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4 Rezultat(e)

Data creării : 19-04-2024

Reform Support Programme 2021-2027

Tipul publicației Briefing

Data 13-03-2019

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Domeniul tematic Adoptarea legislației de către PE și Consiliu | Chestiuni economice și monetare

Cuvânt-cheie ajustare structurală | ajutor al UE | comisie a Parlamentului European | construcție europeană | convergență economică | dreptul Uniunii Europene | ECONOMIE | FINANȚE | finanțele Uniunii Europene | GEOGRAFIE | geografie economică | Instituțiile Uniunii Europene și funcția publică europeană | instrument financiar al UE | POLITICĂ | politică economică | politică și securitate publică | program al UE | propunere (UE) | putere executivă și administrație publică | reformă administrativă | reformă instituțională | relații monetare | UNIUNEA EUROPEANĂ | țară non-participantă | țări ale UE

Rezumat The European Commission adopted the proposal on the establishment of the Reform Support Programme on 31 May 2018, as part of the package for the upcoming multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027. The programme will provide financial and technical support for Member States to implement reforms aimed at increasing the resilience of their economies and modernising them, including priority reforms identified in the European Semester. The overall budget for the programme is €25 billion. It comprises three elements: a reform delivery tool (financial support); a Technical Support Instrument (technical expertise, building on the current Structural Reform Support Programme 2017-2020); and a convergence facility (preparation for adopting the euro). The Reform Support Programme will be open to all Member States on a voluntary basis, with no co-financing required. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) and Committee on Budgets (BUDG) are working jointly on this file under Rule 55 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure. A vote in the joint committee meeting is expected on 1 April 2019, with a vote in plenary thereafter, during the second April 2019 part-session. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure.

Briefing [EN](#)

Reform Support Programme

Tipul publicației Briefing

Data 23-10-2018

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Domeniul tematic Chestiuni economice și monetare | Dezvoltare regională

Cuvânt-cheie ajustare structurală | ajutor al UE | analiză economică | construcție europeană | convergență economică | dreptul Uniunii Europene | ECONOMIE | FINANȚE | finanțele Uniunii Europene | GEOGRAFIE | geografie economică | instrument financiar al UE | POLITICĂ | politică economică | politică și securitate publică | program al UE | propunere (UE) | putere executivă și administrație publică | reformă administrativă | reformă instituțională | relații monetare | studii de impact | UNIUNEA EUROPEANĂ | țară non-participantă | țări ale UE

Rezumat Among the legislative proposals for the spending programmes of the MFF 2021-2027, the European Commission has proposed to establish a Reform Support Programme for structural reforms. The IA accompanying the proposal provides a good review of the baseline scenario, the problem to tackle and the objectives to achieve. However, it concentrates on the expected positive effects of the programme, rather than assessing thoroughly the impacts of alternative options against the baseline scenario like a standard IA. The presentation of the delivery mechanisms is mostly qualitative, with a couple of quantified references that could have been better explained and substantiated. The IA remains vague on the precise scope of the voluntary programme and several implementation details and implies that its impacts depend to a large extent on the implementation by the Member States, which makes an ex-ante assessment challenging.

Briefing [EN](#)

Adopting the euro: Convergence criteria and state of play

Tipul publicației Briefing

Data 17-07-2015

Autor SZCZEPANSKI Marcin

Domeniul tematic Chestiuni economice și monetare

Cuvânt-cheie a treia etapă a Uniunii Economice și Monetare | acquis comunitar | criterii de convergență | dreptul Uniunii Europene | ECONOMIE | economie monetară | FINANȚE | mecanismul ratelor de schimb Sistemul Monetar European | opinie publică | pact de stabilitate | POLITICĂ | politică economică | politică monetară unică | politică și securitate publică | relații monetare | Sistemul European al Băncilor Centrale | UNIUNEA EUROPEANĂ | țară non-participantă

Rezumat Adopting the single currency is the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Even though all Member States participate in EMU, not all of them use the euro: the United Kingdom and Denmark have opted out, while Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden are yet to adopt it, being formally obliged to do so under the Maastricht Treaty. Before this happens, they need to fulfil the convergence criteria of price stability, soundness and sustainability of public finances, durability of convergence and exchange rate stability. Furthermore, they must align their national legislation with the EU acquis on national central banks. Many argue that during the euro's founding phase the convergence criteria were relaxed in order to enable a wide take-up of the currency. This however is no longer the case, as the Member States which have joined since the euro came into use have had to fulfil the criteria stringently. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Sweden fulfil all but one criterion (exchange rate stability) and in fact none of the seven countries have decided to join the relevant currency-pegging mechanism. Furthermore, none except Croatia have made their central bank legislation compatible with the euro area. Public opinion in these countries is divided: a majority in Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Bulgaria is in favour of adopting the euro, while in the other countries most people would vote against it. However, only 18% of all respondents want the single currency to be introduced as soon as possible. Reportedly, most of the non-euro-area Member States cannot be expected to join the euro before 2020.

Briefing [EN](#)

Limits and Opportunities for the ECB in the Multi-Tier Governance

Tipul publicației Analiză aprofundată

Data 14-12-2012

Autor extern René REPASI (Institut für deutsches und europäisches Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsrecht, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg, Germany)

Domeniul tematic Chestiuni financiare și bancare | Democrația în UE, drept instituțional și parlamentar

Cuvânt-cheie AFACERI ȘI CONCURENȚĂ | Banca Centrală Europeană | competență instituțională (UE) | coordonarea politicilor Uniunii Economice și Monetare | criză monetară | economie monetară | FINANȚE | Instituțiile Uniunii Europene și funcția publică europeană | luarea deciziilor | management | POLITICĂ | politică și securitate publică | reformă instituțională | relații monetare | Sistemul European al Băncilor Centrale | UNIUNEA EUROPEANĂ | țară non-participantă

Rezumat The European Central Bank constitutes together with the national Central Banks the European System of Central Banks: a unique governance system in which the execution of tasks conferred upon the ESCB is divided between the European level (ECB) and the national level (national Central Banks) and which is characterised by the principle of decentralisation. The EU level decides to which extent the national level is competent for the proper execution of Central Bank's tasks whilst the main decision-making body is composed by representatives of the national level. A possible extension of this successful governance to other field of economic governance in the euro zone is to be examined. The particularities of the ESCB (independence guarantee and its function to maintain price stability), however, conflict with an extension of its role. Such an extension would require more democratic accountability and in-depth modifications of the law and the functioning of the ECB.

Analiză aprofundată [EN](#)