbed to the sovereign debt crisis. The combined crises had catastrophic consequences ...

It has been a decade since the financial crisis erupted and changed the world in 2008. Few at the time guessed what would be its magnitude and long-term consequences. The interconnectedness of the economy and the financial sector facilitated the spread of the crisis from the United States to Europe. First, the EU faced the Great Recession in the 2008-2009 period and then, after a short recovery, several Member States succumbed to the sovereign debt crisis. The combined crises had catastrophic consequences for economic growth, investment, employment and the fiscal position of many Member States. The EU engaged in short-term 'fire-fighting' measures such as bailouts to save banks and help stressed sovereigns, while at the same time reforming the inadequate framework. While signs of moderate recovery showed in 2014, the risk of falling into deflation or secular stagnation remained high, and it was only in 2017 that the EU economy returned to a state similar to that of before the crisis. The signs in 2019 are not so promising however. Many efforts have been made to improve resilience in the EU and the euro area. These have included improving the stability of the financial sector, strengthening economic governance, creating a safety net for sovereigns in distress and carrying out structural reforms, particularly in the countries most affected. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken unconventional policy measures. Nonetheless many argue that the pace of the reforms has slowed down considerably since 2013 when the economic situation began to improve. The legacy of the crisis is still present and many challenges persist. These include the absence of a clear and agreed vision for the future of economic and monetary union (EMU), perennial macroeconomic imbalances and high public deficits in a number of Member States, and the ongoing risk of a doom loop between sovereigns and the banking sector. Post crisis vulnerabilities also include rising inequalities, youth unemployment and high in-work poverty risk levels. See also our infographic, A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data, PE 640.145.

Monetary Policy in the Euro Area after Eight Years of Presidency of Mario Draghi: Where Do We Stand?

16-09-2019

Against the backdrop of slowing growth and subdued inflation in the euro area, we address the question to what extent additional monetary stimulus can be expected from the ECB if needed. We find that “more of the same” policies will probably not be effective and that there are no attractive alternatives there. After more than ten years of exceptionally loose monetary policy it is now the turn of fiscal and structural policies to reinvigorate the European economies.

Against the backdrop of slowing growth and subdued inflation in the euro area, we address the question to what extent additional monetary stimulus can be expected from the ECB if needed. We find that “more of the same” policies will probably not be effective and that there are no attractive alternatives there. After more than ten years of exceptionally loose monetary policy it is now the turn of fiscal and structural policies to reinvigorate the European economies.

Autor externo

Salomon FIEDLER and Klaus-Jürgen GERN

Amending capital requirements: The 'CRD-V package'

30-07-2019

In May 2019, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) adopted the legislative proposals amending the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings and aim to contribute to sustainable bank financing of the economy. The ...

In May 2019, the European Parliament and the Council (the co-legislators) adopted the legislative proposals amending the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation, which establish the prudential framework for financial institutions operating in the EU. The amendments implement the most recent regulatory standards for banks, set at international level ('Basel III framework'). They also address some regulatory shortcomings and aim to contribute to sustainable bank financing of the economy. The final acts were published in the Official Journal on 7 June 2019. The new provisions will for the most part apply as of 2021. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Debt Mutualisation in the Euro Area: An Assessment

04-06-2019

Existing proposals for reform in the euro area, including the introduction of an orderly sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and of forms of debt mutualisation, rely on similar implicit or explicit assumptions: The “diabolic loop” between sovereign debt and domestic banks is to be mitigated or avoided; market discipline has to be maintained; and moral hazard has to be avoided. This paper discusses the stated goals of existing proposals, together with their likely anticipated and unanticipated ...

Existing proposals for reform in the euro area, including the introduction of an orderly sovereign debt restructuring mechanism and of forms of debt mutualisation, rely on similar implicit or explicit assumptions: The “diabolic loop” between sovereign debt and domestic banks is to be mitigated or avoided; market discipline has to be maintained; and moral hazard has to be avoided. This paper discusses the stated goals of existing proposals, together with their likely anticipated and unanticipated effects and trade-offs. It recognizes that several of these underlying assumptions and frameworks are at odds with the extant empirical evidence. It concludes by setting forth a three-pronged proposal for reform in the Euro Area. First, it is desirable to have a more explicit seniority structure in sovereign debt, which should be achieved by introducing a junior class of risky sovereign bonds linked to nominal GDP growth. Second, governments with high legacy debt and/or high deficits should be required to access new financing by issuing such junior bonds. Third, the extent of fiscal stabilization and banking union in the Euro area should be increased.

Autor externo

S. Rossi

Are the current “automatic stabilisers” in the Euro Area Member States sufficient to smooth economic cycles?

27-05-2019

Since 2008, and as the result of central banks reaching the zero-lower bound, fiscal policy has come back as a potential, possibly primary, tool to stabilize business cycles. We present evidence that European countries have historically relied on automatic stabilisers for counter-cyclical policies, while discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical (unlike in the US). Pro-cyclical fiscal policies became so strong in the years 2010-14 that they completely eliminated the benefits of automatic ...

Since 2008, and as the result of central banks reaching the zero-lower bound, fiscal policy has come back as a potential, possibly primary, tool to stabilize business cycles. We present evidence that European countries have historically relied on automatic stabilisers for counter-cyclical policies, while discretionary fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical (unlike in the US). Pro-cyclical fiscal policies became so strong in the years 2010-14 that they completely eliminated the benefits of automatic stabilisers. Looking forward, there are calls to strengthen automatic stabilisers. We argue in this paper that without addressing the reasons behind the pro-cyclicality of discretionary policy, this cannot be a solution. Strengthening automatic stabilisers faces similar challenges and trade-offs as proposals to make discretionary policy more countercyclical.

Autor externo

A.Fatas

A Fiscal Capacity for the Eurozone: Constitutional Perspectives

15-02-2019

This in-depth analysis, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee, considers from a constitutional perspective the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone. After explaining the constitutional asymmetry of Economic & Monetary Union, and surveying several recent proposals to establish a fiscal capacity, the in-depth analysis explains in comparative perspective how other federal unions by ...

This in-depth analysis, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee, considers from a constitutional perspective the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone. After explaining the constitutional asymmetry of Economic & Monetary Union, and surveying several recent proposals to establish a fiscal capacity, the in-depth analysis explains in comparative perspective how other federal unions by aggregation such as the United States and Switzerland are endowed with centralized fiscal stabilization tools and discusses how such a fiscal capacity could be established in the Eurozone, considering issues of legal bases, governance and accountability, as well as possible windows of opportunities to introduce it post-Brexit.

Autor externo

Federico Fabbrini, Professor of EU Law at Dublin City University (DCU) and Founding Director of the DCU Brexit Institute

Exchange of views with Mrs Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board

05-12-2018

This briefing presents selected issues regarding the work of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in advance of the exchange of views with Mrs Elke König, Chair of the SRB, in ECON on 6 December 2018. The briefing thematically covers the following: (i) Pending response to the EP 2017 Banking Union report, (ii) Updated information in the resolution case of Banco Popular, including the Valuation 3 report, (iii) SRB’s 2018 MREL policy; (iv) The backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); (v) Liquidity ...

This briefing presents selected issues regarding the work of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) in advance of the exchange of views with Mrs Elke König, Chair of the SRB, in ECON on 6 December 2018. The briefing thematically covers the following: (i) Pending response to the EP 2017 Banking Union report, (ii) Updated information in the resolution case of Banco Popular, including the Valuation 3 report, (iii) SRB’s 2018 MREL policy; (iv) The backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); (v) Liquidity in resolution, including the summary of external briefings commissioned by the ECON Committee; (vi) Brexit-related issues, (vii) Bank liquidation regime, (viii) Other publications including the SRB’s 2019 work programme and the 2018 contributions to the SRF.

Futuros eventos

20-01-2021
EPRS online policy roundtable with the World Bank: Where next for the global economy
Outro evento -
EPRS
25-01-2021
Public Hearing on "Gender aspects of precarious work"
Audição -
FEMM
27-01-2021
Public hearing on AI and Green Deal
Audição -
AIDA

Parceiros