Fact Sheets on the European Union
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Common security and defence policy

The common security and defence policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The CSDP is the main policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the EU and its citizens, and strengthen international peace and security. As a result of the tense geopolitical context, the CSDP has been one of the fastest developing policies over the last 10 years. Since 24 February 2022, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has acted as a geopolitical reset for Europe and created further impetus for what should become a European Defence Union.

Legal basis

The CSDP is described in the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009 and amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The workings of the CSDP and the CFSP are explained in Articles 21-46 TEU, under Title V – General provisions on the Union’s external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy.

The role of the European Parliament in the CFSP and the CSDP is defined in Articles 24, 27 and 36 TEU, and the funding arrangements for both policies are set out in Article 41 TEU.

The CSDP is further described in the protocols to the Treaties which were added by the Treaty of Lisbon, mainly Protocols No 1 (on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union), No 10 (on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 TEU) and No 11 (on Article 42 TEU), as well as in Declarations 13 and 14 (declarations concerning the common foreign and security policy).

The EU’s defence industrial policy also draws on further legal bases, notably Articles 114, 173, 212 and 322 TFEU.

Organisation

The CSDP’s political guidelines are established by European leaders within the European Council. At ministerial level, the Foreign Affairs Council translates these principles into concrete decisions on foreign policy and security matters. The Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR). In this central institutional role, the VP/HR presents CSDP proposals to Member States, heads the European External Action Service and directs the European Defence Agency.

The European Council and the Council of the EU take decisions relating to the CSDP by unanimity (Article 42 TEU). Some notable exceptions are decisions relating to the European Defence Agency (Article 45 TEU) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (Article 46 TEU), for which qualified majority voting applies.

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42(3) TEU) and established that the European Defence Agency carries out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary (Article 45(2) TEU); this occurs when it comes to the EU’s defence technology research, industrial and space policies.

In the area of defence industrial policy, Parliament usually adopts legislation with the Council of the EU.

Developments between 2016 and 2022

Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the CSDP has evolved significantly, both politically and institutionally.

A. Global Strategy and European Defence Fund

In June 2016, VP/HR Federica Mogherini presented ‘A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, which outlined five priorities, including EU security and global governance. In the area of defence, the Global Strategy aimed to provide Member States with stronger incentives for operational and industrial cooperation to achieve better strategic alignment and interoperability.

To this end, a European Defence Fund with a budget of EUR 8 billion was created for joint research and capability development. The 2025 work programme for the European Defence Fund features 33 topics under which projects can be proposed, with a total budget of EUR 1.065 billion for collaborative research and development in defence. Moreover, a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence has been established to improve transparency in defence planning and promote synergies and economies of scale.

B. Permanent Structured Cooperation

The Permanent Structured Cooperation is a further framework to promote cooperation through the joint development of capabilities. Under the responsibility of the VP/HR and the European External Action Service, the participating Member States plan, develop and invest in flagship collaborative projects. The goal is to agree on common weapon systems, boost defence spending and enhance the interoperability of European armed forces. In October 2025, there were 74 projects under way as part of the Permanent Structured Cooperation.

C. European Peace Facility

The European Peace Facility was established in 2021 for the 2021-2027 period to finance the common costs of military CSDP missions and operations, which are undertaken outside the EU with the aim of keeping the peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international security. The instrument, which is worth EUR 17 billion and is financed outside the EU budget, enables the burden of these costs to be spread among the Member States. The European Peace Facility can be used to finance training and military equipment (including lethal equipment) for EU partner countries. Enhancing peace support operation capacities and building the military and defence capabilities of non-EU countries and partner organisations increases the effectiveness of the EU’s external action. Between 2022 and 2024, the EU allocated EUR 11.1 billion under the European Peace Facility to supporting the Ukrainian armed forces.

D. Strategic Compass

In 2022, the Strategic Compass was adopted with the overall aim of achieving strategic autonomy for the EU. It seeks to address gaps in the Global Strategy and provide overarching guidance for joint actions in the key strategic areas of crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. For the first time, Member States concurred on a joint threat assessment and a strategic vision which would turn the EU into a security provider. A new EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5 000 troops was created to ensure a swift response to crises, and an EU Hybrid Toolbox was developed.

Developments since the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

When Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Strategic Compass had to be significantly altered to take into account the resulting destabilisation of the European security order and the subsequent change in the EU’s stance, ambitions and tools in the realm of defence.

A. Strengthening the EU’s defence industry

To guarantee defence readiness and strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base, the EU identified key challenges stemming from long-term industrial underinvestment, fragmented demand and supply, dependency on non-EU countries and limited defence capacities. The 2022 Versailles Declaration, which aligns fully with the Strategic Compass, outlines measures to tackle these issues through new and revised EU processes.

These include the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the European Defence Industrial Programme, which were designed to ramp up industrial capacity at EU level. The overall aim is for the EU Member States to increase their joint investments in defence, and specifically in the European defence sector, over the long term, and to make these investments more effective.

To this end, the draft regulation on the European Defence Industrial Programme proposes the following, in addition to funding for joint procurement projects:

  • A fund to accelerate defence supply chain transformation, to support small and medium-sized enterprises;
  • The establishment of an EU security of supply regime, to enhance solidarity and effectiveness in response to supply chain tensions or security crises and allow the timely identification of potential bottlenecks;
  • A structure for the European armaments programme, to enhance cooperation through VAT exemptions; and
  • A European military sales mechanism, to ensure the availability of EU defence equipment.

The EU is also addressing short-term challenges through measures such as:

  • The European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act, which incentivises joint procurement for military goods urgently needed by Member States (running from 2024 to 2025); and
  • The Act in Support of Ammunition Production, which responds to urgent calls to replenish ammunition and missile stockpiles in Ukraine and across Europe (running from 2023 to 2025).

B. Increasing defence expenditure and closing capability gaps

In March 2025, the Commission unveiled the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 to facilitate increases in national military budgets. It seeks to secure a EUR 800 billion boost in defence expenditure across Member States through changes to the European Stability and Growth Pact and loans from a new financial mechanism worth EUR 150 billion, Security Action for Europe.

Subsequently, the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030’s political guidelines were included as concrete actions in the Commission and VP/HR’s Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030. The white paper highlights the need for the Member States to work together to address capability gaps in the following priority areas:

  • Air and missile defence;
  • Artillery systems;
  • Ammunition and missiles;
  • Drones and counter-drone systems;
  • Military mobility;
  • Cyber and electronic warfare;
  • Strategic enablers (strategic airlift capabilities, air-to-air refuelling, intelligence and surveillance, among others); and
  • Protection of critical infrastructure.

Funding for this will come from loans granted to Member States through the Security and Action for Europe instrument.

C. Enhancing readiness and resilience

In June 2025, the Commission introduced the Defence Readiness Omnibus, a legislative package designed to facilitate investment in joint defence capabilities. It is aimed at providing greater predictability for the defence industry and simplifying access to EU funding mechanisms. The 2025 Commission work programme explicitly incorporates defence and security as integral components of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda. Defence policy is now closely aligned with industrial, technological and competitiveness objectives and with initiatives such as the Clean Industrial Deal and the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act.

In October 2025, the Commission published its joint communication on the Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030. The roadmap outlines a set of ambitious objectives to enable the European Union to fill its key capability gaps by 2030. It invites the Member States to form capability coalitions to swiftly address shortfalls, and sets the target of at least 40% of defence spending being joint by 2027. The roadmap also identifies four readiness flagships that will receive particular support from the Commission: a European Drone Defence Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Space Shield and the European Air Shield.

Resilience against hybrid threats is addressed through the 2025 EU Preparedness Union Strategy, which aims to create a culture of coordinated responsiveness to risks such as cyberattacks, disinformation, climate threats and food insecurity.

CSDP missions and operations

CSDP missions and operations are military and civilian endeavours aimed at preventing international crises by stabilising the EU’s neighbourhood and improving the resilience of partners against various threats. The approval of the EU Member States is required to launch CSDP missions and operations, which are then politically and strategically overseen by the Political and Security Committee, a body composed of representatives of the Member States. In October 2025, there were 21 active CSDP missions and operations, involving around 4 000 military and civilian personnel.

The key objectives of CSDP missions and operations include:

  • Security sector reform (EUPM Moldova, EUCAP Somalia, EUPOL COPPS, EUAM Iraq, EUAM Ukraine);
  • Border management (EUBAM Libya);
  • Support and training of national armed forces (EUMAM Mozambique, EUMAM Ukraine);
  • Freedom of navigation (EUNAVFOR Aspides, Atalanta).

One key CSDP mission is the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which had trained 75 000 Ukrainian soldiers by the end of February 2025.

Role of the European Parliament

The European Parliament is supportive of EU defence integration and cooperation. Parliament scrutinises the CSDP and can take the initiative of addressing the VP/HR and the Council (Article 36 TEU). It also exercises scrutiny over the CSDP’s budget (Article 41 TEU). Twice a year, Parliament holds debates on the implementation of the CFSP and the CSDP and adopts reports: one on the progress of the CFSP, drawn up by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and one on the progress of the CSDP, written by the Committee on Security and Defence.

Parliament’s 2024 annual report on the implementation of the CSDP was adopted in Parliament’s plenary session on 10 February 2025, highlighting the need to enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and reinforce its role as a global security provider. It emphasises the importance of improving rapid deployment capabilities, and increasing resilience against hybrid threats. The report underlines the importance of partnerships with NATO and like-minded countries to effectively address shared security challenges. It calls for greater investment in defence research and development, reinforcing the European Defence Industrial Strategy, and promoting joint procurement initiatives to strengthen the EU’s defence technological and industrial base. The report further advocates for reinforcing the European Peace Facility to support partner countries, and emphasises the importance of ensuring that CSDP missions and operations uphold international law and respect for human rights.

Parliament’s call for greater involvement in the CSDP aligns with its role regarding it, as outlined in the TEU. Since 2012, under Protocol No 1, Parliament and Member States’ national parliaments have organised two interparliamentary conferences per year to discuss CSDP matters. The changes brought about by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon ensure that Parliament plays a key role in shaping the development of the CSDP as an essential partner in addressing security challenges and external relations.

To fulfil this role, Parliament engages in regular deliberations, hearings and workshops on topics such as civilian and military CSDP deployments, counterterrorism, arms control and EU institutional developments. Since the 2010 declaration by the VP/HR on political accountability, Parliament has actively participated in joint consultations with the Council, the European External Action Service and the Commission. Moreover, during meetings of the Committee on Security and Defence, it asks questions and makes suggestions directly to the European External Action Service on CSDP matters. Thus, the call in Parliament’s 2024 annual report on the implementation of the CSDP for stronger scrutiny, accountability and stronger dialogue with EU defence officials is in line with Parliament’s duties.

On 12 March 2025, Parliament adopted its resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence seeking concrete measures for defence capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, while framing the EU’s approach to defence integration. The resolution also underlined the need for the EU to develop contingency plans for mutual support in the event of major security crises, to help Europe deter potential aggressors and strengthen its role as a credible power within NATO.

In November 2024, Parliament welcomed the publication of Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission Sauli Niinistö’s report on strengthening EU civilian and military preparedness and readiness. It also welcomed, in April 2025, the adoption of the subsequent Preparedness Union Strategy, thus endorsing the Commission’s vision of a comprehensive and whole-of-society approach to defence and security. It emphasised the importance of citizen involvement, transparency, and coordination across EU institutions, which will reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of Europe’s collective resilience strategy.

On 9 October 2025, Parliament adopted a resolution on a united response to Russian violations of airspace and critical infrastructure. In the resolution; Parliament called for a significant increase in the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia and its allies and urged rapid advancements in EU defence capabilities, particularly regarding drones and anti-drone technology along the eastern flank. It also stressed the need for a stronger European defence industrial base and advocated enhanced cooperation, including through leveraging Ukraine’s expertise and establishing a military Schengen area for rapid deployment.

 

Oliver Krentz